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ABSTRACT
The stem cell research (SCR) and human cloning debates are a site where we can explore the
multiple and competing constructions associated with new and controversial technological
innovations. The aim of this thesis is to explore the multiple and competing discursive
constructions of these developments, tracing how dominant definitions have emerged and
others marginalised or silenced. By analysing the public debates I am able to explore the
negotiation of discursive boundaries during current processes of entrenchment. In order to
access a range of meanings, the thesis draws on four sites of qualitative data collection: 1) the
UK parliamentary debates that led to the amendment to the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act (1990) to permit embryonic SCR, 2) interviews and focus groups with couples
in IVF programmes who are potential embryo donors for SCR, 3) interviews and focus groups
with patient support groups on whose lives SCR may have an impact, 4) interviews with
scientists working in the field of SCR and cloning-related developments.
The starting point for my research is a discursive analysis of the UK Parliamentary debates on
cloning and SCR where I examine the rhetorical strategies of and manoeuvrings over the
meanings of stem cells, cloning and embryos. Here I draw parallels with the rhetorical devices
and legislative outcomes of the embryo debates from the 1980s, such as the return to the
'embryo question' and the construction of health and illness. Following on from this the thesis
explores the perspectives of scientists, patient group members and those enrolled in IVF
programmes, in order to access their views within their own terms of reference. This part of my
thesis examines the uses of cultural tropes and idioms, such as the cultural framing of risk, and
constructions of science, public(s) and expertise. Shaped by the disciplinary and methodological
foundations of cultural studies, sociology and science and technology studies, I have focus upon
how constructions of SCR and human cloning-related developments are embedded in wider
social norms and values.
Central to my analysis is the mobilisation, negotiation and reconstruction of binary classificatory
systems by a range of actors within the debates. Categories, such as nature/culture,
health/illness, expert/lay, science/society, serve as powerful, yet flexible, rhetorical tools
through which meanings around SCR and cloning are negotiated. In the context of science-
public relations in the SCR and cloning debates, my research elaborates on how demarcations
between expert/lay, objectivity/subjectivity etc. are flexibly rendered in ways that preserve the
hegemonic position of science and scientists, thus marginalising alternative accounts. At the
same time, however, I illustrate that some scientists are presenting more reflexive accounts of
their work, pointing to a shift in expert/lay relations. In adopting an eclectic theoretical
framework, my thesis contributes to contemporary sociological debates including critical
approaches to the public understanding of science, sociocultural constructions of risk and the
(re)constitution of classificatory systems.
By identifying 'experts" rhetorical manoeuvrings and devices alongside that of the 'public', this
research offers a valuable contribution to debates on science-public relations - one which
facilitates a more inclusive discussion of the current and future implications of SCR and cloning-
related developments as well as policy decision-making processes.
V111
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Aims and Rationale for Thesis
In 1997 a team of researchers from the Roslin Institute, Scotland, announced that they had
produced Dolly the sheep - the first mammal to be cloned from an adult cell. Just over one year
later, in November 1998, two teams of researchers in the US announced that they had isolated
and cultured the first stem cell lines. These seemingly unrelated scientific breakthroughs have
generated a complex set of debates within the UK (and elsewhere) that I refer to as, the stem
cell research (SCR) and cloning debates. The birth of Dolly demonstrates the ability to clone
mammals, potentially including humans, from cells taken from an adult of the same species - a
procedure previously regarded as 'biologically impossible' (Wilmut et al., 2000: 17). The second
development - the isolation of stem cell lines - marks the ability to grow cells, taken from
human embryos, indefinitely, in the laboratory and to cultivate them into specific cell types -
nerves, cartilage, bone, muscle and guts (see Radford, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). These cells could
then be used for medical treatments and transplanted into patients.
The symbolic, ethical, legal and scientific potency of these developments emerges in their
potential convergence, when the cloning technique is used to create cloned stem cells used for
transplantation (see Appendix II). Although human reproductive cloning is subject to
prohibitive legislation in the UK, SCR, the creation of cloned embryos and 'therapeutic' cloning
are all permitted. Such practices require a combination of various techniques and knowledges,
including the nuclear transfer technique, cell differentiation (see Appendix II), and the material
product of IVF treatments - 'healthy human embryos. In this respect, as Glasner has argued in
the context of what has been called the 'new genetics', developments in SCR and cloning
embody a new set of sociotechnical relations involving new groups of actors, 'including funding
bodies, government and regulatory agencies and firms as well as scientists' (2002: 272).
Subsequently, this area has become a social, legal, ethical and regulatory quagmire, with
competing positions around what SCR and cloning is and how it should (or should not) proceed
(see, for example, Holland etal., 2001; Kolata, 1997; Nisbet et al., 2003; Nussbaum and Sunstein,
1999).
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Debates surrounding SCR. and cloning are being conducted at a time when the research remains
experimental and clinical applications are theoretical. Despite this, or perhaps because of this,
the issues generated by SCR and cloning-related developments are waged at the level of deeply
held sociocultural assumptions. Like other areas of the new human genetics, I have been struck
by what Sarah Franklin calls the 'simultaneous enormity and intimatf (2001c: 336, original emphasis)
of SCR and cloning. Few seem to doubt the potential of this area to transform medicine or our
understanding of the human body, health and illness. But beyond this, SCR and cloning touch
upon and threaten to transform fundamental aspects of what it means to be human, such as
human uniqueness, as well as wider issues surrounding the limits of science and technology, the
relationship between science and commerce, and constructions of expertise and scientific
progress (see Franklin, 2001c; Petersen, 2002; Williams etal., 2003).
When I embarked upon this doctoral research in 1999, there was a lack of in-depth social
science research exploring what is at stake in these debates or how SCR and cloning are being
constmcted as scientific and social practices for different social groups. In the UK, the SCR and
cloning debates tended to be confined to policy and legislative discussions (see Chapter 3), as
media spectacle (see Nerlich and Clarke, 2003; Petersen, 2002; Williams, 2003), or were subject
to abstract ethical and philosophical theorising (see Harris, 1998; McGee, 1998, Nussbaum and
Sunstein, 1999), and cultural commentary (see Appelyard, 1999; Kolata, 1997). The only
available study, titled Public Perspectives on Humm Cloning (1998), was commissioned by the
Wdlcome Trust and investigated the perspectives of non-scientists on human cloning. Using focus
groups, the researchers conducted group interviews before and after participants attended an
'educational' session to leam about the scientific and technical practices involved in cloning.
They found that the public articulated the same concerns about SCR and cloning in both
sessions, but in the second utilised the 'scientific' knowledge gained during the 'educational'
session in order to reinforce their arguments. The Wdlcome Trust report demonstrated that
'publics" were highly sceptical of modem science and scientists, and equally distrustful of
government and related policymakers. Participants also felt that their views were undervalued in
policy and other decision-making contexts.
In 1999 Sarah Franklin wrote a review essay, What We Knowand What WeDon'tAbout Cloningand
Society, where she began to probe existing contributions to the cloning debates. The crux of the
problem, according to Franklin, is that existing contributions to the cloning debates misplace
the 'problem'. As she argues, 'the real challenge is not what to do about it, how to regulate it,
whether to permit it or not, but how more democratically to conduct a less exclusive
conversation' (1999d). This 'challenge' is a central feature of my research. In order to get behind
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the SCR and cloning debates as media spectacle or regulatory dilemma, this PhD aims to
examine what meanings both scientists and non-scientists attach to SCR and cloning-related
developments. This requires mapping out the range of actors and voices for whom such
developments may have an impact, in order to then access the multiple discourses mobilised for
constructing meanings around SCR and cloning. To explore how this area is being discursively
constructed, I selected a range of data collection sites that can be listed as follows:
i) Discursive analysis of UK (Westminster) Parliamentary debates;
ii) Two focus groups with infertility support groups;
iii) Four focus groups with patient support groups: Huntington's Disease Society, Diabetes
UK, Cardiac Support Group and Alzheimer Scotland: Action on Dementia;
iv) Four interviews with scientists working in the area of SCR and/or cloning-related
developments (three one-to-one interviews and one with two scientists); and
v) Thematic collection and analysis of media texts.
These sites have been chosen because they allow me to access both dominant and marginalised
discourses. The choices made are further discussed in the following section where I elucidate on
my research questions and objectives.
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions
This doctoral research has three interrelated objectives:
1.2.1 To identify both dominant andmtrgnalised discourses surrounding SCR and doning. Thus, I sougjot
• To identify key public sites where the SCR and cloning debates are taking
place.
• To identify dominant constructions of SCR and cloning and the key
institutions and/or individuals contributing to such meanings.
• To identify groups and/or individuals that have been marginalised within the
dominant SCR and cloning debates.
• To identify marginalised discourses surrounding SCR and cloning.
Shaped by the disciplinary and methodological foundations of cultural studies, sociology and
science and technology studies (STS), this thesis maps a range of dominant and marginalised
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discourses surrounding SCR and cloning-related developments. Epistemological assumptions
associated with these approaches have played an important role in influencing the research
design, for example in the concern with dominant and alternative meanings and perceptions. In
order to get beyond SCR and cloning-related developments as media spectacle, I felt it was
important to explore both dominant and alternative discourses alongside one another, and
identify corresponding individuals and groups.
Firstly, I have identified dominant meanings, or what Stuart Hall calls 'preferred' meanings
(1980), of SCR and cloning-related developments within public debates. Secondly, I have been
concerned with alternative or marginalised discourses that are potential sites of resistance to
those dominant positions. Thirdly, in exploring both dominant and alternative constructions I
revealed the flexibility of discourses (both dominant and alternative), thus demonstrating how
the production and interpretation of meanings and 'knowledge' of cloning-related developments
are intimately linked to their social context (see Cunningham-Burley and Kerr, 1999).
In keeping with cultural studies approaches that have emerged since the 1980s, public debates
on SCR and cloning are viewed as sites of struggle over meanings, with different groups vying
for power and authority over definitions (Schulman, 1993). According to such a position, it is
important to include a range of individuals and groups within the research who inhabit different
social and cultural positions vis-a-vis technoscientific developments of SCR and cloning.
Following the research of Pinch and Bijker (1984), the starting assumption is that different
people, or 'relevant social groups', make sense of technoscientific developments in different
ways.1 By attending to the views of actors who have gained ascendancy within the public
debates on SCR and cloning as well as marginalised groups with a stake in such developments, I
sought to investigate 'flexibility in how people think of, or interpret, artefacts' (Pinch and Bijker,
1984: 421).
Politically, the thesis takes inspiration from the writings of scholars in the areas of cultural
studies of science and technology (e.g. Cussins, 1998a, McNeil and Franklin, 1991) and critical
approaches to the public understanding of science (cPUS) (see chapter 4). Whilst there has been
a tendency within the field of STS (feminist or otherwise) to either focus upon 'what scientists
think and do' (Reinel, 1999: 163) or to emphasise agency and resistance of subordinate groups
1
'Relevant social groups' are groups who share a set of meanings in relation to the specific
artefact, such as patient groups, 'mothers' or scientists working on SCR (Pinch and Bijker,
1984: 414). However, as I will show throughout this thesis, there is often considerable
variability within what appears to be a relevant social group. Therefore, this concept is used
as a methodological rather than an analytical tool.
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and popular culture (see McNeil and Franklin 1991, Reinel, 1999), the work of people such as
Franklin (1997), Michael (1996a), Kerr et al. (1997; 1998a; 1998b) and Cunningham-Burley and
Kerr (1997) have been instructive in bringing the two together. Synthesising an analysis of both
scientists' and publics' accounts of SCR and cloning is consistent with the STS understanding of
the mutual constitution of science, technology and society.
There are a number of features to this approach. By paying attention to both dominant and
marginalised sites within the SCR and cloning debates, my concern is not to 'reject science and
technology but try to negotiate a critical politics' about them (Cussins, 1998a: 168). In keeping
with the long-standing endeavour of the sociology of science and technology and more recently,
the sub-field of cPUS, I seek to challenge the privileged epistemological status of science and
scientists as the only legitimate producers of knowledge.
1.2.2 To examine meaning and perspectives ofSCR and domng and how they are constructed by relewnt
social groups and indiiiduals mtbin them
• Flow do 'dominant' and 'marginalised' groups construct SCR and cloning.
• How are meanings and perspectives constructed within relevant social groups?
• What cultural resources and discursive repertoires are mobilised?
• What wider social and cultural values are reflected in constructions of SCR and
cloning?
• How are people's views of SCR and cloning shaped by their lived and
embodied experiences?
The thesis is concerned with how constructions of SCR and cloning-related developments are
embedded in wider social norms and values, and, hence, are inseparable from 'everyday life'
(McNeil and Franklin, 1991: 133). My analysis of the SCR and cloning debates is sensitised to
the range of discursive repertoires, cultural resources and rhetorical strategies mobilised by
actors when making sense of these new developments. In particular, I illustrate how people's
accounts of this area of research are shaped by their lived and embodied experiences, for
example, by their profession, gender, health status, as a family member or as a citizen. At the
same time, however, I seek to illustrate that people's views of SCR and cloning cannot be
'explained away through one aspect of their identity (e.g. their health or professional status) but
are constituted in complex and contradictoryways.
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Rather than understanding scientists as simply engaging in objective, 'pure', knowledge-seeking
research practices, I start with the assumption that scientists produce situated knowledge (see
Haraway, 1991) that is reflective of both professional and wider social and cultural values. To
this extent, science is inherently social and value-based. Similarly, 'public' groups draw upon a
range of 'knowledges' including experiential and culturally-based knowledge along with 'expert'
accounts that they have encountered through the media, education, contact with GPs,
colleagues and friends. It is, therefore, important to explore the significance of these accounts
for different groups and individuals, investigating how these are mobilised when constituting
their views on SCR and cloning-related developments.
For these reasons, the accounts of politicians, scientists and other relevant social groups are
treated as both a topic and a resource. That is, they are understood as reflecting particular
versions of SCR and cloning and yet are treated as partial, contingent and subject to change.
Meanings are never 'won' but are always negotiated and always subject to competing versions,
experiences and 'knowledges'.2 As a result, the researcher must sensitise oneself to the range of
meanings and perspectives within the SCR and cloning debates, and seek to move beyond the
dominant rhetoric that emerges within the media and policy documents.
1.2.3 To exploreparticular themes nithin these disamses.
• How do different groups and individuals manage risk and uncertainty?
• To what extent are accounts of SCR and cloning characterised by
contradictions and ambivalence about science and technology?
• How are boundaries between science/society, expert/lay, scientists/publics
(reconstructed and mobilised?
• How is 'nature' constructed in the SCR and cloning debates, and to what extent
are classificatory systems around 'nature' destabilised by these developments?
This third and final research objective seeks to identify recurrent themes across the data
collection sites. In exploring people's accounts of SCR and cloning, it is important to investigate
themes that seem to crosscut various accounts and to analyse how these are mobilised and
negotiated. When collecting and analysing my data, I sensitised myself to how boundaries
2
I also acknowledge that some sociotechnical artefacts and practices are more stable than
others. Stabilization, however, is achieved by a range of sociotechnical processes that
marginalises competing interpretations in order for a dominant set of meanings to emerge
(see, for example, Hall, 1980; Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Michael, 2000).
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around categories such as 'science', 'expertise', 'publics', and 'nature' are constituted, negotiated
and blurred. These categories are understood to be flexible and socially constituted vis-a-vis
SCR and cloning-related developments, rather than being a priori categories through which
knowledge about ourselves and our world is constructed. Developments in SCR and cloning
were taken as troubling conventional understandings of such categories, providing an analytical
window for exploring how classificatory systems are dynamically (re)negotiated. A further
overarching theme is that of ambivalence and contradictions. Here I aim to move beyond
polarised accounts of SCR and cloning that seek to understand accounts as either for or against,
as hopeful or fearful and to show how such positions co-exist in people's accounts of this area.
Of course, the themes highlighted are not plucked out of the air, but are indebted to a range of
related studies conducted within sociology, cultural studies and STS. For instance, the research
conducted by Sarah Cunningham-Burley, Anne Kerr and Amanda Amos (see, Cunningham-
Burleyand Kerr, 1999; Kerr etal., 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 1999) has
emphasised how boundaries between science/society and experts/publics are flexibly deployed
in scientists' accounts of the new human genetics. In the same set of studies, they have shown
how both scientists' and 'publics' ' accounts of the new genetics are characterised by
ambivalence and contradictions. The work of Cunningham-Burley et al. closely corresponds to a
range of related studies within the field of sociology and STS such as Michael (1996a), Irwin and
Wynne (1996a) and Irwin (1995), which have focussed upon and problematised science-public
relations in various research contexts.3
1.3 Wider Relevance
My analysis of the SCR and cloning debates builds upon existing research within the sub-field of
critical approaches to the public understanding of science (cPUS). Following on from the work
of people such as Franklin (1993, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c) Irwin and Wynne
(1996a), Kerr etal. (1997, 1998a, 1998b), Michael (1996a, 1996b, 1998) and Wynne (1988, 1992,
1995, 1996, 2002), this thesis problematises and opens up our understanding of taken-for-
granted categories. I investigate how particular versions of SCR and cloning are conferred with
authority and legitimacy while others are marginalised or silenced. In analysing both dominant
and marginalised accounts of SCR and cloning, I tie my analysis to issues of power. For
instance, I explore some of the discursive and institutional mechanisms involved in privileging
some accounts as 'valid knowledge', and how particular models of science-public relations
excludes the voices of some public groups. Here, I show the significance of doing boundary
3
For further discussion of these approaches, see Chapter 4.
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work around what counts as 'science', 'expertise' or 'nature' and yet how developments in this
field trouble such categories. Such an analysis illustrates how boundaries between categories are
flexible rather than fixed, multiple rather than singular.
In the broader context of a 'crisis of legitimacy - as it is often referred to by spokespeople for
institutions such as the Royal Society (see Franklin, 2001c) - my analysis of the SCR and cloning
debates contributes to work that critically appraises attempts by governments and industry to
counter public anxieties. Firstly, this thesis highlights that such a crisis is overblown or, perhaps,
misdirected. Whilst people are sceptical towards science and anxious of developments in SCR
and cloning, this is coupled with trust and expectation. It seems that despite the apparent shift
towards reflexivity in scientists' discourses and policymaking practices, 'public' understanding of
science continues to be, at best, misunderstood and at worst, silenced. The complexities of
people's views towards developments such as SCR and cloning continue to fall outwith today's
models of science-public relations and policymaking practices, and thereby cry out for more
inclusive approaches to debating controversial developments in science, technology and
medicine.
The findings of this thesis also contribute to debates within sociology, cultural studies and STS
on how sociocultural categories are constructed and negotiated in particular contexts. For
example, social scientists have commented on the current transformations taking place in
society and the implications of these for constructions of expertise and expert/lay relations (see,
for example, Beck, 1992; Irwin, 1995). In the SCR and cloning debates, I show how the
contingencies of categories such as 'expertise', 'nature' and 'human' are rendered explicit. To this
extent, these debates offer new openings for rethinking such categories. Furthermore,
boundaries between binary categories, such as expert/lay, science/society, human/non-human,
nature/culture, are increasingly blurred. For these reasons, it is necessary for social scientists to
continue to develop appropriate and imaginative methodological, analytical and theoretical tools
for capturing such transformations.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
Because the topic calls for an appreciation of the range of issues generated, this thesis is ordered
thematically. Each chapter draws on a distinct set of theoretical and conceptual tools and yet is
underpinned by the broad approach outlined above. For this reason, the reader will not find an
overall literature review of the field to orient the thesis as a whole but will be introduced to
relevant theories and concepts as the thesis develops.
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The first of the 'data chapters', Chapter 3, is a discursive analysis of the UK Parliamentary
debates on SCR and cloning that led to a change in the law to permit embryonic SCR (eSCR)
and the creation of cloned embryos for research and 'therapeutic' uses. This chapter provides an
overall introduction to many of the pertinent issues in the SCR and cloning debates that will be
revisited at various points throughout the thesis. Framed around five subheadings, Chapter 3
illustrates the discursive strategies and repenoires mobilised for constructing what has become
the dominant account SCR and cloning in the UK. The meanings of stem cells, cloning and
embryos are shown to be plural and contested, with some accounts gaining ascendancy whilst
others fall by the wayside. In drawing direct parallels with the embryo debates of the 1980's, I
show how the 2000/2001 debates involve a 'return to the embryo question'. This feeds into an
analysis of the ways in which two specific groups are discursively invoked and constructed -
those with diseases and disabilities who have been identified as likely to benefit from stem cell
therapies, and couples undergoing fertility treatment who are needed to donate 'spare' embryos.
Chapter 4 provides a theoretical and conceptual orientation for chapters 5, 6 and 7. In this
chapter I consider the nature of and extent to which science-public relations are undergoing
transformations in contemporary society. Building on my analysis of Parliamentary transcripts, I
argue that there are a number of core issues at stake in the SCR and cloning debates illuminated
by the approaches of Beck and literature from the critical public understanding of science
(cPUS). Specifically, I consider how Beck's 'Risk Society' thesis (1992) and cPUS approaches
have contributed to analyses of expertise, risk, trust, and uncertainty, and discuss a number of
studies that have examined how scientists and related institutions have responded to public
anxieties towards science (e.g., Brown and Michael, 2002; Irwin, 1995; Irwin and Wynne, 1996a;
Wynne, 1996). One of the main claims here is that apparent shifts towards reflexivity within the
accounts of scientists and spokespeople for institutions such as the Royal Society, sit alongside
attempts to shore up scientific authority and legitimacy. This tension, I argue, is a central feature
of science-public relations today and forms a backdrop to the SCR and cloning debates.
Chapter 4 underpins my analysis of scientists' and publics' accounts of SCR and cloning, as
presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In adopting a theoretical and analytical framework that comes
from synthesising Beck and cPUS, I go on to investigate how SCR and cloning is constituted by
different actors. The remaining chapters examine the range of discursive strategies mobilised by
participants in interviews and focus groups and highlights how people's views are shaped by
embodied and lived experiences.
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Chapter 5 focuses on the accounts of five scientists working within the field of embryonic SCR,
who I refer to as 'core-eSCR-scientists'. Based upon data collected during interviews with these
scientists, I explore the range of discursive strategies and repertoires mobilised by scientists in
order to manage and resolve elements of this controversy. Here, I highlight how in constituting
a particular 'version' of SCR and cloning, core-eSCR-scientists constitute themselves as
particular sorts of actors, whilst simultaneously constructing others around them. My analysis
reveals how scientists appeal to and yet blur boundaries between science/society, expert/non¬
expert, certainty/uncertainty, and inside/outside in order to construct their work as legitimate
and reassert themselves as 'experts'. This involves enrolling some public groups - specifically
patient groups - while continuing to exclude others. The legitimacy of eSCR is further achieved
by excluding scientists who claim to be involved in reproductive cloning from the bone fide
scientific community. Chapter 5, therefore, directly builds upon Chapter 3 to the extent that it is
an analysis of actors whose voices have been present, and indeed dominant, within the public
SCR and cloning debates in the UK.
In Chapters 6 and 7, I turn my attention to the accounts of members in five patient support
groups - Diabetes, Huntington's, Cardiac and Alzheimer's - and two infertility support groups.
These chapters show how people who have been invoked in the dominant debates and
discourses on SCR and cloning make sense of this area of research according to their own terms
of reference. Analysis of people's accounts illustrates the rich discussions generated within focus
groups and interviews. Additionally, participants' views of this area of research are revealed to
be characterised by ambivalence. In keeping with the cPUS approach outlined in Chapter 4,
Chapters 6 and 7 attend to the discourses and views of SCR that have been marginalised in the
dominant public debates. When compared to the accounts of patient support groups within the
Parliamentary debates and the accounts of core-eSCR-scientists (in Chapter 5), my analysis in
Chapters 6 and 7 shows that 'publics" views have been marginalised and excluded. It also
challenges the presumption made by core-eSCR-scientists and politicians within the
Parliamentary debates, that people who may benefit from stem cell therapies are wholly and
uncritically in support of developments in this area.
Chapter 6 shows how, in contrast to the scientists' accounts discussed in Chapter 5, the publics'
views of SCR and cloning 'open up' the debates, offering alternative ways for framing the issues
and identifying problematic aspects of these developments. What this chapter reveals is the
tension between a pervading sense of uncertainty and more optimistic belief in the potential of
science, technology and medicine to develop new treatments or cures. People's views are shown
to be complex, ambivalent, and shaped by their experiences and social situatedness (as the work
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of Wynne and others in cPUS also indicates). This chapter is framed around four themes:
discussions around the 'slippery slope' from 'therapeutic' to 'reproductive' cloning, the
(in)efficacy of regulation and control of science, how participants reflected upon science-public
relations, and how patients mobilise experience-based expertise. All of the themes are significant
gaining a deeper understanding of science-public relations because they reveal how expertise is
constructed, challenged or affirmed by non-scientists.
Keeping risk, expertise and trust as crosscutting themes, Chapter 7 compares the views of
people in fertility and patient support groups on embryos and embryo research. This chapter
builds upon existing feminist analyses of new reproductive technologies and embryo research
(e.g., Cussins, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Franklin, 1997; Goslinga-Roy, 2000; Morgan and Michaels,
1999; Spallone, 1989), and explores the contingent meanings attached to embryos in the current
context of the SCR and cloning debates. In particular, I highlight how people's views of
embryos and the use of embryos for SCR are shaped by a range of embodied and experiential
'knowledges'. For those undergoing fertility treatment, I show that the 'viability' of embryos is
an important issue when considering their position on eSCK To use embryos that are graded as
'viable' for anything other than reproductive purposes, generated a great deal of concern and
anxiety. Contrastingly, one of the key concerns for people within patient support groups relates
to distinguishing embryos from foetuses or children. Flere the process of distinguishing 'early
embryos' from 'foetuses', and aligning the former with biological material and the latter with
'life', is rendered visible within the patient group discussions. I also argue that, within the patient
support groups, the classification of embryos as 'spare' or 'waste' is a central and powerful
discourse that influenced people's views of eSCK Finally, shifting focus to the policy
implications of my analysis, I argue that the dominant rhetoric of embryos within the
Parliamentary debates and scientists' discourses takes for granted the willingness of 'couples' to
donate their embryos for SCR and exaggerates the 'demand' for stem cell therapies from people
with conditions such as Diabetes.
The final chapter, Chapter 8, focuses on the dynamics involved in negotiating and classifying
SCR and cloning as 'natural' or otherwise. I show how distinctions between binary opposites,
such as nature/culture, are central to processes of meaning-making and yet these are managed in
flexible ways by those who participated in focus groups and interviews. Chapter 8 illustrates
how SCR and cloning unsettles 'naturalised' understandings of kinship, human uniqueness,
reproduction and the human life course, thus revealing the social constructedness of 'nature' to
me, as the analyst, as well as those who participated in discussions. Analysis of people's accounts
of SCR and cloning exemplify how categories of 'nature' are mobilised, contested and
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reconstructed; 'nature' is never fixed, but shifting, contested, renegotiated. My analysis of
people's accounts of SCR and cloning, confirms arguments that categories of 'nature' are
achieved through processes of naturalisation, denaturalisation and renaturalisation (Franklin et
ah, 2000: 19). It also raises the veracity of Kristeva's concept of 'abjection' (1982) as a useful tool
that captures moments within that process when novel practices are yet to be categorised.
The thesis concludes by pulling together some of the threads that cut through my analysis,
considering the practical and policy implications of my research, and the its relevance to the
social sciences. Here, I situate my work within the cPUS approach, offering some thoughts on
the direct implications for the SCR and cloning debates as well as for wider issues surrounding
the new genetics. Finally, I revisit how my research has contributed to concepts such as trust,
risk and boundary work, and develops a more sophisticated understanding of how binary
categories are (re)constructed in the SCR and cloning debates.
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CHAPTER II
Research Design and Methodology
2.1 Introduction
This thesis is an exploration of people's views of SCR and cloning, looking at accounts that have
gained ascendancy alongside those that are marginalised. It is both an analysis of dominant sites
and related discourses, as well as showing how we can move beyond these to create a more
inclusive and open debate. Informed by the disciplinary and methodological foundations of
sociology, cultural studies and STS, I attend to three research objectives: to identify both
dominant and marginalised discourses surrounding SCR and cloning, to examine meanings and
perspectives of SCR and cloning and how they are constructed by relevant social groups, and to
explore particular themes within these discourses. The thesis aims to contribute to policy
debates and those within the academy.
This chapter provides an account of the research design as a process and practice. Starting with
an overview of the choices made during the early stages of developing this thesis into a
'workable' project, I chart the evolving nature of the research design. I go on to describe data
collection practices adopted, reflecting on the methods chosen and how I came to identify
relevant social groups. Then I turn my attention to the various elements of the data collection
and analysis process. Here I attend to issues such as gaining access, developing an appropriate
topic guide along with particular experiences and insights gained when conducting focus groups
and interviews. Two specific problems that I encountered are discussed in detail - the presence
of authority and a failed interview - in order to elaborate on the contingencies of successful
qualitative data collection procedures. Finally, I reflect on the research process and limitations of
the study.
2.2 Research Design
2.2.1 Evolving Research Design
In order to access the ways in which people construct meanings around SCR and cloning, I
adopted a flexible qualitative research design, similar to that of 'grounded theory' (see Pidgeon,
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1996). The research design was not intended to reach a point where there emerged a fixed
methodological protocol to follow. Instead, it evolved through conducting background research
of existing social science literature, surveying the technoscientific developments, media texts and
public reports in order to develop a map of the UK debates. Whilst the research was informed
by various theoretical positions and existing literature on related areas, I did not want to impute
theoretical categories onto the data. Instead, I placed a greater emphasis on allowing research
categories to be generated by the data obtained. This iterative method requires a flexible
research design, enabling the research process to be guided by the ongoing and dynamic process
of data collection and analysis.
2.2.2 Selecting Written Sources and 'Relevant Social Groups'
With the above in mind, one of the central questions relates to what constitutes a relevant social
group and how, as a sociologist, one could identify 'dominant' and marginalised relevant social
groups? This question has been similarly pondered by Mike Michael who asks whether relevant
social groups is 'an actor's category, or an analyst's?' (2000: 6). In a case such as SCR and
cloning, this question becomes even more problematic when one considers the potential
implications of these developments across a number of sociocultural spheres including
healthcare, medical regulation and science-public relations, as well as for categories such as
health, illness, life, nature and culture. Thus, if we start with the assumption that SCR and
cloning-related developments have the potential to affect the lives of all members of our society,
then all members of our society are potential 'relevant social groups' (and participants in this
research).
Conducting data collection and analysis for a PhD project such as this, involves explicit choices
regarding who and what to include for practical purposes. A preliminary content analysis of
policy documents, parliamentary SCR and cloning debates, and media commentary was
conducted in order to outline the relevant sociological issues and to reveal the ideological
dimensions underpinning SCR and human cloning discourses and practices. This was a
particularly useful means for addressing the multiple and often contradictory ways in which SCR
and cloning is being constituted by various groups and individuals. By conducting a 'data driven'
analysis (see Tonkiss, 1998: 250), I began to identify emerging themes to both narrow the
research focus and map the range of key actors and organisations within the public debates.
Combining the preliminary analysis of the parliamentary debates and media texts was vital in
ascertaining who the key actors and institutions are. From here, I identified relevant social
14
groups within and outwith science who were involved and/or invoked in the parliamentary
debates and media texts during the period of 1999-2000. These groups were scientists working
in the area of SCR and cloning-related developments, people undergoing fertility treatment who
are required to donate embryos for the research to continue, and numerous patient groups on
whose lives these developments may have an impact (for example, people with Huntington's
Disease and Diabetes). I then drew up a list of potential individuals and groups within the
Edinburgh area to be included in the research.
By adopting the categories used in Parliament, I could be criticised for merely reproducing the
categories imposed upon those groups. However, my methodological and analytical approach is
critical of the 'dominant' debates and aims to redress the gaps, giving voice to groups who were
invoked but not included in the debates. For instance, although patient groups had been
included in the parliamentary debates, this had occurred by proxy (e.g. within politicians
accounts or represented by patient organisations) and their views had not been directly accessed.
Similarly, people undergoing fertility treatment were largely omitted from the dominant debates.
Directly accessing the views of key scientists was thought to be important to get beyond the
journalistic style of questions and answers reflected in newspaper articles, in order to explore the
ways in which they construct their views on SCR and cloning. Additionally, less prominent
scientists were included, as it was assumed that they might have less 'managed views on cloning
- that is are yet to be groomed for media or public appearances. Whilst there were numerous
other key actors that could have been included such as anti-abortion groups and representatives
from national patient group organisations, I felt that the inclusion of patient groups identified
fitted with the broader aims and objectives of the research.
2.2.3 Why Focus Groups?
Based upon the above observations, I could not assume that all potential participants had
thought about or developed fully-formed views on human cloning. Hence, the use of focus
groups was deemed to be appropriate for research with people who do not feel as though they
have anything to say on the subject, or are reluctant to participate in a one-to-one interview
(Kitzinger, 1996: 68).1 The method, therefore, was intended as a means for allowing participants
to 'generate their own questions, frames and concepts and to pursue their own priorities'
according to their own terms of reference' (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999: 5). By this connection,
participants could engage in aspects of the discussion as and when they felt it appropriate, and
'opt-out' at points when they felt they had nothing to contribute.
1
The latter point was felt to be specifically appropriate for those who were not scientists.
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Pre-existing groups, as opposed to bringing together groups of strangers, were targeted because
I felt that the patient support group or professional peer group (such as scientists who work
together in a lab) would be one of the contexts in which ideas about SCR and cloning may be
discussed and formed (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999: 9). It was assumed that the familiarity of
the group context would enable me to explore the everyday uses of language and
communication used in interaction, such as teasing and arguing (Kitzinger, 1996: 68), along with
the use of cultural resources such as jokes, references to fiction, TV and so on. As Kitzinger
states, 'everyday forms of communication may tell us as much, if not more, about what people
know or experience' (1996: 68). To look only at dominant discourses of associated with SCR
and cloning, such as science articles, overlooks the variability and complexities of scientists' and
relevant social groups' accounts. Focus group discussions, then, are ideal data collection sites
where the researcher can sensitise oneself to the social situatedness of meanings that emerge and
develop a sophisticated understanding of the intrinsic relationship between technoscientific
practices and the wider social milieu.
2.3 Elements of the Data Collection and Analysis Process
Qualitative data collection processes are often a 'messy, non-linear, and ad-hoc experience.
When conducting my research, I utilised a number of qualitative methods at a number of
different sites which overlapped in time. These data collection sites can be presented as five
distinct areas:
1. Discursive analysis of UK (Westminster) Parliamentary debates;
2. Two focus groups with infertility support groups;
3. Four focus groups with patient support groups: Huntington's Disease Society, Diabetes
UK, Cardiac Support Group and Alzheimer Scotland: Action on Dementia;
4. Four interviews with scientists working in the area of SCR and/or cloning-related
developments (three one-to-one interviews and one with two scientists); and
5. Thematic collection and analysis of media texts.
Whilst this list indicates the data collection sites that are analysed and discussed within the
thesis, this does not reflect the entire range of people spoken to and material that I have
consulted during the research process. The research design that evolved over a period of a year
or so involved conducting some informal interviews to provide background information and to
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get a 'feel' for the area. I have also spoken to an academic working in the area of genetics, a
prominent science communicator in Scotland, a former infertility support group organiser, a
medical ethics lawyer, and conducted a pilot focus group with undergraduate students from
Edinburgh University. Other informal conversations with delegates at various relevant
conferences provided rich background information which has fed into the research process in
an iterative way. These conversations have pointed to relevant issues for consideration, for
discussing the legal and scientific practices around SCR and cloning-related developments,
providing contacts for interviews, and, therefore, had a profound effect upon the final design of
this research.
In the following section I will discuss the data collection process which are separated into key
sections: collecting written data for discourse analysis, issues of access, and conducting focus
groups and interviews. The latter section is further broken down into developing a topic guide,
group size, composition and setting; engaging in a dialogue; using pre-existing groups compared
to one-to-one interviews; and finally a discussion of two problematic interviews.2
2.3.1 Collecting Written Data for Discourse Analysis
Access to the stem cell and cloning debates in Parliament was obtained through the
Westminster website. All transcripts of debates are available in full, free of charge, and were
printed out. In total, approximately fifteen hours of debates were analysed: two from the House
of Commons (17 November and 19 December 2000) and one from the House of Lords (22
January 2001). Whilst issues around stem cell research and cloning were raised briefly in other
parliamentary discussions, only discussions that took place during the time allocated to the 'stem
cell debates' were formally analysed.
The use of discourse analysis for media texts was conducted in a less systematic manner.
Keyword searches for clone, clones and cloning, were conducted in a number of different
websites, including the Guardian, BBC, Daily Telegraph, Independent and the Obsener. Science related
websites were also searched: New Scientist, Science, and the British Medical Journal, along with the
websites for relevant science institutions. While searching these sites, I also followed links to
related sites and articles on cloning, such as commentary pieces and transcripts of television
documentaries. All articles were then printed and catalogued.
2
Throughout this chapter, 'interviews' will be used as the generic term when referring to both
focus groups and one-to-one interviews. When required, a distinction between the two types
of interviews will be explicitly drawn.
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The identification of relevant sites and articles was not conducted methodically, nor was it
restricted to any particular period. Instead access to public archives was dictated by online
availability as determined by each organisation or publisher. Publications not available online
were excluded, i.e. CD-ROMs were not consulted. This effectively meant that only media texts
produced post-Dolly (1997) were part of the research data. Cloning stories linked to previous
public controversies, such as IVF-related developments in the 1980s, were omitted. A weekly
trawl of the internet was conducted throughout the first two and a half years of the research
(Autumn 1999 - Spring 2002). After this, only prominent news stories were followed up and
printed. This was because the research data had reached saturation point, and for pragmatic
reasons relating to the time restrictions for completing a PhD.
2.3.2 Issues of Access
The following section will discuss issues around gaining access to the various groups who
offered their help and support to the project. As with many other writings on the research
process, this has been written in a one-sided manner and based upon 'hindsight' (see Lee, 1993:
120). That is, accounts of access and non-access are based upon my own 'version' of events with
only limited input from those who were contacted and consulted during the research process.
My own experiences of gaining access (or not) is illustrative of Lee's argument that there is 'little
incentive for a researcher to dwell on the reasons why a request to grant access was refused'
(1993: 119). I would extend this to suggest that there is also little incentive to explicitly address
why access wis granted, although during the research process some reasons may be offered.
Such an approach is significant in that it is impossible to discuss refused access, beyond the brief
comments offered by those acting as gatekeeper, without reverting to speculation.
Further to the limitations outlined above, focussing upon access as separate to the process of
conducting interviews or moderating focus groups is a rather artificial distinction. As is clear in
the following two sections, albeit to varying degrees, acceptance of the researcher's presence and
'role' in the group is an ongoing process. Access is not only a matter of insiders and outsiders,
but also relates to self-presentation, expectations of participants and trust.3 For the purposes of
clarity, however, I will maintain this artificial distinction in order to details the various
negotiations which took place.
3 Each of these are complex and opaque terms and will be clarified in section 2.3.3.
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Due to the range of groups approached and the vulnerability of particular groups in this study,
the process of negotiating access varied considerably. Although access to patient support groups
did not involve gaining approval from the Lothian Research Ethics Committee, there were a
number of gate-keeping mechanisms that required negotiation, some of which acted as barriers.
Accessing scientists, on the other hand, involved a different set of strategies. In this section I
will discuss the range of problems I encountered through a series of access and non-access
'stories' that unfolded as part of the data collection process.
Gaining access to the infertility support groups was obtained by writing directly to the Sister in
charge at an assisted conception unit, who, in turn, responded with a letter containing the
contact details of two groups in eastern Scotland. I then telephoned the organiser for each
group: one was a group run by two patients undergoing fertility treatment (husband and wife),
and the other was attached to an assisted conception unit and run by the same Sister.
The patient led support group held meetings every month in a hospital meeting room, and it
was agreed with the organiser that I could conduct a focus group with the members at the June
2001 meeting. Prior to the event, the organiser distributed a copy of my research outline to all
the members which served two purposes: firstly, to invite those who were interested and willing
to attend, and secondly to enable those who did not want to participate to opt-out. This meant
that participants were self-selecting rather than the organiser playing any further gate-keeping
role. Furthermore, the support group met an hour before my arrival to discuss 'house matters'
relating to the groups. This offered the opportunity for those who did not want to participate to
leave before the focus group began.
The second fertility support group, held at an assisted conception unit, was organised by the
Sister specifically for the purposes of my research. The time, date and venue were set by the
Sister and individuals' participation was requested by telephone. Whilst on the one hand, as an
'outside' researcher wanting to gain access to the Unit's support group, the Sister's role of
'sponsor' (Lee, 1993: 131-133) was vital, on the other hand, there were some serious
implications around gate-keeping, participant uptake and the actual focus group discussion that
emerged.4 Firstly, that participants were selected by the Sister gave rise to some issues around
gate-keeping. I can only speculate about the selection process that occurred because I was not
directly involved in the recruitment procedures. It is notable, however, that I was unable to
4
See the following section for a discussion of the impact of having a 'sponsor' organise and
participate in the group discussion.
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provide information regarding my research outline to the individuals concerned before the
event.
One participant indicated that they had only been asked to participate in the research by
telephone the previous evening. Individuals who might have wished to participate were not
given the opportunity to attend and those who did were not provided with an outline of my
research aims and interests. "Within the focus group discussion it became evident that the three
female participants were not clear about who I was, what the research was about, or what was
expected of them. The outline that they had been given by the Sister had only been verbal (by
telephone) and potential participants were not given the time to think it through. In being
approached by a person in a position of authority at the conception unit may have had a
significant impact upon the participants perception of myself and the research topic.
Identifying patient support groups was achieved through a combination of Internet searches,
telephone calls, letters and emails. The approach used for contacting each group was context
specific. For instance, when contacting the cardiac support group, I obtained the name and
telephone number of the organiser from a poster in the CardiologyUnit within a hospital. I then
telephoned the co-ordinator and explained my research interests and wish to conduct a focus
group with their members. A time, date and venue was arranged immediately and a follow up
letter outlining my research area was sent as a formality. The focus group took place within a
room at the Sociology department, University of Edinburgh, due to it being a central and
convenient place for participants to congregate and park their cars.
In the case of Diabetes UK, Alzheimer Scotland, Grapevine: Lothian Disability Information
Service, Scottish Motor Neurone Disease Association, and the Scottish Huntington's
Association, a letter containing an outline of my research and request to conduct a focus group
or interviews was sent to the local office.5 If the address for a local office was not available, I
sent my details directly to the national office. Contact with the Parkinson's Disease Society was
made using the same letter format, but via an email facility on their Internet site. All
organisations initially responded positively except for Grapevine: Lothian Disability Information
Service. The reason for this declination was offered by Grapevine's Senior Information Worker:
'Grapevine ... is an advocacy and campaigning organisation. Char members are concerned with
challenging local social policy issues, and campaigning against the barriers within society that
disable people'. Although my research design did not preclude Grapevine's members
5 All support groups were asked to participate in a focus group, but I also provided the option
of one-to-one interviews, should that be their preference.
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participating in the study and members could have offered valuable contributions to the data,
such a response suggests that the initial letter sent out to the relevant social groups did not make
clear the relevance for talking to them.
A further setback occurred when the Area Project Co-ordinator for a patient support group at
Alzheimer Scotland - the 'Saturday Break' group - sent a reply stating that 'this request is
probably not appropriate for our group due to the sensitivities of the topic'. The letter went on
to recommend that I contact the Head Office, once again outlining my request in order to
determine whether there were any other means for gaining access to its members. After
contacting the Head Office, I received a telephone call from the project co-ordinator for the
Lothian Early Onset Support Service, who agreed to distribute letters to all members. I
compiled a more detailed research outline that also contained a description of what to expect
when participating in focus groups and interviews. A reply slip with a stamped address envelope
was provided. These packages, containing a letter, reply slip and stamped addressed envelope,
were sent to seventeen people in total. Of those contacted, five were people with early onset
dementia, and sixteen were carers.6
I received four reply slips: two from people with dementia - one of whom included their
spouse, and two from carers. My next step was to telephone each person to organise a time, date
and venue. Upon doing so, the couple (female with dementia and her partner/carer) decided
that it would be 'too much and too upsetting' for them to participate in my research.
Additionally, one person with dementia did not answer their telephone and had not provided
their name and address to be contacted via post. After several attempts and telephone messages,
I decided to abandon this interview. Two carers and one person with dementia agreed to
participate in my research.7 Only one person out of three indicated that they would prefer a one-
to-one interview rather than to participate in a focus group, I felt that it was inappropriate and
unpractical to co-ordinate a joint interview with a carer and a person with dementia.
Both the Scottish Motor Neurone Disease Association and the Parkinson's Disease Society
responded positively in the first instance. The former sent a response to inform me that my
6
A point of clarification: four of the five people with dementia were spouses of carers who
were also approached. This meant that one letter and one reply slip was sent asking for
either or both to parties to participate.
7
I would like to note here that the inclusion of Alzheimer's carers in this research is not to
provide a proxy voice for people with dementia (see Clarke and Keady 2002). Carers of
people with Alzheimer's, instead, have their own set of interests and embodied biographies
which are related yet distinct from those of people with dementia.
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details had been sent to the Chief Executive for consideration, but no response was ever
received. The Parkinson's Disease Society forwarded my details to the Scottish Office. After
discussing my research outline with the manager for Scotland, it was agreed that the most
promising method of recruitment was to include my research details and request in their
monthly newsletter. Whilst in this instance my details reached a greater number of people, the
response rate was zero. Again, here, reasons for non-access were not provided, but might
include the competing demands upon individuals' time or not recognising oneself or ones own
interests within the subject matter of cloning.8
I obtained the name and telephone number for the Huntington's Disease support group
organiser through the Lothian Advisor for the Society. After a brief discussion about my
research topic and methods, the group organiser was extremely positive and invited me to join
their monthly meeting where a focus group could be conducted. In the intervening period, all
members were alerted to the 'guest' subject for the evening and invited to participate.
Participants from a regional branch of Diabetes UK were contacted via the local office. The
Treasurer of the branch put my request to members during a committee meeting. Eight names
and telephone numbers of people agreeing to participate were sent by post, following which I
was able to co-ordinate a convenient time for five people.
Gaining access to scientists involved a lengthier process and an understanding of the different
and relevant kinds of research being undertaken and the relevant actors within the field. Lengthy
web searches of media and scientific journals were undertaken as well as conversations with
scientists working in the area of genetics, and attendance at relevant conferences with the
'snowballing' that occurs out of such interactions.
8 This latter point was reflected in some of the participants comments in the focus groups
and interviews. A number of participants claimed that they had not thought about cloning
related issues at any length, if at all. This seems to suggest that their reasons for
participating where not due to identifying their own interests in the subject according to the
same criteria as used in the research design. For instance, people undergoing fertility
treatment did not attend the focus group because they had identified themselves as
'potential embryos donors' and the members of the cardiac support group did not participate
because of they recognised themselves as 'potential users of stem cell therapies'. Instead,
reasons for attending were stated as being 'out of interest' and also simply because they had
been asked, as a way of helping me with my research. It was only a minority of participants
who, before attending the focus group/interview, recognised their interests in the same way
as defined within the dominant discourses around cloning (see chapter 6).
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Due to the high media profile of cloning issues, the individuals within the two institutes which I
eventually gained access to - the Roslin Institute and Institute for Stem Cell Research (ISCR,
previously, Centre for Genome Research) - receive a large number of interview requests from
media personnel and researchers. My experiences of initial attempts to gain access to IanWilmut
(Roslin Institute) echoed the problems noted by Arksey and Knight: 'leading figures in political,
social or business circles ... have little time to spare, do not usually put talking to academic
researchers high on their list of priorities, and are protected by lower level personnel' (1999:
122). Whilst gaining access to Wilmut required the greatest degree of persistence on my part
(after a series of emails and cancelled meetings), I was permitted to conduct a one hour,
recorded interview. Contact with a second scientist from Roslin Institute, John Clark, was
gained through a colleague who was a personal friend of the interviewee. In this instance, the
initial approach for gaining access was made by a third partywho passed on my research details.
I contacted Austin Smith, of the ISCR, via email, providing an outline of my research interests
and request to interview him. Smith replied positively, and directed me to his secretary to
organise a time and date. It was through Austin Smith that I was able to conduct the joint
interview of two researchers from the Institute. Here, my research outline and request for
participants was posted by the secretary to each person working at the Institute; only two people
responded positively.
When contacting scientists, I pointed out that I had been advised by 'credible' sources, such as
MRC Information Officers or other scientists, that they would be useful and helpful participants
formy research.9 This was to present myself as a credible researcher in the context of competing
against others (especially journalists) for the opportunity to conduct an interview.10 That Austin
Smith had participated in my research provided helped to gain access to others from ISCR. The
advantages of utilising snowballing techniques, however, may be questionable due to the low
response rate to my interview request at the Institute for Stem Cell Research. We might
speculate that non-access was due to a number of issues around work pressures, busy lifestyles
etc. Equally, based upon other researcher's experiences in interviewing scientists (or elites more
generally), explanations maybe due to the research method that I had adopted. For individuals
9
Here, 'credible sources' refers to individuals associated with organisations (such as the
MRC) or professions (such as scientists) that have, traditionally, come to be recognised as
producing or sanctioning 'knowledge'. More specifically, these are sources that are likely to
be recognised by interviewees as relevant and credible sources to their particular field of
work; hence, individuals from the MRC.
10
For a brief discussion of the uses of gaining a 'competitive advantage' in the context of
access to elites, see Puwar (1997).
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working within scientific traditions, the value of the methodological principles and research
agenda of social scientists may easily be dismissed unless they are clearly embedded within the
professional (or personal) lives of scientists (see Puwar, 1997: 5.3). My junior status as a
researcher may have further exacerbated the problem.
2.3.3 Conducting Focus Groups and Interviews: Introduction
Within the following discussion, I will consider a number of issues that arose during the process
of conducting interviews and focus groups. Firstly, providing examples, I will focus upon some
general issues that relate to the methods utilised. Secondly, I will address some differences
between the process of conducting focus groups and one-to-one interviews. Thirdly, I will go
on to discuss two particular encounters that occurred in one focus group and one interview.
These were problematic instances within the data collection process, where a number of issues
that were pertinent throughout the research were heightened.
2.3.4 Developing a Topic Guide
Before conducting either the focus groups or interviews, I developed a topic guide for the
different groups to be included. Given that I was not aiming to standardise the research design
across different constituencies, I did not attempt to develop a set of universal questions or
prompts. Instead, the topic guide was developed as an aid rmrmir of themes that I wanted to
cover during the discussion. The topic guide was sufficiently flexible in terms of the time
allocated to each theme and the order it was addressed to allow the discussion to be guided by
participants' interests. Furthermore, the aid ?7Ermirwas not intended to place boundaries around
what could or could not be discussed, but instead served as a 'safety net' or checksheet to ensure
that I had not missed anything vital to the study. The same topic guide was used for both the
focus groups and individual interviews on the grounds that both the group and one-to-one
interviews aimed to address my research questions in a dialogic manner that was relevant to
participants. At the end of each interview or focus group discussion, participants were asked to
complete a form to provide biographical details, including age, religion, relevant interest to this
topic (i.e. medical or professional). It was made clear that there was no obligation to complete
all, if any, questions.
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2.3.5 Group Size, Composition and Setting
According to most accounts, the ideal focus group size should be between four to ten people
(see, for example Kitzinger, 1996), and researchers are advised to slightly over-recruit to obtain
the optimal group composition. However, when accessing patient support groups - pre-existing
groups - the group size was found to be beyond my control. Whilst when initially contacting
support group co-ordinators I had outlined the ideal number of people to be involved, in
practice, the number of people that came varied. The variability was influenced by a number of
factors, including how many people would ordinarily attend the support group meetings, how
the co-ordinator 'advertised' and recruited members for the discussion, as well as individual
contingencies such as work commitments (see section 2.3.2).
The size of the focus groups ranged from four to eighteen. The largest group, Huntington's
Disease support group, consisted of a relatively large number of regular attendees. That the
focus group was conducted as part of the monthlymeeting meant that I was unable to influence
the size. Equally, the cardiac and patient-led infertility focus groups were conducted as part of
their monthly meeting, resulting in group sizes of ten and seven respectively. The remaining
focus groups (infertility and Diabetes support groups) were organised specifically for the
purposes of participating in the research.
As with size, the group composition was also variable. All of the support groups consisted of a
combination of people with the condition/disease in question, along with family members and
interested individuals. For instance, one infertility support group contained a senior Sister, and
some participants in the cardiac support group had family members with them who had driven
them to the meeting. The Huntington's support group included individuals 'at risk' of
developing the disease,11 spouses, a health advisor, and a retired scientist who had spent much
of her carer conducting research into treatments for Huntington's disease. It is also notable that
some members of the cardiac and Diabetes support groups were the spouses of people who had
died from these conditions and one man had a son living with Diabetes. Whilst all participants
had vested interests in the organisation to which they belonged, those interests were
heterogeneous.
11
There were a number of younger people in the group, and it was not disclosed whether
they had been tested for the Huntington's disease gene, or the outcome of that test.
Therefore, 'at risk' means that they have a parent who carries the gene who may or may not
have been alive.
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The interviews took place in a range of venues. Focus groups with the cardiac and Diabetes
support groups took place in Edinburgh University rooms, as this was the most convenient
option for the participants. The co-ordinators for both infertility support groups and the
Huntington's Disease support group arranged for the focus group to take place at the same
venue in which they hold their meetings: hospital meeting rooms and a church hall. The first
one-to-one interview with an Alzheimer's carer took place in his office, and the second in her
home. In the case of scientists, all one-to-one interviews were conducted in their offices, and the
two-person interviewwith research students took place in the university canteen.
2.3.6 Developing a Dialogue
When entering each interview (group and individual), I had two sides of A4 paper containing a
'map' of areas that I wanted to cover (the aid rmwir). Before the interview began, I explained
the aims of the discussion and how it fitted into my research, outlining the themes that I
wanted to cover.12 I then requested to tape-record the discussion and assured individuals that
they would remain anonymous, except for the three prominent scientists who spoke 'on the
record'. For most of the interviews these issues had already been addressed as part of gaining
initial access, however, I considered it important to go over why I wanted to speak to them.
Explaining the aims of the focus group or interview at the outset enabled individuals to ask
questions and opt-out should they wish (nobody did). This was useful in partly overcoming the
problem of consent in the Sister-led infertility support group.
The way in which I introduced myself and the project area differed, depending upon the group
or individual in question. The greatest difference was between the scientists and non-scientists.
For instance, with the support groups I could not assume that participants were familiar with
technical descriptions of cloning techniques or had thought about cloning prior to the event.
One of the early prompts was to ask 'What kinds of ideas or images come to mind when you
think about cloning?'. With scientists, however, an initial prompt was to ask them about their
involvement in, and thoughts on the SCR and human cloning debates. To have asked a general
question about their thoughts on cloning would have been inappropriate as it is likely to have
12 I broke the themes down into three distinct areas: 1. Views and perceptions of cloning 2.
Views and perceptions of science, technology and medicine 3. How these developments
impact upon people and society, and their views on this.
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elicited a 'technical' or normative response. When preparing for each interview or focus group,
therefore, I adjusted my agenda, language and self-presentation13 to suit the context.
In interviews with non-scientists, participants said that, prior to being invited to participate in
the research, cloning had not been a topic of discussion during support group meetings. Many
individuals claimed that they had not explicitly thought about SCR and cloning before - this was
their first opportunity to consider and articulate their views. So, whilst participants had been
identified as being implicated in cloning developments, it was evident that this did not reflect
the way in which they located themselves in relation to the subject matter. Instead, cloning was a
topic regarded as tangential to their own lives, albeit, an interesting one. Whilst this is the
general pattern that emerged at group level, there were individuals within the groups who
deviated from this. For example, in the Diabetes support group one participant had 'prepared'
for the discussion by searching the Internet, and in the Huntington's Disease focus group a
number of participants remembered parts of a talk on stem cells they had attended.
Participants from the various support groups were often exploring and constructing their views
on SCR and cloning during the interviews; this meant that they had as many questions as views
on the topic. These questions were both about each others views as well as about scientific
practices. Despite introducing myself as a non-scientist, many participants asked difficult
questions about various aspects of SCR and the cloning technique. There were a number of
questions that came up in every group, such as the difference between 'therapeutic' and
'reproductive' cloning, the technique used for cloning Dolly the sheep, and UK policies on SCR
and reproductive cloning. Additionally, there were questions that were often more particular to
the group. To have avoided these questions would have had detrimental effects upon the
interviewer-interviewee relationship in terms of trust and rapport. In conceptualising the
interview process as a dialogue, it was important that I engaged in an open and active exchange
with participants where appropriate, thus bringing 'double subjectivities' into the research
process (Lewis and Meredith, cited in Edwards, 1993: 185).14
13
Self-presentation here refers to the different personas that the facilitator/researcher adopts
(Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999). The self-presentation or persona of the researcher is
constructed relationally. For instance, when interviewing scientists I had to negotiate my
persona as a non-scientist that was also distinct from that of journalist - a group with whom
many of the scientists were used to dealing with when discussing social or ethical issues.
However, when interviewing patient groups I had to negotiate my identity as a non-scientist,
even though many participants addressed me as though I was a scientist (i.e. asking
scientific or technical questions).
14
Double subjectivity involves the inclusion of the researcher in the research process and
analysis, as opposed to claims of objectivity. Also known as 'dialogic retrospection', double
subjectivity refers to an approach where, 'Instead of seeing people in the research process
as simply sources of data [the] research process is a two-way process' (May, 1993: 14).
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Although I did not attempt to adopt the role of scientist, I did provide responses based upon
the knowledge that I had acquired whilst conducting the research.15 When providing answers to
some of their questions, I also offered an account of my experiences and difficulties with
understanding and keeping up with the scientific and technical aspects of this area. It was
important to include myself within the research topic and to reciprocate with a certain amount
of self-disclosure. In doing so, this begin to facilitate a discussion that went beyond the scientific
and technical information, but also enabled participants to incorporate some details provided
into their discussion. Although the focus of the research was not to 'test' participants on their
technical or scientific knowledge of cloning, on reflection, it was na'ive to assume that such
information would not be needed. When asking participants to engage in a discussion where
they reflect upon their, as yet, unformed views on cloning, it might have been helpful to have
produced an information pack of websites, articles and contact sheets for them to take away.
2.3.7 Conducting Focus Groups "With Pre-existing Groups
By accessing pre-existing, or 'naturally-occurring' groups, particular methodological issues
emerged from the discussion process.16 On the one hand, all participants knew one another and
were familiar with the group norms and dynamics. This familiarity meant that participants had
already established a rapport and they engaged in friendly banter. Rather than having to spend
time 'warming' the group I was able to go over the 'ground rules' of participating in focus
groups and then introduce the topic of cloning within a safe environment. On the other hand,
however, the boundaries around the sorts of issues that can and cannot be discussed and who
the nominated speakers are, are often already established and entrenched. As Kitzinger and
Barbour argue: 'the researcher should consider how the group context and broader cultural and
institutional features operate to encourage or suppress the expression of certain points of view'
(1999: 8). That the group convened around one common interest (e.g. Diabetes), served as the
dominant shared identity. Whilst this does not necessarily close off other non-shared identities
within the group, such as gender or religion, the established norms and hierarchies do have an
impact upon contributions offered.
15 It is important to note here, that as the project developed over time, my understanding of
cloning practices increased and, therefore, I became better equipped to answer questions in
later interviews than the earlier ones.
16
'Naturally-occurring' groups is a term widely used within literature on research methods. A
more appropriate term for patient support groups, however, is 'pre-existing' groups.
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In the Diabetes support group, for instance, one participant (identified as DM2) arrived at the
group with some Internet articles containing quotes from Ian Wilmut. It was evident that DM2
was the nominated speaker within the group hierarchy, perhaps due to the absence of the usual
group co-ordinator. Within the group discussion, arguments made by Ian Wilmut within the
article were invoked by DM2 as 'legitimate' knowledge which inhibited the contributions of
other members. In particular, arguments proposed by the two women in the group - that
women might have a different relationship to embryos than men - were readily dismissed as
irrelevant (see chapter 7). By aligning the concerns of Diabetics with 'expert' knowledge, DM2
was able to (re)establish a boundary around what sorts of issues were seen as relevant to the
group, thus suppressing the expression of the points of view of the women. In a different
context, the views of one woman who was expressing her concerns about cloning were
suppressed through humour. Instead of engaging with her and discussing her views on
reproductive cloning, another participant responded "but then there'll be two people making the
tea at the meetings".
2.3.8 Conducting One-to-One Interviews
Whilst holding focus groups was the preferred method of data collection, one-to-one interviews
were used for pragmatic reasons (e.g., they felt uncomfortable speaking in a group situation, or
logistically difficult to co-ordinate a group of people who have many demands on their time). All
participants were asked to participate in a focus group but were given the option of a one-to-
one interview if preferred.
As already noted in section 2.3.2, it was not possible to gather enough people from the
Alzheimer's Society to constitute a focus group. Subsequently, I conducted two one-to-one
interviews with Alzheimer's carers but used the same topic guide used for focus groups.
Whereas in the focus group discussions participants engaged in a dialogue between each other
(and occasionally, myself), in the one-to-one interviews my role was slightly different. Rather
than simply facilitating the discussion and allowing participants to prompt each other, in the
interviews I had to generate a dialogue between myself and the participant. Here, the presence
of double subjectivity in the research was more apparent. That is, the interview was more of an
dialogic process and participants' accounts were 'the result of their interactions with me'
(Edwards, 1993: 185). As in the focus groups, however, participants also 'tested' ideas during the
interview, such as starting sentences with 'I haven't thought this through but...'.
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Another significant difference of one-to-one interviews compared to focus group, was that
participants provided personal, biographical 'stories' about their lives and experiences. Both
interviews involved lengthy conversations about an individual's experience of being a carer for
somebody with Alzheimer's Disease, including stories about diagnosis, relationships with
clinicians and other family members. Such sensitive moments of disclosure did not occur within
the infertility or patient support groups.
When interviewing scientists I also conducted unstructured conversation-based interviews
around the topic guide. After gaining access to scientists working in the area of SCR and/or
cloning, there were a number of issues that arose when conducting the interviews. The main
issue involved developing a rapport with the individual in order to get beyond the accounts
available in the media. All prominent scientists were accustomed to dealing with journalists and
their style of questioning; this meant that it was difficult to get beyond the initial facade. This
was perhaps due to a lack of trust that the scientists had developed in relation to a sensationalist
press that tended to de-contextualise quotes. As a young social scientist, however, it was difficult
to successfully develop a rapport in one hour.
Attempts to get beyond stock phrases and the party line were made by engaging the scientists in
a dialogue, asking them how they would respond to alternative assertions or arguments to their
own. They were also asked to reflect upon how the debates have or may have an impact upon
their own views or practices. One participant, in particular, was very cautious with language and
phrasing. It was suggested by another scientist who overheard part of an interview17 that my
style of questioning, as a social scientist, differed to the style that they had become accustomed
to with journalists; this may have been interpreted as a ploy to 'trick' the person being
interviewed. On reflection, this occurred in the interview with Austin Smith. The wording of
one question resulted in him turning his chair away from me while he considered his response.
He then provided a cautious answer before I reworded the question and explained that I wasn't
trying to 'trick' him.
In focus groups with infertility and patient support groups I was able to continue with the
discussion beyond one hour. With two of the scientists, however, it was clear that there were
more pressing time constraints and I was restricted to one hour. I had to behave more like a
journalist, and simply switch on the tape recorder and then launch into the interview (see Puwar,
17
When conducting the interview with Ian Wilmut, another scientist/science communicator
who shared the same office was moving in and out of the room.
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1997: 7.1). The final one-to-one interview and the two-person interview were more relaxed, and
the discussion was allowed to continue for an hour and a half, and two hours respectively. One
final point here is that in one case, the formal interview lasted under one hour, after which I
thanked the participant for their time and turned off the tape recorder. After this point, the
conversation then became much more open and continued for another three quarters of an
hour. It was only at this point that the participant began to fully engage with my area of research
and offer some insightful comments. I noted these down on paper afterwards, rather than
having them on tape. These 'off-the-record' comments have not been used in the thesis but
instead added to my stock knowledge of SCR and cloning - as defined by a key scientist.
2.3.9 The Presence ofAuthority
As described in the previous section, access to the support group within the Assisted
Conception Unit was achieved via a sponsor. It has been noted byMorgan and Krueger that the
involvement of sponsors or 'other influentials who want to handpick the participants' can,
potentially, jeopardise the focus group process (1993: 10). They go on to suggest that
interference by sponsors is reason net to use focus groups (Morgan and Krueger, 1993: 10). In
reflecting upon this focus group experience, however, I would suggest that the involvement of
sponsors can be both prohibitive and generative.
During the early stages of the infertility focus group discussion, it became clear that all three
participants had been contacted to request participation only the evening before. It also became
evident that they were unsure what research they had consented to participate in. Whilst they
knew the subject was SCR and cloning, they had not received a copy of the research outline. As
the researcher and focus group moderator, initiating a focus group discussion on a sensitive
topic with a group of participants who had not been provided with the full information was an
uncomfortable position to find oneself in. I was unprepared for such an eventuality at this early
stage in the data collection phase (second focus group), and found myself having to provide a
research outline 'on the spot'. In doing so, however, I was able to ensure informed consent.
The second, and perhaps most significant methodological issue relates to the Senior Sister's
presence in a group discussion. After the participants had arrived the Senior Sister then stated
that she would like to sit in on the discussion as she was interested in the topic. As a young
researcher with little experience of conducting qualitative fieldwork, I had not anticipated such a
request and felt obliged to agree. When introducing my area of research and the topics to be
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covered during the discussion, the Sister interrupted to ask that I explain the difference between
'therapeutic' and 'reproductive' cloning to the group. She then went on to describe the
distinction according to her own view. From the outset, she asserted herself as a dominant
figure, controlling the tone and content of the discussion.
The result of the Sister's interventions had a direct impact upon the discussion. For instance,
participants often addressed their views to her rather than one another or myself, which was
indicated in their body language as well as verbally. During the discussion it was clear that the
power relations between Sister and patients affected their experiences of participating in the
discussion. Compared to the patient-led infertility support group, there was a reticence to
critically discuss issues around cloning that relate to their experiences of assisted conception.
This can be attributed to the way in which the Sister managed aspects of the discussion that
directly related to practices in the clinic. For example, issues around embryo donation,
consenting procedures and meanings around stem cell research were areas where critical voices
were silenced through the Sister's interventions.
The presence of the Sister, however, was not an entirely destructive one but also added an extra
dimension to the discussion. After the initial ice-breaking period, the Sister participated in the
focus group, providing her own views on cloning related issues and leading the discussion into
difficult areas for discussion such as issues around the role of corporations in stem cell. Whilst it
was difficult for me to manage the complex power relations between researcher-researched
alongside that of Sister-patient and sponsor-researcher, the power dynamics between herself as
Senior Sister and the three patients was obviously a relationship that she had experience in
managing. This meant that the Sister maintained the discussion, offering some interesting views
as well as managing areas that related to practices at the clinic.
2.3.10 A Failed Interview
Including the perspectives of people with dementia in social research has long been regarded as
an ethically sensitive task (see, for example, Wilkinson 2002). As shown in the previous section,
negotiating the various layers of gatekeepers when gaining consent is problematic in itself. The
process of conducting interviews with people with dementia adds another layer of
methodological issues. The following discussion revolves around conducting an in-depth
interview with a woman with dementia. This interview, as intended, was brought to a halt and
the content were not used within this thesis.
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As already indicated, access to people with dementia and their carers was gained through
Alzheimer Scotland's 'early onset support group'. "When I telephoned Ms. R she had not
remembered replying to my initial letter and was unaware of why I was contacting her. I
explained that I was interested in hearing her views on cloning and clarified my identity as a
researcher from Edinburgh University. Ms. R gave her consent to be interviewed and we
established a time and date for me to go to her home. In the meantime I sent another copy of
the initial letter and a covering letter stating the time and date for the interview, asking her to
contact me should she change her mind. Upon arriving at her home, she was sat in the dark,
with the curtains closed and the radio playing very loud. I asked again if she understood why I
was there and whilst she knew that I wanted to ask her some questions, she was unsure what
they were and was confused about my identity. As the interview began, it became clear that she
did not realise that I was a university student, but thought I was a support worker from
Alzheimer Scotland.18 When I tried to explain who I was and introduce the topic of cloning, this
seemed to further confuse her and led to a brief demonstration of agitation.
When I asked some ice-breaking questions about herself, she replied that she did not have
Alzheimer's disease, but a different form of dementia called Pick's disease - an incurable
condition that her sister had died from six months earlier. Upon mentioning her sister, Ms. R
became upset, explaining that she was still mourning her sister's death and was extremely lonely
and frightened. At this point I stopped the tape-recorder in order to allow Ms R to find some
tissues, and to assess whether I could continue with the interview. Throughout the following
conversation I attempted to introduce the topic of cloning; however it was evident that she was
confused and agitated by this. For instance, it was notable that she often responded with "yes"
or "no" inappropriately to questions that confused her.
When involving patients with dementia, the complexity and importance of conceptualising
consent as an on-going process is heightened. In this particular instance, I was acutely aware of
my responsibility to protect the welfare of the participant, especially given that she had no
family support around her. It was apparent to me as a researcher that even if she had offered
any views on cloning, it would have been unethical to include her comments in the thesis. This
is largely due to it being unclear whether she understood who I was or what she was
contributing to.
18
Ms R was accustomed to having community workers and volunteers coming to visit her
and seemed to ascribe a similar role to me. When I explained that I wasn't from Alzheimer
Scotland she appeared confused, but was then happier when I said that I had contacted her
through the organisation; thus, establishing a degree of trust.
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2.4 Data Analysis
As noted in section 2.2, data collection and analysis were not distinct phases, but instead were
iterative and co-constructive. Analysis of parliamentary debates, media texts, official reports,
interviews and focus groups was conducted in parallel as an ongoing feature of the research
process, and, therefore, fed into one another. In this sense, the data collection and analysis was
characterised by a steep learning curve. Within this section I will outline some of the key
features involved in analysing my data.
2.4.1 Identifying Discursive Regularities and Recurrent Themes
In keeping with the approach of Mulkay et al. (1983), I explore the recurrent interpretive
practices employed by a range of actors across different social contexts (see also, Mulkay, 1993).
This means that, firstly, I recognise that people portray their actions and beliefs in different ways
depending upon the broader context. For example, scientists utilise different discourses and
repertoires in formal literatures (such as journal articles) compared to informal discussions in the
laboratory or within interviews with social scientists. Similarly, patient groups will present their
beliefs differently and draw upon different discursive repertoires when in the company of
clinicians (see 2.4.9) compared to when in the company of other patients, family or friends.
Discourse analysis, then, is a useful tool for identifying the range of repertoires, devices and
cultural resources employed by actors within their accounts of SCR and cloning. To this extent,
my analysis aims, not to explain how science 'really operates' or a definitive account of how
relevant social groups view SCR and cloning, but to provide an interpretive reading of their
readings.
A further but related point of clarification corresponds to the identity of actors vis-a-vis the
context within which the 'data' was generated. Social context constrains as well as enables
particular accounts of the world and people's accounts should always be treated as partial or
even provisional. As already outlined within this chapter, identities are multiple and flexible, and
contexts such as the Diabetes support group generates a particular shared identity amongst
members that excludes other aspects of ones identity. For instance, the needs of people with
Diabetes as 'patients' are foregrounded over gender. This is not to say that other identities do
not seep in to the patient group context, but that the social context and data collection methods
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used impact upon the nature of data obtained. The aim of the research was not, however, to
understand any one persons understanding in detail but to understand how people negotiate
human cloning rather than answering uhy a person has any particular view or opinion.
Furthermore, such an approach is indebted to cultural studies research that conceives the self as
a process of beaming rather than being the self is not a unified or finalised entity, but a project to
be worked on, negotiated and contradictory. This is also to say that I could not claim to have
only witnessed one particular social role, such as being infertile of having Huntington's, but that
identity formation and negotiation is a messier activity where different social roles are brought
to bare, if only momentarily upon the situation.
2.4.2 Coding: Manual and Computer Aided
Transcripts from the parliamentary debates were coded manually, using coloured pens and
"post-it notes". After reading through the transcripts a number of times I identified what
Mulkay calls 'discursive regularities' (1993: 723). These are the discursive repertoires that
reflected the recurrent themes, ideas, assumptions and discourses mobilised during the
parliamentary debates. In order to identify themes and discursive regularities, related material -
such as official documents, media reports and informal discussions with relevant actors (see
section 2.3) - informed the coding system for the Hansard transcripts in a non-formalised way.
Following on from this, analysis of interview and focus group transcripts followed a similar
pattern of reading, note-taking, and comparisons between my data and other analyses of
scientists and publics' discourses (for example, Kerr et al., 1997; 1998a; 1998b). However, rather
than coding the interview and focus group transcripts manually I used the QSR NUDHST data
analysis software for creating coding systems and analysing data. Here I created a simple coding
structure, identifying recurrent themes (such as distinctions between 'reproductive' and
'therapeutic' cloning and constructions of expertise) as well as distinct issues (such as issues of
patenting or the use of embryos for SCR). Within these codes I then looked for rhetorical
strategies and repertoires mobilised by actors as well as deviations. All coded data was then
printed and coded in more detail manually. The combination of the software package and
manual coding helped me to gain a deeper understanding of my data and to compare excerpts
from transcripts.
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2.4.3 Presentation of Data
Throughout the thesis I have used quotes from interviews and transcripts to illustrate analytical
points and to describe certain issues. Underpinned by the epistemological approach for allowing
people to articulate their views 'in their own vocabulary, generating their own questions and
pursuing their own priorities' (Kitzinger, 1996: 68), I have incorporated a large proportion of the
interview material into the following chapters.
Quotes from the three key scientists are directly attributed: Austin Smith (Institute for Stem Cell
Research [ISCR]), Ian Wllmut (Roslin Institute) and John Clark (Roslin Institute). The joint
interview with two research scientists are represented as RSI and RS2. Quotes from support
groups are attributed using shorthand codes:
F1 = Patient-led infertility support group
F2 = Sister-led infertility support group
C = Cardiac support group
H = Huntington's Disease support group
D = Diabetes support group
AC1 = Alzheimer's Carer # 1
AC2 = Alzheimer's Carer # 2
And within each focus group, individuals are identified according to their sex (M =
Woman) and numbered in order of appearance within the discussion, for instance,
man to speak within the cardiac support group is identified as CM2 throughout the
dates when each interview took place are also noted.
2.5 Reflections on Research Process and Limitations of Study
The methods used for data collection and analysis were selected for their appropriateness to
address the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 (section 1.2). A thematic analysis of
parliamentary debates on SCR and cloning allowed me to identify the range of issues pertinent
to these developments, to locate dominant discourses and voices within the debates, as well as
to reveal groups whose voices were rhetorically invoked but not included. I concurrently keep
an eye on media commentaries of this area, cross-comparing the recurrent themes emerging in
each. This helped me to gain an insight into the breadth and depth of public debates on SCR
and cloning and to identify which actors were included or excluded. Analysis of parliamentary
Man; W =
the second
thesis. The
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debates also provided the groundwork for identifying the range of issues raised by this area of
research, which could be further explored within the focus groups and interviews with relevant
social groups.
In order to get behind the way the issues were framed in Parliament, I chose to conduct focus
groups with scientists working in the field of SCR and/or cloning, patient support groups and
infertility support groups. These groups represent both dominant and marginalised voices within
the debates. To conduct focus groups allowed participants to articulate their thoughts and views
on this area according to their own terms of reference, outlining what was, for them, the key
issues. Other than the problems outlined above (see section 2.3), this method worked very well
for patient support groups, revealing how people's views are shaped by embodied experiences
and social location.
Attempts to conduct focus groups with scientists working in the field of SCR and cloning,
however, were unsuccessful. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, gaining access to scientists was very
difficult and I had to conduct individual interviews with three scientists and a joint interview
with research scientists. It had been hoped that focus groups with scientists would create a
similar group dynamic as in the patient support groups. My analysis would have profited from
gaining access to a group of scientists engaged in a discussion about their work, their views of
the social implications of SCR and cloning and science-public relations. Whilst one-to-one
interviews did permit an insight into these aspects, the discussion was limited because I could
not explore the everyday uses of language and communication.
Using focus groups did, however, limit the data obtained. For instance, within the patient
support groups, I was unable to gain an insight into the details of people's biographies because
focus groups do not allow for such personal discussions. Since one of my key analytical points
was to ascertain how people's biographical and embodied experiences shape their views, this
limited the strength of my argument. A further problem was generated by the open-endedness
of the topic guide used. Because I allowed people to generate discussions that were pertinent to
their own experiences and views, this meant that each group tended to foreground different
issues. Subsequently, some of my analysis is based around data from one focus group rather
than being able to cross-compare with those in other groups.
Because of the timing when all interviews and focus groups were conducted, if I were to repeat
this study again, I would expect to obtain different data to that presented in this thesis. Data
collection was conducted between May and November 2001 - the period immediately after the
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amendment to the HFE Act (January 2001) and before any scientists had received a license
under the new regulations to conduct SCR in this country. The SCR and cloning debates were,
therefore, novel to non-scientists who were often discussing their views for the first time during
the focus group and interviews. Two years on, SCR and cloning stories and 'breakthroughs' are
becoming increasingly commonplace, suggesting that processes of entrenchment are underway.
My research is unable to show any changes that may have occurred since the new regulations
came into place, such as changes in public opinion or that of scientists. Furthermore, because
some of the participants had never discussed their views of SCR and cloning before, this thesis
is a snapshot analysis of their 'first thoughts'. I would expect their views to have altered since
then and to conduct follow-up focus groups and/or interviews would be an interesting future
project.
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CHAPTER III
The Politics of Cloning: Mapping the Rhetorical
Convergence of Embryos and Stem Cells in
Parliamentary Debates1
3.1 Introduction
Whilst human embryonic SCR has been carried out since the mid-nineteen nineties, it was not
until after the birth of Dolly the sheep that the Government formerly addressed policy issues
surrounding related developments. Between 1997, the year Dolly was announced, and early
2001, the Government commissioned a consultation paper by the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAQ, and
established an expert advisory committee headed by the Chief Medical Officer, Professor Liam
Donaldson. The outcome of these papers was a proposal to amend the existing 1990 HFE Act,
that culminated in a series of parliamentary debates to decide upon the future of SCR The
proposed amendment would add a further three categories for embryo research to the existing
five.2 The amendment was passed in a non-party vote in the House of Commons with 366 ayes
and 174 noes, then passed to the House of Lords who divided with 212 ayes, and 92 noes.
As in the debates that led to the establishment of the 1990 HFE Act, the stem cell debates
demonstrated that there is still no consensus as to the moral status of the embryo. Indeed, it
appears that recent developments in cloning and genetic technologies have further
problematised questions of life as they relate to embryo research. The significance of Dolly was
not the ability of scientists to clone per se, but the demonstration that cells taken from an adult
mammal could be 're-programmed' - a process called de-differentiation - to produce a
genetically identical copy of the original.3 If adult cells can be de-differentiated, then this offers
1
A version of this chapter has also appeared in New Genetics and Society, Vol. 22, No. 2
(2003), pp. 145 - 168. See Appendix I.
Existing regulations permitted embryo research that related directly to reproductive
medicine: contraception, miscarriage, infertility and the detection of abnormalities prior to
implantation. The three added categories were as follows: i) to increase knowledge about
the development of embryos ii) to increase knowledge about serious disease iii) to enable
any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments for serious disease (HFEA Code
of Practice, Fifth edition, April 2001: 53)
3 De-differentiation was the initial term used by Ian Wilmut to describe the technique used for
cloning Dolly the sheep. This is where cells that have become specialised, such as skin or
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new avenues for scientific research to understand not only how cells become specialised, but
also how to control that process. Consequently, we have seen speculation regarding a number of
applications, including reproductive cloning, stem cell therapies and xenotransplantation.
This chapter examines some of the rhetorical resources and strategies used during the stem cell
debates vis-a-vis analyses of the pre-1990 embryo debates. I will draw upon my analyses of three
Hansard transcripts of stem cell debates: two from the House of Commons (17 November and
19 December 2000) and one from the House of Lords (22 January 2001). By focussing upon
what Mulkay calls 'discursive regularities' (1993: 723), I map the contours of the debates that
dominated discussions of stem cell cloning in Parliament. I have not focussed upon the specific
accounts of individual speakers, nor provided a comprehensive comparison of the broadly pro-
eSCR and anti-eSCR arguments.4 Instead, this chapter identifies discursive regularities of the
stem cell debates comprising typical assertions that reflected the recurrent themes, ideas,
assumptions and discourses that were mobilised during Parliamentary discussions.
Discussion of the embryo debates during the 1980s is enabled through a selective comparison to
analyses conducted by Michael Mulkay (1997), Sarah Franklin (1997, 1999), Marta Kirejczyk
(1993, 1995, 1999) and Patricia Spallone (1986, 1989). In comparing the 'recurrent interpretative
practices employed' (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 14) by parliamentarians during the 1990 HFE
Act debates with those of the stem cell debates, I will identify the discursive points of
convergence. The form and content of SCR and cloning related developments are shown to be
constructed according to pre-existing sociocultural discourses that reveal the 'interrelated set of
background assumptions' of the speakers (Mulkay, 1993: 723).
3.2 Managing the debate: Scene Setting and Lobbying Prior to the
Parliamentary Debates
The announcement of Dolly the sheep in February 1997 opened the floodgates for debates on
the implications of the growing biotechnology industry for humans and society. Religious
leaders, politicians, patient groups, scientists and non-affiliated individuals, have voiced their
particular perspectives on the subject. In response to the escalating public debates, in 1997 the
nerve cells, are re-programmed in order to become any cell type. However, Wilmut has since
questioned the accuracy of this term, in suggesting that cells never fully differentiate to begin
with, hence retaining their capacity to be re-programmed (see Franklin, 2001a: 7).
4 I have used the 'pro' and 'anti' research labels as shorthand for the purposes of this
chapter. Whilst the debates were not entirely polarised around two positions - with individual
speakers inhabiting complex and often contradictory positions - the debates were often
structured around Parliamentary conventions: a vote of either for or against.
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Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAQ and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA) held a joint consultation exercise resulting in a published report, Cloning Issues
in Reproduction, Science andMedicine Qanuary 1998). From this very early stage in the public debates
there emerged signs of the rhetorical severing of therapeutic cloning from reproductive cloning.
Whilst it was recommended that reproductive cloning should remain illegal, and required
primary legislation to explicitly ban it, therapeutic cloning was deemed to hold the promise of
medical benefits. This distinction lay in the intention and purpose of the research rather than the
cloning technique per se. It was considered that the uses of reproductive cloning would be
unethical, unsafe and inefficient as a means for human reproduction. Therapeutic cloning,
however, was not considered to produce the same ethical problems as cloning whole human
beings. That therapeutic cloning is the use of cloning techniques for potentially curing a
multitude of diseases was an important aspect of the argument for separating the ethical issues
of reproductive cloning from this 'benevolent technique'. Furthermore, in an attempt to avoid
the stigma of the word 'cloning', the HFEA/HGAC report changed the terminology from
'therapeutic doning to 'therapeutic uses of oil nudear replacement' (my emphasis).
The HGAC/HFEA report advised government to extend the FIFEA regulations to include two
further purposes for research: 'developing methods of therapy for mitochondrial diseases and
developing methods of therapy for diseased or damaged tissue or organs' (1998: 9.3). The
government responded to this report in June 1999 by establishing an expert advisory group, the
Donaldson committee, to consider the proposed changes to the HFE Act that would allow SCR
with a view to developing therapeutic uses of cloning techniques.
Between 1999 and the Parliamentary debates in late 2000, numerous science-based organisations
published reports and press releases in the UK explicitly outlining their position on the matter of
cloning and its applications and implications for humans. These include the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, Royal Society, Medical Research Council (MRQ, British Medical Association (BMA)
and the Association of Medical Research Charities (AMRQ. The report of Donaldson
Committee, Stem Cdl Research: Medical Progress vdth Responsibility (Department of Health, June
2000), opened by focussing upon the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning.
Stem cell research using cloning techniques was supported for therapeutic purposes,
organisations such as the BMA stated that they remained 'resolutely opposed to the cloning of
whole humans' (BMA press release, 24 June 1999). Whilst identifying various ethical problems
caused by the prospect of cloning humans, such as the devaluation and commodification of life,
therapeutic cloning was constructed as presenting no new ethical dilemmas. These arguments
were based upon the grounds that the aims and objectives of the research and its potential
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applications differ: one aims to provide treatment for a variety of diseases and conditions whilst
the other aims to produce a cloned human. This position, as advocated by science-related
organisations, was endorsed by the Donaldson Committee's report which clearly separated
reproductive and therapeutic cloning mobilising arguments outlined by the pro-eSCR lobby.
Initial public responses to the development of cell nuclear replacement, the technique used to
clone Dolly, were captured in the Wellcome Trust's study Public Perspectives on Hurmn Cloning in
1998. Issues covered by the focus group participants addressed a broad range of social, moral
and ethical problems that cloning poses for individuals and society. These included, for instance,
the potential stigma attached to being a cloned human being, kinship issues and the effect of
cloning on sexual relations and procreation. In discussing cloning, participants also expressed
concerns relating to eugenics, genetic engineering, uses of embryos for scientific
experimentation and the regulation of scientists and scientific research. The initial post-Dolly
report from The Wellcome Trust, thus, indicated a more widespread feeling towards cloning and
biotechnologywhich was, at worst, antipathy and, at best, ambivalence (1998).
Within the Parliamentary debates, public anxieties around cloning developments were translated
into an emerging 'anti-science climate' in the UK, by speakers from both sides such as Yvette
Cooper5, Baroness Warnock6 and Lord Alton7. After the high profile media coverage of recent
controversies, such as BSE/CJD and GM foods, science-public relations were perceived to be
increasingly under strain. For those in favour of SCR, the emerging anti-science climate was
identified in order to suggest that anxieties surrounding SCR could be attributed to the broader
'mood' (see, for example, Yvette Cooper, HC 17 Nov 2000: Col 1228-1229). Indeed, Baroness
Warnock believed that fear and suspicion towards scientists and politicians has reached
'dangerous proportions', and subsequentlywent on to argue that:
We are becoming a nation of cynics who cannot believe anything that they are
told and who suspect the evidence and the motivation of the people who
produce it. This is a situation that we ought to fear (HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 43).
5 Yvette Cooper was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and an advocate
for stem cell research and the proposed amendment to the 1990 HFE Act.
6
Baroness Warnock, a pro-research advocate and moral philosopher who chaired a
committee of inquiry in 1982 to 'examine the social, ethical and legal implications of recent,
and potential developments in the field of assisted [human] reproduction' (Warnock, cited in
Mulkay, 1997: 3). This recommendations from this committee formed the basis of the 1990
HFE Act.
7
As an active pro-life campaigner, David Alton was and continues to be a vocal critic of
embryo research, stem cell research and cloning related developments. During the stem ceil
debates Lord Alton had proposed alternative legislation which would put embryonic stem
cell research on hold until after a select committee had considered the implications of the
research.
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In pondering the relationship between opposition to the proposed amendment of the HFE Act
and the perceived anti-science climate, Yvette Cooper argued that 'It would be a dreadful
tragedy if the BSE crisis ... affected Members' judgement of the regulations' (HQ 17 Nov 2000:
Col 1228-1229). Suggestions that arguments against SCR maybe merely a reflection of a broader
societal 'mood' served to discredit anti-research claims as ill-informed and fuelled bymoral panic
(Baroness Warnock, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 45).
That cloning techniques were being introduced at a time when science-society relations were
under strain, led to the need for 'some serious PR damage limitation' (Sexton, 1999).8 Carl
Feldbaum, head of the Biotechnology Industry Organisation in the US, warned that to
mishandle the serious ethical issue of human cloning would threaten the survival of emerging
biotech companies. He went on to say that 'no current issue has more potential to undermine
public confidence in the whole field of genetic and biological research than human cloning'
(Anon. Financial Tines, 1998: Jan 11). Such sentiments echoed throughout the biotechnology
industry in the UK due to the increasing mobilisation of anti-research lobbyists as reported in
the media. This was evidenced by the lobbying of anti-research advocate, David Alton, who, in
Parliament, voiced his opposition to the Government's role in facilitating cloning research
through funding biotechnological organisations (HL, 3 Sept, 1998: Col WA65).
A comparison of the anti-research tactics of the current debates with those of the 1990 embryo
research debates reveals that similar strategies were employed in both contexts. Anti-cloning and
SCR campaigners such as David Alton and Ann Winterton mirrored their 1990 strategies in
seizing upon the ethical problems raised by embryo research. In the context of the 1990 debates,
anti-research lobbyists 'decided that assisted reproduction and abortion generated the same basic
moral questions about the sanctity of life, about our obligations to the unborn and about the
nature of responsible parenthood' (Mulkay, 1997: 17). By the same logic, stem research was
located in a lineage of issues which, according to speakers such as David Alton and Ann
Winterton, firmly tied together concerns relating to abortion, assisted conception, embryo
research and SCR Similarly, during the HFE Act debates pro-embryo-research lobbyists such as
the MRC were furious at what they regarded as attempts to sabotage much of its work in the
area of embryo research by the pro-life alliances (Mulkay, 1997: 26).9 The considerable amount
8
This theme is developed in following chapters.
9 In particular, the MRC were reacting to the success of Enoch Powell's Unborn Children
(Protection) Bill in 1985. The scientific community had been shocked by the size of the vote
against embryo research which saw 238 votes in favour and only 66 against. This was
further compounded by an article in Nature that attempted to show how the 'enactment of
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of time and research funds that had been put into developing the field of embryology, cellular
development and genetic research were deemed to be under threat. Thus, in both the 1990
debates and the SCR debates, it was not only the future of the actual research that was deemed
to be under threat by the growing anti-research lobby, but the integrity and future of the field of
biotechnology. Whilst the pro-embryo-research lobby had been slow in mobilising itself during
the 1990 debates, in the cloning debates scientists and related institutions were more actively
engaged in a pro-research campaign from the outset.
Utilising tactics similar to those of the 1990 debates, both the MRC and Royal Society produced
a fact sheet 'educating' the public and politicians outlining their position on SCR and cloning.
Additionally, as Ann Wlnterton indicated in the House of Commons (17 Nov, 2000: Col 1200,
1205), representatives of science-based organisations, such as the MRC and Biolndustry
Association, visited Westminster to speak to parliamentarians in an attempt to sway members
who were yet to make up their minds on the issues. They also attempted to convert those who
intended to vote against the amendment.
Winterton highlighted that following the publication of The Donaldson Report, there was a
'carefully co-ordinated propaganda campaign, with one group after another ... announcing their
support for human cloning' (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1200). In particular Winterton objected to
the substitution of the term "cloning" with "cell nuclear replacement" by the 'fine-sounding
bodies', such as those mentioned above, who supported the Donaldson reports
recommendations (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1200). Winterton also pointed out that
parliamentarians involved in the 1990 debates 'were subjected to an almost identical campaign
[and that] the present campaign is little different' (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1205). The similarities
between the 1990 embryo debates and the stem cell debates in terms of strategies and rhetorical
manoeuvrings, is indeed corroborated byMulkay's analysis which illustrates the utilisation of fact
sheets (1997: 39) and visits to MPs outlining the medical benefits of the proposed research
(1997: 40-41) during the embryo debates of the 1980s.
The 1990 HFE Act debates were a rich source of rhetoric and tactics for the stem cell debates.
Put simply, those against eSCR seized upon the opportunity for redressing the embryo question
and those in favour drew upon the successes of the 1990 debates by arguing that the pro-
Powell's Bill would prevent specific advances' (Mulkay, 1997: 27). The positive response to
the Powell Bill by politicians gave the pro-research lobby the impetus to form an organised
network during the 1990 embryo research debates. Up until this point the pro-research lobby
had been uncoordinated compared to the energetic lobbying by anti-abortion and anti-
embryo research lobbyists. The Powell Bill was eventually defeated.
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embryo-research lobby had already 'won'. Integral to the success of the pro-eSCR campaign in
gaining the legislative amendment, was the claim that SCR does not differ from IVF related
research. Much of this argument was upheld by framing the stem cell discussions within the
enclosure of debates about embryo research. That the use of the embryo for SCR would not
breach the 14-day limit imposed in the 1990 Act, was an integral component of the pro-eSCR
position. In debating SCR according to the framework of the 1990 HEA Act, the pro-eSCR
lobby framed opposition to the proposed amendment as futile at best (afterall, the embryo
debates had met their legal conclusion over a decade earlier), or insensitive at worst (for
opposing therapies that could potentially cure as yet incurable illnesses and diseases). In doing
so, public debates remained within well-trodden ground for the pro-eSCR lobbyists, thus
foreclosing debates surrounding wider social, legal and moral concerns regarding the
development of cloning techniques.
3.3 Negotiating Life: Embryogenesis in the Stem Cell Debates
In comparing analyses of the 1990 related debates with an analysis of the stem cell debates, one
can determine similarities in terms of the dominance of the 'embryo question' (Franklin, 1999)
and the strategic politicking of the pro and anti-embryo-research lobbies. That questions
regarding the status of the embryo remained central throughout the stem cell debates clearly
illustrates the sociopolitical lineage and connections between IVF and cloning related issues. The
legal and moral status of the embryo, as outlined during the 1990 debates and consequently
enshrined in law, are repeatedly invoked in the context of these later debates about SCR Thus,
in the following section, the relevance of the 'embryo question' to stem cell cloning debates will
be explored vis-a-vis its significance in the 1990 HFE Act.
Parliamentary SCR debates were couched in terms of a proposed amendment to the HFE Act
and, therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that there was a return to many of the issues discussed
prior to 1990. What is surprising is the absence of discussions about the sociocultural
implications of cloning technologies for kinship relations and health inequalities. Instead, the
stem cell debates are nearly always couched within the terms of ethical considerations of embryo
research, such as the point at which an embryo constitutes a human being, the ethico-legal status
of embryos and the medical benefits versus the exploitation of embryos for research purposes.
For those arguing against embryonic eSCR, the debates provided an opportunity to restate their
opposition to embryo research and related practices and to build further support. For those in
favour of eSCR, the focus on scientific issues relating to embryo experimentation, arguably,
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drew attention away from the more controversial issues relating to cloning through rhetorically
separating scientific 'facts' from wider social and moral questions.
From the outset pro-eSCR speakers asserted that SCR does not differ from embryo research
already permitted under the 1990 HFE Act. The opening speech in the Commons by Yvette
Cooper, the Parliamentary under-secretary of State for Health, indicated several rhetorical
strategies that were to be employed by the pro-eSCR lobby. She began by claiming that:
Those who opposed the 1990 Act will doubtless oppose the regulations, too ...
For those who support the 1990 Act and IVF treatments, there is a strong case
for supporting the regulations, too (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1177).
The alignment of SCR with IVF related embryo research early on in the Parliamentary debate set
the tone for further discussions. Along with many other speakers, Cooper began by outlining the
existing FIFEA regulations, adding that the proposed regulations would introduce a sixth
category of embryo research: 'increasing understanding about human disease and disorders and
their treatment' (Yvette Cooper, HQ 17 Nov 2000: 1178). The new category of research, it was
argued, remained within the existing constraints of the HFEA, thus preventing the use of
embryos over 14 days old:
The proposals do not alter the special status of the embryo. Embryos of up to
14 days, the current cut-off point for research, are much smaller than the head
of a pin, and the 14-day point is cmcial because that is the earliest point at which
the first parts of what will become the central nervous system can appear. We
must recognise the importance and value of the embryo. The rules governing
research on the human embryo must be tightly drawn, as, thanks to the 1990
Act, they already are (Gareth R Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1197-1198).
That SCR would be subject to the FfFEA's 14 day limit provided pro-eSCR speakers with a
powerful rhetorical tool for claiming that the proposed amendment would not challenge the
'special status of the embryo' (Warnock, 1985) as established in the FIFE Act. The arbitrary and
political underpinnings of the scientific explanation and justification for the establishment of a
14 day limit in the 1990 Act received no attention in the stem cell context, instead it was
accepted as a 'biological fact'.10
The point at which an embryo is ascribed the status of 'human being' in the HFE Act debates,
was a notable point of contention. Many of those against embryo research, such as Lord Alton,
10 See Mulkay (1994) for an excellent discussion of the coining of the term 'pre-embryo'
during the 1990 debates. Also, see Pat Spallone (1989) for a brief discussion of the
establishment of the 14 day limit (pp. 50- 55).
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argued that human life begins at the point of fertilisation. Indeed, to use embryos in scientific
experiments was deemed to be 'cannibalistic' (Alton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 28). All embryos, in
this view, are ascribed the status of a human being and must be treated accordingly. Indeed, Ann
Wlnterton, a vocal anti-embryo-research protagonist, stated that she found it 'frightening' that
'we have scientists who think of these [embryos] ... simply as a source to be exploited in
obtaining cells and tissue' (HL, 17 Nov 2000: Col 1204)11.
Anti-embryo-research arguments in the stem cell debates were significantly similar to those
played out within the HFE Act debates. In charting the debates and processes leading up to the
1990 Act, Mulkay (1997) describes the strategies and rhetoric mobilised by the anti-embryo-
research lobby. For Mulkay, the 'recommendations of the Warnock Committee in favour of
embryo research gave the anti-abortion lobby the opportunity to revitalise its activities and,
perhaps, to attract additional members by focussing attention on the new topic of the
destruction of 'unborn children' in scientific laboratories' (Mulkay, 1997: 18). Previous debates
surrounding the 1967 Abortion Act had already provided an established set of discourses that
could be transposed to future debates relating to scientific and medical uses of embryos,
including the harvesting of embryonic stem cells. Thus, in mobilising the rhetoric of human
rights in the context of 'science out of control', the anti-embryo-research lobby were attempting
to attract supporters as well as to revitalise more general issues relating to embryo research and
the beginnings of life.
The response of those in favour of embryonic SCR was to agree that whilst an embryo should
have some rights, these should not be the same as those of a baby or adult human being. Human
rights should develop as the embryo develops. Such arguments often drew upon the rhetoric of
religion and moral philosophy. In combining scientific knowledge of embryo development and
religious doctrine, speakers such as Robert Key and Dr Brand, respectively, argued that:
I share the view of the former Archbishop of York, John Habgood, who has
argued that the value that we attach to the lives of human beings — a value that
is the root of all morality — increases as human life develops, and that we are
therefore entitled, morally, to hold the life of a recently fertilised egg as less to
be protected than that of a foetus at a later stage or a baby when it is born
(Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1215).
I do not believe that foetal cells have the same status as a unique human being.
If we are going to be theological about this, I do not think that the divine soul
enters when an egg is fertilised ... there is a great difference between foetal
11
Within this part of the debate Winterton explicitly outlined her belief that embryos are not
simply human cells, but are 'definitely human'.
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material before 14 days ~ or indeed, a foetus of up to 22 weeks -- and a born
child (Dr. Brand, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1195).
One might expect the religious arguments to be mobilised by those opposing SCR, however, it
was often pro-eSCR speakers that referred to such sources. Rather than simply denunciating
religious arguments against embryo research, as with the 1990 debates, pro-eSCR speakers drew
attention to the points of convergence of the two sides (see Mulkay, 1997: 102). They pointed to
the special status of embryos beyond the 14-day period, and the protection that should be
applied to foetuses and children.
Pro-eSCR lobbyists, in anticipating theological arguments, posited the anti-eSCR lobby as
irrational, through parodying of the principle of ensoulment occurring at the point of
fertilisation:
Nature is profligate. We do not moum for wasted sperm and eggs, alive though
they are; nor for the three quarters of fertilised eggs that are lost before implant,
half of which are genetically impaired. As the Bishop of Oxford has said, 'If
every fertilised egg was indeed a soul ... then, according to these figures, three
quarters of heaven would be populated by souls that lived for less than a week'
(Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1215).
This science-based argument serves to normalise experimentation on embryos by claiming that
scientific practice merely mirrors 'natural' processes and is therefore within the confines of
acceptability. The 'natural' occurrence of miscarriage in ziw, is used to justify scientific uses of
embryos. Baroness O'Neill argued that:
In the normal course of events the cells of which this early stage of embryos is
composed have an open future. They may become part of a human foetus and
thence possibly, if all goes well, as a later stage of a human individual; or again, if
much goes well, they become part of a human placenta; or they may — this is
often the case — be shed. So I believe that we are not talking about a human
individual or a human foetus (HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 67).
Such arguments, in mobilising science-based discourses of human development are instrumental
in constructing the use of early embryos in research as 'natural' and unproblematic. The success
of the pro-eSCR lobby in the HFE Act debates was largely due to the 'transformation of
participants' understanding of the experimental subject of embryo research' (Mulkay, 1997: 132).
In using the term 'pre-embryo' to describe the pre-14 day old embryos, the meaning of the IVF-
related research was shifted from one involving experimentation on defenceless human being, to
research on unformed biological rruterial. Similarly, in the SCR debates, the success of the pro-
eSCR lobby can be attributed to the effective negation of the 'embryos are human beings'
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argument. The anti-eSCR lobby, thus, reiterated their basic moral (opposition to embryo
research (which itself was taken from the anti-abortion movement (Mulkay, 1997: 132)), while
the pro-eSCR lobby maintained their established science-based rhetoric that embryos under 14-
days old are merely biological material; a 'small collection of cells' (Joan Ruddock, HQ 17 Nov
2000: Col 1201). Again we see the framing of the debate according to scientific and medical
knowledge, re-asserting the superiority of the scientific worldview (see Irwin and Wynne, 1996).
Both sides of the SCR debates have engaged with and utilised more recent scientific research
which indicate that embryonic cells have the capacity to generate life. That is, embryonic stem
cells contain the information for developing into any cell type, thus procuring the conceptual
shift from the whole embryo to embryonic adis, as 'life itself' (Keller, 1995). This shift if evident
in the following quotes from anti-eSCR and pro-eSCR speakers respectively:
It is a most wonderful being, which has the capacity to initiate, sustain, control
and direct its own development. Its cells provide every different kind of cell and
tissue which make up the human body — skin, nerve, muscle, bone and other
organs (Ann Winterton, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1203).
[Embryonic stem cells] are pluripotent and capable of being precursors to a
variety of human cell types and immortal (Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 57).
Changes in the discourses of embryos must be located in the context of changes within science,
or more specifically, genetics. Recent developments in genetic research have transformed
biological discourse, as Keller has argued, 'The body of modern biology... has become just
another part of an informational network, now machine, now message, always ready for
exchange, each for the other' (Keller, 1995: 118; also see Franklin et al., 2000). This is pertinent
to the SCR debates, and in particular, the success of the pro-eSCR lobby, in that this shift
provides the basis for establishing embryonic SCR as benevolent. Today, the embryonic cell is
increasingly replacing the whole embryo as a metonymy of life. Whereas in the HFE Act
debates, the embryo was deemed to be the basic unit of life, the recent debates, whilst at once
maintaining this notion, also challenged it in applying the same rhetoric to the cell.
In utilising a science-based discourse of embryonic cells rather than focussing upon social or
ethical issues, the pro-eSCR speakers went on to argue that the costs of not doing this research
are the lives of people suffering from particular diseases. Anti-eSCR speakers, on the other hand,
used this to further consolidate their claims that embryos require protection:
When the Minster tells the House of Commons that the pre-14-day-old embryo
has the "power" to facilitate cures to mankind's misery, to me it simply
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underlines that, even at this early stage of development, we are not dealing with
something that is inconsequential (Lord Alton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 29).
This constant return to the 'embryo question' throughout the debate was, in many ways, the
safety net for the pro-eSCR lobby. Comparisons to IVF-related experimentation enabled the
side-stepping of broader issues - such as equal access to future health care provisions utilising
stem cell techniques - and secured their success through the fall back position of the existing
legislation within which the debates were contextualised:
Some people object because we are creating embryos. That is already done and
accepted (Lord Taveme, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 64).
We are not debating today the question of whether embryo research should be
allowed. Parliament decided in 1990 under the Act that such research ... could be
carried out (Lord Walton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 104-105).
3.4 Constructing a Demand: Curing Disease and Disability
As part of the strategy for separating reproductive and therapeutic cloning, pro-eSCR speakers
repeatedly enlisted the support of groups with diseases and disabilities who are likely to be
implicated in stem cell therapies. Groups such as people with Alzheimer's, Huntington's and
Diabetes were constructed through emotive stories of illness and loss. Whilst there was not any
consensus as to the means by which such groups could be helped, or even cured, both sides
agreed upon their state of 'desperation'. The pro-eSCR lobby focussed upon the potential of
SCR to cure while the anti-eSCR lobby argued that such claims were based upon false hopes and
were, therefore, manipulative. In drawing upon an article in Nature, Mulkay (1997) shows how
similar tactics were used during the 1990 debates. The article suggested that 'if a sufficiently
strong link could be established between research on human embryos and increased control over
genetic disability' then people's views about embryo research might be changed (Mulkay, 1997:
29). Hence, both cases focussed upon the benevolent applications for humans in aiming to
transform SCR from a controversial practice into an accepted one.
The construction of a demand, or user-pull, is the focal concern of the next section where I will
highlight the ways in which potential use-groups were recruited and caricatured during the
Parliamentary debates. In comparing the SCR debates with the 1990 IVF and embryo research
debates, I will reveal aspects of what Kirejczyk calls 'processes of entrenchment' (1995). Such
processes involve struggles over definitions of the new practices according to existing linkages
between 'technologies, problems, social interests, [and] arguments, socio-cultural values'
(Kirejczyk, 1995: 3). Tracing the lineage of pro-eSCR discourses about SCR to pro-embryo-
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research arguments associated with the 1990 debates reveals that processes of entrenchment of
new technologies follow similar patterns. That is, the creation of a demand for a new technology
is an essential component for gaining acceptance and consent more broadly.
The recruitment of potential user-groups was pivotal to the pro-eSCR lobby strategy and its
eventual success. Parliamentarians articulated a demand for SCR by patient groups, in part,
through references to letters received from individuals and organisations as well as emotive
accounts of people with diseases such as Parkinson's. Speakers argued that they had a moral
responsibility to these groups to allow eSCR to go ahead:
We have a duty to society and to the sufferers of degenerative diseases (Joan
Ruddock, HQ 17 Nov: Col 1211).
Those who are ill and in pain cannot wait. We should not be dilatory (Robert
Key, HQ 17 Nov: Col 1213).
Those who are suffering can only stand by and watch us decide (Baroness
Ashton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 87).
In an attack on anti-eSCR lobbyists, one speaker argued that 'some of the letters that I have had
opposing the proposal are somewhat lacking in compassion for their friends and neighbours'
(Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov: Col 1213). Thus, pro-eSCR speakers drew upon the rhetoric of
humanitarianism, arguing that to elevate the status of the embryo above that of people living
with disease and disability, as the anti-eSCR lobby was deemed to do, is to devalue existing life
and therefore, unethical (Gareth R Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1198; Evan Harris, HQ 17
Nov 2000: Col 1217).
The construction of potential users according to narratives of hope and fear posits them as
desperate. Gareth Thomas argued that without the development of SCR, many individuals along
with their families and friends will continue to live in 'hell' (Gareth Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000:
Col 1199); many others argued that these developments are the only chance for a cure for many
people. In a similar way, during the 1990 HFE Act debates, men and women experiencing
fertility problems or carrying genetic disorders were also discursively constructed as desperate
and according to narratives of hope and fear. In both debates the pro-embryo-research/pro-
eSCR lobby effectively articulated an account of scientific progress as alleviating pain and
suffering. As Franklin has argued, 'it is significant that the depiction of scientific achievements in
the form of new techniques are inserted within the narrative sequence framed by the hopes and
desires of infertile couples' (1997: 94). That is, science and technology are positioned as a bridge
at the point when 'life's 'natural' progression' is broken off by infertility or illness. Here, as with
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infertility treatment, the translation of the hopes and desires of groups with diseases and
disabilities into 'desperateness' helps to naturalise stem cell cloning through embedding it within
life's narrative sequence. This provides grounds for pro-eSCR speakers to position themselves as
responding in both an ethical and 'scientifically sound' manner:
If research into human in vitro fertilisation and subsequent implantation of the
embryo was not permitted, hundreds of thousands of couples today would not
be parents. ... Today we have the same opportunity. It is hoped that we can
allow but also regulate research that has the potential to help many others —
those suffering from degenerative disease, diabetes, cardiac disease and those
with injuries (Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 57).
This debate relates to the quality of life of sufferers from any dreadful diseases.
It is not just a matter of quality of life; for some, we are talking about a question
of life or death (Lord Dubs, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 40).
Millions of people — human beings — depend on us today not to take away
something which is most important to them — that is, their hope for a more
dignified happier and healthier future. That hope is becoming more realistic
now. ... They want to be free from the pain and suffering brought about by the
diseases which have attacked them (Baroness Greengross, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col
86).
As with other new technologies undergoing processes of 'entrenchment' (Kirejczyk, 1995),
proponents of eSCR must enable (or engender) the articulation of a demand for the new
technology as part of attaining cultural and political acceptability. Similar patterns of
entrenchment are being following in the case of the SCR debates to those followed byHFE Act
and embryo research. There is a notable similarity between the creation of a demand during the
IVF and the SCR debates. Mulkay (1997) notes how during the 1990 HFE Act debates the press
reported how embryo research 'would lead to more control over pain, further relief from
suffering, more frequent personal fulfilment and, hence, to greater joy and happiness' (1997: 70).
He then goes on to say that, 'this message of hope was regularly conveyed and reinforced by
means of highly personal narratives' (Mulkay, 1997: 70). Whilst Mulkay was referring to press
reportage, there was also evidence of such tactics within Parliament. Using science-based
arguments, pro-eSCR speakers clearly adopted the rhetoric of hope to justify claims that IVF
and related embryo research would engender 'a future in which countless people would have a
realistic hope of achieving a better life with the help of the practitioners of embryo research'
(Mulkay, 1997: 134).
The focus on potential cures for people was pivotal to the pro-eSCR lobby for gaining support
within parliament and also for gaining support from pressure groups and organisations outwith
Westminster. Potential users were constructed as not only demanding but also needing stem cell
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therapies; without them they would continue to suffer. The characterisation of people with
diseases and disabilities as desperate was a powerful rhetorical tool for the pro-eSCR lobby. The
following quote demonstrates how emotive descriptions establish the notion of 'desperateness'
of both those with diseases, along with their friends and families:
[Parkinson's disease] means the end of an ability to work for someone who
cannot rely on his or her body to carry out the most basic of functions -
standing up straight and still, without jerking, or articulation of thoughts clearly
to those he or she manages. Forced medical retirement comes next, and a
gradual restriction of the social circle. Next is a declining ability to participate in
conversations. There is a slow drop in the number of times the person can leave
the house. There is an ever-increasing reliance and dependence on others —
help with food, with getting into or out of bed, with going to the toilet, with
going on holiday and for simply spreading ones wings (Gareth R. Thomas, HC,
17 Nov 2000: Col 1199).
As Franklin argued in the context of infertility, 'the cause of 'desperateness', in other words, is
represented as a failure to conform to social norms' (1997: 91). In the case of infertility, it is a
failure to conform to conventional ideas of adult roles through the inability to 'found a family
(Franklin, 1997: 91). The 'desperateness' of individuals with disease and disabilities is a failure to
conform to conventional adult roles in terms of bodily functions, notions of dependency and
ability to engage in a range of 'normal' human activities.
Understanding the ideological processes involved in constructing a demand requires us to
consider the meanings of ageing, disease and disability within contemporary society. We cannot
detach the negotiation of entrenchment and processes of naturalisation of stem cell techniques
from meanings of health and illness. Recent research in the sociology of disability has sought to
deconstruct social and cultural meanings of disability, including the conflation of disability and
sickness, where the disabled body is conceived according to 'somatic and intellectual
abnormality' (Paterson and Hughes, 2000; also see Turner 1995). In conflating disability and
disease, the 'abnormal' body is constructed as 'an individual health problem and as an individual
existential crisis which requires a charitable response' (Paterson and Hughes, 2000: 39). Disease
and disability, like infertility, are stigmatised conditions, where once identified as such, 'all other
identifying marks are washed away (Pfeffer, 1987: 82). In sum, the understanding of potential
user-groups according to dominant meanings of the elderly, disabled and sick reinforces and
naturalises those ideas whilst simultaneously embedding stem cell techniques within established
conventions of the treatment of illness.
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Existing therapies and alternative research for developing treatments and cures were either
ignored or mobilised in a strategic manner during the parliamentary debate. Crucial to the
construction of potential user-groups as desperate was the construction of SCR as the only hope
of producing therapies that would cure people. Examples of relatives who are ill or have already
died were offered, providing emotive, personalised arguments intended to persuade both
potential users and other parliamentarians that the 'solution provided by the new technology is a
better one than the already existing options' (Kirejczyk, 1995: 2):
I have a daughter for whom the ageing process came depressingly early,
including the loss of her sight... Research maybe too late ... but for millions of
mankind [sic] yet to come ... delay is simply no option (Lord Rex, HL, 22 Jan
2001: Col 78-79).
When mymother died, I felt helpless. Tonight, I am at least not helpless. I could
not save mymum but tonight I can try to help to save someone else's (Baroness
Ashton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 87).
Alternative research projects were only referred to in order to demonstrate that they were
ineffectual as a cure or therapy. Therapies such as the injection of foetal brain cells to alleviate
the symptoms of Huntington's and Parkinson's disease were discussed so as only to argue that
such research is ethically problematic (see Lord Winston, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 100) and in
practical terms, unfeasible (Lord Walton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 105). Finally, the potential of
SCR to provide cures rather than 'expensive or incomplete' pharmacological therapies or
replacement surgery (Lord Rea, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 61), was a further argument mobilised by
the pro-eSCR lobby.
Claims made by pro-eSCR speakers that stem cell therapies would empty nursing homes, thus
relieving the 'burden on the health care system', framed their argument according to the
responsibilities of a parliamentarian: to consider both economic and individual factors. Such
arguments can also only intensify the 'somatisation of the self', where within a 'somatic society
matters of the body such as ageing, health and illness 'dominate the centre stage of political
debate and political process' (Turner, 1995; 1996). Here, disease and disability are defined as
individual and privatised, with matters of health and illness becoming an individual responsibility
rather than a collective, social responsibility. Conversely, where we do see health and illness
constructed as a public issue, as in the SCR debates, these are framed according to the terms of
reference of the state and the 'medical science establishment' (Spallone, 1986: 549). That is,
particular groups were defined according to processes of governance where people with various
diseases where constructed as desperate and requiring intervention at the level of politics on
behalf of science and medicine.
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In the debates, as framed within the Parliamentary context, it has become increasingly difficult
to raise broader questions about the appropriateness of cloning techniques. As Sexton has
argued, 'If enough real-life stories of individual tragedies which could supposedly be averted
through scientific progress can be played out one after the other ... it will seem churlish to ask
questions about public health systems, inequity, distribution, exploitation, racism, eugenics and
corporate control, all of which will recede safely into the background' (1999). The parliamentary
debates on medical applications of cloning techniques, under the official rubric of SCR,
simultaneously constructed and elicited the support of potential user-groups and sympathetic
groups. In representing the proposed research according to its medical potential and
foregrounding stories of suffering to demonstrate the existence of a demand, more poignant
questions were successfully nullified, and indeed, rendered irrelevant within the dominant
discourse.
3.5 Repositioning Infertility: From 'Desperate' to Donors
The continuation of eSCR for developing human therapies requires the co-operation of
'couples'12 undergoing fertility treatment to donate their spare embryos for research purposes.
The views of people undergoing fertility treatment, however, have been conspicuously
underrepresented either in or outside of Parliament. Whilst there has been plenty of debate over
the embryos in question, little attention has been paid to the sources of embryos for SCR:
women undergoing IVF. Where we do see references to those people expected to donate their
embryos, the discourses mobilised are revealing of social and cultural processes involving ideas
of health and illness in the context of reproduction.
Explicit references to the sources of embryos were always made by pro-eSCR speakers in the
Parliamentary debates. Couples undergoing fertility treatment were rhetorically recruited as allies
during the debate as 'public spirited people' (Lord Walton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 107) wanting to
donate their spare embryos for benevolent purposes rather than have them 'destroyed'.
Donating embryos for SCR, it was argued, resulted in embryos playing 'a useful role instead of
12
In using the term 'couple' I acknowledge that fertility treatment, whilst rhetorically treating
the 'couple', actually involves medical interventions on the female body to a much greater
extent than the male body. 'Except for the selection and laboratory preparation of the sperm
for fertilisation, the whole procedure is performed on women' (Kirejczyk, 1993: 518; also see
Crowe, 1990) regardless of whether infertility is due to female or male fertility problems.
Having said this, I am assuming the decision-making processes for embryo donation
involves a complex negotiation between the man and woman trying to conceive, and health
care professionals attached to the clinic.
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vanishing into thin air' (Lord Rea, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 59). By this connection, those who
donate their embryos would be 'contributing to the well-being of current and future
generations' (Lord Rea, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 59).
This emotive rhetoric, as described above, is in keeping with dominant discourses of
reproduction in science and medicine that couples undergoing IVF come to be familiar with. A
central feature of reproductive discourses is one that entails ideas, or indeed, judgements about
what constitutes a normal or an abnormal body. For those undergoing fertility treatment, issues
around normality and abnormality are particularly pertinent due to their embodied negotiation of
'deficient', infertile bodies, and IVF procedures such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis.13
Ettorre refers to this as a 'disablist discourse' (2000). The management of bodies during fertility
treatment by experts is, in part, organised according to broader social models of disability, which
characterises bodies according to 'rigid definitions of health and illness' (Ettorre, 2000: 404).
Given that those required to donate embryos will already be confronted with issues concerning
disability through reproductive practices such as embryo selection, amniocentesis, and pre-natal
screening, they are likely to have already developed an 'antipathy to what is considered to be
undesirable physical, sensory or mentally-related difference or 'abnormality in their bodies'
(Ettorre, 2000: 412-413). The call to arms by pro-eSCR speakers for 'couples' to donate spare
embryos to 'advance the common good' (Joan Ruddock, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1210) is
dependent upon already established complex social and cultural constructions of health and
illness. Therefore, there is less rhetorical work to be done by the pro-eSCR lobby to encourage
couples to donate their spare embryos.
In the context of embryo donation for medical research, couples are subject to discourses of
responsibility. These discourses of responsibility extend beyond responsibilities to a potential
child, but also include responsibilities to the science and medical profession with which they are
engaged. Joan Ruddock, in her speech, recruited the support of donors in arguing that:
More than most, they have an acute sense of what life is. They also have lengthy
and close contact with medical science and an appreciation of the efforts of
those who work in the service of human health and well-being (HQ 17 Nov
2000: Col 1210).
13
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a technique used for screening embryos for
genetic diseases/disorders before they are implanted into the woman's uterus. At present
this technique is in its early stages of development and is only used for those at high risk (1
in 4) of passing on terminal disease to their offspring (Franklin et al., 2001). The potential for
widespread use of PGD for preventing the transmission of hereditary disorders raises
pertinent questions about constructions of health and illness, normal and abnormal bodies.
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Here the discourse of gift exchange is mobilised, where in return for medical science helping
couples to conceive a child, they have a responsibility to donate their spare embryos for SCR.
There is a presumption that in participating in fertility treatment, 'couples' are in agreement with
the dominant scientific model of embryos and life. This greatly simplifies the relationship
between individuals undergoing fertility treatment, their embryos and the clinicians, which are
complex and often contradictory. Whilst on the one hand fertility clinics trade on the
construction of embryos as potential sources of life, and actively encourage the engagement of
'couples' in embryo selection and transfer processes (Goslinga-Roy, 2000). On the other hand,
clinicians also 'destroy embryos as part of the IVF process, requiring the discursive separation
of 'good' embryos from 'bad' ones. This is achieved through employing developmental criteria
as recorded in the lab 'exempting certain embryos from the moral and legal standards that apply
to embryos as potential sources of life in the lab' (Cussins, 1996: 587).
3.6 Adult versus Embryonic Stem Cells
Debates regarding the use of embryonic versus adult stem cells14 became a key controversy
within the Parliamentary context. Concerns were articulated according to the scientific, ethical
and political issues surrounding their respective advantages and disadvantages. Permeating the
SCR debates were discourses of progress where SCR was intimately associated with the
development of science, the economy and the human race. Whilst the pro and anti-eSCR lobbies
envisaged different methods for developing stem cell therapies, in terms of the sources of cells,
both sides talked uncritically of the role of SCR in furthering progress. As already indicated
above, neither side considered alternative therapies, but instead focussed upon the relative costs
and benefits of using embryos or adult tissue for SCR purposes. That SCR is characterised by
scientific uncertainty and controversy, often meant that this particular issue was, ultimately,
fought on the grounds of the 'embryo question'. In the following section I will focus upon some
of the underlying assumptions that permeated questions over sources of stem cells and how the
pro and anti-eSCR lobbies responded to this controversy.
Speakers advocating the use of embryos as a source of stem cells framed their arguments
according to seven main, albeit overlapping, elements. Firstly, as already discussed earlier, the
14
Embryonic stem cells are derived from embryos under fourteen days old. Stem cells are
extracted from the embryo and then cultivated in the lab to produce stem cell lines. An adult
stem cell is derived from tissue such as bone marrow or blood from a range of sources
including umbilical cords and people of all ages. Stem cell research, regardless of the
source, aims to understand the process of cell development and differentiation: the process
by which cells develop into particular cell types such as brain tissue, and to develop methods
to direct cells to develop into particular cell types.
57
use of embryos for SCR was not seen to challenge the 1990 HFE Act. That embryos would not
be used beyond the established 14-day limit and the research aims are essentially therapeutic,
gave credence to claims that there are no 'great new ethical issue[s] here' (Gareth R. Thomas,
HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1197). Secondly, delaying the legislative amendment to allow embryonic
SCR, it was argued, would slow down the research process and the expediency for developing
stem cell therapies. Arguments for the swift development of stem cell therapies were made in
conjunction with four other points: the co-development of adult and embryonic SCR, long-term
research would not involve using embryos, the need for cures, and the role of SCR and
biotechnology in the TJK economy. Each of these points will be addressed in the following
discussion.
Debates over the sources of stem cells were largely framed according to scientific and technical
issues. The anti-eSCR lobby argued that adult stem cells are 'easier to manage' in liw and have
already been demonstrated to have health care benefits for many conditions (Ann WInterton,
HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1204, 1205). As in the 1990 embryo research debates (see Kirejczyk
1999: 93), the parliamentary opponents of embryonic SCR switched from a rhetoric of fear to
one of hope when discussing alternatives to embryonic stem cells. Speakers such as Ann
Winterton, again using scientific rhetoric and evidence, argued that there is insufficient scientific
evidence to support claims that embryonic SCR will 'kick start' therapeutic breakthroughs (HQ
19 Dec 2000: Col 243). Conversely, in drawing upon published scientific papers, adult stem cell
sources such as umbilical cords and bone marrow were cited as having already provided some
therapeutic benefits (Bill Tynan, HQ 19 Dec 2000: Col 251). Furthermore, it was argued, the
'deep divisions within the medical scientific community constitutes a strong reason for deferring
making a definitive, irreversible decision today (Baroness Cox, IYL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 55).
In agreeing with the potential of adult stem cell sources, pro-eSCR speakers, however, argued
that in order to ensure the development of therapies scientists should pursue both embryonic
and adult SCR
There is not an either/or choice between adult stem cells and embryonic stem
cells ... The proposals do not suggest that research into adult stem cells should
be stopped. ... However, we cannot stop research in one area in the hope that
another area mayyield results (Dr Evan Harris, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1220).
It is thought that [embryonic stem cells] will increase the speed at which we
obtain knowledge, [and] increase the range of diseases that we can treat and
trigger the first breakthrough (Yvette Cooper, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1228).
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Again, arguments for the co-development of both embryonic and adult SCR were framed
according to scientific and technical issues, the 'desperation' of potential user-groups and
'speed'. Scientific controversies concerning the two sources of stem cells were mobilised to
justify the need to develop both techniques: if scientists are unsure as to which stem cell source
will provide the breakthrough, then both avenues should be pursued. Discussions between
scientists and MPs were recalled as scientific evidence within the debates. In acknowledging the
importance of adult SCR, pro-eSCR speakers argued that many scientists believe that adult stem
cells do not have the 'plasticity' of embryonic stem cells and, therefore, 'their use and
applications are much more limited' (Lord Dubs, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 40).
Pro-eSCR speakers lauded the significance of embryo research in developing therapies. Claims
that embryonic stem cells would speed up the research process (Gareth R. Thomas, HQ 17 Nov
2000: Col 1198) and 'trigger the first breakthrough' (Yvette Cooper, HQ 17 Nov 2000: 1228) in
understanding processes of cell differentiation, were tempered with the inevitable redundancy of
embryonic SCR. At the point of application adult stem cells rather than embryos, it was argued,
would be used for human therapies:
The beauty of the procedures we are discussing today is that they have the
potential to make themselves redundant in the not to distant future. When the
scientists have leamt enough from the cells from an embryo source, it is not
beyond the bounds of possibility that they may in future be able to use cells
from the adult to be treated, which will have no likelihood of rejection (Baroness
Walmsley, HL, 22 Jan 2001: 102).
The likelihood, in future, of being able to use adult stem cells or even adult cells
for therapeutic purposes requires, initially, research on embryonic stem cells,
cells that are pluripotent and capable of being precursors to a variety of human
cell types and immortal (Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 57).
Thus positing that a decision to permit embryonic SCR is a short to mid-term practice and
legislative change to permit this will simply bring forth therapeutic advances. In treating stem
cell therapies as a homogeneous area, where a breakthrough in one disease such as Parkinson's
signals a breakthrough writ large, is misleading. The fragmented nature of scientific research
according to specialist areas, which themselves have developed according to differing historical
trajectories, suggests that a unified breakthrough for all the diseases and disorders listed by
scientists is a false supposition. Whilst serving as a placatory mechanism, arguments that there
will be one particular point at which embryonic research is no longer needed is, therefore, overly
simplistic and monolithic in its model of science.
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As indicated in the introduction, the outcome of the SCR debates was deemed to be indicative
of the state of science, or more specifically biotechnology, within the UK in terms of public
support and science-public relations. Speakers in favour of eSCR often contextualised eSCR
according to the role of biotechnology in the UK economy. In amending the HFE Act to
incorporate SCR the UK economy would, in turn, be bolstered. This was further supported by
the British Prime Minister at the European Biosciences Conference in November 2000, aiming
to bring together the views of the biotechnology industry and parliament, crucially, during the
week when SCR debates took place in the House of Commons. Blair warned against a growing
'anti-science' culture within Britain, announcing his support of eSCR and the 'revolutionary
potential of biotechnology (cited in Clark, 2000; BBC Online, Friday 17 Nov 2000). In debating
the economic value of eSCR developments and the potential to develop cures for a wide range
of diseases, demonstrates the successful bringing together of the interests of the biotechnology
industry and government.
Claims focussing upon the economic benefits of SCR were not only made with reference to
alleviating the 'burden' on the health care system through cures, but also through elevating UK
scientists working in biotechnology to world leaders in their field. Indecision, it was argued,
would lead to the UK losing its lead in the field of genetics (Baroness Kennedy, HL, 22 Jan
2001: Col 47; Baroness Cox, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 55; Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 58),
with the additional problem of leading scientists leaving the UK to continue their research
abroad (Lord Hunt, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 94). It is perhaps not insignificant that two days
before the first parliamentary debate The Times ran a story with the headline 'Britain's biotech
talent may flee 'hostile' climate', claiming that UK public attitudes to science were the worst in
the world, and that research was suffering (Henderson, 15 Nov 2000). Additionally, within
parliament, it was stressed by Baroness Kennedy, that the UK would 'be faced with pressure to
import expensive stem cell therapies, possibly those developed in an ethically dubious and less
well-regulated manner' (ITL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 47). Thus, the framing of pro-amendment
arguments according to the role of eSCR, and biotechnology more generally, within the UK
economy, also contextualised the proposed amendment within a the broader context of a
biotechnology'race' akin to the space race.
3.7 Conclusions
Within this chapter I have shown how dominant discourses in the SCR debates, as (reproduced
in Parliament, provide interesting analytical nodes from which we can observe the jostling over
meanings and rhetoric by those actors and agencies involved. It is not insignificant that the UK
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debates regarding the future of SCR and, by default, the development of cloning techniques
have hinged upon an amendment to the 1990 HFE Act. The introduction of stem cell
technologies occurred through the amendment to legislation that regulates a relatively
normalised practice. This suggests that Mulkay was indeed correct in his supposition that:
[TJhere will... be no mad rush down the slippery slope. Rather, in Britain, there
will be a cautious, gradual, almost imperceptible movement into a future in
which nothing will be certain except that, in the long run, the practices,
expectations, values and morality associated with human reproduction will have
been transformed (1997: 154).
This chapter illustrates how the rhetorical construction of SCR in the parliamentary debates slips
seamlessly into existing ideas, values and practices, particularly those relating to health, illness
and scientific progress. Invocations of the 1990 HFE Act have served to frame stem cell
developments on relatively safe ground by focussing upon embryo research. Broader
implications of SCR and cloning related developments, such as the financial cost of health care
access to any therapies developed and implications upon sociocultural categories of life, death
and nature were largely muted.
The range of lobbying activities and rhetorical repertoires mobilised by eSCR advocates has been
central to eventual amendment to the 1990 HFE Act. As outlined in this chapter, scientists have
lobbied politicians and provided 'educational' sessions in order to legitimate the use of embryos
for SCR In basing political decision making on the accounts of pro-SCR scientists and
privileging 'scientific' claims about the 'embryo question', for instance, the authority of scientific
knowledge is reproduced (see Gieryn, 1995: 435). Significant to this process, is the
marginalisation of alternative versions of the future of SCR and cloning-related developments.
Whilst Hp-service was paid to controversies surrounding SCR ultimately, the grounds on which
the debate took place were achieved through what Gieryn calls 'boundary-work' (1995).15
Whilst this chapter has focussed upon the rhetorical manoeuvrings relating to the SCR debates
within ParHament, the following chapters will exphcate the range of meanings attached to SCR
and cloning and its related practices. Building upon some of the analytical themes introduced in
this chapter, I will move on to explore the accounts of scientists working in the field of SCR and
cloning, and relevant social groups. Firstly, in chapter 4,1 will outline the theoretical frameworks
and conceptual tools that have informed my analysis of the SCR and cloning debates and
analysis of interview transcripts with scientists and other relevant social groups. Secondly, in
15
The concept of boundary-work will be further explored in Chapter 5 where I will examine
how scientists construct rhetorical boundaries such as that between science and society.
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chapter 5 I present scientists' discourses - revealing the rhetorical devices and repertoires
mobilised by scientists when accounting for their work in the field of eSCR. After outlining the
centrality of pro-eSCR scientists' constructions of this area in this chapter, it is then important to
develop a deeper understanding of those accounts that have underpinned the parliamentary
debates. Thirdly, in chapters 6 and 7,1 go on to analyse the issues as defined by other relevant
social groups - which in this research are the patient groups listed in chapter 2. The inclusion of
different publics' understanding of the issues surrounding SCR and cloning-related
developments is an important step in revealing the omissions, the gaps and the silences in
'dominant' accounts of this controversial area. In moving away from debates framed according
to 'operational categories of government' (Irwin, 2001: 9), I am thus able to explore multiple
constructions of SCR and cloning as they relate to various peoples' everyday experiences and
social location.
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CHAPTER IV
Understanding Transformations in Science-Public
Relations: The Approaches of Beck and cPUS
4.1 Introduction: Troubled Science-Public Relations?
As already noted in the previous chapter, the SCR and human cloning debates have taken place
within a broader context of mounting concern in the scientific establishment about strained
science-public relations. Scientists and social scientists alike have perceived an increasing erosion
to the privileged status of science in society, and turned their attention to what has been termed,
the current 'crisis of legitimacy. As Mike Michael has argued:
Gone are the days when members of the public gazed, wide-eyed with credulity,
at the great men of science; lost forever is the era when the layperson listened in
silent admiration and humble wonder to announcements of the latest scientific
discovery; never again shall we hear the awed gasps of the masses as the covers
are removed from the newest shiny technological artefact (1996a: 105).
This rather dramatic quote suggests a growing public disenchantment towards the scientific
enterprise - especially in connection with 'exotic' technologies (Michael, 2000) such as those
associated with the new genetics. That the traditional standing of science and scientific expertise
is increasingly under threat is exemplified in the growing number of orgamsations and interest
groups contributing to recent controversies, creating new and alternative forms of expertise. For
example, organisations such as the Genetic En^neering Network,1 GeneWatdo UK,2 and The
Comerhouse,3 exemplify the growth of alternative sources of 'expert' knowledge. Such
organisations provide 'alternative' accounts of genetic developments, introducing issues such as
economic interests, biodiversity and different images of the future direction of this area of
research. And, whilst it may be historically inaccurate to claim that challenges to science are an
entirely new phenomena (see for example Tumey, 1998; Collins and Evans, 2002: 275), there are
1
The Genetic Engineering Network are opposed to genetic technologies and the corporate
interests in this area. See http://www.qeneticsaction.org.uk
2 GeneWatch UK describes itself as a not-for-profit public interest group, that aims to raise
awareness of the ethical aspects of genetic technologies and applications of genetic
knowledge. See http://www.qenewatch.org
3
The Cornerhouse is an NGO that aims to support democratic and community movements
on a range of issues, including genetics, SCR and cloning. See
http://www.thecornerhouse.orq.uk
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indications that responses to this problem by both publics and experts have altered as challenges
become 'normal rather than exceptional' (Van Loon, 2002: 25).
The problem of legitimacy and scientific authority is acutely apparent in the SCR and cloning
debates, to which those scientists involved are keenly sensitised. Located at the interface
between scientists and publics, the public debates on SCR and cloning can be seen as 'points of
connection' where trust and authority can be built up and maintained or challenged and
undermined (see Giddens, 1990: 88). As already noted in Chapter 3, some scientists have
regarded the public debates on SCR and cloning as a key site for redressing science-public
relations, where the outcome could make or break public confidence not only in SCR but in the
whole field of genetics and biotechnology (see section 3.2). At stake for many scientists engaged
in the debates is the constitution of expertise and expert identity vis-a-vis non-expertise and lay
identity. This is further complicated by the range of competing constructions of SCR and
cloning offered by different scientists and other 'experts' (e.g., politicians), where one version is
yet to reach stabilisation (see Pinch and Bijker, 1984). To this extent, the public SCR and cloning
debates are sites were particular definitions of expertise are being constituted in ways that
include (and, therefore, benefit) some positions while excluding others.
Both scientists and social scientists alike have acknowledged that relations between science and
the public are undergoing processes of transformation that have broader implications for
expertise in general. In the new knowledge-based market, scientists' expertise is increasingly
located alongside other forms of expertise that have emerged, such as through patient group
organisations and other interest groups (see Novas and Rose, 2000; also, McNeil, 1998). The
reconfiguration of power relations between experts and the public illustrates that the
interrelations between science and the public are not static and fixed, but are dynamically
negotiated and constructed through ongoing associations that are in need of 'constant repair and
reproduction' (Michael, 1996a: 129). Rather like the concept of hegemony, science-public
relations do not take place on a level playing field and yet the privileged status of scientific
expertise is never 'won' or achieved - it is always in a state of becoming.
The SCR and cloning debates, then, are a compelling site for exploring scientists' discursive
mechanisms and stratagems for dealing with waning public trust in science and its institutions,
as well as gaining insights into the 'internal politics' of controversies about science. If scientist
working on SCR do indeed feel that their authority is increasingly undermined, then what
interpretive practices are employed when (reconstituting expertise? Do scientists continue to
appeal to binaries between expert/public, inside/outside, science/social and if so, are they
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renegotiated in new ways? In posing this, it is also important to explore how 'non-experts'
constitute SCR and cloning and the range of discursive repertoires mobilised. To this extent, we
must ask how publics conceive of the relationship between scientists and publics? What are the
points of convergence and divergence between scientists' and publics (in this case, patient
support groups) in their accounts of SCR and cloning?
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical approaches and conceptual tools that
underpin the following three chapters. In exploring the multiple ways in which SCR and cloning
are constructed, as well as sensitising my analysis to processes of inclusion and exclusion, I have
turned to two related 'meta-theories' within social science: the work of Ulrich Beck and the sub-
discipline within STS referred to as critical approaches to the public understanding of science
(cPUS). These approaches have informed my understanding and analysis of the intersection of a
number of core issues at stake in the SCR and cloning debates: expertise, risk, (un)certainty and
(mis)trust. In particular, I argue that the theoretical, conceptual and methodological insights of
Beck and cPUS provide a critical backdrop to the SCR and cloning debates for developing
incisive analyses of the nature and extent of transformations in science-society relations.
4.2 The Paradoxes of Reflexive Modernity: Risk and Uncertainty in Expert
Systems
The theoretical underpinnings of this chapter can be traced back to Ulrich Beck's 'Risk Society'
thesis (1992). In this seminal work, Beck provides an analysis of transformations that are
occurring within contemporary Western societies that continues to contribute to a range of
debates, encompassing a number of substantive areas including political life, interpersonal
relationships, employment and, most importantly for my own purposes, developments in
science and technology. By analysing these areas of society and social life, Beck illuminates
transformations that are taking place within modernity, captured in his theoretical concept of
'reflexive modernity'.4 Processes of reflexive modernisation relate to an epochal shift from
modernity - as associated with industrial society and the project of enlightenment - to a new
reflexive modernity (Beck, 1992). The concept of reflexive modernity involves the idea that
modernity's institutions have become 'self-refuting' where the project of 'modernity' is
confronted by itself and begins, in turn, to transform its own principles and institutions (Beck,
Bonss and Lau, 2003). As the logical development of the project of modernity, processes of
4
The notion of reflexive modernisation has been co-developed but in different ways by Ulrich
Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash during the later 1980s to early 1990s (see Beck,
1994: n1).
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reflexive modernisation characterise a distinct phase within modernity (Beck does not adopt the
termpostoiodernity), which Beck, Bonss and Lau have recently referred to as 'the rmderrazation of
rmdern societf (2003: 1, original emphasis).5 Inherent in this mode of analysis is an attempt to
capture the 'delicate balancing between the contradictions of continuity and rupture within
modernity' (Beck, 1992: 9). Hence, Beck puts forward a non-linear model of change,
characterised by tensions and contradictions where our modes of thought and action are caught
between the past, present and future; tradition and reflexivity (Beck, 1992: 20).
Rather than continuing with a description of Beck's thesis (since a thorough exegesis of his
work is a task that would be too wide-ranging and complex to be adequately conducted in this
discussion), I will provide a brief overview of Beck's account of the risk society. For Beck, risk is
a consequence of processes of modernisation and, therefore, intimately linked to reflexivity. For
these reasons, I will focus upon the implications of risk for transforming our notions of
expertise - and specifically scientific expertise - in contemporary western societies. In doing so,
I will explicate Beck's understanding of the contemporary condition as one characterised by the
dissolution of certainties and where 'natural-scientific categories' no longer enjoy a monopoly on
risk calculation and definition (see Beck 1992; 1995).
Central to Beck's analysis of the paradoxical processes of reflexive modernisation, is an account
of the transformative consequences of risks which have proliferated within (first) modernity.
According to Beck, with the 'exponentially growing productive forces in the modernization
process' there has been a qualitative change in social order from the creation and distribution of
'goods' (such as wealth creation) to one of flows of 'goods' and 'bads' (1992: 19; see also
Lupton, 1999; Van Loon, 2002). This shift - which is intimately linked to the production and
dissemination of knowledge (e.g. the mass media, new communications technologies, and an
improvement in educational standards and literacy levels) - locates science and technology as
central to the processes of reflexive modernisation. For instance, developments in science and
technology have themselves created 'hazardous side effects', such as environmental threats and
other threats to human life (Beck, 1992). These unintended and unforeseen side effects of
modernisation have created an excess of risks that have come to dominate both public and
private arenas, thus generating a 'risk consciousness' where individuals are increasingly
preoccupied with risks (Beck, 1992).
5
Distinctions between these two phases are also referred to as first and second modernity
or simple and reflexive modernity (Beck, Bonss and Lau, 2003; Lash, 2003). More recently,
the latter stage has been identified as re-modernization (Beck, Bonss and Lau, 2003; Latour,
2003).
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Whilst recognising that risks - in terms of threats to lives - have existed within previous epochs,
Beck argues that there are a number of features that are specific to contemporary risks.
Significantly, risks are 'open-ended events, rather than events that have a foreseeable end'
(Lupton, 1999: 62). To this extent, risks cannot be predicted, controlled or avoided and are no
longer delimited in time or space. A further feature of contemporary risks, such as food toxins
or radiation, is that they are largely imperceptible to the human senses and, therefore, transcend
traditional social categories, such as class, according to which risks had previously been
distributed in western societies. As Adam and Van Loon argued, 'the essence of risk is not that
it is happening, but that it nipjot be happening' (2000: 2, original emphasis). And it is in this
context, that 'risks exist in scientific knowledge rather than in everyday experience' (Lupton,
1999: 64).
The complexity and open-endedness of contemporary risks, has resulted in traditional means of
scientific risk assessment (that are based upon calculation, management and avoidance) losing
both their efficacy and authority. According to Beck, 'techno-scientific rationality' has failed
because expert systems relating to science and technology continue to be grounded in the
institutional and methodological approaches of modern science (e.g. non-reflexive) (1992: 59).
Experts' use of the language of certainty and empirical accuracy in relation to risk assessment,
exemplifies for Beck, how the sciences are 'entirely incapable of reacting adequately to civilizational
risks' (1992: 59, original emphasis). The industry of 'risk assessment' is a modern attempt to deal
with risks inherent reflexive modernity and is, therefore, destined to fail. As Adam and Van
Loon have argued, non-reflexive responses to risks 'belong to the realm of rational action and
scientific certainty, a realm of clear distinctions between safety and danger, truth and falsity, past
and future' (2000: 7). In continuing to reproduce non-reflexive accounts of risks, modern expert
institutions undermine themselves and invite public scepticism through their failure 'to provide
... securitywhilst pretending to do so' (Wynne, 1996: 56).
That risks are both more messy and more insidious has resulted in high degrees of public
ambivalence towards 'expert systems' where the cognitive authority of expert systems no longer
goes unchallenged.6 Challenges to scientists' authority by public groups have been brought
6
I have taken 'expert systems' as referring not simply to individual experts, but to a complex
range of social and cultural networks that contribute to the construction and authorisation of
expertise, including institutional mechanisms, professional practices and knowledge
production (see Giddens 1990, 1991; Lash, 2000; Van Loon: 2002). It is important to note
that the concept of 'expert systems' vis-a-vis reflexive modernity has been separately
developed by Giddens and Beck, albeit with different meanings. Giddens focuses upon how
trust in expert systems help us to achieve 'ontological security' and, therefore, distrust in
expert systems engenders 'ontological insecurity'. It is the latter that is characteristic of
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about, according to Beck, as a result of a public knowledge and awareness of contemporary risks
which coincides with the demystification of the sciences (1992: 59). There has been, he argues, a
growing consciousness of the involvement of science and technology in the origin and growth
of risks, as well as their failure to assess or contain them. Specific to the public perception of
risks in the contemporary era is the development of a greater 'sensitivity towards the unintended
consequences of our actions which includes an awareness of an 'open' rest-category, that is, the
inevitability of other unintended consequences we do not and cannot yet know' (Adam and Van
Loon, 2000: 13; see also Wynne, 2002: 469). The very nature of contemporary risks, as
ambiguous and open-ended, renders them open to social definition and construction and,
therefore, inherently political (see Beck, 1992: 23; Adam and Van Loon, 202: 4). According to
Beck, the ambiguity of our knowledge of the causes and potential solutions to risks, marks the
'return of uncertainty to society ... [where] ... no one ... or everyone is an expert' (1994: 8-9).
That is, if cognitive authority no longer resides within expert systems, then expertise becomes
decentralised and pluralized. Or to take his argument one step further, expertise, in the
conventional sense, no longer exists at all but instead is challenged by new and alternative forms
of 'expertise' which requires the researcher to develop new analytical and conceptual tools.
In this respect, developments in science and technology have opened up new spaces for critical
engagement with those very mechanisms that have produced them. Risk conflicts are no longer
confined to the realm of 'experts' within science and technology, but also include a range of
public groups. It is here that Beck has identified the emergence of 'sub-polities', where risks
have 'activated' citizens into alternative initiative groups and political movements, giving rise to
competing rationalities which reflect a range of interests (Beck, 1992: 195). These sub-political
activities have challenged the cognitive authority of science and technology, created new forms
of expertise and, therefore, opened up the political sphere (Beck, 1992).
What Beck's theory of risk and reflexive modernisation offers us, then, is a critical approach for
understanding the current transformations that are taking place within western societies. This
approach, in particular, offers a dynamic model of social change as brought about by the
pervasive sense of risk. The production of an excess of 'bads' by modernity's institutions of
science and technology are beginning to undermine their own promises and programmes
(Wynne, 1996). As traditional modes of risk assessment and avoidance fail, public trust in those
reflexive modernity which has occurred as a result of a shift in trust relations which are now
founded not on face-to-face interaction, but through relations with abstract systems (see for
example, Giddens, 1990: chapter 3; Lash, 1994: 116-119). In sharp contrast, for Beck
'reflexivity is based not in trust but in distrust in expert-systems' (cited in Lash, 1994: 116).
Thus, expert systems are an obstacle to the achievement of security and by extension, to the
radical potential of reflexivity.
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expert systems wanes, and uncertainty and ambivalence increase. In turn, new political
constellations emerge which offer alternative interpretations of risks, thus contributing to the
erosion of the legitimacy of science and technology as the authorities on risk definition.
However, this is not to suggest that the project of Enlightenment and progress as pursued via
science and technology has been abandoned - Beck does not advocate an anti-science position.
Instead, as Furedi argues, challenges to expert systems mark one of the ironies of our times:
'while society is more dependent on science and technology than ever before, it is also more
suspicious of their consequences' (1997: 131). This returns us to the paradoxes of the processes
of reflexive modernisation, where change is characterised as non-linear and our modes of
thought and action are caught between tradition and reflexivity.
It is within this context of growing overt, public ambivalence towards expert scientific expertise
that scientists and related experts are operating. And as Van Loon has argued in his analysis of
the risk society, whilst it is important to note that challenges to the cognitive authority of science
and technology do not constitute a new phenomena, 'such challenges have become normal
rather than exceptional' (2002: 25).7 However, again we should note that reflexive and traditional
forms co-exist. This is to say that whilst the authority of expert systems are currently being
challenged, their power and influence are far from usurped. In terms of defining, constructing and
legitimating risks, experts such as scientists and politicians remain in key social positions as
mediators of knowledge (see Adam and Van Loon, 2002: 4; Beck, 1992: 23). Hence, with the
potential dissolution of old certainties and increasing mistrust and scepticism of expert systems,
conflicts over interpretations of risk become central (see also Irwin, 1995: 44).
4,3 Reflexivity in Traditional Models of PUS: The Shoring Up of Authority or
Public Inclusion?
The development of Beck's Risk Society thesis has converged with what has since come to be
known as critical approaches to the public understanding of science (cPUS) (see, for example,
Irwin and Wynne, 1996a).8 During the 1980s, writers such as Brian Wynne had also turned their
attention to issues of risk, credibility and expertise vis-a-vis science-public relations in
contemporary society. Whilst Beck and cPUS initially developed separately, the approach of
cPUS has since gone on to critically engage with and advance Beck's theory of risk and our
7 See Turney's Frankenstein's Footsteps (1998) for an historically informed discussion of the
various ways in which science, technology and medical interventions into the human body
have been met by public resistance.
8
A point of clarification: I will refer to critical approaches to the public understanding as
'cPUS', and traditional, institutionalised models of science-public relations as 'PUS'. The
differences between these will be apparent as the discussion develops.
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understanding of processes of reflexive modernisation as they relate to expert systems in science
and technology (see Wynne, 1996). As this sub-field of science and technology studies has
developed, cPUS has become heterogeneous in its theoretical and methodological approaches.9
Some of the most prominent work carried out in the sub-discipline of cPUS has come from a
number of case studies that have illuminated upon the political nature of risks by charting the
ways in which experts and the public interact. In taking a range of issues and debates as then-
subject matter - including radioactive fall-out (Wynne, 1992; Public Understanding of Science,
1992), agricultural herbicides (Irwin, 1995), BSE/v-QD (Van Loon, 2002), xenotransplantation
(Brown and Michael, 2002), and the new genetics (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Amos, 1997,
1998a, 1998b; Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 1999; Cunningham-Burley and Kerr, 1999) - these
studies have contributed to theories of reflexive modernisation and risk society. Spanning across
disciplines such as anthropology, science and technology studies, public health sciences and
sociology, cPUS approaches have sought to problematise how the categories of 'expert', 'public',
and 'knowledge' are defined and bounded by a range of different actors (Wynne, 1996: 46). Such
perspectives aim to capture the social and cultural dimensions of science-public/expert-lay
relations and, in turn, extend our understanding of reflexive processes, theories of reflexive
modernisation and risk in contemporary society.
In this section, I will introduce a number of key arguments put forward by cPUS writers,
especially as they relate to some of the ways in which expert systems have grappled with the
consequences of reflexive processes within society. In particular, I will focus upon
institutionalised PUS initiatives that have attempted to redress science's crisis of legitimacy, and
consider to what extent these reflect reflexive or traditional conceptions of risk and expertise.
Although scientists remain in key social positions, the problems generated by uncertainty, trust
and legitimacy have not gone unnoticed, but have taken a prominent place in debates around
science and technology. As Irwin has noted, since the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution,
scientists have recognised that in order to promote and maintain public acquiescence towards
science, they must play an explicit political role in the new world order (1995: 12; see also
Yearley, 2000). Irwin argues that from the establishment of the Mechanics Institute in the early
nineteenth century, through to the Royal Society's 'Public Understanding of Science' report in
1985, certain assumptions about science and the public have dominated these activities. In
particular, 'the public' are conceptualised as 'uneducated' and 'ignorant' in matters relating to
9 Whilst cPUS research tends to adopt qualitative research methods, a team of researchers
across Europe have conducted research into the public understanding of biotechnology
using a more sophisticated approach to quantitative research methods (see Durant, Bauer
and Gaskell, 1998; Gaskell and Bauer, 2001; Bauer and Gaskell, 2002).
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science and technology, with the assumption being that science is central to the future
betterment of individuals and society (Irwin, 1995: 14). Greater understanding of science, it was
believed, would lead to greater acceptance and support for science and technology. Hence, a
fundamental issue underlying scientists' concerns about public understanding of science was to
generate legitimacy for scientific expertise and to reassert scientists as mediators, par ex (silence, of
the natural world.
Scientists' characterisation of public mistrust, scepticism and insecurity as 'ignorance' has given
rise to models of science communication that aims to educate the public in matters of science
and technology. Since 'understanding' of science is equated with scientific knowledge public
scepticism is renounced as //^understanding - 'a shortfall of the scientific facts' (Thomas, 1997:
163; see also Beck, 1992: 58). Such a view closely resembles Beck's point that the sciences
continue to reproduce 'techno-scientific rationality' in their understanding of science, risks and
the public. Beck's scathing attack on dominant models of PUS are evident in the following
quote:
The technical risk experts are mistaken in the empirical accuracy of their implicit
value premises, specifically in their assumptions of what appears acceptable to
the population. The talk of a 'false, irrational' perception of risk in the
population, however, crowns this mistake; the scientists withdraw their bornmed
notions of cultural acceptance from empirical criticism, elevate their views of
other people's notions to a dogma and mount this shaky throne to serve as
judges of the 'irrationality' of the population, whose ideas they ought to
ascertain and make the foundation of their work (1992: 58).
Hence, this model of science-public relations characterises 'the public' as a homogeneous mass
and rather than distinguishing between different publics and their views, science/society,
expert/lay dichotomies are reproduced. This approach for redressing science-public relations
has been termed the 'cognitive deficit model', or simply, the 'deficit model' by cPUS advocates.
It is this notion of public ignorance and misunderstanding - as encapsulated in the deficit model
- that those working in the area of cPUS have taken issue with and in doing so have converged
with Beck. Within science and technology studies, the work of Brian Wynne has been influential
in the establishment of cPUS (see Wynne, 1988, 1992, 1995; Irwin and Wynne 1996a).
According to Wynne, we need to problematise what is meant by both 'science' and
'understanding', which, in turn, automatically problematises the 'public' (1995). Although Beck
does acknowledge non-reflexive accounts within the sciences to public perspectives (1992: 58),
he does not fully attend to the problem of Ixrw the category of 'expert' is defined and mobilised
in risk debates (Wynne, 1996). In addition to this, Beck's work is not based upon empirical
71
research. One focus of cPUS, on the other hand, has been to investigate how science is
represented and constructed within dominant models of PUS through empirical analyses.
The implicit understanding of scientific knowledge, practices and institutions as 'closed' within
dominant models of PUS has been criticised by a number of writers within cPUS. For example,
Wynne has argued that there is a tendency to present science 'as if it were a value free and
neutral activity ... [which] ... illuminates and assists' (Irwin and Wynne, 1996b: 6, original
emphasis). Rather than attending to the inevitable indeterminacies and uncertainties within
science, PUS models instead, construct science as proceeding according to 'mechanical, rule-
following behaviour' (Wynne, 1988: 148) by 'playing up the methodological character of their
knowledge' (Yearley, 2000: 225; see also Beck, 1992: 58-59). This uncritical conception of
science and scientific knowledge closes off reflexive debates about the 'epistemic commitment,
social purposes, institutional structures, [and] intellectual boundaries' within science (Irwin and
Wynne, 1996b: 4). To this extent, then, cPUS is critical of the ways in which traditional models
of PUS engender a recourse to techno-scientific rationality and an uncritical conception of
science, scientific knowledge and the public.
In keeping with Beck's ideas on reflexive modernisation, Wynne has argued that the dominant
institutionalised model of PUS - where science continues to be conceived according to a
rationalist temper - may 'undermine itself by the nonreflexivity of science about its own
constructions of "the public" and the institutional factors that give rise to these constructions'
(Wynne, 1995: 365). Responses to public mistrust that reproduce modes of thought and action
associated with first modernity are counterproductive 'because science cannot be automatic and
method-based, free of trust and judgement' (Yearley, 2000: 226; see also Wynne, 1992).
Therefore, to present science as the only valid explanatory regime, excludes alternative voices and
in turn, further generates public ambivalence and dissent. The point to note here is the
convergence of cPUS and Beck in their view that non-reflexive models of PUS can, potentially,
engender further public reflexivity.
The dominant PUS view that public mistrust can be corrected by educational means, firmly
places responsibility at the feet of the public and leaves science unproblematised. Instead of
applying the deficit model to the public understanding of science, many cPUS studies have
shown that there is no significant correlation between knowledge levels and support for science
(see Thomas, 1997: 169; Collins, 1987). Whilst recognising that scientists have some
responsibility as communicators, the starting point for critical approaches is a recognition that
individuals are not simply information repositories. Public perceptions of science and
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technology are, instead, understood as based upon the perceived credibility and trustworthiness
of expert systems along with the individuals and institutions that constitute them. Public
scepticism towards science and scientists is contextualised according to the social framework
within which science-public relations exist, which Wynne calls the 'social package' (1992: 282).
This refers to the material social relationships, interactions and interests according to which
people experience, define and judge risks and scientific information. For instance, in the case of
controversial developments, publics are confronted with conflicting arguments and expertises
(see Collins, 1987: 691) and to this extent, public 'understandings' cannot be reached simply
through scientific 'facts' but must always involve non-scientific and non-technical judgements.
Hence, public responses to and experiences of science, and associated risk perceptions, are
always the result of active engagement and interaction with science and scientific knowledge as
embedded in social relations, even when the public response is 'ignorance' (see Michael, 1996b;
Wynne, 1995). In short, public understandings of science and risk must always take into account
existing social relations and social identities.
Critical approaches to PUS, firstly, take into consideration the plurality and diversity of public
groups vis-a-vis public perceptions of science. Individuals cannot be reduced to any single or
fixed social identity, but inhabit a range of complex and often contradictory identities that
evolve and shift over time. Secondly, the social context within which publics encounter science
is analytically significant. For example, the historical context, previous knowledge and
experience of expert systems which impact upon whether they trust or find scientists claims
credible. Closely related to this is people's relationship to power, resources to use 'scientific'
knowledge and its relevance to their existing experiential knowledge, which Wynne refers to as
the 'tacit models of social agency underlying encounters between science and public groups'
(Wynne, 1995: 363; see also Wynne, 1992). By this connection, public mistrust, ambivalence or
dissent towards techno-scientific rationality - translated as ignorance according to the dominant
model - should, in fact, be understood as the effects of misrecognition: 'they do not recognize
it, or identify with it' (Wynne, 1992: 282). Hence, critical approaches to PUS have illustrated
how science-public relations are grounded in social relationships between the different actors in
any instance.10
10 It is important to note that these critical interventions into science-public relations and
decision-making processes are themselves a contribution to reflexive modernity. By
deconstructing dominant models and discourses of PUS, a number of social scientists have
engaged with and articulated the voices and opinions of a range of public groups in order to
gain public inclusion within policy-making and decision-making processes and also to
change the basis upon which these are made (see for instance, Irwin, 2001). The active
engagement of social scientists as intermediaries between scientists, government and the
wider public, constitutes cPUS researchers as spokespeople within debates, or what Irwin
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Increasingly, the 'social package' through which publics formulate their views, includes factors
relating to the changing nature of scientific institutions and the political economy of science.
The changing role of science itself, in terms of its function within policy-making and regulatory
processes, along with the 'growing commercialisation of research' (Yearley, 2000: 232) mean
that science can no longer be regarded as a purely disinterested intellectual pursuit. In this
context, issues of public understanding of science and related risks are not limited to the trust
and credibility that they are willing to invest in scientific spokespersons or institutions, but also
extend to 'experts' that traditionally fall outwith the field of science, such as legal systems,
pharmaceutical companies, religious groups, politicians and financial investors. Again, this
returns us to the inherent contradictions of the dominant model of PUS that have been brought
about by the modernisation of science and its institutions. Transformations in the features of
the scientific enterprise, where science can no longer be compellingly separated from social or
political spheres, have contributed to reflexive processes.
4.4 Towards a Reflexive Model of PUS?
What I have attempted to address thus far, is to present the convergences between Beck's
theory of reflexive modernisation and cPUS. More specifically, these two complimentary and
overlapping approaches offer an analytical framework for exploring the dynamics of science-
public relations and for creating critical interventions into dominant models of PUS. In engaging
with debates on reflexive modernisation, cPUS approaches have, to some degree, 'tested' how
much both expert systems and publics are becoming reflexive, and in doing so have begun to
map out the complex forces that are contributing to current transformations. As a next step, this
section will consider the co-evolution of PUS and cPUS approaches to the 'crisis of legitimacy
in science's expert systems. In particular, I will critically consider the apparent shift towards
reflexive models of PUS within science through the lens of critical approaches to science-public
relations.
Brown and Michael have, like Beck, argued that the current crisis in legitimacy extends beyond
the realms of science to other forms of expert systems (2002). Across a number of realms -
including finance, commerce and politics - issues of trust, credibility and legitimacy have
become central to institutional decision-making processes. In seeking to redress the lack of trust
refers to as 'experts of community' (2001: 15). In accordance with Beck's terms, the implicit
political agenda that underpins cPUS has contributed to the emergence of 'sub-political'
activity (Beck, 1992).
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in expert systems, many institutions and organisations have adopted the strategy of
'transparency7. That is, institutions and organisations are increasingly disclosing information
regarding decision-making processes, working practices and financial documents that have
previously remained private. In addition to this, members of the public are invited to attend
meetings and respond to policy documents in order to 'persuade us that they have engaged with
the debate and have listened to and digested other points of view' (Brown and Michael, 2002:
260). For instance, during the decision-making stages of policy creation, bodies such as the
HFEA release questionnaires that aim to encourage the public to respond to and engage with
the issues at hand. Similarly, the Human Genetics Commission have addressed the issue of trust
by opening their meetings to the public (see www.hgc.gov.uk). Hence, these practices illustrate
how transparency is being performed within expert systems in order to improve the crisis of
legitimacy and trust.
This shift towards inclusion and openness is mirrored within recent reports and initiatives that
fall under the general rubric of the 'public understanding of science'. In contrast to the model of
PUS associated with the Royal Society's 1985 report (as discussed above), there has, since the
late 1990's, been a shift in rhetoric that focuses on 'dialogue' and 'engagement'.11 Undoubtedly
in response to pressures and critical spaces opened up by critical approaches to PUS, the
sociology of science and other collective actors such as environmental groups, new forms of
argumentation have been translated and incorporated into policy-making processes (see Irwin,
2001; Wynne, 2002; Beck, Bonss and Lau, 2003). As Irwin has argued, 'for anyone who has
followed science and technology policy debates in the UK over the last few decades, the
congruence of official statements and social scientific findings seems remarkable indeed' (2001:
3). For instance, in February 2000 the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and
Technology published its report, Science and Society, outlining concerns of a lack of public
confidence in science. Focussing on issues of trust, the inherent uncertainty and complexity of
science and public ambivalence, the report calls for changes to the culture of policy-making in
order to ensure that openness and transparencywithin science become the norm. In the context
of this 'new mood for dialogue' the Science and Society report encourages science and its
institutions to adopt innovative methods for integrating public views into science-based policy¬
making. Following on from this the Royal Society established its own Science in Society programme
which aims to 'earn public confidence' by developing 'innovative, widespread and effective ways
of communicating with the public' and to 'ensure that the voice of the public is heard when
11
For instance, the Wellcome Trust has recently established a new grants scheme,
'Engaging Science', allocating £3 million per year for schemes and projects which seek to
develop and improve public involvement in biomedical science
(www.wellcome.ac.uk/enqaqinqscience).
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shaping and discussing science policy'.12 Other illustrative evidence can be found in the
increasing number of public forums for scientists to present and discuss their work which
include conferences specifically organised to address the 'public understanding of science'.13
During the period when policy makers were highlighting the need to move beyond the deficit
model there were a number of high profile controversies, including BSE/v-QD, Foot and
Mouth disease, GM crops, MMR as well as human and animal cloning. In these cases, public
scepticism towards scientific authority adds further weight to 'calls for a recognition of the
fundamental nature of scientific uncertainty, [and] of the significance of public trust and
confidence' (Irwin, 2001: 3). In this current context,
institutional bodies of government and policy have been forced to experiment
with increased public participation in various arenas of expert decision over
risks and technology regulation, in response to waning public trust in their
processes and outcomes (Wynne, 2002: 465).
In analysing these new forms of consultation and decision-making practices, cPUS research has
revealed two central moves: the performance of transparency (Brown and Michael, 2002) and
the translation of a plurality of public meanings into scientific discourses (Wynne, 2002). This
recent shift in rhetoric and practice - what Brown and Michael have called the 'transparency
turn' - is 'part of a powerful repertoire of signification on which the authority of both politics
and science is itself based' (Brown and Michael, 2002: 263). Put simply, if decision and policy¬
making processes in science and technology are made to appear open and transparent, then
science and scientists appear to be accountable and, in turn, scientific authority is reasserted. By
this connection, transparency becomes the solution for problematic science-public relations.
The logic of attaining transparency, according to Brown and Michael, involves the assumption
that 'there is simply nothing more to know and that all relevant information is available' (2002:
263). However, in the context of increasing ambivalence and mistrust towards expert systems
'the logical grounds for such scepticism is that transparency is always compromised, and is
12
Additionally, the Royal Society, in response to its 'Public Understanding of Science' report
in 1985, continues to co-fund the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science with
the Office of Science and Technology (www.copus.orq.uk). Again, the 'public' agenda of this
committee has shifted from education and ignorance to engagement and dialogue.
13 For instance, the European Molecular Biology Organisation and the European Molecular
Biology Laboratory held a joint conference on Science and Society in November 2000,
entitled 'Developing A Dialogue'. This was attended by scientists as well as social scientists
and representatives from lobbying organisations and interest groups. We have also
witnessed the emergence of organisations such as Cafe Scientifique and Sci-Bar within a
number of UK cities, which are public forums for scientists and publics to discuss new
developments in science.
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therefore de jure unattainable' (Brown and Michael, 2002: 260). In other words, for transparency
to be convincing, the institutions or individuals performing transparency must already be trusted.
When trust is already compromised, then experts' claims to openness can readily be challenged
as untrustworthy and lacking credibility. According to Brown and Michael then, there has been a
shift from the problem of legitimacy to the problem of transparency in dominant models of
PUS (2002).
The problem of transparency can be seen to have engendered an interesting rejoinder to the
shift towards transparency in expert systems. That is, experts have adopted the discourse of
emotion so that the performance of transparency is coupled with a performance of pain and
emotion (Brown and Michael, 2002). As Brown and Michael have argued, the performance of
pain and emotion involves expert claims to have gone to great and painful lengths to
accommodate multiple voices. The views of organisations such as environmental, patient and
other interest groups are considered, accommodated and incorporated as a gesture of openness,
inclusion and, indeed, reflexivity. In order to convince the public that expert systems are open
and transparent, the pain and suffering to experts as a result of their efforts to accomplish
inclusion and transparency are offered as markers of authenticity, as Brown and Michael state:
This is because suffering is grounded in the stresses, dilemma and tensions that
emerge when a person or institution attempts to incorporate — give full voice
to — the disparate, contradictory, antagonistic positions that contribute to the
argument or controversy or risk assessment (Brown and Michael, 2002: 261).
Thus, the recourse to emotional discourse is an attempt to resolve the inherent limitations of
transparency for redressing trust relations (2002: 261). Such strategies give the appearance of
reflexivity, suggesting that cPUS research needs to investigate the extent to which this marks a
shift in policymaking ideologies towards meaningfully including public groups and their views.
These institutional and rhetorical shifts seem to echo Beck's account of reflexive modernisation
and risk society (Wynne, 2002: 466; see also Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 1999). Scientific
institutions are responding creatively to the growth of a risk consciousness and,
correspondingly, the undermining of scientific certainty, expertise and cognitive authority.
Inherent in reflexive modernisation is a dynamic 'learning process' that is achieved through
complex 'flows of exchanges (goods, services, people, finance, information)' (Van Loon, 2002:
34-35). Following on from Beck, Van Loon has argued that expert systems (including science
and technology) must be able to reflexively translate, incorporate and "hijack" other systems
into their own in order to sustain their own existence (2002: 38). Similarly, Kember has referred
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to scientists' increasing concern with competing sources of knowledge and how these can
incorporated into the decision-making process as a 'newly adaptive biotechnological
environment' (2002). This adaptability/reflexivity is exemplified by the adoption of new
methods of public consultation practices that aim to improve public involvement, along with
rhetorical shifts towards transparency and authenticity.
Whilst this shift towards authenticity and emotional discourse indicates how those in industry,
regulation and elsewhere have recognised the failure of the authority in expert systems, as
Brown and Michael cautioned, 'the actions warranted by emotion are not always benign' (2002:
270). This was similarly confirmed by Irwin, who found from his involvement in the qualitative
phase of a public consultation exercise, that there are a number of limitations to such practices.
For instance, non-scientists are not granted an active role in defining the agenda of consultation
exercises, but instead this remains within the remit of official experts chosen by government.
Irwin has also demonstrated the weak correspondence in the British context between policy
concerns outlined during public consultation and the policy outcomes. If we also consider the
shift towards transparency, it is notable that this model of PUS leaves the concept of 'science'
unproblematised. Whilst in acknowledging the existence of alternative knowledges and
perspectives, science continues to be grounded in notions of scientific certainty, empirical
accuracy and objectivity. Furthermore, the performance of transparency does not necessarily
challenge the authority of expertise but reinforces scientists' role as adjudicators and legislators
of public views on science.
In a similar vein, Wynne has argued that even where there is an 'apparent cohesion' between
different social worlds, public meanings are often translated into science's 'own restricted one-
dimensional terms' or denied entirely (2002: 461, see also Kember, 2002). Only those risks that
are defined by scientific institutions - and therefore kncnm - are regarded as legitimate (Wynne,
2002). Unknown and ambiguous public meanings of risks - which Grove-White refers to as
'unknown unknowns' (cited in Wynne, 2002: 469) - continue to be viewed as 'intellectually
vacuous and thus secondary, ethical or trust concerns' (2002: 466). Ironically, in the name of
self-reflexive scientific rationality, experts have keenly developed and engaged with new forms
of public consultation exercises, only for rich public meanings to be translated into non-
reflexive discourses (Wynne, 2002: 463). In spite of the recent shift in rhetoric and the adoption
of experimental models of public engagement, critical approaches have revealed that the deficit
model lingers on in expert systems approach to PUS.
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4.5 An Analytical Starting Point
It seems that reflexive modernisation processes are deeply ambivalent; containing both a radical
potential for decoupling power from expert systems and a hegemonic potential where reflexivity
is, itself, mobilised in order to shore up existing social systems (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley,
1999). Whilst transparency and emotional discourses maybe understood as reflexive responses
to changing science-public relations in the context of risk and controversy, they could equally be
seen as non-reflexive because they are attempts to shore up traditional notions of expertise.
Here, there is a tension between reflexive processes and reflexive outcomes. Again, this returns
us to Beck's point that reflexive modernisation is a transitional, contradictory phase - caught
between simple and reflexive modernity.
This tension that is inherent in reflexive modernisation has been explored by Kerr and
Cunningham-Burley with respect to the new human genetics (1999). Their analysis of
professionals' and publics' discourses of the new human genetics provides an empirical basis
upon which to examine theories of reflexive modernisation and risk. They conclude that whilst
there is evidence of a move towards reflexive practices and values within science, the radical
potential of reflexive modernisation is limited. Professionals' institutional reflexivity are shown
to protect their cognitive authority by constraining lay ambivalence (Kerr and Cunningham-
Burley, 1999: 297). At the same time, however, they point to a paradox where scientists are
themselves increasingly critical of the new genetics, such as eugenic practices. To some extent,
then, they concur with Beck that reflexive modernisation is, indeed, a contradictory phase
characterised by both simple and reflexive practices and values.
In building upon such analyses, my research also aims to capture the paradoxes of reflexive
modernisation. Furthermore, like Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, I believe that sociological
analyses of SCR and cloning can 'generate doubt and highlight uncertainty in contemporary
practices, debunk professional claims to neutrality ... thereby disrupting professionals' rhetoric
and fostering greater lay ambivalence' (1999: 298). Sociological research, then, can contribute to
and further reflexive processes by engaging with both scientists and publics. Bymaintaining this
tension between 'tradition' and reflexivity in our analysis and identifying instances of both, as
Wynne has also argued, sociologists can begin to 'prise open these scientific, risk and
environment-consequences cultures, so as to invite democratic entry' (Wynne, 2002: 472; see
also Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 1999; Kerr et al., 1997; 1998a; 1998b; Cunningham-Burley
and Kerr, 1999). Key questions then become: Have reflexive modernisation processes
transformed and reconfigured expert-lay relations in science and technology, or has reflexivity
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become another political strategy within scientists' accounts? What counts as 'expertise' in both
scientists' and publics' accounts and why? Are certain forms of experience and understanding
excluded from scientists' accounts and, if so, how? Such questions take us towards an approach
that problematises rather than reifies recent cultural developments and institutional innovations
for analysing the relationship between experts and non-experts, science and society.
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CHAPTER V
Flexible Boundaries in Scientists' Discourses:
Expertise, Uncertainty and Authority
5.1 Stem Cell Research and Cloning: 'Once More into the Breach'
As already outlined in previous chapters, the status and role of science in society were perceived
to be undergoing transformations. At the same time, key protagonists within the SCR and
cloning debates believed the debate could, potentially, make or break the future of this area of
science. Against this backdrop to the public debates on SCR and cloning, it is interesting to
explore how scientists have mobilised a range of rhetorical resources and strategies in order to
manage and resolve elements of this controversy. The work of social scientists Gilbert and
Mulkay (1984) and Gieryn (1995) has demonstrated the importance of analysing the range of
rhetorical devices and repertoires used by scientists in constructing and maintaining the
dominance, legitimacy and credibility of science and scientific knowledge. By analysing what
scientists say, we can identify how rhetorical devices, discourses and boundary constructions are
used in order to construct particular 'versions' of scientific practices, as well as 'constituting
themselves as particular sorts of actors, [whilst] simultaneously constructing others around
them' (Michael, 1996a: 79). Before discussing my empirical findings, it is worth reflecting on
what makes the case of the SCR and cloning debates particularly interesting to the social
scientific researcher in this respect.
Within controversial science such as SCR and cloning, core-scientists must publidy debate the
scientific and social dimensions to their work at a time when scientific consensus is yet to be
reached, rather than being played out within the laboratory between core-scientists, or even
between core-scientists and the wider scientific community (see Collins and Evans, 2002; also
Jasanoff, 1987).1 The conventional images of science and technology as 'mechanical, rule-
following behaviour' (Wynne, 1988: 148) are, in turn, undermined because the 'core' of science
1
This is taken from Collins and Evans (2002) who distinguish between core-scientists and
the wider scientific community. Core-scientists refer to those scientists who are 'deeply
involved in experimentation or theorization which is directly relevant to a scientific
controversy or debate' (2002: 242). In the case of eSCR, core-scientists include all those
scientists interviewed as part of this research. And, as I will show, membership of the core-
scientists is a highly political issue.
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is publicly exposed and 'everyone gets to see the soft flesh of the scientific fruit and the familiar
passions and arguments that constitute it' (Collins and Evans, 2002: 248). To this extent, the
SCR and cloning debates can be seen as a 'breaching experiment'.2 That is, traditional public
presentations of science are breached, revealing that science does not have a homogeneous
voice. In constructing the credibility and legitimacy of their own and others' work, scientists
tend to rely on everyday criteria - such as who has developed a positive reputation, where
people have published their work, who is deemed trustworthy and what their institutional
affiliation is (Collins, 1987: 691). Thus, once the black box of science has been opened, revealing
the 'extra-scientific factors' of scientists' argumentation, then taken-for-granted dichotomies
between expert and non-expert knowledge and between scientists and non-scientists become
destabilised (Collins and Evans, 2002: 239).
As we have already seen in chapter 3, controversies over SCR and cloning have not only take
place within the field of science, but also between other fields such as politics, law, ethics,
medicine, social sciences and an array of lobbyists. In this situation, scientific institutions are no
longer the only sources of accredited knowledge on SCR and cloning, but instead are subject to
scrutiny and scepticism by different professions and groups, each bringing different kinds of
expertises and framing the debate according to their own terms of reference.3 Scientists' power
to define science and its practices, along with 'its authoritative status of providing 'truths' about
the natural [and social] worlds' comes under threat Qasanoff, 1987: 196). Collins and Evan argue
that under these circumstances, where scientific controversies are played out in public before
consensus has developed, the status of science is (potentially) undermined (2000: 247). To
borrow Latour's Machiavellian metaphor, the struggle within the palace between the Prince and
his own collaborators requires relatively soft techniques compared to the feroricity of struggles
between the Prince and others outside the palace who say they are the Prince (1988).
In sum, disruption or breakdown in 'normal' social relationships and rules - in terms of science-
public relations, the status of scientific knowledge and the public presentation of science - can
be seen as a 'breaching experiment' which offers an insight into how social actors construct,
2
A 'breaching experiment', as originally coined by Garfinkel (1963, cited in Collins and
Evans, 2002: n33), is a methodological experiment that was designed as a means for
exploring how actors respond to violations of 'normal' social relations across a range of
social interactions. In the experiment, an individual breaks social rules through engaging in
what is deemed to be inappropriate behaviour to the particular social context, in order to
study others' responses to this. However, in the case of SCR and cloning debates, rather
than the researcher creating an experiment, these are 'naturally' occurring.
3
Similarly, Van Loon has argued that in debates around recent health-related issues such as
BSE/CJD, 'scientific, political and legal arguments often operate on totally different grounds,
leading to a highly complex web of discursive assertions and debates' (2002:201).
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negotiate, legitimate and reproduce particular discourses and practices (see Barnes and Edge,
1982: 234; Jasanoff, 1987: 197). It is not enough for scientists working on SCR and cloning to
simply establish themselves as credible experts (although this remains extremely important); they
must also engage in processes of recruitment, translation and mobilisation in order to construct
a powerful and convincing justification (see Chapter 3). To this end, risk and trust become
important factors to be managed and negotiated by scientists. As we shall see, scientists'
participation in public debates involves a range of tactics and strategies that are not necessarily
coherent, but instead are often contradictory. By examining their discursive constructions of
SCR and cloning, we can identify the variability of interpretative repertoires that are mobilised,
as well as gaining an insight into the kinds of interests that are at stake.
5.1.1 ANote on Methodology and Structure
In the following chapter I explore a number of key analytical themes that emerged from
interviews with five core-eSCR-scientists. As already outlined in Chapter 2, scientists included in
this research were identified because of their prominent role either in the public debates and/or
they are involved in developing embryonic stem cell research. Whilst I encountered some
problems in gaining access to key scientists working in the area of SCR and cloning, those that
did agree to be interviewed offered a great deal of insight into the range of issues regarded as
pertinent to the debates and there was some convergence between views. All interviews took
place between May and November 2001 - the year that the 1990 HFE Act was amended. The
timing of the interviews meant that the public debates (including those in Parliament) were fresh
in their minds. Austin Smith and Ian Wilmut, in particular, had spent a great deal of time
speaking to politicians, journalists and participating in public debates. Consequently, scientists
had rehearsed their views and had had time to refine their positions over the previous months.
This then raised the issue of how, as a sociologist, I could get beyond scientists' accounts as pre-
rehearsed 'public relations' exercises. Following on from the work of Kerr et al. (1997) and
Cunningham-Burley and Kerr (1999), this chapter explores scientists' accounts of SCR and
cloning, and how they account for the social and ethical implications of scientific developments
in this area. As in the afore mentioned research, I also draw upon and combine the approaches
of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) in Opening Pandora's Box: and Gieryn's concept of 'boundary work'
(1983; 1995). Gilbert and Mulkay's work is analytically and methodologically instructive for
understanding scientists accounts, not as 'definitive versions' of scientific knowledge and other
areas of social life, but instead to look for the 'multiple and divergent versions' generated by
scientists (1984: 2). As already outlined in chapter 3, it is important to identify discursive
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regularities within scientists' accounts and to be sensitive to interpretive variability. For instance,
I will highlight some of the rhetorical strategies mobilised by scientists when accounting for
uncertainty, risks and the social and ethical implications of their own and others' work.
Here, Gieryn's 'boundary work' is a useful analytical concept for investigating how scientists
(reconstruct boundaries between science/society, expert/non-expert, inside/outside in order to
negotiate their position and professional status, as well as that of science more generally. As
Cunningham-Burley and Kerr have argued, such distinctions are a result of the complex
'interplay of a range of professionals' interests', which serve to preserve and promote the
privileged status of scientists as experts (1999: 648). In taking such an approach as my starting
point, this chapter extends the work of Cunningham-Burley and Kerr (1999) and Kerr et d.
(1997) by showing how, whilst such boundary work continue to be found in scientists' accounts,
they have becoming blurred within the SCR and cloning debates. As I reveal, scientists construct
boundaries as 'there' yet negotiable, rather than firmly constructed.
The chapter is organised around four sections in each of which I have identified rhetorical
devices and discursive repertoires mobilised by scientists in their accounts of SCR and cloning.
Broadly themed according to 'scientism', 'separating science and the social', 'separating stem cell
research from cloning' and 'insiders and outsiders', I address wider issues - as constructed by
the scientists - such as the use of embryos for SCR, differences between 'therapeutic' and
'reproductive' uses of the cloning technique and the role of publics in the debates. Where
relevant, I relate my analysis of scientists' discourses to other aspects of the thesis.
5.2 Scientism
In this section I focus upon scientists' proclivity towards scientism when articulating their views
of SCR and cloning. Scientism is 'the tendency to "convert" value issues into technical
discussions ... [which] involves an attempt both to extend the scope of accepted expertise, and to
establish its scientific pretensions' (Barnes and Edge, 1982: 244-245, original emphasis). Centred
around the 'embryo question' and the rhetorical distinction between embryonic and adult SCR, I
will show how scientists respond to social and ethical issues with scientific and technical
explanations.4
4
For the time being, I will leave aside issues relating to the socially constructed boundary
which separates science and technology from society. This will be addressed in the following
section.
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As evident in the parliamentary debates (see Chapter 3), the use of human embryos in scientific
and medical research continues to be an ethically sensitive issue. As such, the embryo question
arises within scientists' accounts in the public domain, such as, public talks and 'educational'
materials such as those found on the Internet. Within my interviews with scientists, the embryo
question arises as a pre-identified ethical 'hotspot', which (as in the Parliamentary debates) tends
to be converted from a value issue into a technical one. For instance, when giving public talks
on SCR, Austin Smith uses a diagram of a blastocyst (a 6-8 day old embryo consisting of
approximately 100 cells) in order to provide a technical description of how stem cells are
derived (see below).5
Human Blastocyst
Source: InstituteforStem Ceil Research, Edinburgh http://www.iscr.ed.ac.uk/stemcells.html
Crucial to this description is that the cells taken from the embryo are the inner cell mass that
would form part of the foetus, not the outer layer of cells that gives rise to the placenta - the
trophoblast. From here, Smith goes on to explain that without the trophoblast the embryo
cannot connect with the maternal circulation and develop any further:
So if you take these [inner cell mass] away, this [the embryo] can't really do
anything more ... Once you take them out then they can't remake this
[trophoblast] population of cells. So although they can, in culture, they can make
the different types of cell that would make up a foetus, they can never acquire
the proper organisation or develop any of the stmctures that you'd find in a
foetus. Because that absolutely requires the support of the tissue and then the
physical architecture that requires. And indeed, it provides some specific signals
to trigger this to start developing in an organised way (Smith, Institute for Stem
Cell Research, 15/05/01).
5 I have been present on a number of occasions when Smith has used this diagram as an
'explanatory' tool, including at the Royal Society discussion meeting on Stem Cells, June
2001.
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What Smith is emphasising here is that embryonic stem cells cannot continue dividing and
become a foetus. By inserting a technical description of practices that take place within the
laboratory, Smith is simultaneously pre-empting two key issues in the debates. Firstly, fears that
this research may lead to reproductive cloning are allayed because the embryo is 'emptied' of the
cells required to develop into a foetus. Secondly, stem cells are disconnected from their original
source - the embryo - which can be seen as a move towards circumventing ethical debates
about the relationship between stem cells, embryos and the 'question of life'.
In a similar vein to that noted above, John Clark, a scientist from the Roslin Institute stated that
human embryonic stem cells are:
Just like any human cell, they just happen to be made from an embryo ... So the
fact that they are just cells that grow in culture and because of that, other than
normal safety kind of things, there's no ethical regulations that apply to them
Qohn Clark, Roslin Institute, 28/11/01).
The conversion of the status of embryonic stem cells into scientific and technical ones, renders
the social and ethical issues redundant. As in the 1990 embryo debates, the ethical issues
generated by the use of human embryos for research purposes and the arbitrary nature of the
14-day limit are averted by scientific and technical explanations (see Mulkay, 1997). Thus,
constructing stem cells as distinct to embryos deletes non-scientific views of embryos (e.g., as
life giving). It is interesting to note that this conception of stem cells also deletes the range of
social relations and laboratory practices that go into producing stem cell lines. That is, the 'real-
world conditions in which risks are actually experienced' (Wynne, 1996: 58-59), such as the
involvement of those undergoing fertility treatment or the commercial exploitation of human
embryos and cell lines. In displacing such actors and social relations, scientists are recreated as
technical experts and as socially responsible.
The controversy over the development of adult SCR compared to embryonic SCR offers
another site for us to explore scientists' tendency towards scientism. As an alternative to
deriving stem cells from human embryos, adult stem cell research has received a great deal of
attention from patient groups, anti-abortion groups, politicians and a number of scientists.
When asked about this issue John Clark responded:
There is a big debate going on, on the efficacy of embryonic stem cells versus
adult stem cells but nobody knows yet. One thing I would say about embryonic
stem cells, is that they certainly, from judging from what we know about them
in mice, they can really do a lot. We really believe in them that they do have
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these properties. The properties of adult stem cells are far more debatable about
how useful theywill be (John Clark, Roslin Institute, 28/11/01).
As indicated in this quote, no ethical or social issues enter the 'debates', instead it is limited to
scientific issues. This position is constructed from the starting point that the use of human
embryos does not generate any problematic ethical or moral issues and, in turn, the embryonic
versus adult stem cell debate is converted into one about expediency. Similar rhetorical
manoeuvrings are made by Austin Smith in his response to a questionnaire issued by the
European Commission's Temporary Committee on Human Genetics and Other New
Technologies of Modem Medicine. After calling for both types of research to continue
simultaneously, Smith argues that:
Overall our understanding of and ability to manipulate embryonic stem cells is
more advanced than for adult stem cells. Consequently there are compelling
reasons to pursue human embryonic stem cell research and in fact there is no
scientific rationale not to do so (Smith, 2001, original emphasis).
Whilst this seems to indicate that there may be non-scientific rationales for not continuing with
eSCR, he then goes on to argue that social and ethical perspectives are irrelevant because
research on human embryos is already permitted within the confines of the 1990 HFE Act. The
underlining of 'scientific' rationale illustrates the reproduction of a hierarchy of knowledge,
where scientific knowledge is separated from, and assigned higher status than, other forms of
knowledge. That is, other forms of argumentation are acknowledged and yet science remains the
most valid source of knowledge. By framing the debate according to scientific arguments, these
quotes show how scientistic moves reinforce their 'scientific pretensions' within science and
wider society by controlling the grounds on which this dispute is conducted, and the
institutional forms by which any decisions or resolutions are reached (Barnes and Edge, 1982:
244).
Implicit in the above quotes is a usage of the 'truth will out' device. The truth will out device, as
coined by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), is a rhetorical device used to reconcile contradictory
statements in order to maintain the appearance of consistency. For instance, on the one hand,
core-scientists cannot guarantee that it is scientifically correct to state that embryonic stem cell
research will be the 'better' option - in terms of expediency, developing therapies, etc. For this
reason, scientists working on eSCR have supported the co-development of adult and embryonic
stem cell research. On the other hand, both Smith and Clark argue that in the long run eSCR is
more likely be the most useful scientifically. These arguments illustrate how scientists oscillate
between strong and weak assertions about the certainty of scientific assessments of SCR (see
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Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 93). Thus, the 'truth will out' device resolves contradictions that arise
out of the tension between traditional notions of certainty and the uncertainty of 'real world'
(reflexive) science by orienting us towards the future.6
5.3 Separating Science And 'The Social'
The conversion of social and ethical issues into scientific ones - scientism - often runs in
conjunction with the exclusion or downplaying of non-scientific and non-technical issues. That
is, scientism and the separation of science from the social are both part of the process of
maintaining and reproducing the authority of scientific discourses (see Mulkay, 1979). Separating
scientific from social aspects of SCR and cloning has been a powerful strategy in public debates.
We can identify specific distinctions that both overlap and (often) contradict one another:
therapeutic cloning/reproductive cloning, embryonic or adult SCR, SCR/therapeutic cloning.7 A
key discursive repertoire cutting across these distinctions is the construction of an idealised
account of SCR that distinguishes non-scientific and technical issues from scientific ones:
science from the social. However, the line between science and the social is a permeable one
that is both contingent and negotiable (see Gieryn, 1995; Cunningham-Burley and Kerr, 1999).
What are regarded as scientific and technological issues as opposed to social issues is neither
fixed nor stable. The following section will explore interpretative repertoires mobilised by core-
scientists for including or expelling non-scientific and technical issues.
Scientists working in or supporting the area of eSCR have invested a great deal of energy into
constructing therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning as two distinct techniques, each with
their own set of social, moral and ethical issues. For instance, during the discussion with
research students, RSI remarked:
We've come some way towards people making a distinction between cloning as
in generating a person for spare parts and cloning as in making an army full of
Hitler's to conquer the world, and cloning, as in something that will make a cell
6 For a detailed exposition of the 'truth will out' device, see Gilbert and Mulkay (1984: 91-
111).
7 In addition to the distinctions that I have highlighted here, immediately after the
announcement of Dolly the cloned sheep, scientists (including Ian Wilmut) 'separated the
work on Dolly (defined as acceptable) from human cloning (defined as unacceptable and
abhorrent)' (Einsiedel et at., 2002: 329). However, the Dolly/human cloning distinction did not
emerge as a dominant distinction within my own research which may be due to the three
year time lag between the announcement of Dolly and my own research. During this time,
debates around the potential medical applications of SCR and cloning had gained
momentum, shifting the emphasis and agenda of public debates from 'Dolly' as the dominant
signifier to the human embryo.
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type for you ... [where] they can take some skin and make cell types that your
liveris meant for and they put them back in your liver (RSI, 16/10/01).
Here, RSI identifies two types of cloning. The first refers to two future uses of reproductive
cloning where cloned humans will be created to then be used for military purposes or for
harvesting organs. The second type of cloning refers to 'therapeutic cloning' - the process of
generating cloned tissue that matches the genetic profile of the recipient. Within the first
account of cloning are two distinct narratives that have emerged within the media and the public
imagination: Ira Levine's novel, Boys From Brazil, and the historical figures of Burke and Hare.
Like Frankenstein, both narratives are potent cultural repertoires for expressing anxieties
towards new areas of biological and genetic research (see Turney, 1998; Mulkay, 1997, Ch. 8).
Each version of cloning is constructed according to available cultural narratives that are used to
complete the as yet unfinished storyline of cloning developments. However, the usage of science
narratives operates in this instance as a defence of therapeutic cloning 'by removing its
opponents' objections from the sphere of fact to the cognitively inferior domain of fiction'
(Mulkay, 1997: 121). Therapeutic cloning, then, is constructed as a legitimate and benevolent
medical practice. Whilst the thrust of this quote was a defence of therapeutic cloning,
reproductive cloning is portrayed as ethically problematic through its alignment with narratives
of uncertainty and fear.
When I asked IanWilmut whether reproductive cloning is a separate issue to therapeutic uses of
the cloning technique, he responded:
I think that ethically you can [separate the two]. The ethical implications are
different. Practically the same comments that you make about the safety of
reproductive cloning should also make you wonder about the cells that you
grow from those embryos as to whether they are also going to be abnormal. But
we know so little about why clones are abnormal, well it's kind of difficult to
predict. We don't know in many cases what the genes are, for example, so you
can't even begin to predict, you know, that's important in the placenta so it's not
going to be important for stem cells, or that's important for the organ but not
important for this organ and these sorts of things ... So it does make you
wonder how realistic those thoughts are at present time, or any thoughts are.
But I do think that the ethical issues are very different actually (Ian Wilmut,
Roslin Institute, 13/09/01).
Again, this statement rests upon the assumption that embryonic stem cells are ethically
^problematic sources of stem cells. Thus, there is no further need to justify using human
embryos for SCR (although references to potential cures serve as an implicit justification). By
this connection, risks and uncertainties associated with eSCR are acknowledged and applied to
the case of reproductive cloning without undermining the legitimacy of eSCR. This quote is a
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further illustration of how the 'truth will out' device is used when accounting for error and
uncertainty. Wilmut moves between an empiricist conception of scientific research on
reproductive cloning and a more contingent (and to this extent, not entirely 'scientific')
perspective that incorporates uncertainty and personal belief. Risks associated with the genetic
abnormalities of cloned mammals are framed as practical issues rather than ethical ones. As
practical problems they can be investigated, controlled and overcome by further research and
development. Or, there would be enough information to say that such practices are not
achievable for scientific and technical reasons. By separating scientific from ethical issues, the
speaker formulates an argument that resolves contradictions between empiricist and contingent
elements of eSCR, whilst simultaneously separating reproductive cloning from SCR. Hence,
uncertainties associated with both therapeutic and reproductive cloning are mobilised to justify
continuing development of eSCR.
SCR, then, is framed as a knowledge seeking enterprise with scientists simply employing their
knowledge and skills for understanding and developing this area. In order to rhetorically
construct this position, scientific and technical issues associated with SCR are detached from
non-scientific and technical concerns:
RSI Is it scientists' responsibility? You know science is providing the tool,
now how this tool is going to be used is to some extent the responsibility of all
the legislation and the Government to control what can and cannot be done.
You know, you can't blame [the person who] created the knife just because I
took it and stabbed someone. It's just a tool. I can use it in a useful or a
destructive way (RSI, 16/10/01).
By invoking the familiar use/abuse model, scientists' research activities are strategically
separated from future 'negative' applications of any knowledge produced (see Kerr et al. 1997).
According to this argument, scientists are simply engaged in objective, disinterested knowledge
production. Such claims are important rhetorical strategies for constructing borders between
science and politics. In the above quote, politics - science policy and related legislative matters -
are outwith the realm of science. As argued by Gieryn (1995) it is important that the realms of
science and politics are not seen to overlap and politics does not spill into science. Thus, the
decoupling of SCR, as a disinterested knowledge source, from future applications and the issues
that surround it, is an important and well established strategy for legitimating and maintaining
credibility of scientists and their practices (see Barnes and Edge, 1982: 10).
This brings us to an interesting paradox in scientists' accounts: whilst SCR is decoupled from
politics, it is simultaneously embedded in public health issues - a powerful trope in the political
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domain. The potential medical applications of SCR and the implications upon public health and
the economy has been one of the central features of core-scientists' accounts of eSCR for
constructing this area as publicly acceptable and, therefore, eSCR-scientists as credible. In the
parliamentary debates, for instance, scientists influenced the policy outcomes in their roles as
expert advisors to government officials. Here, scientists gained control of regulatory decisions
by explicitly extending the reach of their expertise. On other occasions, as noted in RSI's quote
above, regulatory control is shifted back to government officials and related administrators
(Gieryn, 1995: 438). Highlighting this contradiction shows the permeability of the
science/politics border and, importantly, how these categories are mobilised as rhetorical
devices 'through which distinctive interests of diverse players are advanced or thwarted' (Gieryn,
1995: 436).
When referring to the development of reproductive cloning, scientists interviewed as part of this
research often blurred the boundary between science and the social. Whereas, during
interviews, scientists have gone to great lengths to divorce social issues from scientific ones in
the context of SCR in the case of reproductive cloning, non-scientific arguments were readily
mobilised. This is illustrated in the following, quotes from interviews with scientists which I
have quoted fully because they illustrate the range of strategies used to link reproductive cloning
to ethical issues:
I think that [reproductive cloning] is nasty and I do think that... it's wrong. It's
very difficult to argue these things totally logically, you have to move to these
things like intrinsic human beliefs and this sort of stuff and you might as well
say that cloning is intrinsically bad because a) it's never going to be 100%
perfect, so it's never going to be as good as IVR So the easy argument is that
you'll always have a substantially greater risk of abnormality. That's an easy cop-
out. In many ways we have an intrinsic taboo. It should be a taboo and
recognised as such. I think that we should recognise that some taboo's which
are powerful and important in societies may not have, necessarily, a full
rationality about them (John Clark, Roslin Institute, 28/11/01).
I think that we as a society have a responsibility in some situations to say well
this is just not allowable. This is just not ethically, morally or humanely
acceptable and I can't see any, well to me, I can't imagine an argument that
would make it acceptable to generate any embryo, cloned or non-cloned, and
then implant it into a woman and then use it as a system for research. For me
that's not tolerable, both because of what you would be doing to the, you would
be using a woman as a vehicle for production of material and you would be
using a much more potential human being than a pre-implantation embryo
(Austin Smith, Institute for Stem Cell Research, 15/05/01).
RSI To clone a human you have to have hundreds and hundreds of egg
donors. Donating eggs is not as trivial as donating sperm. It's quite more
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invasive, so you have to get heaps of that. And then you have to get people who
are prepared to receive an embryo, and that is not trivial at all ... OK and then
they put it back in this black box and then they wait nine months and see what
comes out. OK a lot of them will die. Most of them will die sometime within
that period. A lot of them will die earlier. Some of them will die late. And to
terminate a pregnancy is traumatic for the mother and the same mother will not
do that again. OK maybe they'll do it twice. But then there are dangers to the
mother, and the mother dies of complications. How many people is he
[Antinori Sevorini] prepared to kill to do something that is useless?
RS2 And there's also the issue that children are going to be born who are
potentially could be quite handicapped, either physically or mentally. I mean,
how do you explain that to them - "I'm sorry you were an accident in an
experiment"? I mean all the ethical issues that are wrapped up in it are just a
nightmare. OK if it worked first time that would be good but I honestly don't
think it will.
RS1 Even if it works first time it won't work every time.
RS2 No. You know with Dolly there were some that died early on.
RS 1 The people that are going to volunteer for treatment they are going to
be wanting to have fertility perfectly aware that the child, that potentially there is
1 out of 500 chance that they get a live child that is not severely handicapped, is
not deformed. It could die later, a month later, 5 years later, 10 years later. OK it
could make adulthood. But are they prepared to do that? (Research Students,
16/10/01).
Here, where they are arguing for limits on science, core-scientists extend their expertise for
engaging with social issues relating to reproductive cloning - a U-turn from the construction of
eSCR as disinterested, knowledge seeking scientific research. Non-scientific understandings take
on a particular significance rather than being dismissed as 'opinion'. It is implicitly accepted that
perceptions of reproductive cloning elude scientific rationality and explanation (explicitly in
John Gark's quote), revealing the limits of such knowledge. In the exchange between the
research students, however, issues of safety are paramount.8 By focussing on uncertainties and
risks relating to the survival and health of a cloned human being, as with Gark, the research
students are also appealing to a sociocultural taboo - that of murder.9 This reconceptualisation
of the science/social boundary is evidence of the political skill of scientists in exploiting
'relevant social beliefs and attitudes in order to managed the public image of science so as to
improve its political visibility and its capacity to evoke public support' (Ezrahi, 1971: 120, cited
in Barnes and Edge, 1982: 238). Such evidence suggests that Cunningham-Burley and Kerr were
8
There is an some interesting gender dimension to the quote from RS1. Risks identified
corresponded to those experienced by women when donating eggs, undergoing terminations
and 'complications' experienced during pregnancy - a rare occasion when the embodied
experiences of women were foregrounded by eSCR advocates.
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indeed correct when they argued that, 'operating with these boundaries [between
science/society] ... involves scientists in both embracing and deflecting social concerns' (1999:
657).
5.4 Separating Stem Cell Research from Cloning
In the parliamentary debates and many other public discussions on SCR, eSCR advocates have
framed their research in terms of potential medical applications of their work. In particular,
combining eSCR with cloning techniques to develop 'therapeutic cloning' has been a powerful
strategy because it offers to produce medical treatments for as yet untreatable conditions as well
as circumventing present problems relating to immune rejection of transplanted tissues. By
enlisting patient groups, diseases and various biological artefacts, 'cloning' has become an ally
for scientists pursuing this area of research. During interviews with scientists it is interesting to
observe the flexibility of the potential application of 'cloning', where 'therapeutic cloning' is
strategically invoked and rejected. In the following section I will explore how 'cloning' is
mobilised as a flexible resource in often contradictory ways.
Within the parliamentary debates, the development of personalised transplantable tissue was
flagged as one of the main benefits that may come out of eSCR. Advocates for eSCR argued
that scientists could produce replacement tissues that are perfectly matched to the recipients
immune system so as to avoid the complications currently associated with tissue and organ
transplants. Using cloning techniques, it was argued, scientists would create a cloned embryo
using an adult cell taken from the person requiring the tissue, extract the stem cells, direct them
into the appropriate tissue type and transplant them into the patient. This is the technique which
came to be labelled 'therapeutic cloning', recently renamed 'patient-specific stem cell therapy
(see http.7/www.iscr.ed.ac.uk/stemcells.html). A striking feature to emerge from my interviews
with scientists' was their claim that eSCR and its potential clinical applications does not
necessarily involve cloning - which is a departure from one of the key strategies mobilised
during parliamentary debates. For instance, Austin Smith referred to cloning as, 'a sort of add on
that would make it a perfect therapy (15/05/01). And whilst cloning would make it 'perfect',
eSCR is argued as leading to potential medical therapies in its own right, regardless of cloning
developments. Smith suggests that for diseases such as Parkinson's and Huntington's Disease,
immunological rejection 'is not a critical thing'. He also adds that other areas of development
9
Significantly, groups such as pro-life organisations have also utilised this argument in
relation to uses of human embryos in SCR.
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around immunology are being undertaken that 'might make transplants less prone to rejection'
(Smith, Institute for Stem Cell Research, 15/05/01).10
A similar point was made byJohn Clark:
Clark ES cells don't necessarily have anything to do with cloning.
SP But at the point of application would that not be using the cloning
technique?
Qark No, not necessarily. Because, I mean it won't be, at least for the first
applications of this. So really what you're talking about with human embryonic
stem cells is cells that are prepared from human embryos and then grown in
culture. And the normal way you do that, is take a human blastocyst that was
surplus from an IVF fertility program, so the couple have given informed
consent, so now it's worked, we've got our baby or whatever, we don't want
these embryos anymore and they've given informed consent, etc., etc. That
requires a license and everything. Then you would make, you'd take those
embryos, maybe let them develop a bit more, maybe not, and then make the so
called cell line from them. And then you grow that cell line in culture and that is
essentially your starting material and you use those cells to make maybe a nerve
cell, maybe a liver cell whatever it might be. Maybe a pancreatic cell. But that
doesn't irrudtE doming (John dark, Roslin Institute, 28/11/01).
I then pressed dark on this issue, pointing out that within the parliamentary context and other
public debates, scientists have focussed upon the potential of eSCR in producing therapies that
were compatible with the recipients' immune system, dark responded with technical
explanations as to why eSCR may not solve the problem of transplanted materials being rejected
by the immune system, stating that 'the jury is still out as to what will the incompatibility will be.
We just don't know' (28/11/01). He then goes on to argue that therapeutic cloning, as a routine
medical practice, is unlikely due to inefficiencies: it will require a large number of oocytes, will be
expensive and will take too long. Indeed, contrary to the arguments outlined in parliament and
other public debates, dark dismisses the use of cloning techniques as a 'side issue'.
In both of the above transcripts, scientific and medical uncertainty is used to defer judgement
about the future of SCR and cloning. Without being able to predict the future of SCR and
cloning, scientists generate a range of claims and propositions that reflect their interests - and
that of other core-scientists in their community - in continuing with their research (see also
Chapter 3). Areas of uncertainty such as immunological rejection, how to make the process of
'therapeutic cloning' efficient enough to become financially feasible as a routine treatment, and
10
For a description of the scientific practices involved in SCR, 'therapeutic' and
'reproductive' cloning, see Appendix II.
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epidemiological issues relating to differences between diseases, are all raised as problems for
scientists to overcome. However, rather than undermining the future of their research, scientists
instead invoke uncertainty in order to separate cloning issues from eSCR. This is exemplified in
the following quote from Austin Smith:
One way of completely avoiding that problem [of transplanted materials being
rejected] is through cloning, what's called somatic cell nuclear transfer. So in
that case you may produce the stem cell from the patient who needs the
transplant by transferring the nucleus into an oocyte. And we know that in mice
we can do this, that you can make ES cells that way and probably at a reasonable
efficiency. My bet is that with human cells it could actually be very efficient. A
lot of people say, well, you know this will just be [... ] so expensive it will only be
applicable to millionaires in the US. I don't actually believe that, or at least I
think that's open to question until you do the basic research to find out. And
that's why you need the permission now to do the research rather than banning
it [... ] And so then, if cloning was efficient and the derivation of good stem cells
from cloned embryos was efficient, then that would be a realistic treatment and
it could well be cost-effective because immuno-suppression is not cheap (Austin
Smith, Institute for Stem Cell Research, 15/05/01).
The thrust of this excerpt directs us towards the medical applications that may come from
combining SCR and cloning. Within Smith's quote one can identify a number of key elements.
Firstly, Smith extends his expertise to make a judgement on the relative financial costs of
personalised stem cell therapies compared to existing immuno-suppression practices - an area
where he is not a core-scientist. Secondly, arguments that stem cell therapies will be
unaffordable to the general public - an argument often used by critics (see Sexton 1999) - is
reclaimed and turned on its head in order to justify further research. Such a move can be
understood as similar to Brown and Michael's recourse to emotion (2002) where Smith
demonstrates that he has listened to different arguments, considered his position and come to a
conclusion of sorts. Thirdly, uncertainty is mobilised as a flexible interpretative device. The
uncertainty of the future of stem cell therapies allows Smith (and others) to speculate or even
promote a certain amount of 'hype' and anticipation - again, constructing a market and a
demand, as in the parliamentary debates.
The partial rhetorical separation of cloning from SCR has been particularly evident since the
changes to the 1990 HFE Act came into place. Once the 'embryo question' had been resolved
in Parliament then the prominent features of the repertoires employed by advocates of eSCR
illustrate a shift in temporal emphasis - from a long-term to a short-term perspective. In
removing 'cloning' from the 'story' of eSCR, scientists have refocused their accounts of SCR
onto the present 'state' of research, and 'cloning' is rendered a future, potential development to
be discussed when that point arises. As eSCR becomes increasingly entrenched as a legitimate
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research practice it is no longer important to construct this area according to future medical
benefits; instead scientists can safely address some issues of uncertainty - the legal debate has
been settled (see chapter 3). However, we should note that a number of issues continue to be
kept out of the public domain - such as animal rights issues relating to the use of mouse 'feeder
cells' for growing human stem cells (e.g. the production of chimeras and their safety for use in
the clinic).11 The insertion of a temporal element is one component of the 'truth will out' device,
enabling scientists to defer judgement whilst simultaneously reconciling contradictory arguments
(Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). As we saw in the above quote, by reverting to a description which
isolates the current research from the larger picture, Smith offers a technical response to value
questions and reinforces his scientific pretensions. Furthermore, uncertainty is redefined as a
problem to be uncovered by scientific research and practices, thus reasserting scientific
authority and expertise.
5.5 Insiders and Outsiders
5.5.1 Expelling Rogue Scientists
Previous analyses of scientific controversies have shown how participating scientists negotiate
the inside/outside border on a number of different fronts, 'jealously guarding their power to
define the public image of science, and warding off competing claims by rival disciplines'
(Jasanoff, 1987: 196; see also, Van Dijck, 1998: 10-11; Gieryn, 1995). When there are many
competing positions and arguments from within and outwith science, such as in the SCR and
cloning debates, modes of representation that operate through processes of inclusion and
exclusion become powerful strategies for (re)constructing expertise. That is, disciplinary
approaches, groups and individuals are included and excluded from the 'bone fide' scientific
community, endorsing or denying their 'rights' to make credible knowledge claims (see Gieryn,
1995: 424-29). The boundary work involved in securing these distinctions is tightly connected
with securing expertise, trust and legitimacy - central to the concerns of eSCR advocates in
fostering their interests.
Distinctions between inside and outside not only serve to keep the 'publics' out, but also can be
used to expel fellow scientists who threaten the future of eSCR in some way. This is nowhere
11
Here, I am referring to the cultures used to grow stem cells in the laboratory. At present,
most stem cells are grown in cultures that contain cells from mice. This then raises the issue
of whether any stem cells derived are chimeras because they have been 'contaminated' by
cells from a species other than human.
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more evident that when advocates of eSCR construct distinctions between SCR and therapeutic
cloning, and reproductive cloning. Reproductive cloning is not only distinguished from eSCR in
terms of scientific practices - that is, descriptions of the techniques and practices - but also in
terms of the personnel involved. Scientists working towards developing reproductive cloning,
such as Severino Antinori, Panos Zavos and Brigitte Boisselier - an infertility specialist,
andrologist and biochemist respectively - have become the archetypal 'mad scientists' in this
particular debate. Their expertise within their specific fields within science has made it difficult
to dismiss their claims, but has required a number of strategies for excluding them from the
'legitimate' scientific community. 'Insiders' (core-scientists working on SCR or with experience
in animal cloning) have been quick to point out that these scientists have no experience in
cloning, thus rendering them as publicity-seeking amateurs, at best and irresponsible criminals,
at worst (see also Nerlich and Clarke, 2003).
During the interview with Ian Wilmut I asked him about a recent trip to Washington where he
had sat on a public panel on human reproductive cloning with Antinori, Zavos and Boisselier:
SP Where you in Washington recently when Antinori... [interrupted]?
Wilmut: Aha! I view the world the other way round. Antinori was in
Washington with me (Ian Wilmut, Roslin Institute, 13/09/01).
From the outset, Wilmut drew a clear distinction between credible scientists and non-credible
scientists. By referring to his meeting with Antinori in this particular way, Wilmut is defining
Antinori as an illegitimate poseur who is 'exploiting the authority that belongs only to bona fide
occupants of the cultural space for science' (Gieryn, 1995: 432). In order to give his view more
weight, Wimut's regard for Antinori as lacking credibility was presented as not only a personal
view, but one also sanctioned by the wider scientific community:
Wilmut: I think that [Antinori] has got an interesting track record, done some
interesting things. I think that people who know think he's making a mistake in
this regard at least. And it may or may not have anything to do with the
Washington discussions and all of the publicity but there is a meeting in Monte
Carlo in the program which was organised by the [International Association of
Private Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics and Laboratories] [...] of
which he is a committee member and they've recently withdrawn on that basis.
So I think that he really is losing credibility (Ian Wilmut, Roslin Institute,
13/09/01).
Here, Wilmut was referring to a forthcoming international conference on cloning, organised by
Antinori - who has a proven track record as a fertility expert - which was subsequently
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boycotted by fellow scientists and fertility experts and eventually cancelled. Antinori was also
expelled from the organisation due to his public activities and support for reproductive cloning.
What is being described here, is how Antinori's association with reproductive cloning has led to
the withdrawal of support and recognition by his professional peers in an area which he is an
established expert. Once expertise is divorced from credibility, this opens up a space to begin
questioning the presence of expertise.
As in Gieryn's analysis of the case of Sir Cyril Burt, 'insiders' - such as Smith and Wilmut -
distinguished Antinori's behaviour and intentions from the possible scientific validity of his
findings (see Gieryn, 1995: 434). This is an important strategy, given that the techniques to clone
a human being are the same as those used for cloning human embryos for patient-specific stem
cell therapies.12 'Insiders', that is those working in the area of eSCR and animal cloning, stressed
a number of risks involved in reproductive cloning, including health risks to the mother, child as
well as 'social' risks, such as comparisons to eugenic practices - all of which were seen as
crossing the line of acceptability (see Nerlich and Clarke, 2003). By focussing upon the health
risks involved in human reproductive cloning, 'insiders' are constructing the limits of
acceptability, which firmly places reproductive cloning outside of these. The establishment of
limits contributes to the exclusion of reproductive doners from the bone fide scientific
community, which in turn prompts speculation as to the motivations of 'looney' pseudo-
scientists for driving science 'out-of-control' (see Nerlich and Garke, 2003).
The mechanisms by which scientists working on reproductive cloning have been marginalised
echoes Adele Qarke's historical analysis of the development of contraceptives (2000). Qarke
shows how reproductive scientists have, historically, been marginalised within the field of
science because they were 'unable to create the separation between science and society' (2000:
39). Reproductive scientists have been hampered by the very nature of their subject matter -
human reproduction. In this respect, their 'scientific and social/cultural illegitimacy is rooted in
broader concerns that 'reproduction is too much at the core of human social life for any
tinkering in its processes to be ignored' (2000: 39). According to Qarke, scientists who
12 It is noteworthy that during the interview with Ian Wilmut he informed me of an impending
application to the HFEA to conduct human eSCR. Almost one year later it emerged that
Wilmut and his team at Roslin had applied for a license to create cloned embryos to be used
for medical testing (see Meek, 2002). This is a highly controversial practice as it would
involve obtaining a large number of oocytes from women willing to donate them. Then
removing the nucleus and replacing it with the nucleus of a cell donated from a person with,
say, Parkinson's Disease. From this, human stem cells would hopefully be cultivated and
then used for medical research. Whilst the research proposed by Wilmut and his colleagues
does not involve implanting cloned embryos into women's wombs for gestation, this does
extend beyond existing SCR that uses embryos donated from IVF treatment users.
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developed contraceptives in the early twentieth century were characterised as 'mavericks'
working at the margins of their discipline, concerned with effectiveness rather than safety, and,
therefore, lacking in legitimacy (Clarke, 2000:66). Subsequently, new reproductive technologies
have been subject to sustained criticism and resistance from feminists and women users for
nearly 100 years, thus establishing a discursive repertoire that exposes the social dimensions and
goals that underpin them.
In the case of reproductive cloning, it is interesting to note the incorporation of critical
understandings of reproductive technologies into the repertoires of core-eSCR-scientists. The
exclusion of scientists working on reproductive cloning from the scientific community has been
achieved by embedding narratives of cloning within existing critical narratives that have troubled
the demarcation between science and society, exposing the purposes and goals of the
reproductive sciences. There is a convergence between core-eSCR-scientists accounts of
reproductive cloning and many critical commentators. For instance Smith articulated his sense
of unease that reproductive cloning 'would be using a woman as a vehicle for production'
(15/05/01), and the research scientists were concerned that 'there are dangers to the mother'
(16/10/01). This alignment of scientists discursive strategies with 'frameworks of opposition'
(Kember, 2002) simultaneously distinguishes eSCR and its products from non-legitimate science
(i.e. reproductive cloning), and protects the autonomy and professional authority of core-eSCR-
scientists (see Gieryn, 1983).
The lack of trust and credibility assigned to those working on reproductive cloning has been
further enabled because of the means by which their work and results have entered the public
domain. For instance, over the Christmas holiday period of 2002, an organisation called Clonaid
claimed to have produced the first cloned human being. This was subsequently dismissed as an
elaborate public relations campaign by both core-eSCR-scientists, such as Ian Wilmut and
Austin Smith, and reproductive doner, Panayiotis Zavos. That Goneaid scientists announced
their work via the media rather than adhering to the conventional procedures of peer reviewed
articles for diffusing scientific knowledge, contributed to their expulsion from the 'legitimate'
scientific community. In a similar case, Zavos announced that he has produced the first cloned
embryo to be used for reproductive cloning. Rather than releasing this via the media, however,
Zavos is to publish a short report in RefrnxLictize BioMedidne Online - whose chief editor is Robert
Edwards, who co-developed IVF techniques with Patrick Steptoe in the 1970s (see RBM
Online, June 2003). Robert Edwards has stated that the publication of Zavos' findings in RBM
Online is a positive move towards 'openness'. By adhering to professional conventions such as
publishing scientific findings within journals, suggests that Zavos is attempting to strategically
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distance himself from his former colleague, Antinori - a performance of transparency in order
to gain credibility and legitimacy within the field of reproductive medicine as well as within the
wider public.
This suggests that traditional gatekeeping mechanisms and authentication procedures
established to professionalise science continue to play a cmcial role in policing the boundary
between insiders and outsiders (see Jasanoff, 1987: 196). As illustrated above, the role of
publishing one's findings within peer-reviewed journals serves a number of roles such as,
establishing or affirming ones membership within a discipline, enabling scientists to scrutinise
each other's work, and enabling refutation or verification to take place. However, publishing is
only one of a number of mechanisms that is important for acquiring the status of insider, and
other mechanisms can be enrolled in order to keep 'charlatans' out. For instance, in response to
Zavos' announcement that his laboratory had produced a number of cloned embryos, Azim
Surani - a developmental biologist at Cambridge, UK - argued that Zavos does not provide
enough evidence of the procedures used in order to suggest that his work 'represents a real
advance in knowledge'. In addition to this, Surani argued that Zavos' previous exaggerations of
the statistical success of the cloning technique demonstrates that such claims cannot be trusted
(Surani cited in Cohen and Carrington, 2003). The constitution of Zavos as untrustworthy
illustrates how scientists rely on 'ordinary reasoning to bring their technical arguments to a
conclusion' (Collins and Evans, 2002: 248). This suggests that publishing within peer-reviewed
journals can be used to both include and exclude individuals from the scientific community and,
moreover, can be achieved within the public domain (i.e. within journals and the science press).
On this occasion, then, Zavos' performance of transparency was taken as an opportunity to
publicly exclude reproductive cloning researchers from the 'legitimate' scientific community.
The public sanctioning of deviants, according to Gieryn, is 'an opportunity for corrective public
relations campaigns, restoring ... a belief that science on its own is capable of weeding out
impostors (so hands off) and restoring confidence that science is reallywhat genuine insiders say
it is (nothing dirty is going on)' (1995: 432).
5.5.2 Excluding and Including the Publics
When carving up generic territories between inside and outside - science and non-science -
scientists often revert to a simplistic model of how the public (mis)understand science, what it is
and how it works. Specifically, core-eSCR-scientists' accounts of public uncertainty revolved
around the public perception of experimental science. The perceived tension between 'insider' and
'outsider' perspectives of SCR is captured in the following quote:
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Smith: I guess that [clinicians] have to behave almost like they're God and just
tell people 'this is it, this is the way things are done'. For a scientist, our training
and professional lives are all about being critical and cautious. But the problem
with that is that's no use to a politician or to a journalist or really even to the
general public. You know, it's something contentious then they need to know
with some conviction anyway, that there's, they certainly need to know what the
purpose of the work is. What your aim is and that there's some likelihood of
realising that aim. I think it's a delicate line, it's a delicate balance. You don't
want to say that this will definitely provide a cure for Parkinson's Disease but I
think that you have to say, I personally feel it's appropriate to say that this is,
there is a realistic anticipation that this can provide a treatment for Parkinson's
Disease and there really isn't much else on the table at the moment. [... ] Every
journalist Eve ever done an interview with, they always finish with 'so when is
this gonna be in the clinic?' because they have to put that in their pieces. I think
they just always do that, and that's a very difficult question to answer (Austin
Smith, Institute for Stem Cell Research, 15/05/01).
Similar views were also expressed within the discussion with research students:
RS1 You know, with the QD stuff, I think the most scary thing is for the
public is not that the scientists ... have an idea what's going on, it's when a
scientist says, well I don't actually have a clue. That actually is more scary than
giving someone their basic research. I've read a few variant CJD papers about
two years ago now, and they were like, 'well, we're not actually sure how it's
transmitted yet and where it's come from'.
RS2 Would you rather they lied?
RS 1 No I wouldn't rather they lied, but I think that if the emphasis is on
scientists doing their research and this is where they've got so far but they still
have to prove ... [interrupted]
RS2 But people want the bottom line.
RSI Exactly, and there isn't a bottom line (Research Students, 16/10/01).
Uncertainty is cast as an inherent aspect of scientific research, which is at odds with
presumption that 'the publics' who want science to provide certainty. This is a crafty rhetorical
move, in effect arguing that scientific uncertainty is an indicator of responsible practices, and
public uncertainty is translated as misunderstanding, thus reinforcing scientific authority. As
Jasanoff has argued, '[m]uch of the authority of science in the twentieth century rests ... on its
success in persuading decision-makers and the public that the Mertonian norms present an
accurate picture of the way science 'really works'. Unlike politics, science is 'disinterested' and
'objective' and, unlike religion, it is 'sceptical' ' (1987: 196). By appealing to binary frameworks
of insider/outside, science/public, lay/expert, scientists' accounts distinguish between two types
of uncertainty that are formed according to the social location of the speaker - scientific
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uncertainty and public uncertainty. Furthermore, this illustrates how the characteristics of
science are flexibly constructed: on some occasions the preferred description of science is one
of certainty, and on others scepticism and uncertainty are predominant features in scientists'
accounts.
The examples of boundary work discussed so far has focussed upon how the demarcation of
science from non-science serves to expel 'not-real members' from the midst of the 'legitimate'
community of scientists (Gieryn, 1995: 432). In discussing how scientists are excluded from the
core-set of scientists and the mechanisms by which this process is negotiated, I have highlighted
how the drawing of boundaries between science and non-science depends upon the social
context: Who, why and when? As we have seen, membership of the scientific community can be
withdrawn by appealing to a range of mechanisms and processes that are already in place.
Furthermore, the expulsion of members and all the public controversy that surrounds this, can
reinforce the authority of a particular 'version' of scientific knowledge and reinstate public trust
in the ability of science to regulate itself as an autonomous profession. The discussion of
exclusion concluded with an example of how the inside/outside invoked as a repertoire for
accounting for public mistrust and anxieties. Uncertainty, when expressed by non-scientists,
becomes a cause for concern and management by eSCR advocates rather than being treated as a
legitimate concern. In this respect, the boundary work that goes in to demarcating science from
non-science serves to exclude public meanings that threaten the authority of core-scientists. In
the following discussion, by contrast, I will turn my attention to the strategic inclusion of publics
by 'insider' scientists. Significant to this discussion is how public uncertainty, when expressed by
particular groups - patient groups - is mobilised in order to legitimate eSCR.
As already shown, the potential of SCR to provide treatments or cures for a range of conditions
has been a powerful argument for constructing this area of scientific development as legitimate.
On some occasions, scientists simply invoked patient groups as likely benefactors of SCR, thus
inferring a benign motivation and a demand for stem cell therapies:
Smith: Let's say you can use them for heart repair, for cardiac, so you could
paste in cells that repairs damage to the heart - which is another promising area
of ES cells because they make those types of cells quite easily and there's a big
clinical demand (Austin Smith, Institute for Stem Cell Research, 15/05/01).
However, rather than simply invoking patient groups as a passive, silent 'market', Austin Smith
also highlighted the lobbying activities of members of the Parkinson's Disease Society (PDS).
For instance, after referring to the way in which journalists adhere to news values and ask for a
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time frame when cures will be available, Smith goes on to compare this to the views of patient
group members:
Smith: Whereas, actually, the patients had a much more realistic appraisal of
the situation and they, again, initially I found quite surprising, that people said
this to me a couple of times now, that 'we just want to know that good research
is going on and that, eventually, there may be a cure, even if it's not for us.
SP Have you spoken to any other patient groups?
Smith: Erm, no, actually no, just the Parkinson's people. They were the first to
really come off the fence on this [SCR]. So that the medical charities are
traditionally non-political, so they stayed out of this really until very close to the
end. But the Parkinson's Disease people were, erm, got involved lobbying
proactively quite early on and so they, through very different routes, both
through the national PDS and the local branch, contacted me (Austin Smith,
Institute for Stem Cell Research, 15/05/01).
Smith was keen to point out that, based upon his contact with PDS members, they were not
interested in sensationalist media accounts, but instead wanted to engage in a 'realistic'
assessment of SCR rather than wanting promises of stem cell therapies. That members of the
PDS were deemed to be interested in knowing what research is taking place led Smith to re¬
evaluate his opinion of the involvement of patient groups in the stem cell debates. Significantly,
PDS members, in their understanding of scientific uncertainty in the context of experimental
science, could be seen to have acquired the status of 'experience-based' expertise (see Collins
and Evans, 2002). That is, their embodied knowledge and experience of Parkinson's Disease is
accepted as a type of expertise that is deemed to be credible and legitimate. Because of this, such
patient groups are seen to have learnt about and gaining an understanding of 'the science' and
how science works.
The overlapping of interests of patient group organisations and SCR advocates has served as a
crucial legitimating repertoire. Across of number of contexts within the public debates, scientists
have repeatedly turned to the lobbying activities of patient groups, diverting attention away from
the motivations of scientists to the 'demands' of the public. For instance, when I asked about
his involvement in the public debates on SCR, Smith says about his work:
It sounds really grandiose to say [it's] important, but you know, you could see
this could really make a difference to people (Austin Smith, Institute for Stem
Cell Research, 15/05/01).
As in the parliamentary debates (see Chapter 3), by invoking patient groups as a potential user-
group, scientists portray themselves as acting on behalf of the public. This enlistment,
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translation and mobilisation of patient groups is also a powerful strategy for shaping the
direction of public debates and counteracting any negative effects that the spectre of human
cloning may have had upon eSCR (see Petersen, 2002: 84).
We should also note that similar strategies of invoking potential user-groups have been utilised
by scientists involved in reproductive cloning. For instance, Antinori and Zavos began to refer
to reproductive cloning as 'therapeutic cloning' when used to treat infertility. A further example
of this is provided on Zavos' biography page on his website where he can be seen to be posing
for photographs with Louise Brown - the first baby to be born through IVF treatment - and
Robert Edwards - one of the two fertility specialists involved in Louise's birth and who has
subsequently published Zavos' paper in his journal, RBM Online.
This blurring of the boundary between reproductive cloning, IVF and SCR can be seen as an
attempt to 'enhance their own image as fertility experts' (Nerlich and Clarke, 2003: 46) by
inserting reproductive cloning into the narratives of less controversial techniques and practices.
Louise Brown with Panayiotis Zavos
Source: http://www.zavos.org/drz.htm
Panayiotis Zavos and Robert Edwards
Source: http://www.zavos.org/drz.htm
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However, according to Ian Wilmut, Antinori and Zavos' adoption of 'therapeutic cloning'
regarded this as 'just mischievous' (Roslin Institute, 13/09/01). Indeed, as Nerlich and Clarke
(2002) have also argued, this blurring of distinctions between fertility treatment, reproductive
cloning and eSCR has facilitated the political and legal discussions within the UK and elsewhere.
My focus upon how scientists have mobilised the rhetoric of 'patient power', 'cures' and
'treatments' is not intended to suggest that scientists are cynically incorporating and deploying
all means at their disposal. As Latour has argued, when a scientist (or in Latour's terms, 'the
Prince') is engaged in many struggles, 'sometimes he [sic] exploits, sometimes rewards,
sometimes lies, sometimes tells the truth, sometimes skills, sometimes deskills' (1988). Thus, the
incorporation of the hopes and desires of patients into the rhetorical repertoires of SCR for
legitimating its development, may indeed serve the interests of both parties. Boundaries between
inside/outside, expert/lay, then, are not necessarily barriers 'to the inclusion of experience-based
experts into the very heart of scientific decision-marking' (Collins and Evans, 2002: 264).
However, an interesting dimension to this is that invoking the perspective of patient groups
allows scientists to include emotional, experienced-based evidence into their own arguments,
without threatening their own position as objective, disinterested researchers. By returning to
the issue of 'experience-based expertise' in the following chapter, I will consider to what extent
scientists' rhetoric flattens the complexity of patients views of SCR and cloning. On the one
hand, scientists accounts of patient inclusion and influence in the development of SCR implies a
more equal distribution of power between scientists and patient groups than actually exists. On
the other hand, however, this may signal an opening for patient groups and social scientists to
encourage greater public involvement in decision-making processes relating to SCR and cloning.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown how the SCR and cloning debates have produced a range of
difficulties for scientists working within this field seeking to gain legitimacy for their research
and maintain their status as experts. As outlined in chapter 4, the wider context of science-
public relations appear to be moving beyond the 'traditional' PUS model and scientists can no
longer assume the privileged position of 'expert' within scientific controversies. Consequently,
there are a range of relevant social groups located both within and outwith the 'walls of the
palace' with whom scientists must engage. Flowing from this, the already complex ethical issues
are multiplied as different groups raise specific concerns that core-eSCR-scientists must be seen
to address. Thrust into the public sphere at a time when scientific consensus, such as the
continuing debates around embryonic and adult stem cell research, is yet to be reached, then,
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scientists are negotiating the legitimacy of their research practices. Such negotiations have been
shown to span scientific, technical, social and ethical concerns, in ways which generate a range
of tensions and contradictions within scientists accounts of SCR. In turn, such contradictions
are reconciled, or at least accommodated, with a number of rhetorical devices and discursive
repertoires, such as scientism and 'the truth will out' device. What this chapter provides, then, is
a nuanced analysis of scientists accounts of SCR and cloning.
In exploring scientists' discourses, one of the key points to have emerged from my analysis in
this chapter, is how scientists appeal to various boundaries in order to constitute themselves as
experts within this area. My analysis reveals how scientists' accounts of SCR and cloning rest
upon an intricate weaving and borrowing between boundaries such as certainty/uncertainty,
science/society, expert/non-expert, scientists/publics. Significantly, scientists appeal to both
scientific authority and scientific expertise as wdl as uncertainty and experienced-based expertise.
For example, when advocating the use of human embryos for SCR, Smith draws upon a
technical description of pre-14-day embryos and uses disembodied images of 'blastocysts'.
Technical accounts (based upon scientific 'knowledge') of embryos redefines embryos as cells to
be manipulated and cultured, and eSCR is constructed as expediting the development of medical
therapies. Here scientists' accounts of SCR are reasserted as authoritative and the legitimacy of
alternative constructions of eSCR - such as those of people undergoing fertility treatment - are
marginalised. At the same time, this privileging of scientists accounts is counterpoised by
assigning expert status to some patient groups. That is, when patient groups mobilise their
experiences of illness as a mechanism for advocating eSCR, scientists such as Austin Smith
readily accept this 'experienced-based expertise' (Collins and Evans, 2002) as legitimate
'knowledge'.
The nuances of scientists' construction of expertise was also identified in core-eSCR-scientists
negotiation of inside/outside boundaries when expelling reproductive doners such as Antinori.
As I have argued, it was important for SCR advocates to separate eSCR and 'therapeutic
cloning' from 'reproductive cloning'. And in order to construct such distinctions, a range of
rhetorical repertoires and devices were mobilised such as aligning eSCR with the rhetoric of
hope, and reproductive cloning with fear. In doing so, core-eSCR-scientists were posited as
socially responsible, whilst those working on reproductive cloning were regarded as
irresponsible mavericks who are potentially risking people's Eves. It is interesting to note that
the expulsion of Antinori could not be achieved by casting Antinori as a 'bad' scientist, which, if
we consider Wilmut's view, is perhaps because his credentials as a fertility expert precluded this.
Instead, 'doners' such as Antinori are posited as going beyond the boundaries of what is
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publicly acceptable and, therefore, sanctioning occurs through appealing to social dimensions
rather than scientific ones. To this extent, it becomes difficult to talk about scientists as simply
pursuing professional interests; rather, these co-exist with other concerns (e.g. ethical). For
instance, Smith was concerned about exploiting women's bodies for reproductive cloning and
the research students discuss the health risks to both mother and child in reproductive cloning.
It is significant, of course, that the articulation of risks related, primarily, to reproductive cloning
rather than eSCR or 'therapeutic cloning'.
A final point to make within this chapter relates to the extent to which scientists' discourses
meaningfully include the voices of other relevant social groups. As I have shown, some core-
eSCR-scientists have, indeed, appealed to the experienced-based expertise of patients. However,
there remains a tendency to marginalise the views of people undergoing fertility treatment
(potential embryo donors) and to uncritically invoke patient groups as allies. Little attention is
paid to public ambivalence or risks other than those framed by scientists. For instance, issues
around commercial interests in SCR or people's embodied relationships to embryos are
excluded from scientists' accounts. To this extent, most public voices are excluded as non-
legitimate experts. Only some patients' experiences are included as legitimate and then only
some patients - for instance, only patients who belong to organisations that have publicly
supported eSCR - and any 'dissenting' voices within such organisations remain excluded. For
this reason, in the following two chapters, I will present the views of members of these other
relevant social groups, exploring the range of issues and discursive repertoires mobilised by
them.
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CHAPTER VI
Public Perceptions of Stem Cell Research and
Cloning: Expertise, Risk, Trust and Ambivalence
6.1 Moving Beyond the Polarised Debates
As already noted in previous chapters, the pubHe debates on SCR and cloning-related
developments have become polarised. The framing of the debates in ParKament (see Chapter 3),
scientists' accounts (see Chapter 5) and media reporting of the debates (see WiHiams etal., 2003;
Hargreaves etal., 2003), have tended to exclude the complex views and experiences of a range of
relevant social groups. Where the views of non-scientist pubhes have been included they tend to
be incorporated into pre-defined discourses. For instance, as shown in Chapters 3 (section 3.4)
and 5 (section 5.6.2), patient groups are mobilised as a 'desperate' market, demanding stem cell
therapies. Similarly, people undergoing fertiHty treatment are enlisted as willing participants in
the stem cell network (see section 3.5). The support of both potential embryo donors and user-
groups for SCR and cloning-related 'therapeutic' developments are unquestioned and their
identities are delimited.
The characterisation of patient groups as unequivocal in their support for SCR has been
fostered by some patient organisations. Both individual organisations (e.g., Diabetes UK and the
Parkinson's Disease Society) and umbrella organisations (e.g., the Genetics Interest Group and
Association of Medical Research Charities) have been vocal in the stem cell debates - for
example, by responding to pohcy documents, attending relevant conferences, and providing
press releases and other documents on their websites. Furthermore, as we have seen in chapter 5
(section 5.6.2) and in pubHc debates, pro-eSCR advocates argue that patient organisations have
actively lobbied scientists and poHticians and, in doing so, were instrumental in the 2001
amendment to the 1990 HFE Act. In this sense, then, patient organisations seem to occupy a
key position in the pohtics of SCR and cloning-related developments, and have become part of
the poHcy community. In the broader context of patient-doctor relations, however, Salter has
questioned whether there really is a transformation in the dominant ideology of the policy
community 'towards an acceptance of an enhanced role for patients in pohcy making' (2003:
928). He argues that patient inclusion in the poHcy process has become a 'central ideological
symbol ... to legitimise pohcy making by the use of a political language which constantly
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reiterates a particular theme: in this case, that the public plays a central role in both the policy
process and its outcomes' (2003: 931). If we consider how patient groups have been rhetorically
invoked and mobilised by eSCR advocates in the SCR debates, this does seem to echo Salter's
point.
The criticism can be taken one step further, on the basis of the contact I have had with
members of the local branches of patient organisations. This aspect of my research challenges
the presumption that patient organisations, lobbyists or spokespeople represent the views of their
members in any literal sense. For instance, during discussions with patient support groups many
of the participants said that they had not thought about the issues of SCR and cloning or
identified this as an area of research that had any relevance to their own (future) healthcare. It
became clear that the members of local patient groups I spoke to had not been consulted by the
wider organisation before they gave their public support to SCR.1 It is against this backdrop,
then, that this chapter explores the views of relevant social groups. By analysing and comparing
the accounts of participants in two infertility support groups, four patient support groups and
two individual interviews with members of an Alzheimer's support group, I will attend to the
various discursive mechanisms mobilised for negotiating issues of expertise, risk and trust. In
keeping with a cPUS approach I will show how the complexities of public understanding of
SCR and cloning cannot be captured by research that attempts to gauge the levels of 'technical'
or 'scientific' knowledge held by individuals. Instead, this chapter focuses upon the rich array of
cultural resources, meanings and interpretations that are 'brought to the table' during
discussions on this topic that 'mediate and reflect local cultural conditions' (Michael, 1998: 314).
Such discussions also reveal the extent to which participants' views are contradictory and
ambivalent, differing both within and across groups.
The overall approach for analysing these publics' accounts is similar to that adopted in the
previous chapter. As with scientists' accounts of the SCR and cloning debates, I focus upon the
rhetorical devices mobilised by participants in the patient support groups and highlight some of
the dominant issues and tensions that emerged within the discussions. In doing so, my analysis
1 One known exception to this is Diabetes UK which organised a discussion meeting with
some of its members. The meeting consisted of a briefing paper along with some 'experts'
talking about the science and ethics of SCR, and a panel discussion. Following on from this,
delegates moved into small groups in order to discuss their views on the issues. The overall
aim of the day was to consider the role of Diabetes UK in the debates and whether it should
fund both adult and/or embryonic SCR or lobby for a change in the regulatory framework.
However, it should be noted that none of the members who belonged to the branch which
participated in my research were invited to, or aware of the Diabetes UK discussion meeting
before it took place. This meeting also took place over six months after the 1990 Act was
amended.
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shows how, in contrast to the scientists' accounts, the publics' views of SCR and cloning 'open
up' the debates, offering alternative ways for framing the issues and identifying problematic
aspects of these developments. Participants within the various patient support groups were not
restricted by concerns to legitimate this area of research (although this was an issue for some
participants), but instead explored the various implications in some detail, outlining both their
hopes and fears. The views held by members of these relevant social groups are shown to be
contradictory and ambivalent, and cannot be pigeonholed as either for or against. What the
focus group discussions reveal is a tension between a pervading sense of uncertainty and more
optimistic belief in the potential of science, technology and medicine to develop new treatments
or cures.
This chapter builds upon existing work that explores how people negotiate the promises and
risks of the new human genetics. For instance, research conducted by Kerr, Cunningham-Burley
and Amos on lay people's views on the new human genetics has focussed upon the use of
metaphors of 'drawing the line' as a way of expressing and exploring ambivalence (see 1998a;
1998b). Directly influenced bycPUS research, their research has illustrated the inadequacies and
inappropriateness of approaches that seek to produce resolute expressions of public opinion
(such as opinion polls and attitudes surveys) or to measure people's knowledge levels of
'scientific facts' as indicators of public understanding. Public understandings are, instead, shown
to be complex, ambivalent, shaped, as the work of Wynne and others indicates, by their
experiences and social situatedness. The work of Kerr et al. demonstrates how 'any clear
boundary between good and bad practice [in genetic science] remained elusive and slippery*
(1998a: 130) in the eyes of non-scientists. They find that people raise a range of issues including
genetic determinism, medicalisation and wider social prejudices and inequalities (e.g. the
stigmatization of disability or abortion) when formulating their views of acceptable and
unacceptable areas of genetic research. The significance of such issues is that they were used by
participants to point to the grey areas of the new human genetics that make 'drawing the line'
difficult.
In a similar vein to Kerr et al., Susanne Lundin has explored the range of views and everyday
strategies adopted by patients participating in clinical trials for xenotransplantation (2002).2
Lundin investigates how people negotiate their understandings of the potential consequences of
animal-to-human transplantations (such as health risks and the destabilisation of cultural
categories) and connects these to their embodied situatedness of illness. In particular, she shows
2
Xenotransplantation refers to the practice of using organs or tissues from one species,
usually an animal, for transplantation into another, usually human, for therapeutic purposes.
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how the entrenchment of new therapies is not characterised by wholesale acceptance and
support but instead is achieved through complex negotiations over hopes and fears. Patients'
ambivalence towards xenotransplantation reveals how all-embracing ethical principles, such as
attitudes towards animal research, are renegotiated, thus demonstrating that values are flexible
and are often intricately contingent on specific contexts (Lundin, 2002: 341).
Located within cPUS approaches, this chapter explores how members of patient support groups
negotiate the tension between the risks and promises of SCR and cloning-related developments.
I will illustrate how participants' views are shaped by their embodied biographies and their
understanding and experiences of the broader social context of expert-public relations. For
instance, I will highlight the range of cultural resources and experiential knowledge that are
inserted into discussions around distinctions between 'therapeutic' and 'reproductive' cloning. In
linking the construction of SCR and cloning to the broader experiential and sociocultural
context, I will show how issues of trust are central to the publics' views of the role and status of
science in contemporary society.
6.2 'Therapeutic' and 'Reproductive' Cloning: The Slippery Slope
Alongside the 'return to the embryo question' (see chapters 3 and 5), the rhetorical separation of
'reproductive' and 'therapeutic' cloning has been central to the success of pro-eSCR advocates
in bringing about the amendment to the 1990 HFE Act (see chapters 3 and 5). Accordingly, the
creation of legitimacy in the area of SCR was accomplished by effectively drawing a line between
these two uses of the cloning technique, and so averting 'slippery slope' arguments. Within the
patient support groups, however, the line between reproductive and therapeutic cloning was
regarded as problematic and participants tended to blur the two. Whilst, like the core-eSCR-
scientists, they argued that therapeutic and reproductive cloning differed at the level of intention
(one is to develop medical treatments and cures while the other is to create a cloned human
being), this distinction was often undermined as the discussion developed. Within both fertility
support groups, for instance, participants talked about this distinction a number of times in the
discussion and in the same breath alluded to a 'slippery slope' relation between them:
SP Do you think these [reproductive and therapeutic cloning] throw up
different issues?
F2W3 Yeah, I think that they do yeah.
F2W2 You're talking about a part rather than a whole. To cure someone who
is really ill so it doesn't [inaudible]. But cloning is extreme.
Ill
F2W4 One is sort of for giving new life, the other one is to satisfy someone's
wishes.
[All agree]
F2W2 Yeah I think that it's only a matter of time before it [reproductive
cloning] is done.
SP So you don't think that primary legislation will stop it?
F2W2 Hopefully it does, but if they can do it to a sheep.
And then again, later in the discussion:
F2W2 They're totally different. One is to cure, obviously, and the other is just
out of curiosity - to see if it can be done.
F2W3 But I think that's probably right. I think that there may be a slippery
slope - that once they've done one they'll just go on to do the other. I wouldn't
be surprised if that happened. As you said [looking at F2W2] it's only a matter
of time before they can, they obviously know they can clone animals so it's only
a matter of time before they clone humans. I think there will be a slippery slope
because we've opened the door on therapeutic cloning so it will only be a matter
of time before it's used for reproduction. Somebody out there will do it (Sister-
led FertilitySupport Group, 27/06/01).
In this exchange of views, participants begin by drawing a clear line between reproductive and
therapeutic cloning. This distinction is underpinned by a particular understanding of what
constitutes a legitimate illness that, interestingly, excludes infertility. Their experiences of
infertility treatment (Wl, W2 and W3 were undergoing fertility treatment and W4 is the Sister
within the unit that they attend) did not, in this instance, cause them to reflect upon what
constitutes an illness.
Despite the perceived moral differences between therapeutic and reproductive uses of cloning
techniques, both W2 and W3 argue that reproductive cloning will be developed. This sense of
inevitability and powerlessness was also expressed by a number of participants across the patient
support groups. Implicit in their accounts is an understanding of science as driving forwards in
the pursuit of knowledge with little control or reflection upon the broader ethical and social
issues. Similar views were also articulated in the patient-led fertility support group (19/06/01):
F1M4 This [reproductive cloning] is the next stage eh? It has to be. They have
to go that way. You get progress don't you?
F1M3 It's like rolling a ball. You've got to go all theyway... [interrupted]
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F1M4 Yep.
F1M3 ... [continuing] because if you create stem cells then you'll want to
create an eye and the heart... [interrupted]
F1M4 That's right.
F1M1 Yeah.
F1M3 ... [continuing] The onlyway you can do that is by totally, at the end of
the day, is by cloning a whole human being. Just like rolling a ball down a hill.
F1M1 Yeah.
F1M4 That's what's happening now.
F1M2 I have a picture of something that I saw on the tele some time ago
about growing earlobes on mice or something ... [interrupted]
[General recognition of mouse by group]
F1M2 It's abnormal that you know, growing false earlobes onto animals - and
that's questionable. But you can understand as well why they're doing it. So
you've got that dilemma. It [the ear] needs something in order to sustain it and
keep it alive but, I don't know.
SP So do you think that if, I mean, the research on stem cells has been
permitted. They've changed the legislation of the HFEA in January, do you
think that if this becomes accepted and widely practised, I guess this is what you
were suggesting, do you think that this will lead to reproductive cloning?
F1M4 I don't know. If you can do all these things to help people and that,
you've got to go all the way. You can go so far.
F1M3 What I was trying to say is that the therapeutic side will get so far and
they'll say "we can recreate skin for the bums victims". This will create far more
pressure for the other side, reproductive cloning. They'll have far more pressure
to keep on going, but at the end of the day it will happen. They will clone a
human being once they've got the technology. Nothing can stop people from
doing that. I'm not necessarily saying that's a bad thing but I think that people
are kidding themselves if they think that's not scientists ultimate aim. They will
do it, just to prove they can do it. Not necessarily for the therapeutic side to
work, but they will do it. To my mind that's what will happen with cloning
whether it be in this country or in another country.
F1M4 It'll be done somewhere.
In this long exchange between participants, the perception of cloning as an inevitability (using
the metaphor of 'rolling a ball down a hill') is related to growing a human ear on the back of a
mouse. On the one hand, this is used as a narrative device to present science as out-of-control
and to reconfirm the perceived slippery slope from therapeutic to reproductive cloning. On the
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other hand, whilst M2 regarded the image of the human ear on a mouse as abnormal, it was also
seen as a necessary (albeit problematic) aspect of research for developing medical therapies.
Scientific progress, it seems, was understood as intrinsically Faustian in nature, caught between
potential therapeutic benefits and potential risks.
The linking of these two cases shows how the 'slippery slope' towards reproductive cloning is
understood as both an inevitable consequence of SCR and therapeutic cloning, and yet an
acceptable risk. Such a view was similarly articulated by W4 in the Sister-led fertility support
group, who, after supporting SCR for the most part of the discussion went on to outline her
concerns:
F2W4 I think that myworry is that we are all prepared to take one little small
step repeatedly. If we take a big leap from coming from IVF and going to
cloning that's a huge, but you could take small steps for a number of years and
suddenly cloning is only one final step further than what we are doing already.
So I can see that anything you do now and find it acceptable ethically, erm, what
you find is not ethically acceptable, it will be ethically acceptable in a few years
time. Because you've gradually done a little bit more as it's gone along. So I
don't think that you put a barrier and say this part of cloning is OK and this part
is not (Sister-led Fertility Support Group, 27/06/01).
In this account, the 'slippery slope' occurs as new developments become entrenched and
normalised. To this extent, F2W4 problematises the 'slippery slope' by presenting public 'ethics',
or what is deemed as un/acceptable, as context specific and a shifting set of ideas rather than
fixed across time. And it is by this connection that she links IVF, therapeutic cloning and
reproductive cloning together as part of the same trajectory.
As in the patient-led fertility support group, a number of participants in the Piuntington's
support group also linked SCR and therapies with a other aspects of genetics in order to
elaborate upon a 'slippery slope' argument:
HM1 I think that we're concerned that it's unnatural replication. We've
concerns about the research and where it leads it. You know, is this the start of
cloning as such, where it moves from that? A wee bit about the effect that it has
on engineering, as such, you know, where things are being manufactured.
Obviously we're worried that it could prove a lot of benefits to people with
medical conditions and that's certainly what would appear to be happening, in
terms of doing this genetic design to try and find cures to certain illnesses. I
suppose my main concern would be where it goes after that or if it gets into
different hands or different countries or things like that (Fduntington's Disease
Support Group, 31/10/01).
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Here, Ml articulates both his expectations of and anxieties towards SCR and cloning-related
developments. Whilst Ml mobilises the slippery slope narrative as a device for imagining the
future, his 'concerns' are not presented as fait accompli. Genetic engineering and reproductive
cloning were regarded as risks, not inevitable consequences. This view typifies those offered in
the Huntington's group discussion - where narratives of fear were mobilised as the antithesis to
their own hopes and expectations for SCR and cloning-related developments. And despite any
concerns regarding the perceived 'misuses' or ethical problems involved in SCR, members
within the Huntington's support group were ardently in favour of SCR At the end of the
discussion (Huntington's Disease Support Group, 31/10/01), participants ended on a
supportive note:
HW2 Right, I think that we should draw this to a close because we're out of
time. Has anybody else got anything to say?
HW I was just going to say that anything that helps should be pursued and
this is why it must go on.
HW Oh yes, it must go on.
HM I mean, fifty years from now, all these people wanting it to stop it
happening, there'll be another problem.
HW I suppose we're selfish too bywanting research to go on just to help us.
HW1 Yes, but it must go on. We must go forward.
Again, like F2W4, there is an implicit understanding of the social and historical contingency of
what are considered to be public ethics and risks. Indeed, the contingencies of what constitutes
un/acceptable practices are used to legitimate the continuation of SCR Contained within this
account is an insight into the significance of their embodied biographies and lived experiences
of Huntington's disease in shaping their views of this area of research.3 Framed by discourses of
progress, when risks - such as genetic engineering and reproductive cloning - are compared to
the potential therapeutic uses of SCR these are considered to be acceptable.
3
Participants had varying lived experiences of Huntington's disease (HD), including being 'at
risk', caring for partners with HD, some individuals had overt symptoms, and there was one
retired scientist who had spent many years conducting research into HD. All members of the
support group had a vested interest in the care, support and development of treatments for
HD.
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6.3 Regulation and Control: 'It'll Be Done Somewhere'
Continuing with theme of slippery slope, I will now pick up on the theme of regulation and
control - a theme already implicit in some of the accounts discussed so far. The view that SCR
and 'therapeutic' cloning would lead to human reproductive cloning was a key feature in all
focus group discussions. Central to this, is the issue of the (in)efficacy of regulatory mechanisms
in this area of science. Participants reflected upon the extent to which SCR and cloning-related
developments can be controlled and the dynamics of contemporary science.
During the discussion in the Diabetes support group, participants talked about their images of
reproductive cloning and the range of social, ethical and moral issues that this raised. In
particular, reproductive cloning was compared to eugenics practices and, related to this, dog
breeding:
SP So what do you think frightens people so much about cloning humans?
DM1 It's a guess, but just what uses could be made of what you've cloned?
Whether you put it down to the sci-fi or ... [interrupted]
DM2 Or if anyone who could remember back to the second world war and
Hitler... [interrupted]
[DW2 and DW1 "I was just about to say that"]
DM2 ... and the Arian nation. Six foot four, blonde and muscular erm, young
men etc., etc., and young ladies to go with it. I think that was one of his
[Hitler's] goals and I think is always something that people are very afraid of
ever happening. Although not that it's likely to ever happen, but that fear is
buried in peoples' sub-conscience probably throughout the world - or
throughout the world that knows of the second world war.
DW2 It [reproductive cloning] was probably what theywere working on with
all these people who were gassed. They were probably trying that out even then.
Not succeeding of course but that was probably behind Hitler's strategy.
DM3 Are you saying that that wouldn't happen over-the-way [in scientific
laboratories]? But the way people look at life now, especially cloning, now
there's Dolly the Sheep and, actually, I know some dog-owners that are trying to
get the perfect breed. They continue to breed and interbreed and interbreed
until they've got this specimen that "that is it" and when you say that wouldn't
happen I can sort of picture in years to come there will be the white coats
working through this. Getting the perfect six-foot-four [LAUGHS]. It's just,
when you say it can't happen and when you consider how do you get an
aeroplane off the ground? How do you get a car to move? And you say well,
we've actually done that and there's been somebody on the moon. Could it
happen? I mean we are getting the technology.
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DM2 Sure, sure. I think that probably the technology is there but I suspect
that the outcry from the general public and the informed public would be such
that...
DM3 I was thinking just before you got up about Hitler in the '30s, his
thinking. But now we're in the 2000s now and look at the distance we've come.
So therefore what's to say in another 70 years that somebody else is coming up?
(Diabetes Support Group, 26/09/01).
One of the significant aspects of this exchange is the comparison of reproductive cloning to
eugenics to illustrate that controversial practices have been allowed to take place. It is not only
that reproductive cloning is reminiscent of eugenics and 'breeding' practices, but that eugenics
provides an empirical basis on which to found concerns about the slippery slope. Public outcry
is not reckoned to prevent scientists working in and developing controversial areas of medical
research, indicating a sense of powerlessness to alter the direction of science, technology and
medicine.
Following on this, I asked whether they thought that primary legislation to prevent reproductive
cloning would be effective:
DM2 No, no of course not. No. I mean there's legislation against terrorists, if
I can mention that, but that doesn't help. You can legislate until you're blue in
the face but someone will always ... [interrupted]
DW1 People always find a way around it don't they, yeah? I still don't think
that it's a reason to stop the therapeutic side.
DM2 Yes, I would agree with that.
DW1 I think that anything that helps people who have chronic illness can
only be for the good. I'm not speaking as somebody who has Diabetes because
I don't have it but my husband had and I could see the effects that it had on
him. If only that technique [stem cell therapy] had been around to stop that then
it would have been wonderful. I could only wish for people who are in that
position.
DM2 That, I think, is verymuch an informed comment. Going back to what
I said earlier, if you put these questions to the general public you tend to get an
affirmative answer for cloning and reproductive research from people who have
been affected somewhere in the family by chronic illness. But other people who
have healthy families and who never had a day off work in their lives quite often
don't see the necessity or the requirement for it.
DM3 I think that the difficulty I have with it is just where do they close,
where does it stop? You mentioned earlier, how far, I mean, once a stem cell,
there's a cure for Diabetes, then somebody takes a step further, a step further, a
step further, a step further. That, I think, is the difficulty people have. Just
where will it stop? and again, you mentioned Government legislation and I
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mean, there's a lot of things happen when they shouldn't, you know? (Diabetes
Support Group, 26/09/01).
Participants' ambivalence towards SCR and 'therapeutic' uses of cloning techniques are related
to broader social issues and examples. In particular, DM2 draws upon the terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Centre in New York in order to illustrate his points (these events had taken
place two weeks prior to the focus group). The inability of legislation and related policing to
prevent terrorist attacks are used as cultural knowledge for articulating their views on SCR and
cloning. At the same time, the inevitable slide down the slippery slope was not deemed a
sufficiently persuasive argument for ceasing SCR. Participants' lived experiences of Diabetes
were mobilised to legitimate their support for SCR
In the cardiac support group, the potential benefits and risks of SCR were also central to the
discussion. Informed by their experiences of medical experts, recent high-profile scientific
controversies and other relevant experiential knowledge (including 'how society works'),
participants debated how SCR and cloning-related research and applications might proceed, or
otherwise. As part of these discussions CM1 adopted the role of 'devils advocate' by presenting
a position that supported both reproductive and therapeutic forms of cloning. In doing so, the
contributions of CM1 served to agitate other members of group and engender a lively
discussion. However, as I will show, CMl's account of SCR and cloning exemplify how focus
group discussions can illuminate public ambivalence, in particular, the perceived inefficacy of
regulation and control are shown to generate public concerns.
During the first few minutes of the discussion, I asked participants what the role of the support
group was, what their meetings usually included and whether they had thought or talked about
cloning before? At this point, there were a number of small conversations taking place within
the room and people were helping themselves to drinks. As these 'warming up' questions were
coming to an end, CM1 steps in, stating:
CM1 About what you said [not clear who he is addressing], in all honesty the
Government are dithering as usual. I think that this country will be overtaken
fairly rapidly by others in this field. I mean, the Americans are gonna be ahead
of us very soon, yet we started it. As usual we've got great ideas but somebody
else makes money out of them.
SP So you think cloning is a great idea?
CM No.
CW2 Nooo, I don' think so.
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CM1 I differ then. I think that there's a place for it. I'm not talking about full
human cloning but I can see medical uses for cloning.
CM4 For organ replacement
CM1 Exactly (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
At this point in the discussion, CM1 indicates his clear support for 'medical uses' of cloning-
related developments. Being at the forefront of scientific and medical developments is
introduced as a matter of 'national pride', and Britain is pitted in competition with the USA in
this modem 'space race'. As the discussion continues, however, CM1 begins to argue in favour
of legalising both reproductive and therapeutic cloning within the UK (or at least it become
unclear where he is 'drawing a line'). As the following set of excerpts illustrate, CM1 was quickly
identified as the 'deviant' within the group which made for a rich and animated discussion:
CW2 You could see greedy people overstepping the line I think. I think it
could get worse.
CM1 Well the beauty of it is if it's legalised ... [interrupted]
CM2 [Interrupting] You mean that the poor man's not gonna get it and the
rich man is gonna get it?
CW2 Yes, that's exactly what I'm meaning
CM1 But if it was legalised at least they'd have a certain amount of self
control.
CW2 No
[Talking over one another]
CW2 I'm glad you put it like that, that's exactly the way I meant it.
CM2 [Repeating himself] The rich get rich and the poor gets poorer.
CM4 If the Americans get in front of this thing there's a danger that they'll
slap patents on everything and they'll charge money for everybody using these
techniques and it's, I mean, I think it's just morallywrong.
CM1 Well?
CM4 That's my idea. It's morally wrong. You're a bloody wanker, you think
money's the only thing
[Laughter]
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CM1 No, no, no. The main problem is that the other side of the coin is there
is nothing they can do about it. American and British systems are totally
different. America is purely... [interrupted]
CM4 [Interrupting] Commercial.
CM1 ... [continuing] it's a private economy.
CM4 Everything must make money.
CM1 Yes.
[Talking over one another]
CM1 By the same token it doesn't matter where you are, unless it makes
money it's gonna fail. If it fails you'll get none of it. But there is no, Utopia
doesn't exist it never will. Therefore, money has got to come into it and money
is the base-line for most things (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
In this exchange, the potential harms or risks are seen to arise from an abstract notion of
'money - the commercial interests that are perceived to pervade scientific, medical and
technological developments. Economic systems are expressed as a set of risks that are both
faceless (as opposed to the 'mad scientist' rhetoric) and inevitable. That is, this area of research
is being driven by the potential commercial gains. This suggests that there is a strong sense of
powerlessness with respect to the commercial realisation of science and technology as well as
regulation. Risks are perceived to extend beyond an identifiable group of individuals or even
profession, but are attributed to wider societal structures and systems, and yet the 'greedy' or
rogue scientist is simultaneously implicated.
Whilst acknowledging the presence of risks engendered by commercial interests, like FM2 (see
section 6.2), CM1 seems to regard these risks as acceptable. Moreover, it is precisely because of
the commercial vested interests in SCR and cloning that CM1 argues that both reproductive and
therapeutic cloning should be legalised. Through legalising cloning, he argues, this area of
research can be monitored and controlled:
CM1 Yes, but the question is, well I think the basis of the question is
whether or not it [reproductive cloning] should be legalised or allowed? And the
answer is, as far as I'm concerned, is it should be legalised otherwise we get folk
doing it illegally for lots of money.
SP So if we were to legalise reproductive cloning, how do you envisage
that working?
CM1 I've no idea [laughs]
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SP I mean, you're saying that if we don't legalise it people are going to
exploit it and they're gonna make money from it. I'm not sure I know what you
mean.
CM1 I would suggest that it would have to be treated in the same way as the
original abortion laws where you had to have a damn good reason for wanting it
to be done. And to prove that reason other than on just economic grounds.
Following on from this, he goes on to say;
CM1 I'm still doubtful whether human [cloning] right true should ever be
allowed, but I'm sure it will take place (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
As we can see above, CM1 argues that the potential for commercial exploitation is greater if
reproductive cloning is practised as an illegal activity. Accordingly, through tight regulatory
control both reproductive and therapeutic cloning could be developed within a more ethical
framework (since he suggest that reproductive cloning is not entirely ethical) and certain risks,
such as the commercial exploitation of SCR and cloning, could be minimised. One of the key
factors for allowing both types of cloning is to enable the relevant science-base in the UK to
develop as a world leader (especially in competition with the USA) and to allow for regulatory
control rather than clandestine developments either in the UK or elsewhere - thus echoing the
government perspective (see Chapter 3).
Whilst CM1 regards reproductive cloning as ethically problematic, 'ethics' are separated from
'practical' matters of regulation and control. In doing so, CM1 translates the social and ethical
concerns - as identified by other participants - into regulatory issues. For instance, other
members of the cardiac support group, in responding to what they saw as CMl's pro-cloning
views, felt that the word 'cloning' evoked negative images and thoughts. As one woman said:
CW1 I mean, when you say clone you automatically think of somebody
identical. I mean, you're not thinking that it's just a cell or an organ or
something.
At this point in the discussion I asked whether they felt that it was more acceptable to talk about
'stem cell research';
CW2 Yes
CW1 No, no, no, no.
SP Why?
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CW1 All you've really done is changed the name - it's still basically the same
thing.
CM1 No, stem cell research is going to a certain point and stopping.
CW1 Aha.
CM1 And you're going to get somebodywho will not stop, who'll go beyond
that point. Now how are you going to control that? It's going to be impossible
to control because who would know what they hell was going on? Erm, so
therefore I would suggest that when the debate eventually takes place within the
Government they are going to have to make up their mind one way or the other
in total. So they've got to be all or nothing, and the trouble is it can't be nothing
for the simple reason that it's already started and you can't go back on it. So you
can't go back. It's there. And there's only one way to go and that's total.
CM4 Just sort of ... [interrupted]
CM1 [Interrupts] So, can you have a moral argument beyond that about how
you actually control? I mean, I think that the legal argument has got to be that
you've got to allow the research to take place. How you control it beyond that is
a totally different question (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
On the one hand, CM1 contradicts CW2 in saying that SCR, or 'therapeutic' cloning, is separate
to 'reproductive' cloning. On the other hand, CM1 seems to suggest that in legislative terms
they are tightly interwoven and, therefore, must either be sanctioned or prohibited. However,
inherent in CMl's view is a sense of powerlessness and fatalism - the cloning of human beings
must be legalised because legislative bans are futile.
This position put forward by CM1 did not go unchallenged by others in the group. Whilst
others agreed that it is difficult to prevent reproductive cloning and appealed to slippery slope
narratives, sanctioning reproductive cloning was regarded to be as problematic as prohibiting
medical uses of such techniques. For instance, one discussion that spun-off from CMl's
comments related to the (in)efficacy of laws in preventing 'deviant' activities or behaviours:
CM4 [Addressing CM1] I think that you're thinking along the lines of the
difficulty of controlling it. It's just you're saying that legally it would be difficult
to control, you know. Heroin addiction is impossible to control but do you
think that we should legalised it?
CM1 No.
CW1 No, but with heroin and all that, it's all self-inflicted so.
CM1 That is self-inflicted yes.
[Shouting over one another]
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CM1 Follow your [CM4] line of argument, cannabis is illegal in this country
but you go across to Holland and you can buy it in the comer shop.
CW2 Are you sure that this tape is gonna be long enough [laughing]?
SP Yep, I've got another one
CW2 Good, 'cause once we get started.
[Laughter]
CM1 Abortion in this country is legal, it's illegal in Ireland and so they come
across here. The same thing. I mean no matter what area you look at, the world
is getting smaller daily. It's globalisation for everything.
CM4 The difficulty of controlling something is not a good reason for
legalising it.
CM1 Alright then, but the only way you can do that is if you've got one law
covering the whole world and we don't have and never will have. Because if you
outlaw it here, somebody else will say I can make money out of this and we'll
make it legal there. And it might be somewhere like Cambodia.
CM4 You're looking at it this way with a bankers mind. You keep coming
back to money all the time.
[Laughter]
CM4 I mean, I would never have given money a thought in talking about
this. I don't think money comes into it. Money is totally immoral when you
apply it to something like this.
CW1 Not for the research it's not.
CM1 Money is the bottom line for the research - that's the problem (Cardiac
Support Group, 18/07/01).
In having one participant within the group taking what was seen to be an 'extreme' position on
the topic of SCR and cloning, provided a focus for the discussion. As this exchange illustrates,
the efficacy of laws to prevent reproductive cloning is questioned by drawing parallels with
other issues - recreational drugs and abortion. These issues are also mobilised in order to
illustrate that we can no longer think about science regulation as a local concern because the UK
is no longer understood as a bounded nation state. CM1 reconfigures his view of 'local'
regulations for SCR and cloning in relation to its connections with a global order, for instance,
people can develop cloning in other countries and 'consumers' can travel receive treatments or
purchase such services.
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In addition to the use of cultural knowledge and resources when constructing their views on
cloning, it is also interesting to note the significance of participants' situated knowledge. As a
retired banker, CM1 applies his knowledge and experiences of business and planning to the SCR
and cloning context. Others in the group are reflexively aware of the role of CM1 in drawing
their attention to financial dimensions of the scientific enterprise, which, as evident above, is
responded to with great humour along with, at times, exasperation. Such data illustrates the role
of social location in shaping people's views of SCR and cloning. It is reflects positively on the
appropriateness of focus groups for allowing participants to bring a range of experiences and
knowledges to the discussion, generating their own questions and issues according to their own
terms of reference.
6.4 Publics' Views on Science-Public Relations: Trust Transparency and
Uncertainty
In the following section, I will explore how participants reflect upon science-public relations,
including the cognitive authority of science, the nature of the scientific enterprise and their view
of scientists. As I will show, we need to investigate the public understanding of science-in-
general that underpins public ambivalence towards SCR and cloning. Participants' reflections of
the wider issues of science in contemporary society are then linked to specific issues that relate
to the particular areas of research in question, as the accounts of participants switched between
'science-in-particular' and 'science-in-general' throughout the discussions. From this, however, I
can also explore some of the wider issues around expertise, trust and risk that are central to
cPUS approaches.
In keeping with Beck's theories of reflexive modernity and risk, discussions within patient
support groups revealed that participants have recognised a shift in science-public relations.
There is a reflexive awareness of the decline in scientific authority and the growth of alternative
sources of expertise. This growing scepticism towards the scientific enterprise is largely
attributed to public conflicts between a range of people vying for expertise. As the following
quote from the Huntington's Disease support group illustrates, participants reflected upon
increased public mistrust towards science and the implications of this for the relationship
between science and the public:
HW Even in the supermarkets now, you don't buy ordinary vegetables now,
you go over and buy that because they're pure and all the rest of it and there's
nothing scientific in it, nothing in it - the grounds clear and they haven't been
sprayed with stuff. That's only a small thing but yes I do think that it's growing.
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And all this destroying GM crops and all that, I do think there's a nucleus and it
is just beginning to spread. Maybe we get more information now, the general
public, and because of that we know that all scientists are not good. Maybe
that's the problem, whereas a few years ago people didn't realise that. And we
know that with Huntington's there have been cases who have held back
information that would, well maybe not with Huntington's but with other
degenerative disorders, they've held back information from other scientists
throughout the world because they wanted to be the first, they wanted to get the
money. So I think that has probably put people's, made people aware that not all
scientists are white.
HW5 I'm not saying that some of the things aren't deplorable but of the
change that they make, or say they make are over exaggerated. For example the
tobacco companies, I think that the anti-smoking lobbies are just as dirty, just as
a for instance.
HW I think the thing about anti-science is that people are much more,
they've got costs involved and there's huge cost implications for scientists taking
the ball and running with that. We've just heard about effect of BSE on sheep,
people are worrying about these threats that have been going for about five
years or so. The money is huge.
HW TV programmes and that now, you get folk coming on and telling you
that herbal remedies, I mean that's really coming to the fore now. And washing
your hair instead of buying shampoo in what you can make. You can make your
own shampoo, "it's cleaner and it's better" and it's all this sort of thing. There's
a lot of that and there's a lot of this thing. People are of course, we're more
informed now. Twenty years ago we weren't informed about anything, we just
took what they said and believed it. You believed whatever your doctor told you
and that was it. But now there's information and things going about.
HW I think if you just look back over the last ten years, how many things
have we been told that are really really bad for us and then five years later they
come back and say oh it's quite all right? And if you'd eaten more fat you're
gonna die of cancer and you know. And then you're told if you eat too low fat a
diet then you will get something else. I think that people now are a bit more
aware that scientists are not Gods (Huntington's Disease Support Group,
31/10/01).
In this exchange - which took place towards the end of the group discussion - we can see
participants' awareness of a range of conflicting voices within science as well as the emergence
of alternative forms of expertise outwith the traditional walls of expert systems. A key
dimension to this discussion is the lack of trust in all experts regardless of whether they are seen
to represent traditional science institutions or competing ones. Science and scientific activities
are not seen as value-free but instead are inherently social - and, importantly, 'the public' 'know'
this. It is difficult to know, from this matieral, whether any expert knowledge is allocated a
privileged status over others or whether, indeed Beck is correct in suggesting that there has been
a 'return of uncertainty to society... [where] ... no one ... or everyone is an expert' (1994: 8-9;
also see section 4.3).
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In slipping between the topics of organic vegetables, GM crops, smoking, BSE, shampoo and
cancer, participants construct their own identities in relation to a range of others. What this
seems to suggest is that the proliferation of expertises has engendered a situation where expert-
public relations are 'played out through the processes of consumption' (Michael, 1998: 320). To
this extent, the public come to scientific expertise in a similar way as they do other aspects of
consumer culture and in doing so, blur the boundaries between 'citizen' and 'consumer'. The
point here is that the identity of the consumer lends itself as set of discourses through which
publics can locate themselves vis-a-vis an increasing number of expert knowledges and
positions.
The above excerpt from the focus group with the Huntington's Disease support group indicates
how matters of expertise, trust, transparency and (uncertainty are interwoven. Recent
controversies such as BSE/v-QD have contributed to the paradox where publics are both more
trusting and sceptical of science and scientists. A number of participants across the focus groups
and interviews raised concerns about transparency and effective communication, reflecting upon
whether disclosure of information by scientists is indicative of trustworthy science. For instance,
in the cardiac support group, CM1 questioned whether scientists are providing all of the relevant
information:
CM1 The thing about the whole concept [of cloning] is that it has been
brought into the public domain and we are talking about it like we are at this
present time. I would hate to think what is going on behind closed doors which
we have not even got an inkling of. And it could possibly be way beyond this
little lot (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
Similarly, within the Huntington's Disease support group, participants question the
trustworthiness of scientists in communicating their work to the public:
HW And we know that with Huntington's there have been cases who have
held back information that would, well maybe not with Huntington's but with
other degenerative disorders. They've held back information from other
scientists throughout the world because they wanted to be the first, they wanted
to get the money. So I think that has probably put peoples', made people aware
that not all scientists are white (Huntington's Disease Support Group,
31/10/01).
Both quotes indicate the inherent contradictions in the shift towards transparency and openness
in science noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. As Brown and Michael have outlined, the increase in
information available to the public has had the 'effect of making people more aware of the
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complexities of science - that science does not speak with one uniform and necessarily coherent
voice' (Brown, 2002; see also Brown and Michael, 2002). Moreover, publics' awareness of the
social and political nature of scientific research, such as scientists' professional aspirations,
means that scientists' attempts to 'tell it as it is' can reinforce existing levels of mistrust and
uncertainty.
As the critical approach to PUS reveals, publics' trust in science and scientists cannot be limited
to people's understanding of medical science and scientists but must be related to the wider
social and political worlds in which people locate both themselves and the scientific enterprise.
For instance, participants within the cardiac support group, reflected upon the public debates on
SCR and cloning in both the media and Parliament. The parliamentary debates on SCR and
cloning were regarded with scepticism, primarily because politicians were not to be trusted.
Participants were also critical of media accounts of the issues because they believed that the
quality of debates was poor. The following excerpt is taken from a discussion which took place
towards the end of the focus group with members of the cardiac support group. Here,
participants reflected on their experiences of the focus group vis-a-vis the wider public debates,
and prompted the group to think about wider issues of science-public relations and public
inclusion in policy debates:
CW1 Do you think that they should have more larger scale debates, not the
Government, but for common people like us?
CM1 Well there are ten of us here and ten different viewpoints.
CW2 Oh yes.
CM1 If you enlarge that by a thousand.
CW1 Yes, but even if you want to get it over to people. You've got to get it
over someway haven't you and get them on your side of whatever?
CM4 Everyone that you spoke to would need to have the ability to absorb
that knowledge and understanding and that's not possible.
CW2 No.
CM1 No the layman hasn't got sufficient knowledge to give an answer to
them.
CW1 Well they'd only start off, well, you see all these television programmes,
debates, or they just have an audience that walk up being on it. They have other
things, they had it about a woman being a lesbian or gays. You know, it draws
your attention to it. Whether you turn it on by accident or you hear something.
Well, obviously there might be some things where I say, 'I'm not gonna watch
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that' and turn over. And it's like oh, the wee argument starts or they're doing
their points of view and the doctor or whoever's interviewing there, and you'll
think oh that was good this week so I'll watch it. Just a build up that's what I'm
meaning. I'm not saying that the Usher Hall with all these people in because
nobody would talk.
CM4 Yeah, but these programmes can engineer the result of the debates
because it's an invited audience.
CM1 It's not only that... [interrupted]
CW1 There's always other viewers outside on the outside of the television
and it's bringing it to their attention. It's to get them to start to think.
CM1 The situation like that, the person that's interviewing them asks the
questions, in such a way as to get the desired answer.
CM4 Yep, yep.
CM1 There are two ways to ask the same question. One will get the answer
'yes', and the other will get the answer 'no'.
CW1 Yes, but, as she [SP] asked us when we first came in tonight, 'have we
thought about it, have we talked about it?'. No. She got us talking about it.
Whatever view it is, you're talking about, you're still talking about it. It's
bringing it to our attention. That's what I'm getting at - it's not enough people
(Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
In this exchange members had conflicting views. Some believed that there needed to be wider
coverage of the SCR and cloning issues within the media in order to raise awareness and to
generate public discussions. Others were sceptical of media debates which were regarded as
staged and limited the scope of debate. Participants were also reflexive about the range of views
within the cardiac support group and considered the implications of this for implementing large-
scale public debates, with the suggestion that public debate would require an educational
component to it. Such arguments echo the claims put forward by Wynne and others who are
critical of PUS models and present communication and engagement practices between scientists
and publics (see Chapter 4).
Participants in the cardiac support group then raised concerns about parliamentary debates on
SCR and cloning:
CM4 Political discussions, I mean, politicians are professional manipulators
of the truth.
CM1 Without a doubt. I mean, that's one of the problems in many senses -
it's [SCR and cloning] not been discussed.
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CM4 They never tell the bloody truth, they don't know what it means. The
whole topic of cloning has already been raised and has been fairly widely
debated in the media but the powers that be have made it such a low priority it's
either on the back page, oh no, we cannot do the back page that's the sport
[laughs]. It's either in the middle of the paper or it's on about two o'clock in the
morning on channel 17 (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
When scientists are perceived to be linked to politics, participants are highly sceptical towards
the views expressed and evidence provided. Such scepticism also emerged within discussions
with other patient group members. For instance, during the interview with one of the
Alzheimer's carers she talked about the range of information sources such as broadsheet
newspapers, tabloids and medical journals such as the Lancet (which she said she regarded as
very trustworthy), for obtaining information about scientific and medical issues. I then asked her
how she felt about scientists:
AC2W I trust some scientists. I mean, you know, like Susan Greenfield, but it's
when like the Government scientists, they've got such a bad reputation and they
deserve it (Alzheimer's Carer 2, 03/10/01).
This suggests that when the science/politics boundary is perceived to have been breached,
credibility and trust diminishes. Scientists, like politicians, are seen to push forward a particular
viewpoint based upon vested political interests. However, within the above accounts there is an
interesting contradiction. On the one hand the scientists, the media and politicians were believed
to have a responsibility to communicate with the public (which was sometimes constructed as
'educating' the public). On the other hand, communication and public engagement activities are
understood as marred by attempt to manipulate, mislead and delimit public views.
6.5 Patients as Active Citizens: How Patients Assert Experience-Based
Expertise
Following on from the above discussion, I will consider the extent to which participants in the
patient support groups are actively engaging with and redefining their relationship with experts,
and constituting themselves as experts. In considering the applicability of theories of reflexive
modernisation to the SCR and cloning debates, I will explore any insight participants' views and
understandings of the science-public relations offer into transformations of 'patient' identity.
For instance, theories of reflexive modernisation suggest that risks generated by 'expert
institutions', such as those associated with SCR and cloning, also engender lay ambivalence
towards the cognitive authority of science and scientific expertise. As publics become more
aware of 'risks' they simultaneously become aware of the choices which exist in daily life, and
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new forms of social agency emerge (see, for example, Irwin, 1995). In turn, scientists are
increasingly aware of 'public' ambivalence and the growth of alternative forms of expertise,
including 'experience-based expertise' (see Chapter 4 and Section 5.6.2). It is, therefore,
important to consider how publics construct their own identities - especially as experts in their
own healthcare matters - and see their role within public debates.
Commenting on science-public relations - or more specifically relations between scientists,
clinicians and people who are 'genetically at risk' from Huntington's Disease - Novas and Rose
have argued that 'patients' actively engage with experts (2000; see also Michael, 1998: 321-323).4
Through an analysis of the risks generated by new molecular genetics, Novas and Rose argue
that those who are genetically at risk are actively formulating life strategies and new forms of
personhood. The rise of 'genetic risks' are shown to have induced 'new and active relations to
oneself and one's future' (Novas and Rose, 2000: 785). Central to these new forms of
personhood, are transformations in expert-patient relations where patients are reconstituting the
role of scientists and clinicians and enrolling them into their own new life strategies. As Novas
and Rose have argued, 'patients' and their families are,
increasingly demanding control over the practices linked to their own health,
seeking multiple forms of expert and non-expert advice in devising their life
strategies, and asking of medics that they act as the servants and not the masters
of this process. These persons defined by genetic disease have an investment in
scientists fulfilling their promises and discovering the basis of, and the cure of
treatment for, genetic conditions (2000: 490).
Thus, developments in medical genetics are seen to produce ideas about genetic identity and in
turn, creates new subjects. And this emergent subject is one who 'is to become skilled, prudent
and active ... elements in the practice of cure' (Novas and Rose, 2000: 489).
This account of expert-patient relations is reminiscent of Beck's theories of reflexive modernity
where risks generated by science, technology and medicine bring about new 'expertises'.
Developments in human genetics are argued to have created new 'knowledge' of the human
body (e.g. around health and illness) and, in turn, created novel forms of patient identities.
Comparing Novas and Rose's analysis of Huntington's patients with my analysis of patient
groups in the SCR and cloning debates, does suggest that some participants are constituting
4
'Patients', here, is used as a generic term for including those who have already been
diagnosed with Huntington's Disease, people who have had received a negative test result
and those who have not been genetic tested for whatever reason. Thus, 'patients' covers
both those who are 'ill' and 'asymptomatically ill' who are defined by genetic disease (see
Novas and Rose, 2000).
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themselves as active citizens in their own healthcare regimes. For instance, within both the
Huntington's and Diabetes support groups, participants indicated that some members attend
conferences and public events relating to scientific and medical developments. Relevant
information from these events is then conveyed to other members of the group who could not
attend. And whilst such explicit knowledge-seeking activities was not common across or within
groups (i.e., some members seemed, to be more active than others), membership of a patient
support group can be interpreted as the presence of the 'active subject' (Novas and Rose,
2000).5 Participants indicated that membership of patient support groups provides emotional
and social support, along with information relevant to their healthcare needs and a forum to
discuss science and medical developments towards treatments and cures. For example, support
group meetings were said to have included invited speakers, such as clinicians and medical
researchers, as well as used for discussing their experiences as patients, family members of
patients or carers.6
In a number of focus group discussions and interviews, participants indicated that one
motivation for contributing to my research was to learn more about SCR and cloning
developments and the potential implications for their own or other families members' medical
treatments. For instance, in the Sister-led fertility support group, F2W3 was interested to know
whether SCR would develop organs to be transplanted. Similarly, F2W1 wanted to know more
about the potential treatments for Huntington's Disease - as this was something that affected
her grandfather and, now, her brother. However, to suggest that an interest in medical
treatments was the only motivation would be overly simplistic. Others, such as one Alzheimer's
carer, declared an interest in the moral and ethical dimensions of SCR and cloning:
AC1M It was topical if I remember correctly. At the time that the letter came
there was stuff in the press which I had sort of read without being avidly
interested. You can't read everything in the papers but I found the moral
question fascinating without having sat down and thought deeply about it. Just
5 I do not mean to suggest that attendance at science meetings is the only or most important
indication of the presence of the 'active subject'. The constitution of the active subject can be
achieved through a range of actions in both public and private spheres, such as attending
patient group meetings, searching the Internet or simply talking to friends and colleagues.
There are two number of points of clarification to make here. Firstly, only the Diabetes,
Huntington's and Alzheimer's support groups were linked to larger, national patient
organisations. The two fertility groups and cardiac support group were not officially attached
to national patient organisations, but were locally run. Secondly, the cardiac support group
differed to all other groups to the extent that their meetings were organised as social
gatherings, such as playing skittles, quiz nights, going on a dinner cruise and having
massages. As CM1 says, The group has evolved into something that's basically social.
Other heart groups have gone a different route, they went for stupid things like exercise'
(Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
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superficiallymy reaction was that there are moral issues or ethical issues, serious
ones (Alzheimer's Carer 1, 21/09/01).
Similarly, the second Alzheimer's carer, within the same sentence as stating that she was
interested to know more about the potential medical applications of SCR and cloning, also
declared an interest in the moral dilemma's generated by such research:
AC2W I have a sister who has early onset dementia. We're now in a very bad
phase. This is exactly the sort of thing, cancer, Alzheimer's, etc., etc., that this is
going to help. My first words were now what sort of check, what sort of holds
are there going to be on just doing your own thing? What, it's not control it's
the ethical borderline. How are you going to keep checks on that and nobody
abuses it? (Alzheimer's Carer 2, 03/10/01).
Both quotes illustrate that these participants were interested to find out about the potential
medical applications of SCR and cloning and yet took a critical stance. The promise of medical
treatments for their respective family members did not preclude concerns regarding the ethical
issues generated by these developments. What is seen to be at stake in SCR and cloning
developments goes beyond health care benefits but also includes a broader unease about the
risks that may ensue. The offer to participate in this research can be seen to have facilitated an
active engagement with the issues by members of patient group support groups and providing a
forum within which they could explore their views.
This active engagement with relevant health care research was also a key issue for those in the
Diabetes support group. Members of the group described themselves as an 'extremely active
branch' who attended relevant meetings and showed a keen interest in the latest developments
for understanding and treating Diabetes. As with members of all support groups that
contributed to this research, during the discussion it was evident that their participation was as
much to do with expressing their views as seeking information about SCR and cloning and
potential medical applications. One participant in the Diabetes support group had prepared for
the focus group by searching the internet and printing a transcript of an interview with Ian
Wilmut. And as the discussion developed it became clear that this member was unhappy with
the lack of information that he had received from the national Diabetes patient organisation.
When I asked whether he was concerned about this he responded, 'Yes I suppose it does
because this has been the first chance that I've had of airing my viewpoint and saying that I'm
for research of this type' (DM2, Diabetes Support Group, 26/09/01). Active engagement for
DM2 involved a combination of seeking information from a range of sources as well as feeding
back into the patient organisation and relevant experts.
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As we saw in the previous chapters, patient groups have been characterised by eSCR advocates
as demanding developments in stem cell and cloning-related therapies (see 3.4 and 5.6.2).
Patients are enrolled as actors in the pro-eSCR lobby, and the overlap of interests between
'patients' and core-eSCR-scientists are highlighted (i.e., to develop treatments and cures). Such
strategies of enrolment tend to be reinforced by human interest stories and corresponding
emotional discourses (see Brown and Michael, 2002). Rather than simply rejecting this position,
we should note that within the patient group discussions a number of participants echoed
similar views. As the following excerpt from the Diabetes support group discussion illustrates,
patients reflect upon their health status and articulate a set of expectations:
DW1 I think that anything that helps people who have chronic illness can
only be for the good. ... If only that technique had been around to stop that
[husband dying of Diabetes] then that would have been wonderful. I could only
wish for people who are in that position.
DM2 That I think is verymuch an informed comment. Going back to what I
said earlier, if you put these questions to the general public you tend to get an
affirmative answer for cloning and reproductive research from people who have
been affected somewhere in the family, by chronic disease. But, other people
who have healthy families and who never had a day off work in their lives quite
often don't see the necessity or the requirement for it.
DM2 then goes on to say:
DM2 Well I'm certainly demanding it. It's great. It's going to come too late
too help me, but if it comes soon enough to help the kids that are growing up
just now with [Diabetes] then so much the better. ... Not only to help Diabetes
... but to help people with Parkinson's, MND, etc., etc. I think that if it's going
to help people at the end of the way then it should be followed up.
DW1 And if it'll help people with spinal injuries when you see so many
horrific cases then that would be wonderful (Diabetes Support Group,
26/09/01).
Such sentiments were also stated within other groups discussions. Participants in the
Huntington's focus group discussed issues relating to the possible sources of stem cells. When
talking about the use of adult stem cells from aborted foetuses one woman stated:
HW2 I would not agree with a foetus being aborted simply to help somebody
with Huntington's. But if a foetus is going to be destroyed anyway, surely it's far
better to do some good for somebody else. I mean, I think this is the difference
for somebody who's got children at risk and somebody who's not got anybody
at risk [from Huntington's] and maybe could look at it a little more objectively.
But I've got no problem with it.
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And then later on:
HW Like we've said, if you've got somebody, you know, you've got
someone in the family, your grandchildren and things like that with the
possibility that they might develop Huntington's and all that then you know, I
think it's worthwhile (Huntington's Disease Support Group, 31/10/01).
The above quotes are typical examples of the kinds of statements made within all patient focus
groups. Contained within the above are a number of pertinent points that should be teased out.
Running through these accounts are aspects of the constitution of patient identity according to
'experience-based expertise' (see Collins and Evan, 2002). In a similar vein to that of the
scientists, participants in the patient support groups also appealed to their embodied and lived
experiences of particular diseases for articulating their support for the development of stem cell
therapies. Significantly, patients separated their 'expert' identities from the wider public who
were considered to lack such experiences and by extension, expertise. To this extent we might
say that these examples illustrate how patients are actively constituting another layer of
expertise; that is, their own 'expert' identities which is based upon experiential knowledge and
embodied biographies.
The constitution of patients as experts often involved patients reflecting upon various aspects of
expert systems and their relationship to it and, importantly, mthin it. That is, patients acquire
knowledge of relevant healthcare services and systems and actively insert themselves - with their
expectations, hopes and fears - into the network. For instance, AC1M, an Alzheimer's carer,
talked about the advice, support and treatment available to his wife who has early-onset
dementia. He discussed the various problems that he and his wife encountered in receiving
adequate healthcare treatment and, in particular, the drawn-out process of being accurately
diagnosed. As this excerpt shows, upon learning through his daughter that there was a history of
dementia in his wife's family, AC1M conveyed his suspicions that his wife was also developing
early-onset dementia to their GP:
Of course the family didn't advertise "the family disease" as I now know they
refer to [re: Alzheimer's]. But [my wife] had always been afraid that she would
get it and when the early signs came she was very upset. I pooh-poohed it to her
face and said "there's no reason to believe that it's hereditary". Of course I
know that that was a silly thing to say. I was absolutely wrong. But I did tell the
doctor and he pooh-poohed it, just completely pooh-poohed it ... And
eventually last year after about three long letters [written to the GP] - which I
don't know if he read - documenting everything. And eventually, eventually
after I first mentioned my fears he referred her. That was last summer ... three
years from when I first used the words Alzheimer's to the doctor. Three bloody
years (Alzheimer's Carer 1, 21/09/01).
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In the context of this part of our discussion AC1M articulated a number of instances where he
felt that medical experts had failed, of which the above example was the one. Other problems
identified were the administrative system at the hospital (a part-time secretary had forgotten to
send out the hospital appointment), existing therapies (there was only a 50% chance that the
drugs would slow down the deterioration) and social support networks (a role fulfilled by the
Alzheimer's Society).
In connection with his experiences of the failure of experts, AC1M went on to talk about
medical research into dementia. Problematic expert-patient relations were not confined to the
more obvious patient requirements, such as diagnosis, access to specialist clinicians and
treatment, but were also extended to include patients' involvement in what he called
'experimental therapy and clinical trials:
AC1 And yet no-one, to my surprise, no-one has sought to involve us in any
research or anything. It kind of surprises me. I would have thought that
someone so young with teenage children and all the rest of it, I would have
thought that all the research from different angles, your one [SCR] and I had a
lady who lives in Edinburgh, but some researchers have come along, well two,
one the basis of the Alzheimer's Society giving out my name, which I've said
they can do. But no-one on the social side of things ... no-one from the social
angle, the medical angle, the physical - if there's a difference - you know, my
wife's stability, no-one. Not even a questionnaire to fill in except in relation to
the assessment of my wife. I've filled in countless questionnaires of that sort but
that's in her medical files, nothing to do with research ... which is surprising
(Alzheimer's Carer 1, 21/09/01).
He then comes back to this point when reflecting upon the development of stem cell therapies:
The time will come, after all processes have been gone through and approvals
and all the rest of it, the time will come when that's going to be used
experimentally or in trials, or whatever the terminology is, on humans. Would
one want, would I want mywife to be a guinea pig? That answer is yes because I
can't see it could make things worse in any practical sense. And if it could help,
well, there's not much to be lost. If you come back to stem cell research, yes it's
got to be speeded up if there is a real prospect that this will transform treatment
or be really effective, perhaps more effective. I'm not saying there shouldn't be
research on the drugs and all the rest of it, but every avenue has got to be
explored. And I think that the stem cell one, going back to the point I was
rambling about earlier, the fact that it has such wide application, potentially, yes
it should be speeded up. And I'm talking from the scientific, medical point of
view. Leaving aside the ethical question. If it can work, get on with it would be
my reaction. Lives are being destroyed and devastated right now and if
politicians have the real measure of that, I'm not suggesting I do - I'm only
talking about my personal experience. I don't know how many people are
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affected and how badly by all of these things. I can imagine it's an awful lot, a
much bigger number than I imagined and it happened to me and I began to
think about it (Alzheimer's Carer 1, 21/09/01).
The excerpts above can be seen as 'points of connection' (Giddens, 1990: 88) between patients
and expert systems (in the GP's clinic and the hospital). AClM's account illustrates how
different types of expertises are often negotiated in what we might call the micro-politics of
expert relations. For instance, the GP's diagnosis and treatment was not accepted as correct and
his status as expert was disputed. Instead, embodied and experiential accounts of AC1M and
family (including his wife and daughter) constitute expert knowledge that usurps that of the
traditional expert. In this reconfiguration of expert-patient relations, patients are not simply
consumers of science, technology and medicine, waiting around for new developments, but
instead are active throughout a number of aspects of relevant healthcare systems. Participation
in clinical trials can be taken as one other component to the fashioning of new forms of
responsibility and obligation to contribute to the production of new therapies and ones own
treatment.
6.6 Conclusions
The overall aim of this chapter has been to show how the accounts of patient support group
members 'open up' the SCR and cloning debates. In particular I have shown that it is overly
simplistic to characterise 'patients' as wholly supporting developments in this area. Whilst none
of the participants within the focus groups objected to SCR and cloning for developing medical
therapies, they held complex and contradictory views that are more ambivalent than the
parliamentary debates or core-eSCR-scientists' accounts have indicated. People's understanding
of SCR and cloning is located within their existing knowledge and experiences of science and
scientists, of the efficacy of regulation and the wider social context. To this extent, and in
keeping with theories of reflexive modernity and risk society, it does appear that people are both
credulous and critical of science and scientific expertise.
Most of the participants could not be described as scientifically or technically knowledgeable
about SCR and cloning practices. As already stated, the majority of people had not thought
about SCR and cloning or made connections between these developments and their own
healthcare practices. What this chapter has shown (and will continue to develop in the following
two chapters), however, is that it is not necessary for publics to hold 'scientific knowledge' in
order to apprehend the range of issues pertinent to the subject matter. Although the focus
group and one-to-one discussions being the first time that most people had considered and
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discussed their views, participants were able to formulate ideas and generate discussions on the
basis of to their own frameworks of knowledge. That is, they brought a range of social and
cultural 'knowledges', including embodied and lived experiences, to the discussion.
In the focus group context, the range of knowledges brought 'to the table' by individuals served
to raise issues that were marginalised by core-eSCR-scientists' discourses and in the
parliamentary debates. For instance, within the cardiac support group, the retired banker, CM1,
introduced issues relating to the economic factors and commercial interests involved in SCR. and
cloning. The group then considered topics such as patenting, differences between the UK and
US economies, and the role of regulation in balancing ethical and commercial issues. That
people draw on their views and experiences of wider social, political, economic and cultural
domains, was further exemplified in the Diabetes support group discussion where participants
connected SCR and cloning with eugenics. As a form of cultural knowledge, eugenics serves as
resource for articulating a particular set of shared values for defining the limits of 'ethical'
scientific practices. That is, what constitutes acceptable, or ethical, scientific practice is
understood as culturally and historically contingent. To this extent, members of the Diabetes
support group (as with a number of members in other groups) underline the difficulties in
distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable scientific practices (see Kerr et al., 1998a).
Here, narratives of the slippery slope are based upon knowledge of how science and society
'work'. Such accounts also reveal that, science and society are not distinct, monolithic categories
by people in these patient support groups, but are shifting and mutually constitutive.
In such ways, the boundary between science and society was problematised in focus group
discussions. Moreover, participants were quite reflexive about the inherent uncertainties and
contingencies of the scientific enterprise. For instance, within the Huntington's Disease support
group participants moved away from uncritical constructions of scientific knowledge - as
(re)produced in scientists' accounts - to an account that acknowledges the contingencies and,
often, transient nature of what constitutes scientific 'knowledge'. As shown in section 6.4, a
range of examples were used for illustrating how science is multi-vocal and that publics must
interpret these voices and make choices about how to live.
Running through many of the participants' accounts are issues of trust. The cognitive authority
of scientists can no longer be taken for granted, as participants reflect upon recent science
controversies such as BSE. Such controversies have raised an awareness, not only of the
inherent uncertainties in science and the provisional nature of scientific 'knowledge', but also
that scientists are not a homogenous group. For instance, members of the Huntington's Disease
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support group talked about 'good' and 'bad' scientists, and AC2W discussed how some
scientists could be trusted (e.g. Susan Greenfield) whilst others could not (e.g. Government
scientists). Discussion about the trustworthiness of scientists, therefore, illustrates how 'trust' in
scientists' expertise was intimately linked to participants' view of science and scientists as
connected to related expert systems. For example, for some people within the cardiac support
group, scientific claims made via the media and politicians were regarded with scepticism. This
shows that scepticism is equally applied to 'experts' in other social spheres, such as the media
and politics.
This chapter confirms cPUS arguments of a need to understand publics' views of SCR and
cloning as shaped by and reflecting the embodied experiences and social location of participants.
On the one hand participants within the patient support groups were in favour of developing
stem cell therapies with a number expressing an interest in participating in clinical trials. On the
other hand, we cannot 'read off' people's views of SCR and cloning from their status as
'Diabetics' or 'infertile. As I have shown, contrary to the core-eSCR-accounts, people with such
conditions express complex and ambivalent views and adopt critical positions towards this area
of research. Participants' active engagement with the issues raised by SCR and cloning illustrate
how, as Edwards has argued 'they apprehend innovation through what they already know, and
produce new meanings and understandings which are not always predictable' (2002: 324).
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CHAPTERVII
(Re)Constructing Embryos: A Comparison of Fertility
and Patient Support Groups
7.1 Conceptualising Embiyos as Flexible Actors
This chapter builds upon the issues raised in chapter six. Continuing to highlight people's
ambivalence towards SCR and cloning, I will focus upon the ways in which embodied
biographies and experiential knowledge shape views of using human embryos for this area of
research. At the same time, I will reflect upon how developments in SCR and cloning are
feeding back into and reconfiguring people's understandings of embryos and of life. In this
regard, this chapter is an analysis of the co-construction of science, technology and society
through the lens of eSCR.
As already discussed in previous chapters (see Section 3.3), there has been a return to the
'embryo question' in the SCR and cloning debates. The announcement of Dolly the cloned
sheep in 1997 and of the development of the first embryonic stem cell cultures by James
Thompson in 1998 (Thompson et al. 1998) generated a great deal of public debate within the
UK. As the debates progressed (e.g. within Parliament, newly established working groups and
the media), it became evident that the use of embryos for SCR extended beyond existing
regulations on the use of embryos for research purposes - as contained with the HFE Act. That
is, the original 1990 HFE Act regulated the use of human embryos for research in the area of
reproductive medicine, whereas eSCR involves the use of embryos for a potentially wide range
of medical research areas, including regenerative medicine and drug development. This
expansion of the uses of human embryos in biomedical research has reopened the complex
legal, moral, ethical and social issues relating to embryo research. Moreover, such research
problematises the teleology of the embryo that places it within a sequential, linear narrative of
'life'. By this, I mean that the teleology of the embryo can no longer be represented as gametes-
embryo-foetus-baby. As new actors are introduced into the narrative (e.g., stem cells and patient
groups), the meaning of embryos are further pluralised. To this extent - and as I have shown in
chapter 3 - the SCR and cloning-related debates constitute the most recent embryo controversy
and must be located within the lineage of previous debates on this topic.
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My conceptualisation of embryos as flexible signifiers is not novel, but is indebted to a number
of writers, especially within the broad field of feminist studies of new reproductive technologies
(see, for example, Cussins, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Franklin, 1997; Goslinga-Roy, 2000; Morgan
and Michaels, 1999; Spallone, 1989). Such works on the variability of meanings attached to the
embryo have already attended to its multiple constructions and roles across a number of sites,
including politics, religion, popular culture, science and medicine. In investigating scientific and
medical interventions into human reproduction across history (e.g. abortion, pre-natal screening,
IVF, embryo research and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis), feminists have offered astute
analyses of the corresponding range of ideologies, narratives, forms of representation and
embodied understandings of embryos (see, for instance, Martin, 1996, Duden, 1999, Morgan
and Michaels, 1999). In particular, the construction of the embryo according to 'scientific facts'
has been criticised by a number of writers who have attempted to denaturalise such meanings
and reveal their contingencies (see for example Duden, 1999, Franklin, 1998). Furthermore,
'scientific' accounts of embryos are shown to eclipse both women's bodies (as 'sources' of
embryos) and the lived, embodied understandings of those undergoing fertility treatments (see
Franklin, 1998; Morgan and Michaels, 1999). For instance, how people constitute relationships
between themselves and embryos or how embryos move between 'identities' as objects, kin,
potential lives, biological material and so on.
The significance of this existing body of work to my own research is that it provides a
conceptual framework for reflecting upon the material-semiotic practices that 'bring to life'
human embryos. In particular, embryos are revealed as the outcome of a complex network of
actors and practices, such as the discursive construction of the 'pre-embryo' in the embryo
debates (see Mulkay, 1997; Spallone, 1987, 1989), material-semiotic practices within the fertility
clinic that seek to classify the embryo and render it visible (see Cussins, 1996, Franklin and
Roberts, 2001) and the embodied experiences of women undergoing fertility treatments (see
Franklin, 1997; Goslinga-Roy, 2000; Rapp, 1999).1 By this connection, the embryo - which
Franklin has called one of the 'new biologicals' (2001b: 303)2 - must be understood as always in
a state of becoming rather than being. The 'identity' of embryos, then, are subject to
interpretation and can defamiliarise or denaturalise existing categories of personhood, kinship
and even the role of biological 'facts' (see Franklin, 2001; Strathern, 1992).
1
This list is not an exhaustive list of actors and practices or of relevant research in the area,
rather it is indicative of some of the readings that have informed my analytical and
conceptual approach for understanding the 'embryo' in the SCR and cloning debates.
2
The 'new biologicals' is used by Franklin when referring to new entities created by material-
semiotic practices within contemporary biological sciences that defamiliarise our
understanding of 'what it is to do biology or be biological' (2001b: 303). Other examples
include transgenic animals, genetically modified seeds and patented gene sequences.
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To return to the case in hand, in building upon analyses of the 1980's embryo debates (see, for
example, Franklin 1997, 1999; Mulkay 1993, 1994, 1997; Spallone, 1986, 1989), my own analysis
of the 2000/2001 SCR and cloning debates within Parliament has shown that there remains little
consensus on the meaning of human embryos (see chapter 3). Instead, human embryos
continue to represent different things to different commentators. For instance, my analysis of
scientists' accounts illustrates how we cannot talk of a single scientific and technical
understanding of the embryo, but that within science there are disputes over where one can
'draw the line' between acceptable and unacceptable uses of human embryos (see chapter 5).
Despite these controversies over the use of embryos for SCR and cloning-related developments
in the parliamentary debates and scientists' accounts, however, the experiences and views of
those undergoing fertility treatment and potential user-groups (patient groups) are grossly
underrepresented. Or to put it another way, these groups are grossly overrepresented by
politicians, scientists and other spokespersons (e.g. the Genetics Interest Group or public
relations officers from patient charities) but they themselves are not present. That is, patients are
strategically invoked and their views represented. This can be attributed, I would argue, to the
dominant framing of the SCR and cloning debates whose lineage can be traced back through the
embryo debates of the 1980s to the abortion debates which have been sporadic since 1967.
Here, the embryo question continues to be polarised according to pro-eSCR (who were also
pro-abortion/IVF/embryonic research) and anti-eSCR advocates (who were anti-
abortion/IVF/embryonic research).
This dichotomous framing of the debates has, I believe, acted to simplify many of the issues
involved in the use of embryos, and to construct particular associations between different actors
in this sociotechnical network For example, 'couples' undergoing fertility treatment are
recruited by pro-eSCR-advocates as 'on their side' and repositioned as embryo donors (see
section 3.5). Similarly, potential user groups and their families are recruited as 'desperate' and as
having an instrumental relationship to the embryo (see section 3.4). In this sense, the
relationship between embryos, potential user-groups and those undergoing fertility treatment
remains unproblematised and unexplored. This chapter focuses upon the various ways in which
members of the fertility and patient support groups construct their relationship to the embryo.
Building upon existing analyses of the meanings of embryos, I will explore how people talk
about embryos, how they are understood in relation to cells and foetuses, how embryos can and
cannot be used, their processes of production (i.e. in the context of assisted conception
practices), how they are visualised and what cultural resources are brought to bear upon their
constitution. In doing so, I will show how the relationship between scientists, clinicians, those
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undergoing fertility treatment, patients (as potential-users) and embryos, are far from simple.
Instead, the embryo appears in contradictory ways and also serves as a vehicle for understanding
and making sense of the relationship between experts and publics, as well as those undergoing
fertility treatment and potential user groups. Indeed, in keeping with the general vein of this
chapter as a whole, I will argue that addressing the embryo question helps us see how the
relationship between experts and publics is becoming increasingly complex, where the
boundaries between these groups are often blurred.
7.2 A Note on Methodology and Structure
When preparing for the group interviews with fertility support groups, I had envisaged the
members as having already thought through the issues of embryo donation for medical research.
I had assumed that they were aware of the potential use of embryos for SCR, even if they had
not fully considered their views on this. In the event, however, the majority of participants in
the patient-led support group and all of those in the Sister-led support group appeared to come
to the focus group without having any well-formulated views on either embryo donation or
SCR. The focus group discussion was an opportunity for participants to explore their views on
this area, which involved asking many questions of one another and myself. Also, given my own
limited knowledge of the use of embryos in reproductive medicine and SCR at the time of the
interview, I was often unable to convey technical or procedural information. Since the aim of
my research was not to 'test' participants technical knowledge of SCR and related issues, their
views should be regarded as no less significant than if they possessed such 'technical'
knowledge. Instead these accounts are analysed in the spirit of cPUS, focussing upon the ways
in which those interviewed make sense of and represent SCR and cloning-related developments.
Accordingly, the analysis reveals the complexities and contradictions of their views and how
they are embedded in wider cultural assumptions and embodied experiences.
At the beginning of each focus group I introduced my area of interest and outlined why I
wanted to speak to them and why their views are important. This involved telling a 'story' about
SCR and cloning-related developments, which included the use of both embryos and adult
tissue for research, the use of the cell nuclear replacement technique (aka therapeutic cloning)
and the potential medical treatments and therapies that may ensue. When telling this 'story' to
the fertility support groups I highlighted their potential role in this research as embryo donors;
in the focus groups and one-to-one interviews with the patient groups I highlighted the range of
diseases for which SCR and cloning-related developments may provide treatments. Thus, in line
with the parliamentary debates, my 'version' of the SCR and cloning debates also invokes
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members of patient groups as key actors in these developments. For instance, when introducing
myself and my research at the beginning of each interview or focus group, I also appealed to the
teleology of the stem cell 'story' - from embryo donation, to the scientists conducting eSCR to
potential patient groups - which is also reflected in mymethodology (since these are the groups
that I have included in my research design). And in doing so, I opened up the discussions to
include the issue of embryo donation so as to capture the range of views on this within and
across the groups.
The following two sections in this chapter (7.3 and 7.4) revolve around the views of participants
within the patient-led and the Sister-led fertility support groups. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 is a
discussion of the negotiation over meanings of embryos in the patient support groups. Whilst
there are some interesting convergences between the groups, I have separated them for the
purposes of clarity. Where relevant I have endeavoured to draw comparisons and distinctions
between different perspectives.
7.3 Donating 'Spare' Embryos for Research Purposes: Meanings and Uses
Within official documents (e.g. Department of Health's report, June 2000) and scientists'
accounts of eSCR (see chapter 5), the embryos used for research purposes are referred to as
'spare' or 'surplus' embryos from IVF cycles (see for example House of Lords Select Committee
on Stem Cell Research, 2002). That is, 'couples' undergoing IVF are 'invited' to donate 'spare'
embryos that will not be used for implantation specifically for research purposes which may
include eSCR. However, what constitutes 'spare' or 'surplus' embryos and the practices involved
in their production is never clarified. For instance, it is not made clear that scientists require
embryos that are graded as 'viable' for implanting into a woman in order to derive 'healthy stem
cells.3 Stem cells cannot be derived from embryos which are graded as 'poor quality' and would
not be used for implanting into a woman. Thus, the language of 'spare' and 'surplus to
requirement' is central to processes for shifting our understanding of embryos from potential
life to biological material used for medical research. At the same time, however, the potential life
of embryos are implicitly recognised in legislation, where they continue to be afforded a 'special
status' requiring legal protection. This, illustrates how embryos are subject to a number of
constructions where not all embryos are regarded as the same (see Franklin and Roberts, 2001).
3
Indeed, we should note that one research institute within the UK has, at the point of writing,
received over 1500 'spare' embryos from a fertility clinic and is yet to produce a stem cell
line.
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The extension of the UK. regulations to allow the use of human embryos for SCR, makes it
important to explore the views of people undergoing fertility treatment on donating their 'spare'
embryos for medical research. At the time of designing and conducting fieldwork (2000-2001),
'potential embryo donors' were excluded from the dominant debates and it was because of this
that I chose to include such groups in my research. Since the amendment to the 1990 HFE Act
in 2001 it seems that pro-eSCR-scientists are now acknowledging this as an area for legitimate
concern. In this section, then I will address the views of those undergoing fertility treatment on
donating embryos for medical research in general, as well as for the specific purposes of SCR.
Alongside this, I will consider the views of participants in the patient support groups - again
whose views on this subject remain unexplored in the policy process.
For those undergoing fertility treatment, the prospect of donating 'viable' embryos for medical
research generated a great deal of unease. Whilst a number of people from the fertility support
groups had already agreed to donate 'spare' embryos for medical research, these embryos were
understood to be 'non-viable' (i.e., could not develop into a baby). This is captured in the
following quote fromMl in the patient-led fertility support group:
F1M1 We've had to sign every time we've done a fresh cycle. We have to
decide at the start what's going to happen during that cycle. So you're allowed to
keep it for five years, allowed to perish, or the extra ones that you wouldn't have
used are allowed to go for research purposes - that's the three. But by saying
that they're allowed to go for medical research, well, the understanding there is
that, well, my perception is that they wouldn't have progressed anyway so
they're not any use to us. So then they can be split, the cells can be examined to
see how they're developing, how they're splitting and things like that. But you
appreciate that that's to help couples in the same position as yourself (Patient-
led Fertility Support Group, 19/06/01).
What F1M1 seems to suggest is that he was happy to donate embryos when they were used to
help people requiring fertility treatment rather than for other forms of medical research.
However, he assumes that only non-viable embryos are used for medical research rather than
viable ones. Within the Sister-led fertility support group, participants were also reluctant to
donate viable embryos for research purposes:
F2W1 I wouldn't give them away. They're really precious to me unless there
was something wrong with them and they weren't any good to me. And then I
would give them to research, but certainly no give them [sic].
SP Have you agreed at any point to donate your spare embryos for
research?
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F2W1 I've agreed to donate eggs, but obviously I couldn't do that anymore
but previously I have. And it was because there was something wrong with
them, because theyweren't any good to me.
F2W4 One of the things that we do here, erm, is embryos, only if they are not
good enough for taking or transferring [inaudible] but patients would have to
sign a consent form for that. So [inaudible] or may have been. If you leave them
in the incubator for long enough they may be good enough to grow stem cells
from.
F2W2 On the form after a certain amount of time, if they're not being used
then they can be used for research?
F2W1 But if you have good ones and you choose them first, what happens to
the other ones?
F2W4 If they are good enough they will be frozen. The ones who are not
good enough to be frozen will not thaw anyway, so there's no point. [Inaudible]
put them in the incubator and if they survive for another couple of days then
you get stem cells (Sister-led FertilitySupport Group, 27/06/01).
Both of these accounts of embryo donation for medical research illustrate participants'
understanding of which embryos would be made available for research purposes. After
undergoing the processes of classification, embryos are no longer regarded in any homogenous
sense (if they ever were) but instead come to mean different things. Those classified as 'non¬
viable' - that is, they could not be used for reproductive purposes - are not viewed as 'precious'
in the same way as those that could result in a pregnancy.
In the above excerpt, it is also interesting to note that the intervention of the Sister (F2W4)
'explaining' that the embryos used for research are not 'viable', added a different dimension to
the patient-led support group. Her presence as an 'expert' within the group served to legitimate
clinical practices and so to alter the direction of the discussion.4 Whereas in the patient-led
group the participants discussed the issues around embryo donation for medical research at
length, within the Sister-led group the Sisters' contribution limited these discussions by
rendering them irrelevant. After the above intervention of the Sister, both F1 and F3 stated that
theywere happy to donate their 'spare' embryos for research purposes.
So, returning to the first quote from the patient-led fertility support group, F1M1 outlines two
key points. Firstly, his understanding of embryo donation is that only non-viable embryos would
be made available for research purposes. Secondly, 'spare' embryos donated from fertility
4
I have since learned that only viable embryos are required for creating stem cell lines rather
than non-viable ones. During the focus group, however, neither myself or the other
participants knew that the information provided by the Sister was incorrect.
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treatment are envisaged as being used in research within the field of reproductive medicine only
- to improve understanding of and treatments for infertility. In order to press Ml on his views
of the purposes of embryo research and the implications of this for his willingness to donate
embryos, I sketched an outline of the original 1990 HFEA regulations for embryo research and
the 2001 amendments, before raising the question of donating embryos for SCR:
SP Do you feel any differently about donating embryos for stem cell
research than you would if it was for within reproductive medicine? Does this
throw up any new concerns for you?
F1M2 From my point of view any embryos that we get erm, I presume that
by having the embryos, that they are viable, therefore, I want to keep them for
my own treatment. Not for somebody else to do research on - as much as in a
way that you would also like to be able to contribute because how do people
leam? How do they, the doctors leam how to inject ICSI cycles, or whatever,
unless they've got something? But then I believe they use erm, egg cells or just
eggs for that which is slightly different from [interrupted]
F1M1 Part of the bit that you take for research is for that, because we were at
[another hospital] it was a new angle that was explained to us that that part of
that research is to train people to be able to inject the sperm into the egg and
they have to be able to do that to get the qualifications. We've always ticked that
box on the understanding that it's for that aim, it's always for infertility.
F1W3 We understood that it was just eggs that haven't fertilised for medical
research, it wasn't actually embryos. I just ticked that and said if the eggs haven't
fertilised then you can have it, because it's not good and you can use it for
whatever. But it wasn't an embryo. No way are they getting any of my embryos
if I get any. [laughs]
F1M1 We've agreed that any embryos that are going to be allowed to perish
can be used. It's for the infertility side of things, you know, we haven't thought
outwith that - that it could now go to cloning.
F1W1 If we were to tick our box that says yes it can go for medical research,
does that mean then that it can go to any research? (Patient-led fertility support
group, 19/06/01).
Throughout this exchange, participants share with one another what they understand they are
consenting to when donating embryos for medical research, in terms of 'what' are they
donating, what theywill be used for and why embryos are required for research purposes. Given
that the participants cited above were all undergoing fertility treatment and were yet to have a
child (only M4 within the patient-led support group had already had a child through fertility
treatment), it is not surprising that 'viable' embryos were regarded as valuable entities and
imbued with hope and expectation. As in Franklin and Roberts' analysis of the construction of
embryos in the clinic during PGD programmes (2001), the accounts of those interviewed as part
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of my research reiterates how 'viable embryos' are centred whereas 'non-viable' embryos are
peripheral to fertility treatment.
As these accounts seem to suggest, for those undergoing fertility treatment 'spare' embryos are
those that could not be used for reproductive purposes. This understanding is also extended to
include eggs - those that did not fuse with the sperm to create an embryo were set apart from
viable eggs that went on to develop into embryos, and yet aligned with non-viable embryos.
According to the views of those above, then, the processes of ordering, classifying and grading
gametes and embryos by 'experts' within the clinics has profound implications on the
relationship between people undergoing fertility treatment and their embryos. People
undergoing fertility treatment, like scientists, appeal to technical descriptions of some embryos.
This use of a scientistic understanding of embryos illustrates the extent to which hegemonic
meanings attached to embryos have permeated the ways in which we think about embryos. As
in the accounts of pro-eSCR-scientists and eSCR-advocates in parliament, the complex medical
processes and interventions for producing eggs and creating embryos are absent from the
accounts of those undergoing fertility treatment. Here, the scientific and medical means of
categorisation for ordering and assigning particular meanings to gametes and embryos are
privileged.
Exceptions to the above, however, did occur within the patient-led fertility support group.
During the discussion there was one couple who sat quietly for most of the discussion. Whilst
they did not offer their opinions directly, they demonstrated that they were engaged in the
discussion through their body language, such as nodding or shaking their heads at appropriate
points. After approximately one hour their body language seemed to suggest that they were
unsettled by some of the discussion, especially as the discussion moved on to consider issues
around donating embryos for SCR and cloning-related developments. At one point
(approximately three-quarters of the way through the focus group) I asked whether they would
be happy to donate embryos for SCR and directed my gaze towards the said couple. The female
partners' response was a very quick and sharp 'No', and when I asked why she explained:
F1W4 Because it's an embryo and it's like my baby, it could be my baby. I
can't bear the thought of you cutting it up and doing whatever you want to do
with it. I can't bear the thought of that.
And then others followed on:
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F1W1 That's the difficultly that probably everyone here has to get over. It's a
chance. And for us to give that away to somebody else just to play with is taking
away our chances.
F1M3 We've got to go through a lot to get that.
And then later in the discussion:
F1M3 Everybody here tries very very hard to get enough stock whether they
be good grades or not good grades (Patient-led Fertility Support Group,
19/06/01).
In these excerpts, participants allude to a more embodied understanding of embryos that are
tightly bound up with the pain (both emotional and physical), hope and expectations involved
when undergoing fertility treatments. To attach utilitarian meanings to embryos, was interpreted
as objectifying not only embryos (as potential babies) but also the couples undergoing treatment
who have made personal investments in the processes that they are undergoing (see also
Cussins, 1996). A number of studies, such as Cussins (1996), Franklin (1993), McNeil (1993) and
Price (1999) have shown how fertility treatment tends to be framed according to narratives of
hope which tie women to motherhood, offering a technical fix to complex social and biological
problems. Therefore, to introduce a view of embryos as sources of stem cells rather than
potential children, is inconsistent with and disrupts narratives of hope.
The tension that arises from the construction of embryos according to grading processes, where
some are deemed as potential lives and yet others are regarded as less precious was lucidly
presented byMl in the patient-led fertility support group. In drawing upon his own experiences
and those of others who have been members of the support group, he explains his own views of
embryos vis-a-vis 'life':
F1M1 I personally don't have any worries if it's for research on infertility. If
it's an embryo we've had the right grading of embryo to go back and one that
doesn't look like it will make the grade and will be allowed to perish, I've never
had any problem with that going to research. I think that for me that's because
after so many years every one that goes back [into the woman's womb] has
either the possibility of going on to develop or perish. And at the outset, I know
it sounds very harsh for me to take this line, but it's, I've always seen it as the
opportunity for life at that stage at the outset. I've never particularly allowed
myself to get wrapped up in saying that it's a child at that point. Because at that
point to me it's not, it's the possibility of life at that stage. It's not a human
being. That's maybe sounds harsh and I fully understand people who say that
from the point of conception an embryo as it starts to divide that is life and I
can fully understand that. I don't see that as wrong at all. But for me, as time has
gone on, has always been the opportunity of life and if it's not gone, as we've
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had for five years of not having a child, then that possibility of life didn't take
off. But it wasn't at that stage a child, it was always just a, it was cells that
offered the possibility of life. And as I say, for five years it hasn't. So I think that
because there's so much upset and there's so much emotions involved and you
can see how it's quite a difficult thing to kind of hang on. For some people what
could be their potential child [pause], have I gone away from what we were
saying? There's different perceptions. It's so emotive, I've seen it from all the
couples that have passed through the group. They all have different perceptions,
it's all emotion, and quite rightly. Every one of the embryos that's produced
whether it's going to ultimately perish naturally within the woman or if it's good
enough graded at the moment for us, one, two, three the grades that they do, if
it's not going to make the grade at that stage and go back then that one that's
allowed to perish I've always just said it offered the opportunity of life and just
left it at that. I've never let myself get emotionally caught up with it. I don't
know whether that's just the way I've tackled it (Patient-led Fertility Support
Group, 19/06/01).
In this account, the embryo is something that is worked on in a number of ways - not only in its
'production' and grading by clinicians, but also requiring emotional work to distinguish embryos
as cells from embryos as a potential life. And given that even those embryos graded as 'potential
life' have not resulted in a full-term pregnancy for Ml and his partner, then 'viable' embryos
continue to be imbued with potent meanings. In this sense then, such views illustrate how
scientised distinctions between embryos according to their 'quality' are problematic even when
they appear to be adopted by'couples' undergoing fertility treatment.
I also asked participants in the Sister-led fertility support group how they feel about viable
embryos compared to those that are graded as non-viable. Since this focus group took place
after the patient-led group, I drew upon some of the themes that emerged within that group,
one of which was the differing degrees of emotion attachment to 'different' embryos. As in the
patient-led group, participants distinguished between embryos according to their grading. But in
addition to this, one participant raised the issue of the quantity of embryos created through
fertility treatment:
F2W1 Flow do you get emotionally attached to one embryo if you've got
seven or eight there? It's a difficult thing to say because I've been through quite
a lot up here erm, if it doesn't work then how can you be attached to something
that you've not got? Alright, you've seen the wee cell in the camera but it's not
going to materialise into anything so why get emotionally involved with
something that's never going to be?
F2W3 I got emotionally involved with the two that have been put back inside
F2W1 That's right.
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F2W3 But not the ones that haven't. If it's not meant to be, if it's not meant
to happen. What's important, what you're concerned about is what's going on in
here, not what's going on in the ones that didn't work.
F2W3 then goes on to recount her experiences of a recent failed cycle of treatment where two
eggs were successfully fertilised and graded as viable:
F2W3 The guy came through from the lab to say that they'd been successfully
fertilised and - my husband and I do not actually have IVF we do ICSI - and
that they'd managed to get two eggs and that both eggs had been fertilised and
was alive. And that's the first time that anybody has ever said that word to me,
that they were alive. I went home that night and I thought my God, they were
alive. And when I came back in and only one of them had survived and the way
I felt about that one was far different than any of the other cycles that I've ever
gone through, purely because he had used the word 'alive'. It's a whole
rollercoaster of emotions, far more than any of the other cycles because I'd
never thought about it in that sense before (Sister-led Fertility Support Group,
27/06/01)
Here, as in the previous accounts of embryos, the material-semiotic practices within the clinic
that constitute some embryos as viable and others as non-viable has as a powerful effect upon
the perceived relationship of people to embryos. The distinction between embryos is further
strengthened, from the perspective of F2W3, by the subsequent language used by the clinicians
to describe 'viable' embryos as 'alive'. Additionally, the description of emotional attachment to
embryos 'put back' into the womb reveals how understanding of embryos has powerful
embodied dimensions - dimensions that remain unexplored in the accounts of core-scientists
and other SCR advocates.
At the time when the focus groups were conducted, the people whose views have been
discussed so far in this section were childless. And as I have already suggested, this seems to
have had some impact upon their views of embryos and embryo donation for medical research.
One of the participants in the patient-led fertility group, however, already had one child through
using fertility treatments (with his wife who was absent from the focus group discussion). At the
point when we met, he and his wife had decided that theywere unlikely to continue with fertility
treatments to conceive a second child and were now faced with the issue of what to do with the
remaining 'viable' embryos that were being stored. As this excerpt shows, whilst he is happy to
donate them for medical research he wants them to only be used in research that would help
other people requiring fertility treatment:
F1M3 We knew, well, me personally, I can't speak for my wife, but these five
embryos in storage are a possibility of life, you know, as far as I was concerned.
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If they were going towards helping in any way instead of perishing, helping
other infertile couples then I would be quite happy for them to go down that
road. Actually, the proviso being that it'd be helping infertile couples. Can I do
that? You know, I don't really know.
F1W2 responded to the thoughts of F1M3:
F1W2 With them going to help other infertile couples you know, in a way you
know there'd maybe be some hope of life. But by going to medical research
there may be a bit of distrust there because you just don't know what's going to
happen.
Then, later on in the discussion they return to this issue:
F1M3 In four years time they'll contact me and we'll decide by that time yes
we're not going to go ahead [with further fertility treatment], I would like these
embryos to go to treating infertility or helping people treat infertility, not for any
other purposes because that was the reason that we came in the first place. But I
don't know how much say I have in that if any of course.
F1W2 But when you say that, I mean, to treat infertility, do you mean to be
transplanted into a woman or for research?
F1M3 Personally - and I can't speak for my wife, my wife might speak
differently - I would donate them.
F1W2 And they could be used for either?
F1M3 I haven't really thought about it to be honest.
F1W2 Because that's something that I keep thinking about. Be careful with,
you know, be specific.
F1M3 Yeah, no no, I don't know is the answer.
F1W2 I mean, when it comes to the time it's mymistrust though. If you write
something and you didn't mean to say it, you know, so simply and it gets used
for anything.
F1M3 Yeah well, you get that (Patient-led Fertility Support Group,
19/06/01).
In this exchange it is not entirely clear what F1M3 means when he talks about embryos helping
infertile couples. Even when quizzed byFlW2 on whether he means that they could be used for
implantation into another woman (other than his partner) to allow another couple to have a
child or whether he means only to be used for research into furthering our understanding of
infertility and for developing therapies - he does not offer a conclusive response. However,
what is evident is that he wants his donated embryos to be used within the field of reproductive
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medicine rather than SCR, which was seen to extend outwith the remit within which their
embryos had been produced.
As indicated in the above exchange between F1W2 and F1M3 in the patient-led fertility support
group, the concerns of F1W2 regarding donating embryos for medical research went beyond the
issues of using them for research into infertility compared to regenerative medicine, but lay with
a sense of uncertainty of what would happen to embryos used for research. The decision of
whether to donate embryos elicited fundamental questions relating to the trustworthiness of
scientists and medical researchers to tell people what they are using embryos for. In the
following exchange, participants share their doubts on the trustworthiness of scientists:
F1W2 I mean, why would you want to give embryos if you don't have the
knowledge of what they're going to do with them, you know?
SP Well if a scientist was going to come to speak to you, they would tell
you that they were going to take - if you offered them your spare embryos -
they would cultivate from your embryos stem cells. Cells that they would then
use to grow particular tissue, say if they were to try and grow skin, nerves, heart
cells and so on.
F1W2 I don't know. I've still got a mistrust when I fill in forms about what
things they're really gonna be used for. There's just a general, I'm still not
confident that they're going to be used for what they say they're gonna be used
for.
F1M3 Well Dolly the sheep didn't turn up until she was alive.
F1M1 Well yeah, that was my earlier point. Dolly the sheep never turned up
until she was alive.
F1M3 There's also the other situation of babies organs in the Liverpool
hospital where people were dissecting their organs without permission from the
parents (Patient-led FertilitySupport Group, 19/06/01).
As a novel and unknown area of research the use of embryos for SCR produced a number of
anxieties and fears which were anchored around a sense of mistrust in scientists. This exchange
demonstrates how participants construct a lineage of issues, slipping between SCR, reproductive
cloning and the illicit retention of organs in hospitals. The general sense of mistrust offered by
F1W2, was furnished with two grounded examples by F1M1 and F1M3. And whilst I do not
believe that these three issues were understood as the 'same thing', such an exchange does
demonstrate how people draw parallels with a range of issues when formulating their thoughts
on novel and controversial developments. At the point when this discussion took place a
number of high-profile 'organ retention' scandals, including the Alderhey Hospital, were
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receiving a great deal of media attention. During these 'scandals' children's organs were either
used for medical research, or simply 'retained' without the consent of the parents, thus
generating anxieties and mistrust in official procedures for gaining consent from next of kin.
The examples of Dolly and the organ retention cases are used to elaborate on participants'
anxieties over how their embryos have been and continue to be used by scientific and medical
researchers. Such examples seem to bear out Wynne's argument that public perceptions of what
constitutes a risk may be more ambiguous than a normative framework for analysing risks
allows (2002). For instance, in the above account of embryo research, the examples used by the
speakers serve to convey a sense of unanticipated risks - what Wynne calls 'unknown
unknowns'. This is further captured byM2:
F1M2 Can I use an example here? Dolly the sheep was bom in 1997. Nobody
knew about Dolly the sheep until 1997. I'd have signed these forms four years
ago, in 1996, or five years ago, whatever, my viewpoint might have been
different once I knew the cloning side of Dolly the sheep. But I signed that
form not knowing what people could be, well, not people could be cloned but
sheep could be cloned (Patient-led FertilitySupport Group, 19/06/01).
What was seen as the 'secret' development of reproductive cloning has generated concerns
regarding what is being done behind closed doors in the laboratory. In this sense, F1M2 is
concerned that potential embryo donors do not have access to all of the relevant information
regarding what their embryos are being used for and could be used for in the future. The
insertion of both Dolly and Alderhey into the narratives of embryo donation, I would argue,
reveals a pervading sense of powerlessness on the part of the public over the direction of
scientific and medical research (see Kerr etaL, 1998a, 1998b).
In the patient-led fertility support group, one participant located her sense of mistrust and
powerless within the context of her experiences of fertility treatment. As shown on the previous
page, F1W2 expressed some strong concerns about what happens to embryos donated by
people undergoing fertility treatments and at one point compares scientists working on eSCRto
Burke and Flare. During the discussion she describes her experiences on being asked to
participate in a new dmgs trial as part of her fertility treatment. At the end of the focus group I
offered to provide a copy of the transcript to anybody wanting one and so agreed to send a
number of copies to the group co-ordinator who would forward them on to other members.
Two months later I received a letter from F1W2, who, after reflecting upon her contributions to
the group discussion requested that I replace the part where she discussed the dmgs trial with
the following explanation:
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F1W2 When asked to take part in a research study [clinical trial], the way that
the study is explained and presented and the length of time given to think about
it has a marked effect on the way I approach the study. If I feel rushed and not
given more than a couple of days to think about my involvement, then I may
develop strong and conflicting emotions through both a perceived moral
obligation to take part and frustration at not having sufficient time to think it
through carefully. Time to talk to others, both those going through a similar
situation and professionals in the field, may help to alleviate any fears that have
developed and may make me feel more confident about making an informed
decision (Personal correspondence, 29/08/01).
In the letter she wanted to make it clear that her concerns about this drugs trial were no
reflection of her view of staff at the hospital which she and her partner attends; 'I have nothing
but admiration and respect for them'. The source of her sense of mistrust was, instead,
attributed to 'scientists testing these drugs, people whom I will never meet and for whom I'm
simply a statistic'. For the purposes of my analysis, this illustrates how, when participants talk
about distrusting scientists, what appears to be a general statement may obscure more nuanced
views of science and scientists. And whilst a number of quantitative studies have been
commissioned to examine the extent to which the public trusts (or otherwise) scientists and
other experts (see, for example, The Public Consultation on Developments in the Biosciences, 1999), what
these fail to do is to explore how trust is not fixed across time and how 'scientists' as a group of
experts are not homogenised (see Chapter 6). As the example of F1W2 in the patient-led fertility
group suggests, mis/trust may be temporary and contextual, and as much to do with ones
immediate knowledge of scientists in order to humanise our image of some scientists where
others remain abstract.
The general consensus within the patient-led fertility support group seemed to be that theywere
not willing to donate 'viable' embryos for SCR (and, in fact, it was not clear that they were
willing to donate non-viable embryos for this purpose either). In this context, one of the
participants - F1M2 - reflected upon the implications of this upon scientists working in the
field of eSCR. Specifically, F1M2 was concerned that if the scientists didn't receive enough
embryos then theywould turn to alternative sources:
F1M2 I would also be worried about the encouragement of perhaps third
world countries, scientists in Britain, for example, willing to pay perhaps
normally fertile, erm, couples for embryos for money. Because as well, erm,
what ethics are there in place to cover that? I mean, we've got problems of, you
know, the embryos we want to keep for ourselves but these people need to be
able to do the research and if they pay for it you know, it's, it becomes a market
place (Patient-led FertilitySupport Group, 19/06/01).
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According to this view, people undergoing fertility treatment are caught in a double-bind: either
they can donate their 'spare' embryos for research that they are not entirely comfortable with, or
they refuse and then scientists will exploit other 'couples' in countries with less regulatory
controls. Thus, in considering the range of unanticipated consequences that might arise from
SCR developments, F1M2 reflects upon the potential 'risks' that may arise if people like himself
do not make their 'spare' embryos available for this research.
7.4 Consent: AQuestion of Trust?
Running through the discussions of embryo donation was the issue of consent and, intimately
related to this, questions of risk and trust. As alluded to in much of the discussion in this section
so far, how consent is obtained is seen as problematic by those undergoing fertility treatment.
Within the patient-led fertility support group in particular, members raised concerns about the
procedures in the clinic for obtaining consent from patients to donate embryos for research
purposes. Discussions regarding the perceived inevitability of reproductive cloning led on to
issues relating to the source of embryos and their potential uses. As one of the women within
the group asked, 'But the big question is where do they get their healthy cells?' (F1W2) to which
another responded, 'Do you have to have an embryo?' (F1W1). When one participant
confirmed that embryos are used for this research, this sparked a lively exchange of views with
everybody talking at once - which is itself indicative of the emotive nature of using embryos for
this area of research. As the initial clamour to talk died down it became clear that the issue of
consent had emerged as their primary concern:
F1W2 Well that's what I've been thinking. Every time you go into hospital
and you sign your, you read all the consent sheets. We live in a culture of
reading the small print, eh? You're always looking for something where you're
going to fall and sign something and going to go through the net. That's the
kind of culture we live in, yeah. It breeds fear for me this word "cloning" if
there's not legislation there, not proper permission sought and given. Of course
some people are going to give permission but if there's not proper legislation
there and it's not done properly that'll be my biggest fear, you know, taking
without people knowing (Patient-led FertilitySupport Group, 19/06/01).
Her understanding of the broader social, political and economic context can be seen to have
informed FlW2's perception of the consent procedures, where the issue of 'consent' and
'knowing' was seen as problematic. Despite the use of consent forms - which in some senses
are indicative of a move towards transparency and choice rather than the more paternalistic
doctor-patient relations of old - the problem of trust is not resolved for F1W2. In particular,
she points to several problematic areas in the consent process: what information is offered to
155
the patient, how it is presented and, as indicated in the letter that she sent (see above), how
much time people are given to consider their position.
Many joined in the discussion about obtaining and giving consent within the fertility clinic
context, offering their own thoughts and experiences:
F1M3 Can anyone, what I was trying to think of earlier on, can anyone
remember when they started with treatment, remember filling in the forms. It
was a few years ago when mywife and I filled in this form. And I remember, we
both had to sign I think it was two different forms, the husband or partner had
to fill one and the other filled in another. I remember we signed everything and
you're under a great amount of stress, you know, as we're all well aware of here,
a hell of an amount of stress. We were ticking boxes and I was thinking this and
my wife was thinking that. To this day actually I cannot remember, I just
remember saying to my wife, "oh it says here, what do you want done with any
frozen embryos? Do you wish 'A', that they go to medical research, or
whatever". Well that's three years ago and I cannot remember what the form
even looks like now, because I was under a hell of a lot of stress. Can anyone
else remember?
F1W2 Yeah, it says that they will be stored for up to five years and then after
that you have to pay after that, and then after that you can keep them longer
with consultation with the doctor ... [interrupted]
F1W1 You can keep them for up to ten years I think
F1W2 ... [continuing] But it doesn't say what happens after that, are they
allowed to perish is it?
[People talking over one another]
F1W2 Yeah it doesn't saywhat happens to them.
F1M2 The thing you're talking about is that to be used for the treatment of
the partner, one for other medical or scientific research and I can't remember
what the other one is
F1M1 Allowed to perish
F1M2 Allowed to perish, yes I think it was those three, those little boxes.
F1W2 What happens after they're allowed to perish?
F1M1 Theywill just wither, the cells will just degenerate and become nothing.
F1M3 Well I can't even actually remember if ...
[F1M1 and F1M3 talking over each other]
F1M3 ... the dilemma we had, sorry [to F1M1], was whether to sign, for
instead of letting them perish letting them go to medical research and I
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remember thinking for quite a while about that one question. It's interesting that
none of us can remember word for word what was on that form. Am I right in
saying that? Yeah?
[General agreement and confirmation within group]
(Patient-led fertility support group, 19/06/01)
This excerpt from the discussion illustrates the problems that are confronted, from the
perspective of potential embryo donors, when obtaining consent. The situational context within
the clinic when consent is obtained was seen as stressful and confusing, and in this sense not
conducive for thinking through ones views on embryo donation for medical research. In
addition to this, when I reflect upon many of the accounts outlined above, there is an implicit
sense of a moral obligation to participate in medical research - especially when understood as
contributing to research on human reproduction. For instance, F1W2 (from the patient-led
fertility support group) introduces this within her letter to me and F1M2 (also from the patient-
led fertility support group) talks about the importance of donating eggs so that clinicians can be
trained to perform ICSI.
7.5 Distinguishing Embryos from Foetuses
Within the diabetes support group discussion, participants considered what kinds of arguments
might be used against the development of eSCR and cloning-related developments. Here, they
identified faith-based arguments which stipulate that 'God's creations should never be touched'
as the main source of anti-eSCR claims (DM2, Diabetes Support Group, 26/09/01). In
reflecting on how some faith communities may feel about the use of embryos for research
purposes, DM1 argued that other sources of human materials such as blood or bone marrow
were seen as 'probably more acceptable' (DM1). I then asked the group to consider why they
think that for some people it is more problematic to use embryos than other forms of human
tissue for SCR:
DW2 Well, as (DM2) says, I think behind it, the problem of religious belief.
You know, they are cutting up something. I mean God created a person, you're
interfering with God. I mean, that's the way that some people would look at it.
Religion I think is behind it.
At this point, DM2 introduced into the discussion an article written by Ian Wilmut from the
Rosin Institute that he had obtained on the Internet. From this article, he read out a small
extract to the group:
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DM2 If I can just now read you a research piece by Ian Wilmut of the Roslin
Institute, which you'll know is near here, erm, about the making of human stem
cells for treating various conditions. "Stem cells matched to the individual
patient could be made by creating an embryo by nuclear transfer just for that
purpose using one of the patients cells as the donor and a human egg as the
recipient. The embryo would be allowed to develop only to the stage needed to
separate and culture stem cells from it." And this is the important bit. "At that
point an embryo has only a few hundred cells and they have not started to
differentiate. In particular the nervous system has not begun to develop so the
embryo has no means of feeling pain of sensing the environment." (Diabetes
Support Group, 26/09/01).
As we have already seen in chapters 3 and 5, Wilmut's account of pre-14-day embryos is in
keeping with the dominant rhetoric of pro-embryo research advocates that emerged during the
embryo debates of the 1980s. When DM2 introduces Wilmut's 'description' of eSCR he is using
it in the context that it was originally mobilised during the embryo debates - to invalidate
religious and moral opposition to the use of human embryos by framing the issues according to
scientific and technical 'facts' (see Mulkay 1997).
The constructions of the pre-14-day embryo as a group of cells, as shown above, tends to
simultaneously frame the issues in ways that eclipse the lived and embodied experiences of the
women and men from whom they came. It is, therefore, significant that in the diabetes support
group DW1 responded to the above description by locating the embryo within the experiences
of men and women:
DW1 I wonder how many women would be against the embryo being used
as against men? I think that would be quite an interesting thing.
SP Why do you think there might be a difference?
DW1 I really don't know. But I suspect that more women might think that,
you know? It wouldn't worry me at all, but I suppose of course there's an
emotional bond. I don't know, I'm just surmising.
DW2 I think the maternal side comes into that (Diabetes Support Group,
26/09/01).
In this account, then, DW1 and DW2 mobilise an embodied accounts of ones relationship with
embryos in order to differentiate between men and women's understanding of embryo research.
Implicit in this argument is an understanding of women as mothers, nurturers and carers whose
relationship to embryos (and by implication, foetuses and children) is determined by their
biological capacity to bear children. That is, women form emotional bonds with embryos and
for men, perhaps, less so.
158
Again, in countering this suggestion, DM2 returns to the scientific description of embryos:
DM2 Bearing in mind you would only, well, I doubt you'd be able to see this
with the eye. You'd be able to see it under the microscope. Do you think you
could have an emotional attachment to something that was the size of a
pinhead? That was just... [interrupted]
DW1 No I suppose not, no. I'm thinking of an embryo.
DM2 ... [continuing] that was just literally? No you wouldn't have any
physical embryo, something that you could take out and bury or anything like
that.
As DM2 was talking he was holding up one of the articles that had a picture of a human
blastocyst similar to that used by Austin Smith (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2) in order to illustrate
his point. This argument (combined with the image of the pre-14-day embryo) had a powerful
effect upon the view of people within the Diabetes support group. The discussion that ensued
illustrates the extent to which DM2's intervention resulted in participants re-examining their
own views of embryos:
DW1 It would be, you know, in some ways it's maybe picky but people have
this misconception of the embryo as being something that is alive. If there was
another terminology for it, it might be more acceptable to some people.
SP They did trywith the term pre-embryo.
DW1 No I don't think pre-embryos. I think that you need to get rid of the
'embryo' all together
[All agree]
DW2 As [DM2] says, that's a real education, because I didn't know that and
probably nobody else did - that it's before the actual formation of the embryo
you're actually taking the cells. That's important because the first thing I picture
is an embryo, you know, you see the beginning of a baby. That's the first thing I
see. But that was very important and that should be emphasised. That particular
aspect of it, the cell, the nucleus cell that's taken out.
And then later on in the discussion DW2 returns to this point:
DW2 I think what cleared the way for me was that passage that [M2] read
out. It's not actually formed yet because that was worrying me - the fact that it's
the nucleus that's before it's feeling pain or anything. That's, you know, won me
over to a certain extent.
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I then I outline the 14-day limit for using human embryos for research purposes according to
the arguments made in the Warnock Committee in the 1980s:
DW2 That puts a completely different context on it all together. It's a
personal thing I think.
DM2 I think that you're probably quite right. I think that most people would
probably baulk at the idea of a 24 week old foetus being used as I would. But I
think that there has been a certain amount of disinformation spread by the
popular press that that was the sort of thing that we were likely to face rather
than a collection of a couple of hundred of cells which you can only see with the
microscope. And maybe, as you were both suggesting, we need to find an
alternative word for the embryo that isn't quite as evocative as the term
'embryo' is. Because I think the term 'embryo' has become irrevocably linked
with the term foetus and of course, once people start to think, wow, I'm not
going to play around with those.
(Diabetes support group, 26/09/01)
As these exchanges show, for a number of the participants within the diabetes focus group, the
meanings that they attached to embryo at the beginning of the meeting were not necessarily the
ones that they left with. For instance, the embryo and the foetus were not seen as distinct
entities but were placed on a developmental continuum where the teleology of the embryo is
one that ends with a human child. For DW2, in particular, her view of embryos as potential
children was informed by her experiences of three miscarriages, where she explains 'I was
devastated every time I lost the baby. Flowever, when DM2 introduced the 'scientific'
explanation of pre-14-day embryos, the group participants began to distinguish 'their'
understanding of embryos from the technical meaning of 'early embryos, and even called for a
change in the terminology. To this extent, then, 'the embryo' (singular) was pluralised according
to stages of development.
In comparing the view of people undergoing fertility treatment with the views of members of
patient support groups there is an clear difference. For the former, one of the primary issues
surrounding the use of embryos for SCR is whether embryos donated and used are 'viable'. For
members of patient support groups, the main concern is to what extent an embryo has
developed features that we associate with human beings. Within this group, but not for the
fertility groups, the context in which the embryos are originally created are deleted, such as the
experiences of the women who have undergone hyperovulation treatments to 'harvest' the eggs
and the nexus of hopes and fears attached to embryos by 'couples' in fertility programmes.
Moreover, the exchange of views within the diabetes support group illustrates how the
'scientised' embryo can be mobilised to actively expel other, more inclusive constructions of the
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embryo from the frame.5 Even when DW1 and DW2 introduced the experiences of women into
the debate, this dimension was swiftly offset and the women within the group conceded that
their experiential knowledge was less significant than scientific knowledge of embryos which
prescribes a particular relationship between blastocysts and women.
The interview with the second Alzheimer's carer only briefly touched upon the use of embryos
for SCR. The main reason for this was because AC2 was completely happy for embryos to be
used for research purposes - although, like those in the diabetes support group, she
acknowledged that her views wouldn't be shared by everybody. When I ask her how she feels
about this topic she begins by telling me that both of her daughters have had miscarriages and
that one of them has used assisted conception to conceive a child. One of her daughters'
miscarriages took place when the foetus was five weeks old, and whilst her daughter was very
upset, AC2W explains that it wasn't sufficiently 'human' enough for her to feel affected:
AC2W It wasn't even a human shape, it was only just a tiny thing. But then I
haven't experienced it, but to me this would have to be a little bit bigger and a
little bit more human and not so much, I mean, these are little fishy shapes
aren't they. What can you do with a mother like me? (Alzheimer's Carer 2,
03/10/01).
As she alludes to in this final sentence, she does not regard herself as a 'sensitive' mother.
Indeed, she felt that she did not have the 'mothering instinct' but instead was more interested in
what she called 'equal stimulation'. That is, her understanding of what constitutes a human
being was something that one could interact with - or at least be large enough to 'see' the
human form as we associate with a fully-developed human (i.e., not shaped like a fish). For
AC2W, then, scientific and technological developments for visualising embryos have served to
further distance embryos from more developed foetuses rather than ascribing subjectivity to
them. That techniques that have rendered early embryos visible as fish-shaped objects, made it
difficult for AC2W to oppose to their being used for SCR
7.6 'Waste Not Want Not'
In the Huntington's Disease support group discussion, the use of embryos for SCR was also
considered to be a contentious issue. Indeed, the second person to speak in the group directly
addressed their concerns about using embryos:
5 This idea of 'the frame', where some actors and practices are included in the frame and
others are excluded, was introduced to me by Sarah Franklin in her presentation at the
'Gender, Genes and Generation' workshop, University of Lancaster, 26th & 27th June 2003.
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HW2 I think that for some of us, the young ones, we felt that taking an
embryo, taking bits and pieces, it's kind of horrific - although worse things no
doubt have happened between the years. But you know, it's just the thought
somehow (Huntington's Disease Support Group, 31/10/01).
After HW2 had opened up this topic for discussion other participants joined in and, in
particular, the issue of where and how scientists obtain embryos was seen as their main area of
interest. And as the following excerpt illustrates, the ethical and moral issues of using embryos
was compared to using material from aborted foetuses:
HW1 What's the main source for the embryos?
SP Couples undergoing IVF, 'spare' embryos that are deemed to be non¬
viable for use for IVF.
HW1 So what would happen to these normally, would they just be
destroyed?
SP They would maybe be frozen or left to perish.
HW1 That's why I don't see any problem, I've got children and I don't see
any problem in using them.
[Talking over one another, agreeing with HW1]
HW2 I would not agree with a foetus being aborted simply to help somebody
with Huntington's. But if a foetus is going to be destroyed anyway surely it's far
better to do some good for somebody else. I mean I think this is the difference
for somebody who's got children at risk [of Huntington's] and somebody who's
not got anybody at risk and maybe could look at it a little more objectively. But
I've got no problem with it.
HW You're much better helping somebody than wasting something.
HW2 I know but there are some people, Pro-Life groups would disagree with
that. But I say, if they had children at risk they might change their minds.
HW Yes I would agree
[All agreeing]
HW4 It certainly puts a different slant on them.
HW5 But surely if they're being discarded anyway that's ... [interrupted]
HW That's better, that has to be the criteria as far as most reasonable
people are concerned.
HW So what, I mean, why did Pro-Life people object to this
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HW2 I think in principle they object to the use of embryos at all
SP The simple answer is because they believe that life begins at the point
of fertilisation and that to use embryos, even if a few days old, is to destroy a
life.
HW2 Well, we can't argue with that, but I say if a human being is going to be
destroyed anyway, it's better to help somebody at least.
HW It's the same with aborted foetuses, provided that the foetus hasn't
been aborted deliberately and it's been aborted naturally erm, you might as well
make use of it. I mean it's like us giving blood for blood transfusions, you're
saving somebody's life, you're helping somebody. So surely that's the thing, the
significance, it's helping someone and it's no good to the person, you know,
they've had a miscarriage which is upsetting for them but there's nothing they
can do with it. So they might as well... [interrupted]
HW Like we've said, if you've got somebody, you know, you've got
someone in the family, your grandchildren and things like that with the
possibility that they might develop Huntington's and all that then you know, I
think it's worthwhile.
HW The only fear would be that you start saying, you know, I don't really
want this child I'll abort it
HW But it's most unlikely, but I think from natural miscarriages
(Huntington's Disease support group, 31/10/01).
In this lengthy exchange, the almost seamless slippage between embryos, children, foetuses and
blood poses some interesting analytical questions for myself as researcher. Specifically, this
prompts me to ask, according to what criteria are these 'entities' connected by the women
engaged in this discussion? If taken in the broader context of what appears to have been the key
matters at stake - under what circumstances embryos can be used for SCR - then I would argue
that these different entities are enlisted into the jointly composed narrative by members of the
group. Central to their understanding of embryo donation for SCR is whether the material in
question is classified as waste. If embryos are not going to be used for reproductive purposes
and foetuses have been terminated for reasons other than simply to be donated for research,
then they are regarded as ethically acceptable sources of biological material for SCR
On the issue of using aborted foetuses for SCR, participants in the Diabetes support group did
not reach any consensus. As the discussion progressed one of the participants asked for some
clarification on where adult stem cells can be taken from. I listed the examples of bone marrow
and blood from adults and added that umbilical cord blood and cells taken from aborted
foetuses are also potential sources of stem cells. To my surprise, DW2 did not regard the use of
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aborted foetuses as problematic whereas DM1 raised concerns that women could be paid to
become pregnant with the intention of terminating their pregnancies for research purposes. And
whilst DM2, DW1 and DW2 regarded these fears as 'far-fetched', this did prompt a set of
anxieties for M3:
DM3 I think that there's an issue, especially when we've heard about there's
so many brains and hearts and lungs in jars in hospitals and it's all come to light
just recently. But I think that I don't know if I'd be one hundred percent
comfortable if it was a child, erm, an aborted foetus and theywere going to start
playing about with it. I feel uncomfortable about that. Especially that I know
it's not alive, I just feel uncomfortable that the pain I feel with interfering with
something that I've created, I'd like it to rest you know. It's like a donor card,
I've got two sons, if anything happened to my two sons, you know in terms of
when somebody says well, you could use the eyes, the lungs and I do feel a wee
bit uncomfortable about that. It's about not necessarily helping somebody but
actually defacing, you know? I would say would you stitch everything back up
again. It's just I feel uncomfortable, I feel like they would be destroyed again
(Diabetes Support Group, 26/09/01).
As in the patient-led fertility support group, the recent organ retention controversy is invoked as
a cultural resource for articulating a set of anxieties about scientific and medical research using
human biological material. The perceived convergence of issues raised by the illicit retention of
organs and the use of aborted foetuses in medical research, hinges on the extent to which the
embryo/foetus/child can experience pain. Moreover, for M3, the ability to experience pain is
intimately linked to whether an embryo is defined as a human life (albeit potential) or
understood as a collection of cells. The conception and image of the foetus as a 'life' that can
feel pain, makes it difficult for M3 to consider foetuses as ethically acceptable sources of
biological material for SCR. And if we turn this around, the use of embryos for SCR is afforded
some legitimacy on the grounds that they cannot feel pain. It is through this connection that we
can reflect upon the ongoing significance of the scientific model of pre-14-day embryos, as
established in the 1980s, for generating legitimacy for all forms of embryo research.
7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I have explored the views of participants from the fertility and patient support
groups in order to highlight the multiple and flexible meanings associated with embryos. As
such, I have pointed to a range of factors that are relevant to the (reconstruction of embryos
vis-a-vis SCR For instance, visual and linguistic representations of blastocysts that have come to
constitute the dominant public discourse on embryos in the UK, also had significant currency
within both the fertility and patient groups who participated in this research. This is exemplified
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within the Diabetes support group, where the reconstruction of embryos takes place during the
group discussion. As already shown, the intervention of DM2 with Wilmut's technical
description of eSCR can be seen to have altered the perceptions of other participants. Similarly,
within both of the fertility support groups, their understanding of embryos according to
'viability discourses was a key component in shaping their perceptions of research using human
embryos.
However, what was regarded as 'spare' differed across individuals and groups and was
contingent upon their embodied and lived experiences. Within the fertility groups, for instance,
participants who were still undergoing fertility treatment only regarded non-viable embryos as
'spare' - and therefore potentially available for SCR (although this was not unanimous). Only one
participant, whose wife had already had a child and was probably not going to continue with
treatment, suggested that he [sic] might donate their spare viable embryos for research. At the
point when the focus group took place it did appear, however, that he would only donate
embryos for research that remained within the field of reproductive medicine rather than SCR.
This nuanced account of what 'spare' means was not present within the patient groups. Instead,
'spare' was understood as embryos that would otherwise be allowed to perish and the issue of
viability was not explored. But given that nobody from the patient groups had undergone
fertility treatment (to my knowledge) and I did not raise the issue during the discussion, then it
is perhaps not surprising that such embodied accounts of embryos did not emerge as a key
concern.
Within the patient support groups, views of eSCR are linked to their embodied experiences of
illness, or of family members. As shown in section 7.5 and 7.6, some members of the
Huntington's and Diabetes support groups appealed to their experiences of health and illness
when considering the use of embryos for medical research. Whilst their shared identities as
members of a particular patient group was privileged, other aspects of their identities emerged
during the discussion. For instance, participants drew upon their knowledge as parents and
grandparents (e.g., in the Huntington's support group) or as women who had experienced
miscarriages (e.g., DW2) and childlessness (DW1). It is often in the switching between these
identities that the contradictions and ambivalence towards eSCR are revealed - as it become
difficult to resolve, for example, the tensions between embodied understandings of embryos (as
women or childless) and experiences of incurable conditions (such as Diabetes).
A further interesting aspect of the discussions is the way in which eSCR both re-opened the
embryo debates and in some instances was seen to further unsettle meanings around the range
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of possibilities associated with embryos. The teleological end point of embryos (and foetuses) as
human babies had already been disrupted by previous embryo debates. In this sense, ongoing
developments in the field of reproductive technologies - from abortion to pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis - have already produced new teleologies that overlap and blur into one
another. Accordingly, whilst embryos can become children, the range of possibilities also
include being frozen and stored, being left to perish, implanted into the 'mother' who then
miscarries, used for implantation into a woman other than the source of the oocyte, or used by
clinicians to practice fertilisation techniques. Developments in SCR has added a further
possibility for embryos, where the negotiation over the social, moral and ethical implications of
this area of research involves the reconstitution of embryos. The acceptability of these various
teleologies, however, is not evenly distributed but instead engenders a great deal of ambivalence
and, sometimes, anxiety.
The dominant rhetoric of embryos in the parliamentary debates as eventually enshrined in the
amendment to the 1990 HFE Act, takes for granted a) the willingness of 'couples' to donate
their embryos for SCR and b) that people with conditions such as Diabetes are 'demanding' the
development of eSCR and take a utilitarian view of embryos - as a means to an end. However,
as I have tried to show in this chapter, the meanings attached to embryos by individuals is not
determined simply by their 'health' status as 'infertile' or having 'Diabetes'. The complexity of
our identities - as, for instance, women, parents, or patients - are partial and fragmented where
we cannot 'read-off' a person's understanding of embryos and embryo research from any one
aspect. For instance, to briefly consider F2W1 in the Sister-led fertility support group, her
perception of embryos and their uses in SCR is shaped by a number of factors. If we trace her
contributions to the discussion we can identify some key points that illustrate this argument,
including having a family member with Huntington's Disease compelling her to 'want to help'
(see 6.5), and her experiences of undergoing fertility treatment where viable embryos are
regarded as 'precious' and so should not be donated for SCR compared to non-viable which
were seen as accepted sources of embryos for SCR. Although this is only one individual case,
exemplifies the conflicting and contradictory factors shaping people's views of developments in
SCR
What this chapter has shown is how embryos are subject to a range of constmctions and
meanings by different actors. From this, my analysis illustrates that we need to develop a more
sophisticated understanding of the meanings attached to embryos, how these views are formed
and how they relate to people's own particular embodied experiences in complex and
contradictory ways. As Edwards has argued, we need to develop more sophisticated ways of
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hearing publics' views (2002), and to this extent, in-depth interviews and focus groups are shown
to be effective methodological approaches for achieving such aims.
A final point relates to the provisional nature of people's accounts in both this and the previous
chapter. Given that many of the people who participated in this research only began to consider
their views on SCR and cloning-related developments during the focus groups, there are strong
reasons for thinking that their views may have changed since that meeting. As the follow-up
correspondence from F1W2 indicates, the views expressed during the focus groups and
interviews were often spontaneous thoughts, triggered by others within the group. Follow-up
focus groups or interviews may reveal differences in participants' accounts, especially as SCR
and cloning become entrenched and gain public acceptability over time.
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CHAPTERVIII
Destabilising Nature? Renegotiating Cultural
Categories in the SCR and Cloning Debates
If human beings once knew what 'nature' was, they do so no longer. What is
'natural' is now so thoroughly entangled with what is 'social' that there can be
nothing taken for granted about it any more. In common with many aspects of
life governed by tradition, 'nature' becomes transformed into areas of action
where human beings have to make practical and ethical decisions (Beck,
Giddens and Lash, 1994: vii).
8.1 Introduction
This chapter continues to develop some of the key analytical points raised in previous chapters,
such as public ambivalence about science and technology, the role of embodied experiences in
shaping ones views of SCR and cloning, and the mobilisation and negotiation of sociocultural
categories in accounts of this area of research. At the same time, this chapter makes a distinct
break from previous chapters. As indicated in the opening quote from Beck et at., I will be
concerned with both the mobilisation of 'nature' as a category for understanding SCR and
cloning and the processes bywhich 'nature' is negotiated, transformed and (reconstructed.
This chapter has emerged for three reasons. Firstly, I had an existing interest in constructions of
'nature' and the significance of binary categories for ordering the social and natural worlds which
developed during my Masters degree in cultural studies. During my postgraduate degree I began
to become interested in feminist poststructuralist theory, such as Judith Butler's work on gender
and the sexed body (1990, 1993) and Donna Haraway's early work on the cyborg (1991, 1997b).
In the event, these theorists do not figure highly in this chapter (indeed, Haraway is not
discussed at all), but they have played an important role in forming my underlying interest in
constructions of 'nature'. Secondly, my pre-existing interest led to me sensitise my analysing of
the interview transcripts to how 'nature' is mobilised, (re)constructed and transformed within
the SCR and cloning debates. Thirdly, background reading of cultural commentaries and media
accounts on SCR and cloning indicated that this area of research (like many others in the new
genetics, such as xenotransplantation) is a limit case. That is, current and potential practices in
this area exist at the edge of 'received wisdom' of human bodies, identity and the realms of
possibility. The 'cloning' dimension, in particular, has been presented as challenging 'nature' or
the 'natural order' of life itself, challenging meanings around what it is to be human and
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intervenes in processes that are regarded as fundamental to the human condition - reproduction.
Furthermore, narratives of cloning have a long history in literature and film, appearing as limit
cases that signify 'ultimate' control of human bodies and biology.
What this chapter does, then, is to focus upon the dynamics involved in negotiating and
classifying SCR and cloning as 'natural' or otherwise. I begin the chapter (in Sections 8.2.1 and
8.2.2) with a discussion of relevant theories that have informed my understanding of 'nature'.
Then, I go on to show how distinctions between binary opposites, such as nature/culture, are
central for the processes of meaning-making and yet these are managed in flexible ways by those
who participated in focus groups and interviews. I also highlight ambivalence and contradictions
within people's accounts in order to illustrate that boundaries between categories are blurred.
Flowing from this, I illustrate how in unsettling cultural categories around 'nature', the SCR and
cloning-related developments reveal the social constructedness of 'nature' to me, as the analyst,
as well as to those that participated in the discussions. This chapter is ordered around four
themes - kinship, human uniqueness, reproduction and the human life course - I draw primarily
upon the accounts of those in the patient support groups in order to explore the sociocultural
processes involved in constituting nature.1 To a lesser extent I draw upon the accounts of core-
eSCR-scientists and other relevant material available in the public domain (e.g., the media). I
would have liked to have included a more detailed analysis of media accounts but was
constrained by time and space.
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main points raised, drawing together some
of the overarching themes pertinent to my analysis. I then return to the theoretical and
conceptual tools introduced in sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. Whilst an effective melding of theory
and empirical data requires further analytical work, my conclusion suggests how my analysis of
sociocultural categories in the SCR and cloning debates may proceed. Specifically, I argue that
SCR and cloning debates are potential openings for social scientists to explore, deconstruct and
reveal the social constructedness of categories of 'nature'. If cultural categories are unsettled by
these developments, social scientists can make interventions into the cultural processes involved
in the entrenchment of this area of research, revealing new ways for ordering and thinking about
the social and natural worlds.
1
As in previous chapters, whilst I have isolated excerpts and placed them in particular
sections, many of the accounts presented contain themes that correspond to other sections.
Therefore, when following my analytical discussion it is important to note this artificial
separation of issues.
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8.2.1 'There's Nothing Natural About Nature'
Before entering into a discussion based upon my empirical data, I will first introduce some of
the theoretical approaches and concepts that underpin my analysis of participants' accounts.
Here, I point to a range of related approaches in order to explicate a broader understanding of
how I understand 'nature' and its significance for analysing the SCR and cloning debates.
The importance of binary categories for ordering and understanding the 'social' and 'natural'
worlds has been documented by a number of writers spanning across social science disciplines
(see, for example, Douglas, 1966, 1970, 1975; Franklin et aL, 2000; MacCormack, 1980;
Macnaghten and Urry, 1998, 2000; Michael, 2000; Soper, 1995; Turney, 1998).2 'Facts' about
'nature' - as opposed to culture, science, technology and so on - along with distinctions between
these binary categories, continue to be central to thought, knowledge and practice. In
interrogating categories of 'nature' in its various contexts, many writers have revealed their
sociocultural constructedness, where what is deemed to be 'natural' or 'unnatural' is achieved
through processes of negotiation and contestation. That is, categories exist in their context of
usage as a classificatory system that serves as a powerful rhetorical tool through which we can
include or exclude particular behaviours, practices, objects and even people. Therefore,
categories such as 'nature' and 'culture' are not value free, unmediated systems of arbitrary signs,
but are generated by sociocultural practices in particular contexts: there is nothing natural about
'nature' (see MacCormack, 1980, Macnaughten and Urry, 1998, 2000).
In Frankenstein's Footsteps (1998), Turney illustrates how biological research and medical
developments involving the human body have always evoked deep-rooted, feelings of hope and
fear. He argues that 'biology offers the prospect of ultimate control over or transformation of
the living realm' which means that, for publics and scientists alike, 'biology is indeed 'no
ordinary science" (Turney, 1998: 37). In keeping with the thesis as a whole, in this chapter I will
show how SCR and cloning-related developments provoke complex responses which, like Mary
Shelley's Frankenstein, expresses the desire and fear of 'technology's ability to break down old
boundaries, and dissolve taken-for-granted categories' (Turney, 1998: 2). Cloning practices,
whether for 'therapeutic' of 'reproductive' purposes, generates anxieties about the certainty of
boundaries such as between self/other, normal/abnormal, human/non-human.
2
Analyses of the production of binary opposites as central to the formation of human society
date back to Structuralist theories, such as the linguist, de Saussure, and anthropologist,
Levi-Strauss. Furthermore, anthropological evidence demonstrates binary classificatory
systems are not peculiar to Western societies (see Douglas, 1966; 1970; 1975;
MacCormack and Strathern, 1980).
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To argue that categories for ordering our world, such as 'nature' and 'culture', are inextricably
linked with the sociocultural context in which they exist is a well-established and well-worn
position in sociology today. Historical and anthropological research have clearly demonstrated
how what is understood as 'natural', and the ensuing practices surrounding these beliefs, vary
significantly depending upon the sociocultural context. What is clear from the research of people
such as Levi-Strauss and Douglas, however, is that whilst categories of nature are socially
constructed this is not to say that they can be easily re-constructed or even 'undone'. Symbolic
systems relating to the nature-culture binary have been shown to be durable and to a great extent
immutable across cultures and history. Whilst the content of the binary varies, the existence of
dualistic categories remains relatively constant as a powerful trope. Therein lies the paradox of
such categories, that is, both their immutability and their malleability. In the following chapter I
aim to elaborate on this paradox, through exploring the ways in which idioms of nature, as a
classificatory process (Franklin etaL, 2000: 1), are mobilised in flexible and contradictoryways.
Whilst such classificatory systems are ordered according to binary opposites, these are
constructed relationally in a process of co-production. In arguing for such a conception of
binary categories I am suggesting two things. Firstly, that reflections upon, for instance, the
nature-culture binary, involves reflection of other categories (see Douglas, 1966: 5). This is not
to say that nature = health = normal and culture = illness = abnormal, for example, but simply
to say that there are borrowings between different categorical domains (see Franklin et al., 2000:
8-11). Secondly, the relationship between binary opposites is often complex and contradictory,
illustrating how'nature and culture have become increasingly isomorphic vhile remaining distinct' (Franklin et
al., 2000: 9, original emphasis). For instance, IVF practices intervene in, or assist, 'natural'
processes of human reproduction and biology. In such cases, it becomes difficult to disentangle
categories of 'nature' from those of 'science', 'technology or 'culture' (I will develop this point
further in later sections).
In considering people's views of SCR and cloning-related developments, what becomes clear is
the significance of binary opposites for thinking, understanding and communicating our views.
As I will show in this chapter, the mobilisation of binary opposites is not simply an uncritical
reproduction of dichotomies, but involves an interrogation and reworking of dominant
categories. In investigating the views of, primarily, members of patient groups and also scientists'
and media accounts, this chapter will demonstrate how, 'habits of thought ... that reproduce
themselves in our communications never reproduce themeLves exactly (Strathem, 1992a: 6, original
emphasis). Therefore, public debates on SCR and cloning are sites where we can observe the
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(re)production of binaries and reveal the social constructedness of classificatory systems in
action.
A further point that I would like to emphasise is that 'nature' is constituted in multiple ways
through dynamic practices that are embedded in both the sociocultural context and ones
embodied and lived experiences. This process of negotiation and contestation is captured in
Franklin et al's. (2002), conceptualisation of 'nature'. They argue that categories of 'nature' are
undergoing processes of denaturalisation and renaturalisation, where 'nature' is
contemporaneously challenged, renegotiated and re-asserted. Developments in areas such as the
new genetics, they argue, do not undermine categories of 'nature', but instead, understandings
and meanings of 'nature' are redefined or shifted. Again, this points to the malleability and
durability of 'nature'
8.2.2 'Cloning' As Cultural Taboo?
Human cloning, like many other technoscientific practices that alter the body, has acquired the
status of taboo and is now subject to primary legislation in the UK.3 The power of human
cloning as a taboo has fuelled the imaginations of science fiction writers for over half a century,
dating back to the publication of Aldous Huxley's Braze New World in 1933. Since then, the
technological future of cloning has been explored in varying depths in literature, film. Also, even
though reproductive cloning did not become a technological possibility until the production of
Dolly the sheep in 1997, discussions on the subject had already figured in the parliamentary
debates on embryo research during the 1980s. This illustrates that the status of human
reproductive cloning as cultural taboo, predates its technological feasibility.
The production and maintenance of cultural taboos, whilst often accompanied by a legislative
ban, is a generative process. In keeping with a Foucauldian notion of regulation, discursive
techniques which aim to control and prohibit ideas and practices result in the proliferation of
those same ideas and practices (see Foucault, 1979: 15-49). To claim that cloning is a taboo is
not to claim that human cloning is unthinkable and unspeakable. On the contrary, cloning has
served as a fruitful trope in science fiction to explore the boundaries around the self, identity,
humanness and nature (see Van Dijk, 1999). Indeed, science fiction has been one of the primary
vehicles for exploring the implications of human reproductive cloning and has engendered a
3 See http://www.hmso.qov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010023.htm for details of the Human
Reproductive Cloning Act 2001.
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range of discursive repertoires for imagining the future (see for example Mulkay, 1997, Rose,
1994). Today, with the potential of a technological realisation of cloning-related practices, those
very same boundaries are being explored as part of the public debates on human cloning.
The maintenance of human cloning as a cultural taboo has a twofold function. Firstly, it rules
out these discourses and practices relating to SCR and cloning developments which threaten to
disrupt the social order. That is, disruptions to ideas such as those around human uniqueness,
identity and selfhood. Such processes are evident in the rhetorical separation of 'therapeutic'
from 'reproductive' cloning. Secondly, taboos function as regulatory mechanisms whereby
boundaries within classificatory systems are (re) asserted: to separate the 'natural' from the
'unnatural', purity from defilement. As Stacey has argued 'cultural taboos ... are reproduced in
order to secure distinctions' (1997: 75). That cloning is unsettling, or what John Clark called 'an
intrinsic taboo' (personal interview, 28/11/01), indicates the presence of abjection. Abjection, as
defined by Kristeva, 'is not lack of cleanliness or health ... but what disturbs identity, system,
order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the
composite' (1982: 4). The abject is contradictory, it is met with both fear and desire; it is that
which is jettisoned from dominant classificatory systems and yet requires purification. Indeed,
abjection, the act of jettisoning objects, ideas or groups, functions as a means of purification - to
create binaries or distinctions between the acceptable and the unacceptable.
Butler's account of abjection describes how abjection is to 'cast off, away, or out and, hence,
presupposes and produces a domain of agency from which it is differentiated' (1993: 243, n2).
She then goes on to say that, according to Lacan's theory, the abject 'may not reenter the field of
the social without threatening ... the dissolution of the subject itself' (Butler, 1993: 243, n 2).
Here, the dissolution of the self would occur through dominant classificatory systems being
challenged by the abject. That which is constructed as outside, other, or beyond the limits of
acceptability is constituted as such not to protect social life. Butler argues that abjection (the
expulsion of something as 'other') is part of the matrix of binaries - nature/culture,
normal/abnormal - which are mutually constitutive categories. The abject, however, reveals the
instability of this matrix because it is unplaceable and, to some extent, beyond the limits of
classification or located within a 'third space'. Therefore, the abject by its mere existence poses a
threat to the classificatory system through which identities, and by extension, the subject is
constituted.
Like Douglas' theories of symbolic systems of pollution and disorder (see 1966, 1970),
Kristeva's abjection is a useful concept for exploring ideas and objects that exist at the
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boundaries and threaten to disrupt social order. Both Douglas' purification and Kristeva's
abjection point to the social constructedness of classificatory systems. As a post-structuralist,
Kristeva, however, departs from Douglas (who is a structuralist) in her implicit understanding of
binary categories. Whereas Douglas' work explicitly argues that the social and natural worlds are
ordered according to binary opposites, Kristeva's abjection allows us to theorise the borders: the
in-between. Theorising abject zones is useful for examining the (re)production of classificatory
systems as a dynamic and relational process. According to this perspective, new developments
such as SCR and cloning do not simply become incorporated into the existing classificatory
system but are productive and generative of categories as well as indicating a moment of
potential change.
Although abjection has often been utilised to conceptualise bodily fluids in relation to bodily
boundaries (see, for example, Longhurst, 2001),4 I would argue that the concept also lends itself
to an understanding of public responses to SCR and cloning developments. The constitution of
cloning as abject is demonstrated in this chapter. Using a combination of excerpts from focus
groups and interviews, plus extracts from various public sites within which the cloning debates
are taking place, human cloning is shown to be a site at the boundary of what constitutes
'nature'. It is both, either and neither natural or unnatural, acceptable and unacceptable; it is
expelled, disavowed and yet is at the same time entertained (e.g., as an example of scientific
progress). Such contradictory responses to the developments of cloning which posit cloning as
abject, confirms how classificatory systems are cultural constructions that are subject to cultural
interpretations and therefore to negotiation. Furthermore, whilst people's thinking of human
cloning is structured by such classificatory systems, it is not determined by them. What is
regarded as natural or unnatural is subject to the particular and complex, sociocultural and lived
experiences that a person or group have encountered. What this chapter demonstrates is that
individual responses to technoscientific developments such as SCR and cloning cannot be
predicted according to single causal factors, such as direct experience of Alzheimer's or
infertility, but are produced according to complex, and often unique, combinations of lived and
embodied experiences.
4
For instance, for theorising the categorisation of menstrual blood, sweat or urine as waste
or dirt.
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8.3 Reproductive Cloning and Kin Relations
In the fields of anthropology, sociology and cultural studies, the implications of assisted
conception practices for kinship relations have been well documented (see, for example,
Franklin, 1993; Graham, 2002: 111-116; Strathem, 1992a,). Since their inception, developments
in new reproductive technologies (NRTs) have unsettled taken-for granted boundaries and
cultural categories. In particular, interventions into reproductive processes have been shown to
reconstitute representations and understandings of what constitutes 'natural' or 'unnatural'
kinship relations. For example, Franklin has argued that the advent of gestational surrogacy5 has
created a 'new form of 'blood tie' ', where the relationship between the child and surrogate
mother 'has no categorical foundation within the 'natural order' upon which kinship
classifications and definitions are based' (1993: 551). Similarly, the birth of the first IVF baby,
Louise Brown, in 1978, resulted in the negotiation of categories of nature, where 'natural facts'
about reproductive processes can no longer be regarded as authoritative accounts.
There are two key points to take from such examples that are pertinent to the arguments made
in this chapter. Firstly, assisted reproductive practices such as IVF and surrogacy, have not
replaced 'natural' forms of human reproduction, instead 'assisted' and 'natural' procreative
practice co-exist alongside one another.6 To this extent, both 'traditional and detraditionalised
versions of nature co-exist' (Franklin et al., 2000: 13). Secondly, after twenty years of
development, these reproductive technologies have undergone processes of entrenchment and
become a naturalised technique for assisting the production of a family (see chapter 3)7 This
illustrates that boundaries between nature/culture are not fixed but are permeable and that
practices that were once deemed to challenge the natural order of things, can be reconstituted to
reinforce 'nature'.8
5
In this context, Franklin is referring to surrogate mothers who have no genetic link to the
child which they gestate, rather than surrogacy using the eggs of the surrogate mother.
6
Although we should note that some interventions into the female reproductive body, such
as caesarean sections and amniocentesis, have become routinised and are widely
practiced.
Notwithstanding ongoing opposition from those adopting pro-life positions. In addition to
this, a number of feminists continue to offer critical interventions into the exclusion of
women's voices and experiences along with the intense medicalisation and surveillance of
women's bodies involved in fertility treatments and related social processes (see, for
example, Ettorre, 2002).
8 Franklin has shown how assisted reproduction has been subject to various and competing
constructions, for instance, as either challenging or reinforcing 'natural' facts' around
motherhood and kinship (1993).
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Twenty years on from the birth of Louise Brown, boundaries around kinship and relatedness
vis-a-vis nature have been unsettled by developments in reproductive cloning. With existing
NRTs, including gamete donation and surrogacy, reproduction is achieved through the fusion of
male and female gametes and, therefore, each person produced through NRTs has a biological
mother and father. This is not to suggest that other NRTs do not lead to different kinds of
kinship configurations; as Charis M. Cussins has shown, egg donation 'disrupts the coherence of
the natural ground for bilateral linear descent' and reveals other ways of "doing" kinship (1998b:
42-43). The theoretical possibility of reproductive cloning, however, departs from previous
NRTs in the sense that any births arising from this technique would only have one biological
parent.
In the Sister-led fertility support group, participants talked about their concerns that SCR would
lead to reproductive cloning. I then asked why they believed there is a difference between IVF
and reproductive cloning since both can be seen as assisted conception techniques:
F2W2 Because with IVF you're reproducing yourself and your husband but
with cloning you're producing one or the other. It's not both.
SP Is it important for reproduction to be a mixing of gametes rather than
just one?
[General agreement within group]
(Sister-led Fertility Support Group, 27/06/01)
A key issue for F2W2 was the biological lineage of children from two parents - one male one
female. To have a child that was produced from one person was regarded as unsettling.
Significant to this distinction between IVF and reproductive cloning is the process of
naturalising IVF through aligning it with 'natural' reproductive processes of gamete fusion.
Whilst cloning could achieve the same ends as other NRTs (the birth of child), participants in
the Sister-led fertility support group were unwilling to ascribe legitimacy to reproductive cloning
as a new reproductive technology.
Conversely, in the cardiac support group, reproductive cloning was argued as being similar to
surrogacy in terms of disrupting kinship relations:
CM1 Well what is a surrogate child? It mightn't have anything to do with the
mother at all. It mightn't have anything to do with the father.
CM4 A surrogate child is naturally produced.
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CM1 It's not, that's the trouble, it's not
SP Do you think it's different because with surrogacy the child is made
from an egg and a sperm, even if another woman gestates it?
CM1 And brought up by two other completely different folk, they're not
even who the originals were.
CW2 Imagine the world.
CM1 And what does that amount to? A lot of money changing hands.
CW1 You're doing a comparison there.
CW2 I mean, can you imagine the world in a hundred years. Brothers and
sisters don't know who, or what...
[People talking over one another]
CW2 You could be married to your brother and not know about it, or your
sister or... [interrupted]
CM4 That already happens. That has happened.
CM1 A lot has happened (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
The combination of reproductive cloning, surrogacy and incest provides a window on
participants' understanding of kinship. In connecting other examples where kinship relations are
unsettled, we can see the processes of meaning-making involved as people negotiate kinship.
Furthermore, the contribution made by CM1 suggests that assisted reproduction techniques,
such as reproductive cloning and surrogacy, are not amenable to categorisation. Such practices
seem to produce a degree of reflexivity, with participants reflecting upon the social
constructedness of kinship relations.
The relationship between a potential cloned child and its parents/sibling was also identified as a
central concern.9 As the following set of excerpts illustrate, participants in the patient groups
argued that clones would feel like replacement people, or copies of existing family members
rather than unique members of the family;
F2W3 I personally think that it would put an awful lot of pressure on that
poor child. You know, what's the child's life going to be life, you know, it's a
replacement of the original basically. In this day and age, so much pressure is put
on a child as it is. What kind of pressure is that child going to be under, knowing
9 A cloned child would be the genetic twin of the person cloned. This problematises our
understanding of the genetic relationship between children and parents, and between
siblings.
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that yes, it was wanted desperately, so much so that somebody cloned them? But
people are going to say it's a replacement (Sister-led Fertility Support Group,
27/06/01).
AC1M It would be an individual but how would they feel about being an exact
physical copy of someone else? They might not feel that they're an individual.
Goodness knows what psychological problems it would bring and also how
other people surrounding would look. You know, "ha ha, he's a clone" at
school, you know, goodness knows what. So I would think that the individual
would face some very, very serious problems. I don't, I notice that I just used
the word "individual", erm, I didn't mean it in that sense. But I don't think that
the personality could be the same as the father, say (Alzheimer's Carer 1,
21/09/01).
HW5 The thing that worries me, I'm concerned for these poor children that
a) are lumbered with these people who aren't concerned for the welfare of this
child, and b) that they are lumbered with those parents. ... I think that the
parents would try to pressurise them into being something that they are
(Huntington's Disease Support Group, 31/10/01).
In quite different ways, these excerpts exemplify how reproductive cloning engenders shifts in
the nature and meaning of relationships amongst kin. Reproductive cloning brings about new
connections between children and their parents, which, for the three people quoted above,
generates anxieties. In a context where definitions of parenthood are already problematised -
e.g. between social and biological parents (see Strathem, 1992a) and procreation is subject to
discourses of choice and responsibility (see Ettorre, 2000, 2002) - reproductive cloning marks
the latest development to potentially redefine relations between kin.
A further dimension to the above accounts relates to people's understanding of the role of genes
in the formation of identity and personhood. In raising the issue of parents' expectations of
cloned children, people are implicitly binding cloned children to their genes, or at least as played
out in kinship relations. If we pick this argument apart, the risk identified by participants is a
complex and contradictory one which can be expressed as follows: the environmental conditions
(e.g., the family context and expectations of 'parents') would place clones in a context where
they are constrained by their genes. This is an interesting argument, because is suggests that
genetic determinism is environmental in its origins - genetic determinism via social determinism.
A similar point was also made by Ian Wilmut, who separated therapeutic from reproductive uses
of the cloning technique on the basis of child welfare issues:
Wilmut: I don't like the idea of human reproductive cloning because I don't
think that it would be much fun to be a clone. Because I think that the sort of
similarities between the original and the copy would be very great and the
178
expectations between them would be different and so the whole relationship
would be different. So I don't see it as being catastrophic or kind of life-
threatening as it were, but I see it as an issue of child welfare (Roslin Institute,
13/09/01).
He then goes on to aslc
Wllmut: What would it be like to be a genetically identical copy of your parent?
(Roslin Institute, 13/09/01)
Here, genetics-environment debate is held in a fine balance and clones are seen to embody the
inherent tensions of determinist positions. Such views have been expressed across a number of
contexts, including media debates. For instance, in his contributions to a televised debate on
cloning, Grahame Bulfield of the Roslin Institute argued:
As a geneticist I always think the environment is far more important than
genetics is. I would say the environmental influences are pretty dramatic. I think
it is a very interesting point that the clone would almost see their future in their
"parent". That might be a difficult thing to live with (Grahame Bulfield, in
Cloning Debate from "Every Man". http://www,world- of-
dawkins.com/cloning_debate.htm [20/06/01]).
And in an article from The Guardian newspaper, the novelist and cultural commentator Eva
Hoffman stated:
From the child's perspective, what would it be like for a daughter to realise that
she has no biological father at all; that her grandfather is in effect her father; and
that her mother is her genetic twin? ... Twins are not made to order they come
to their parents as a surprise, and they are firmly situated within their own
generational lifespan ... Of course, a cloned child m$>t go on to develop its own
consciousness and autonomous selfhood; but the normal difficulties of
separation and individuation would be hugely magnified (Eva Hoffman, The
Guardian, Aug 29 2001, own emphasis).
Reproductive cloning, it seems, combines a number of pre-existing problematic aspects of child-
parent relations as well as generating novel ones. For instance, cultural repertoires around child
welfare vis-a-vis the implications of parental expectations are not novel issues. Indeed, since the
advent of assisted reproduction practices such as genetic testing and sex selection, it is difficult
to maintain the argument that children come as a complete surprise. So again, this returns us to
debates about the role of genes in shaping our identities - who we are and who we can become.
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8.4 Human Uniqueness: Genes and Twins
Source: Brian Duffy, http://cagle.slate.msn.com/news/cloning/5.asp [26/02/03].
In the focus group and interview discussions, human uniqueness was mobilised as a discursive
repertoire when exploring their views of reproductive cloning. As indicated in the previous
section, people's accounts of clones and cloning implicitly revolve around the genes-
environment debate. And, for many, the spectre of reproductive cloning raises the question of
what constitutes a unique human being? Following on from the above discussion, I will now
turn to the issue of human uniqueness and individuality, exploring how people negotiate
meanings around human identity. In particular, I will highlight how twins has been a recurrent
theme in the cloning debates and in the accounts of people in focus groups.
The notion that each individual is a unique person is a salient one in Western cultures. Whether
it is an argument based upon genetic determinism, social determinism or a mixture of the two,
the construction of the self in contemporary society is based upon ideas of individuality and
uniqueness. This is evidenced in many sociocultural spheres ranging from consumer culture
where advertising strategies are employed which interpellate the subject as unique, to the new
genetics which individualises the subject according to their genetic make-up. At the same time,
however, genetic knowledge (e.g., the Human Genome Project) identifies similarities and
patterns between human populations, as well as between humans and non-humans. To this
extent, then, there is a play between unity and uniqueness in contemporary culture, where we are
interpellated in terms of sameness and difference.
180
Twins have served as a potent site for investigating both biological and cultural aspects of
human uniqueness across a variety of cultures (see, for example, Douglas 1975). Since Gabon's
initial study of twins, published in 1875, the twin study method has been used to explore the
genes-environment debates of human behaviour, psychological traits, language and intelligence
(Garfield and Holton, 1984). Alongside natural science analyses, research on twins has informed
discussions around human uniqueness, individuality and identity within the cultural sphere,
where similar questions have been explored. In film, literature, art and folk tales, twins have
been utilised at a symbolic level to explore questions of humanness, suggesting that symbolically,
twins inhabit a contradictory space. They are both the same and other to the degree that they
disturb constructions of 'reality and human uniqueness (see Sadri, 1994).
Mary Douglas has shown how in the Lele tribe, twins and their parents are ascribed a special
status, where 'twin children are spoken of as spirits and their parents as Twin Diviners' (1975:
35). Locating twins and their parents in the spiritual realm of the symbolic order Douglas show
how, in the Lele, twins are seen as transgressing important socially constructed boundaries.
Similarly, we can observe how in contemporary Western societies, twins are also ascribed a
special status which has been taken up bymany in the human cloning debates (see Sadri, 1994).
In imagining a future with human cloning, it is perhaps unsurprising that people have turned to
'natural clones' as a cultural resource and subsequently, social boundaries are explored,
negotiated and, often, redrawn. In this section I explore how cultural representations of twins
have informed the cloning debates.
There are numerous myths and urban legends surrounding twins and cloning. A particularly
evocative myth is that of the "doppelganger". A doppelganger, meaning "double walker", is
often reported as one's double that walks alongside oneself but cannot be seen (see, the Merriam
WebsterDictionary.
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Significantly, the myth states that to come across one's own doppelganger indicates bad luck or
even imminent death. In relation to the theme of "double walker", whilst not directly referring
to the doppelganger myth, some of the views articulated in the focus groups confirm the
concerns which underpin the myth. For instance, in the cardiac support group, participants
talked about whether a clone would be a unique individual or not:
CM1 I think that it would be an individual, irrespective of whether it was
identical to somebody else.
CW1 It depends. If it knew it was a clone it might feel as though it's in the
shadow of somebody.
CM1 It might want to get rid of it (laughs). There's a new one now, get rid of
that one.
CW1 Depends on how much on how much it would take of the personality
of that it was cloned from. Howmuch has got... [interrupted]
CM1 Transferred.
CW1 ... [continuing] transferred of that. So then you could feel as though
you're, obviously, in the shadow of somebody. Felt as though you're always
having to do as good or you know, expected to do better.
CM1 That's what one of the basis of one of the future legislation as to
whether or not a clone could have its other half still alive or whether it is an
individual in its own right.
SP So that you could only clone a person once the person was dead?
CM1 Or possibly dying ... Well, erm, if it was that the person to be cloned
was no longer alive then the clone would just be an individuals original. Then
they wouldn't have any, it would just have to grow in its own way (Cardiac
Support Group, 18/07/01).
Here, there are references to living in somebody's shadow and to have a person co-existing with
their clone was perceived as troubling the boundary between self and other. Again, the genes-
environment debate implicitly figures in the above accounts, with CW1 unsure whether a clones
would directly inherit personality traits from the person cloned.
Participants in the Sister-led infertility support group also discussed their anxieties about having
both 'originals' and clones living simultaneously. This issue was framed around the problem of
identifying criminals if either the clone or cloned committed a crime. Subsequently, participants
suggested that one solution would be to regulate when a person can be cloned:
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CW2 Maybe they should do it after the person has died. Then there'd only be
one with that DNA
CW4 (Laughing) Then people would be thinking, "you'd better die so I can
clone you" (Sister-led FertilitySupport Group, 27/06/01).
In tying reproductive cloning in with their knowledge of genetic fingerprinting and forensics,
participants identify cloning as not only an ontological problem, but a practical one.
Films such as The 6th Day illustrate how the ideas underpinning the doppelganger myth serve as
powerful cultural resources for imagining future scenarios of reproductive cloning. In The 6th
Day, death can be 'undone' through secretly cloning people soon after their death. The
memories of the 'original' are then implanted into the clone who would continue with their lives
without either themselves or their friends and relatives knowing that they are a clone. The plot is
based around Arnold Schwarzenegger's character who is mistakenly cloned whilst still alive.
What ensues is a series of failed attempts by the organisation responsible for cloning to prevent
the clones coming face to face with one another. One underlying assumption of the film is that
to have two clones existing simultaneously is socially unacceptable and unsettling. Although
there are other more sophisticated explorations of cloning, such as Boys From Brazil, The 6°' Day
is the most recent example of cloning narratives where writers have touched upon a number of
relevant issues surrounding human uniqueness and socially constructed boundaries of
self/other, natural/cultural.
The use of twins for informing the cloning debates has been explicitly addressed in a David
Teplica photographic exhibition, Take Two: Identical Twins in Focus, at the Wellcome Trust,
London.10 The exhibition consists of a number of photographs of identical twins which are
intended to provide a 'down-to-earth perspective on the cloning debate' (Denna Jones, BBC
Online, July 22 1999). Again, in keeping with the remit of other twin studies, the exhibition aims
to explore ideas of sameness and difference and contribute to the genes-environment debate.
Furthermore, to reiterate my earlier assertion that twins are ascribed a special status, the
promotional literature states that identical twins are a 'fascinating cultural and scientific
phenomenon'. Similarly, a symbolic-interactionist sociologist, Sadri (who is also a twin), has
argued that twins provide an exceptional opportunity for exploring the social constmction of
reality (1994: 203-204). In a similar vein to David Teplica, Sadri has argued that twins disturb
10 David Teplica is a plastic surgeon who photographs twins in his spare time. His initial
interest in twins was fuelled by knowledge of his own twin brother who died in the womb (see
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/old/taketwo/MISexhTWOtwnBGDart.html [23/02/03],
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our sense of human uniqueness in terms of human genetics and behaviour, and therefore, twins
provide a site for examining these assumptions.
Although twins are deemed to be 'fascinating' and seem to challenge the borders of classificatoiy
systems, both Teplica and Sadri align twins with 'nature' or the 'natural'. In asserting that
identical twins can inform debates on cloning, the Wellcome Trust exhibition goes some way
towards the naturalisation of clones (see pictures below). Depictions of twins within Teplica's
exhibition aims to unsettle conceptions of human uniqueness in similar ways as do the computer
generated clones associated with human cloning news stories. Furthermore, Teplica exhibits
twins in poses that unsettles ideas of kinship relations in terms of socially sanctioned behaviours
around sexuality and relatedness. Indeed, Teplica is quoted as saying 'they are very comfortable
with each other - if one wants to bite the others jaw, the other is happy to oblige' {BBC Online,
July 22 1999).
Source: http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/old/taketwo/MISexhTWOtwn.html
[26/02/03].
Despite the 'special status' ascribed to twins and assumptions that they have 'special
relationships' (e.g., exemplified by biting each others jaws!), they are, in the final instance, aligned
with nature. Nature, it is argued, produces its own clones through the process of twinning and
by extension, cloning merelymimics natural processes.
It is not surprising, then that the relationship between clones and twins is an area which was
explored in the focus groups and interviews conducted as part of my research. In imagining a
future with human cloning, many turned to twins as an existing phenomenon through which
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they could explore their views. For example, when discussing what it might be like to be a
cloned human F1M1 postulated:
F1M1 It's hard, I mean, you've got identical twins walking the planet and
they're independent individuals. They are not clones, because we wouldn't say
that they're clones of each other, we'd say that they were identical twins. We
don't tend to think of them as clones of each other, they are ... [interrupted]
Whilst F1M2, like many others in the focus groups, was concerned about the development of
human reproductive cloning, when attempting to flesh out his concerns he formulates an
argument characterised by ambivalence. However, the response to this by another member of
the group confused matters further:
FW1 Identical twins are natural humans.
F1M1 They are natural humans, yeah.
F1W1 They're part of nature. Cloning is, like, verymuch purposeful.
And then a few minutes later, F1M1 comes back to his comparison between twins and clones:
F1M2 If a cloned child were to be a replica of a parent, erm, completely, in
terms of the full process and thinks the same as the parent, the mannerisms are
totally the same as a the parent, then I would have questions about whether that
is normal. Because I would perhaps have to question whether that really is, it's
almost a spiritual question. Whether that person is a real person with his own
spiritual identity. And with twins were you know that each is an individual, as a
clone I wouldn't know whether that really would be an individual. My guess is
that it would be actually and, therefore, [laughs] I wouldn't have a problem
because you're creating an individual being then (Patient-led Infertility Support
Group, 19/06/01).
As with many other discussions that took place within the focus groups, cloning becomes
unplaceable in the classificatory system. It is both like twinning, and therefore, natural, but also,
due to being 'purposeful', unnatural. To a certain extent cloning was deemed to be non-
threatening, even ordinary, since twins could provide a familiar reference point. On the other
hand, whilst being like twins, clones were deemed to be something other, something beyond
twinning which can be linked to the purposefulness of cloning. Twins are produced by chance,
but clones are produced through conscious action. By this connection, clones are problematic
because they are the result of controlling 'nature', whereas twins are produced by'chance'.
185
What I have tried to make clear in this section, is how debates about human reproductive
cloning are simultaneously about what constitutes a human being. Imaginings of cloned humans
and their status in society provides in insight into both nbat are regarded as fundamental
questions of life, such as what makes us human and what is the role of our genes in determining
individuality, and /jozr>people formulate their ideas of such issues, such as what cultural resources
are mobilised and what cultural categories are (re)negotiated. I have shown that people draw
connections between clones and twins, and that such connections can operate to naturalise or
denaturalise clones (and perhaps twins). To this extent, I have argued that reproductive cloning
disrupts taken-for-granted assumptions about human uniqueness.
8.5 Challenging 'Natural' Reproduction: Human Cloning and IVF
The previous section introduced how, for some members in the patient-led infertility support
group, the 'purposefulness' of reproductive cloning generates anxieties. In comparing twins with
clones, 'nature-as-fate' (e.g., twins) becomes 'nature-controlled' and manipulated (e.g., clones).
This understanding of nature-as-fate, however, is at odds with their own experiences of
undergoing fertility treatment. IVF-related techniques are also 'purposeful' in that they intervene
in the 'natural' reproductive process - for example, enabling people with fertility problems to
have children or embryo selection techniques. To this extent, arguments that reproductive
cloning is unsettling because it is 'purposeful' created an interesting dilemma for participants in
the group.
In the following excerpt, participants in the patient-led infertility support group are engaged in a
discussion about reproductive cloning as compared to existing fertility treatments:
F1M1 That's the application that I can see next [reproductive cloning], I think
that its already been in some papers, erm, that for infertile couples, that if there's
a problem you might decide that you could actually clone and have the result of
a child in a natural progression of the womb. That its initial starting point is the
cloning point. That to me, I feel is just like the next step along the IVF line. It's,
you know, I can see that coming down the line. We're already sort of artificially
fertilising the egg and sperm together. Cloning for infertile couples I can see, I
see that further down the line.
[Talking over one another about 'designer babies']
F1M1 No, not so much a perfect human, just so that they could have a child
if normal IVF techniques that we're using just now are not working.
F1W2 Yeah well, that's the same thing as saying that we're going against
nature if it's not happening naturally.
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F1M1 Yeah, that's right. You're circumventing nature, that's happening
already (Patient-led InfertilitySupport Group, 19/06/01).
Explicit references to 'nature' or 'natural', here, are appealed to as a relatively stable set of
meanings and understandings against which interventions into reproductive processes are
evaluated. In reflecting upon their uses of assisted conception practices, participants point out
the contradictions of claiming that reproductive cloning is 'unnatural' since IVF already
intervenes in 'natural' reproduction.
As the discussion progressed, it became clear that IVF has undergone processes of naturalisation
and in doing so, shifted how participants construct 'natural' reproduction. Reproductive cloning,
however, seemed to defamiliarise assisted conception practices. Subsequently, the accounts of
participants reveals the processes involved in denaturalising and renaturalising meanings around
reproduction. For example, in slipping between reproductive cloning and 'designer babies',
participants raised their concerns that 'designer babies', such as using donated eggs from gifted
musicians, limits 'nature' compared to assisted conception practices used by those in the group:
F1M1 That's [designer babies] something different to what we're trying to
achieve here. We're using IVF techniques and that to circumvent a natural
problem with the male or the female and given other circumstances there would
be natural conception and the child would just grow up, you know. We're
circumventing that because of technology that's been developed. I wouldn't say
that's wrong. It's given my wife and I a chance to have what we want, and
through no fault of our own there's a medical problem there. There's a blockage
or a malformation of tubes or whatever. That's not anything that we did to
ourselves, that's nature that has done that to ourselves. Is it, I don't know the
question of whether it's wrong to be able to ... [interrupted]
F1W1 Thirty years ago there might have been somebody like you [indicating
SP] actually asking practically the same questions about IVF.
[Agreement amongst group]
F1W1 And people would have, you know, it's not something that happens, it's
not something that people think about. But now, twenty years down the line,
goodness knows what will happen. Maybe there will be a clone.
F1M1 Maybe it's morally questionable whether to create that, let's say a
designer child, purposely going along and taking eggs and sperm from particular
gifted people and trying to create a child that will be gifted. I think that that
would be morally wrong. But perhaps what we're going, I wouldn't say that.
We're just wanting to have a natural child and be able to look after it (Patient-led
Infertility Support Group, 19/06/01).
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'Nature' here is something that both acts upon individuals and is acted upon by them. Infertility,
for instance, is constructed as 'nature-gone-wrong', and in restoring people to their 'natural'
state, assisted conception is 'nature-overcome'. In contradistinction to this, particular aspects of
'nature-as-fate' are held as a constant, such as the element of 'chance' produced from mixing the
gametes of two people involved in a relationship. Reproductive cloning and 'designer babies' are
regarded as morally reprehensible because, through embryo selection and manipulation, certain
characteristics are screened in or pre-selected, thus determining the child's genes. To this extent,
IVF practices are constructed as giving nature a 'helping hand' (Franklin, 1997: 96), enabling
couples to have a 'natural' child, within a 'natural' family.
Central to the naturalisation of IVF is the mobilisation of what Koch has called the 'fairy tale
model' (1992). In the above excerpt from F1M1, IVF is described as imitating nature through
allowing a couple to have a child that is genetically 'their own' and 'technology' is the hero. The
fairy tale model is akin to Franklin's argument that assisted reproduction is represented as
'natural science in the service of the natural family (1993: 527). As I have shown so far in this
chapter, a number of people questioned the 'naturalness' of reproductive cloning on the basis of
kinship, reproduction and uniqueness. However, the quote from F1W1 illustrate that 'nature' is
also understood as a shifting category with flexible boundaries that change over time. What
constitutes 'nature' remains unresolved and yet 'natural' categories continue to serve as powerful
reference points within the group discussion.
What has become clear from the above discussion (and in previous chapters) is the significance
of embodied and lived experiences in shaping people's understanding of SCR and cloning. In
terms of reproductive cloning, the views of members of the patient-led infertility support group
were clearly shaped by their experiences of infertility and assisted conception practices. In the
Diabetes support group, participants were less sympathetic towards any form of intervention
into the reproductive process. For instance, during the discussion participants talked about
distinctions between 'reproductive' and 'therapeutic' cloning. I then asked their views on using
reproductive cloning for people who cannot conceive either with or without existing assisted
conception techniques:
DW1 But nobody has the right to a child. So I mean, I think there has to
come a time that you accept that there's not going to be a family. And there are
lots of children who are looking for homes, and I'm sorry, I just can't go along
with this way of doing things. I think it's very wrong to fertilise people in their
fifties. I genuinely think you're far too old to cope with young children and I
think we need to redefine, people nowadays, they think you have a right to
everything and you don't. There is no right.
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Later on in the discussion, I ask what they think might drive developments in either SCR
or cloning, to which DW1 responds:
DW1 Demand from the public, especially women who seem to feel that at
sixty they have the right to a child. I just can't understand that. I can't
understand why anyone would want a child at sixty.
SP What about if theywere thirty and had fertility problems?
DW1 Well, I think that's just unfortunate.
SP Would that warrant cloning?
DW1 No, I don't think it does.
DM1 Although on demand, you've clearly got somebody who isn't infertile
but want a particular sex of child or particular type of child or whatever and
cloning would, I guess, provide an answer to that. A desire, not need, but desire.
DW1 I think when you start on that sort of cloning you lose the human
aspect. Everybody's very different. You know, there are disappointments in life
and human beings just have to cope with these. They just have to, I think that's
part of life. That's what forms your character and I really can't see why even at
thirty you should be saying that I have the right to that, because you don't
(Diabetes Support Group, 26/09/01).
Firstly, it is interesting to note that DW1 seems to confuse reproductive cloning with post¬
menopausal women using fertility treatments. I have assumed that this is the result of media
reports on Antinori who has received a great deal of public attention for both reproductive
cloning and for enabling a woman in her sixties to bear a child. A second point relates to DWl's
view that childlessness is a 'disappointment in life' to be accepted. Any interventions into the
reproductive process appear to be intensely unsettling for meanings around reproduction as well
as for those around individuality and humanness.
During the interview with AC1M, who's wife has Alzheimer's Disease, he also talked about
similarities and differences between reproductive cloning and existing assisted conception
techniques. As in the Diabetes support group, I asked what he thought about using reproductive
cloning for people who cannot conceive either with or without existing assisted conception
techniques:
AC1M A non-answer. I think that it's unfortunate that it would be the only
alternative. Even in those cases Em not sure that it should be used, I think that's
too radical a process. I would really need to think about it a bit further to give a
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reasoned, considered answer, but my first reaction is it's too radical a process to
use for such a common, or mundane, and I don't mean that word in an unkind
sense. Obviously it's awful for the people but I would have thought that
research, or the medical ability can get to cloning can find some half-way stage
that is more appropriate to replace IVF or whatever.
Later on in the context of making a broader distinction between 'reproductive' and 'therapeutic'
cloning, he says:
AC1M Reproductive cloning I see as much narrower, just as important to the
couple who stand to gain from it, a cancer sufferer or whatever, but it's still,
reproductive compared to therapeutic is still very very narrow and it doesn't
really, talking as a parent if you like, I'm not sure it really achieves the objective
of a couple having their child which is a mixture of both of them, sort of thing.
So you know, I'm just sort of uncomfortable with it (Alzheimer's Carer 1,
21/09/01).
In these accounts, reproductive cloning continues to be distanced from other forms of fertility
treatment which are regarded as acceptable. As he clearly explains, he has not considered his
views on reproductive cloning before the interview took place, but his first reaction points to the
'yuk factor' of cloning. Like the views of participants in the Sister-led infertility support group
(see section 8.3), AC1M indicates that reproductive cloning is unacceptable as an assisted
conception technique because reproduction occurs without the mixing of gametes.
In sum, this section has shown how views of reproductive cloning are mapped onto existing
meanings attached to human reproduction and assisted conception practices. As a potential set
of practices, reproductive cloning foregrounds meanings around 'natural' reproduction and
explicitly reveals their contingencies and constructedness. What is understood as acceptable
interventions into human reproduction becomes central to the debate and participants were able
to trace shifts in meanings and categories. For instance, for those undergoing fertility treatment,
reproductive cloning evokes a complex set of responses, revealing how existing assisted
conception techniques are subject to processes of denaturalisation and renaturalisation which are
intimately linked to embodied experiences of childlessness.
8.6 (Re)Constructing the Human Life Course
A fourth and final theme explored in this chapter concerns the way SCR and cloning-related
developments unsettle conventional understandings of the human life course. This was an
unforeseen theme that was not pursued as a key question across all focus groups and interviews,
but emerged during discussions in some of the patient support groups. Both 'therapeutic' and
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'reproductive' cloning practices were viewed as disrupting distinct stages within the life course,
such as birth and death, albeit in different ways. By reflecting upon the ways in which people
talked about SCR and cloning-related developments vis-a-vis their understanding of stages of the
human life course (e.g. how and why they unsettle the human life course), I will highlight how,
in this connection, 'nature' is socially (reconstructed and put to work.
In contemporary western societies the human life course is divided into distinct stages of life
which are socially and historically specific (see Aries, 1960; Pilcher, 1995): childhood, youth,
adulthood, middle age and old age.11 Transitions between these stages are often marked by
particular events such as completing compulsory education, leaving home, employment, and
procreation. Whilst there are significant differences in terms of biographical trajectories, there
remains a dominant, normative narrative against which we each assess our own embodied life
course.12 Such life course events are punctuated by biographical disruptions which include
unemployment, illness and/or death (Hareven, 1995: 129). Disruptions to the life course caused
by illness are averted by medical science which offers drug and treatment regimes for managing
or curing an increasing number of health conditions. By this connection, SCR and cloning-
related practices are some of the latest developments to intervene in the human body and life
course.
Before entering into a discussion of the accounts of participants in patient support groups, there
are two key discursive strategies for understanding the relationship between new technologies
and the human life course that are central to my analysis in this section. The first narrative
corresponds to the co-existence of hopes and fears for (representing new technological
developments. New medical practices that intervene in human biology - ranging from organ
transplants to NRTs - have evoked complex and ambivalent responses that often revolve
around narratives of hope and fear (see Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1995; Mulkay, 1993;
Turney, 1998). For example, Turney (1998) and Lock (2002) have shown that early
developments in organ transplantation were regarded by some public groups as intervening in or
manipulating nature. To this extent, medical research and practices are perceived to threaten the
11
The boundaries between these categories, however, are not clearly demarcated and
people's experiences of different life stages are diverse. Human life stages also 'vary
significantly across cultures, classes, and historical periods' (Hareven, 1995: 125) and,
therefore, cannot always be defined according to biological age (see Featherstone and
Wernick, 1995). For instance, Tulle-Winton (2000) has referred to processes and
experiences of infantalisation which occur during extended old age.
12
Indeed, Harevan has argued that the transitions and events which constitute the life
course have become institutionalised. The specific needs of the population at different life
stages are dealt with by legislation and with the establishment of institutions, which in turn,
affects the experience of individuals going through the life course (Harevan, 1995: 121-122).
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'natural order' of life. This is not to suggest that people experience only fear in relation to new
medical practices, but as the work of Turney (1998) and Lock (2002) illustrates in the context of
organ transplantation, feelings of hope and expectation are also present. Furthermore, historical
analyses illustrate that medical practices undergo processes of naturalisation and entrenchment,
and views towards such practices are not fixed across time. This suggests that classifications of
'nature' also shift over time, dynamically incorporating scientific and medical developments into
the 'natural order'.
Secondly, medical interventions into the human body are often framed as re-establishing the
narrative of the human life course, thus assisting nature. This process of naturalising medical
interventions through narratives of 'nature assisted' has been identified by Strathern (1992a,
1992b) and Franklin (1997, 1998) in the context of debates around new reproductive
technologies. They have shown how dominant discourses in medical science construct
interventions into human reproduction as a remedy to a problem in nature. For instance,
infertility disrupts the naturalised life course of women who are unable to fulfil their 'natural'
desire for motherhood and NRTs facilitate the events of reproduction and motherhood. NRTs,
therefore, enable life's natural progression, tying gender roles to stages of the human life course.
To this extent, the insertion of NRTs into conventional understandings of stages within the life
course, converges with the rhetoric of hope discussed in previous chapters. In turn, categories of
'nature' are simultaneously reasserted and transformed - incorporating novel practices into
narratives of the human life course.
Turning to the case-study in hand, SCR and cloning-related practices are recent examples of
developments that threaten understandings of the 'natural' human life course. Reproductive
cloning threatens to disrupt the human life course by enabling people to genetically reproduce
themselves. Whilst such a position is founded on a genetic deterministic view of life, the birth of
ones genetic copy disrupts the narrative sequence of the human life course. As already shown in
section 8.4, participants within the cardiac support group suggested that reproductive cloning
should only be permitted when the 'original' is already dead. Whilst the thrust of the point
related to the issue of human uniqueness, a secondary reading of this hints at a disruption to the
human life course. To 'purposefully have two people alive who are at different ages (as opposed
to 'natural' twins who are the same age and not-purposefully created) unsettles conventional
understandings of the trajectory of the human life course.
To elaborate on this point a little further, I will briefly discuss how concerns that reproductive
cloning disrupts the 'natural' life course are shaped by people's views of the relationship between
192
genes and individuality. Participants in the cardiac support group, imagined a future with cloned
humans, discussing whether this allows people to 'live forever'. Suppositions that a person can
live forever through exactly reproducing their genome, implicitly draw upon genetic determinist
arguments, as illustrated in the following exchange:
SP But why do you think that somebody would want to clone themselves?
CM1 Because they're an egotist
CM4 Vanity
CM1 Theywant to live forever in one form or another
CW1 That's what I was saying earlier, somebody that wants to live on and
on. (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
As this excerpt shows, some participants argued that reproductive cloning would appeal to
'narcissistic' individuals who want to reproduce their genome to 'live again'. This suggests that
reproductive cloning is believed to extend the human life course because humans are determined
by their genes. In order to avoid oversimplification and deconextualising people's quotes,
however, it is important to note that the broader context of the cardiac support group discussion
revealed a far more complex view of the genes-environment debate than is presented above.
Whilst there was often a recourse to genetic determinism and such explanations were sometimes
privileged, a number of participants argued that humans are the sum of complex interactions
between ones genes and the environment.
A further point to raise on the implications of reproductive cloning, corresponds to the quote
from DW1 in the Diabetes support group in section 8.5. As already discussed, DW1 links
reproductive cloning with the use of fertility treatments to enable post-menopausal women to
have children. In connecting these two issues together, DW1 points to an underlying concern
that stages within the life course are being transgressed by such practices. The biological capacity
of women to bear children is reinstated via science and technology, and this unsettles taken-for-
granted categories associated with different stages of the life course. According to DW1,
motherhood marks an earlier phase in women's life course, and should not be available to
women during their 50's.
Potential applications of SCR and 'therapeutic' cloning also unsettle taken-for-granted
classifications of the human life course. As outlined in previous chapters, one of a central aims
presented by SCR-advocates for legitimating this area of research (see chapters 3 and 5), has
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been the potential to develop treatments or cures for diseases such as Alzheimer's and
Huntington's - diseases associated with ageing.13 SCR, it is argued, holds the potential to
intervene in biological processes currently linked with the ageing body, such as dementia and
other conditions related to cell degeneration. Aims include the ability to replace damaged tissues
or nerve cells and, ultimately, to grow replacement organs. If SCR and cloning-related practices
are successful, then human life expectancy could extend beyond what is currently possible.
In the cardiac support group, this issue of extending life expectancy raised a number of concerns
that I will address in turn. Very early on in the discussion, CM4 outlined his hopes for
'therapeutic' cloning and the ability to grow replacement organs. Drawing on his experiences of
receiving a heart transplant, CM4 describes the complications involved in taking
immunosuppressant drugs, such as kidney damage and organ rejection problems. In responding
to this, CW2 expresses her anxieties:
CW2 But what if somebody tried to use it for, you know how they go in for
all these operations, for face-lifts and this and that. If they wanted to prolong a
good life, if it got in the wrong hands, if they made money out of it that way.
That I don't, that's why I'm not sure about cloning. If you look at medical,
whether it's necessary, but if it went too far and you know, somebody else
thought "oh, I'm fine otherwise and I've got a good life and I've got loads of
money", and that's it, "I've got loads of money and I just wanted - if
something's failing replace it" (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
There are three elements interwoven in the above quote. Firstly, 'fixing' parts of ones body that
begin to fail with age is regarded as crossing the line of acceptability. Secondly, CW2
distinguishes between cosmetic and medical uses of medical interventions. Here, her concerns
are not with extending life per se, but instead seem to lie with extending 'youth'. There is a
subtlety to her views: repairing body parts to save lives (e.g. heart transplantation) is acceptable,
but repairing body parts to avoid problems associated with ageing (e.g. wrinkles) are
unacceptable. Thirdly, transgressions of the human life course were further compounded by
economic factors. In relation to healthcare access and provision of SCR and 'therapeutic'
cloning, CW2 compares these to existing medical practices which are 'therapeutic' but are also
used for commercially lucrative applications (i.e. cosmetic surgery). Such quotes provide an
13
Research conducted by pharmaceutical companies such as Geron, one of the leading
companies involved in developing SCR and cloning-related developments, are striving to
understand, control and even reverse processes currently associated with the ageing body,
such as cell degeneration. Under the rubric of regenerative medicine (a term that has
emerged in the US political context to refer to eSCR and 'therapeutic' uses of the cloning
technique), scientists working in the field of SCR and other advocates have argued that this
research has the potential to eradicate many diseases associated with ageing.
194
insight into the anxieties felt by some participants - that medical therapies derived from SCR
and cloning will not be available on the National Health Service. Here she fears that only those
who can afford such therapies will be able to extend their life expectancy.
One of the Alzheimer's carers, AC2W, outlined similar concerns about SCR and cloning-related
developments. At the beginning of the interview, I asked her about her motivations for
participating in my research. She then began by explaining that her sister has Alzheimer's disease
and that this area of research sounds promising as a source of medical treatments and cures.
AC2W then goes on to say
AC2W My first words were, no, what sort of check, what sort of holds are
there going to be on just going your own thing? What, it's not control it's what is
the ethical borderline? (Alzheimer's Carer 2, 03/10/01).
I then asked whether she had any immediate thoughts on what problems might arise:
AC2W I don't mind if somebody is sick, they're sick. It's more how it could
filter through into other things where you could use cloning. You know, a
second and third stage where you could use these sort of things for cosmetic
reasons or, that's all. It's unethical isn't it? (Alzheimer's Carer 2, 03/10/01).
Like CW2 in the cardiac support group, AC2W distinguishes between medical and cosmetic uses
of SCR and cloning. Again this suggests that there is a perceived difference between extending a
person's life who would otherwise die through illness and extending the signs of youth that
cosmetic surgery brings.
As illustrated throughout this thesis, developments in SCR and cloning have generated
contradictory 'public' responses. Whilst on the one hand, the potential of SCR to develop
therapies for as yet incurable conditions was deemed to be a positive thing, on the other, many
people also expressed fears and anxieties. In the following excerpt, participants in the cardiac
support group are talking about potential developments in 'reproductive' cloning, which CM1
argues will inevitably take place:
CW2 Well, well I'd be against it.
CM1 Well there are rumours that it's already happened or it's in the process
of happening.
CW2 I mean the thing is, you're bom to a man and a woman, you know,
you're an individual person, you don't want to reproduce you, yourself. At I least
I wouldn't. I mean, I'll take my life span and I'll go and that's it. You know,
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you're sort of like flowers, you come, you grow and then you die. I mean this
idea of having something artificial.
CW1 But I thought we said, say an idea such as organs - we're not going to
die.
CW2 Yeah I suppose so. It's just, I don't know (Cardiac Support Group,
18/07/01).
The analogy with flowers provides an interesting insight into how SCR and reproductive cloning
unsettles the 'natural' life course. Whilst CW2 begins by talking about reproductive cloning she
slips into 'therapeutic' cloning, applying the same sense of unease to both. It is also notable that
a cloned human is regarded as 'artificial' - a point that relates to the earlier section on human
uniqueness (see 8.4).
As the discussion progressed others in the group were arguing that 'reproductive' and
'therapeutic' cloning differed because the latter would, potentially, produce organs or tissue for
people requiring them. CW2 was also uncomfortable with these suggestions:
CW2 It just seems disgusting to me, I'll be quite honest it really does.
CM4 We're not talking about whole cloning here, but maybe for organs
CW2 Yeah, maybe for organs, but to clone a person.
CM4 You don't want to be doing it for whole humans, but you want to ...
[interrupted]
CW2 [interrupting] Well if it's going to be helpful. To be honest I would
rather you don't have anything. You would just live your life, you die and that
was it. I mean I'm grateful.
CM1 Well lets take it one step beyond that. You've got a child of three which
is dying because of heart failure. If they could clone a heart and transplant it and
that child lives until it's ninety-three.
CW2 Yeah, it's a very difficult dilemma from my own point of view I think.
CM1 But what if that child happens to be Einstein or the second one?
CW2 Yeah well. Yeah, I do sometimes think that you're put on this earth and
you live a span and then you die and that's it, but erm ... [interrupted]
CM1 [interrupting] Well we've been interfering with that side for ...
[interrupted]
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CW2 [interrupting] Oh yes, I mean all of us progress. If you don't progress
you don't live it's as simple as that. I could have been dead by now, you know,
but I had a heart operation.
SP Do you see SCR and cloning as part of progress?
CW2 No, I honestly don't. I think it's disgusting, I honestly do (Cardiac
Support Group, 18/07/01).
This exchange, once again illustrates participants' contradictory responses to SCR and cloning-
related developments. Throughout the discussion CW2 struggled over the stem cell issue, with
her ambivalence expressed according to both hopes (in the form of scientific progress) and
fears. On the one hand, she does not support the use of the cloning technique for medical
therapies. Even when CM1 uses the emotive example of a child requiring an organ transplant,
her response remains acutely ambivalent. At the end of the exchange, however, she states that
without a heart operation she would probably have died, thus illustrating that her embodied
experiences of illness and medical interventions did not wholly determine her view of SCR and
cloning. Overall, it seems that CW2 was not against medical interventions, but against the use of
'cloning' for both 'therapeutic' and 'reproductive' purposes. Because 'cloning' evoked the 'yuk
factor' and unsettled her understanding of the 'natural order', CW2 mobilises a version of
'nature' that renders her own experiences of health and illness 'unnatural'. The processes of
denaturalisation and renaturalisation that occurs during the above excerpt exemplifies the
complex interplay between CW2's embodied biography and her understanding of 'nature'.
Meanings of SCR and cloning are never settled, but remain unplaceable in the classificatory
system - hence, abject.
When considering whether SCR and cloning-related practices are 'unnatural', a number of
members in the patient support group drew parallels with other medical practices. For instance,
in the Huntington's disease support group one woman compared reproductive cloning to the
fears generated by the development of Chloroform:
HW I was reading about Simpson who first used Chloroform. The medical
profession and the Church throughout the world said it was evil and that man
was made to suffer and that it was actually cowardly to have an anaesthetic. So
all these new things that come out, people, and that was the medical profession
and the Church throughout the world.
F1W We've come a long way in just over a couple of hundred years so who
knows in two-hundred years what we'll think about cloning.
HW It's like these films, you know, it's like having ... [interrupted]
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HW [interrupting] Frankenstein.
HW ... [continuing] Yeah, that's right. It's like it coming to life
(Huntington's Disease Support Group, 31/10/01).
Similarly, in other groups, participants talked about medical practices that used to be regarded as
against nature, or against God but today are normalised, including IVF, organ donation and
travelling to the moon. What this illustrates, is how during the focus group discussions
participants actively denaturalised and renaturalised a range of scientific and medical practices by
placing them in a broader social and historical context. One function this seemed to serve in the
discussions, was to naturalise SCR and cloning. As I have shown throughout chapters 6 to 8,
CM1 argued very strongly in favour of SCR and 'therapeutic' cloning. And in the group context
where CW2 believed that such developments go against nature, he argued:
CM1 Life's too short no matter how long it is. And if it will prolong life, I'm
all for it.
Later on he states:
CM1 I want to live until I'm at least 107 (Cardiac Support Group, 18/07/01).
Rather than being unsettled by the potential to extend life, CM1 emphatically embraces such
developments. As in many of the discussions in the cardiac focus group, CM1 stood out as the
'joker' as well as holding affirmative views for SCR and related medical applications. For CM1,
nature is a shifting category that has always been reinvented as science, technology and medicine
have progressed. Therefore, to argue that SCR and cloning - whether for 'reproductive' or
'therapeutic' purposes - are, or will continue to be regarded as 'unnatural' and unsettling
understandings of the life course, was counterpoised with his knowledge of historical cases. As
indicated above, such arguments were not specific to the cardiac support group but also arose
within many of the other discussions.
What I have shown in this section is how existing understandings and discourses of the human
life course are mobilised when considering ones views of SCR and cloning-related
developments. Whilst there are a set of meanings associated with ageing, or moments within the
life course, these intersect with other naturalised sociocultural categories such as gender and
motherhood. As I have shown, 'reproductive' cloning seems to, primarily, unsettle conventional
meanings around the trajectory of the life course - a view deeply embedded in genetic
essentialism. SCR and 'therapeutic' cloning unsettle understandings of the life span by opening
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up the possibility to extend life beyond what is currently regarded as 'old age'. Relating to this, it
also holds the potential to redefine the experience of old age, 'fixing' tissues and organs as they
degenerate. A further dimension to SCR and cloning developments is the potential to treat a
wide-range of diseases and conditions, thus, having implications for a large number of people.
For sociologists then, it is important to continue to investigate both the various applications of
SCR and cloning that impact upon the human life span, but also people's views of such
developments.
8.7 Conclusions
Framed around four themes - kinship, human uniqueness, reproduction and the human life
course - this chapter has highlighted how categories of 'nature' are mobilised, negotiated,
contested and reconstructed in people's accounts of SCR and cloning. Here I have illustrated
how classificatory systems operate according to complex borrowings between binary categories.
In my analysis 'nature' is used as both a category and repertoire in itself, as well as a meta-
category for classificatory systems. That is, binary categories such as human/non-human,
self/other are naturalised categories, constituted through a variety of sociocultural processes.
As in previous chapters, I show how participants' views are shaped, but not determined, by their
embodied and lived experiences. What is particularly interesting here, is that the issues raised in
the discussions denaturalised medical practices used by some participants. For example, in
section 8.5 I show how participants in the patient-led infertility support group reflect upon IVF
practices, considering whether they are already 'going against nature' (F1W2). Similarly, within
the cardiac support group, CM4 compares SCR and 'therapeutic' cloning with organ
transplantations and CW2 connects 'cloning' with cosmetic surgery. In all instances, the
contingencies of 'nature' are made visible and explicit, and cultural categories are put to work in
complex and contradictory ways. Although binary categories remain powerful as discourses for
ordering meanings, understandings and knowledge, 'nature' and its 'other' (e.g., science,
progress, technology, culture) are co-produced and dialogic, and their boundaries are permeable.
I now want to return to the significance of the theoretical approaches introduced in sections
8.2.1 and 8.2.2 in this chapter. Following on from the approach of Franklin et al. (2000), I have
illustrated how 'nature' as a category is continually (reproduced in a dynamic process. Analysis
of people's accounts of SCR and cloning exemplify how 'nature' is never fixed, always shifting,
contested, and renegotiated and often 'held' paradoxically. In reflecting upon my analysis of
empirical data, Franklin et ofs conceptual approach is useful for capturing how 'nature' operates
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through processes of naturalisation, denaturalisation and renaturalisation (2000: 19). This
processual model of 'nature' refers to a dynamic set of techniques and practices (e.g., discursive
and political) through which categories are produced, and where such categories are embedded
in sociocultural contexts. A further important point corresponds to the durability and
pervasiveness of 'nature' as a powerful category and set of discourses. What my analysis has
confirmed, is the paradox of cultural categories, that is, their immutability and their malleability.
Once 'nature' is understood to be achieved through processes of naturalisation, denaturalisation
and renaturalisation, then abjection becomes a helpful concept for capturing specific moments
within that process. As outlined in section 8.2.2, abjection relates to ideas and objects at the
boundaries that threaten to disrupt the 'natural order'. In the context of SCR and cloning
developments, abjection is when novel practices are yet to be categorised, when 'nature' is
denaturalised. Overall, the accounts presented in this chapter illustrate that SCR and cloning
developments offer new ways for thinking about human reproduction, kinship relations, the life
course and human uniqueness. Because these practices unsettle the 'natural order', some people
articulated specific anxieties, such as Ian Wilmut's concern that reproductive cloning would
generate problems within the family that may negatively impact upon the clone (see 8.3). Others
expressed a more general sense of unease, such as CW2 in the cardiac support group who refers
to cloning developments as 'disgusting' (see 8.6). Threats to the natural order also generated
discussions that contextualised 'nature' according to historical specificities. For example, in the
Fluntington's disease support group, participants connected 'reproductive' cloning with the
development of anaesthetics (see 8.6). Here, naturalised medical practices (use of anaesthetics
during operations) were denaturalised, connected to 'reproductive' cloning, and then both were
renaturalised.
What is interesting in all of these examples, is that people showed an awareness of 'nature' as
malleable, as a category to be put to work in complex and contradictory ways. However, as I
have shown, it is when 'nature' is cross-referenced with other categories - e.g. between age,
gender and motherhood in NRT's or 'reproductive' cloning (see DW1 in section 8.5) - that
constructions of 'nature' is a powerful discursive repertoire. Whilst categories such as gender,
age and motherhood are flexible, when cross-mapped they limit the range of meanings,
understandings and possibilities. To return to the concept of abjection, this is potentially a useful
political concept to open up critical spaces within the SCR and cloning debates. If we harness
this "non-category" or "third category", then as social scientists, I believe, we can deconstruct
the naturalness of nature as well as contribute to theoretical models for understanding how
'nature' is constituted in specific contexts. My analysis of people's accounts of SCR and cloning
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in this chapter has shown how 'nature' is explicitly questioned, negotiated and put to work,
revealing its constructedness. As a limit case, existing at the borders of classificatory systems and
still undergoing processes of naturalisation, SCR and cloning points to new ways of ordering and
thinking about categories such as human, life, reproduction, ageing and kinship. By this
connection, as social scientists, we need to continue developing more sophisticated ways for
theorising and modelling the implications of new practices in science, technology and medicine.
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CHAPTER IX
Conclusions
Rather than simply summarising the thesis, in this chapter I will attempt to pull together some
of the threads that cut through my analysis for a fuller picture of its scope and magnitude.
Because of the political aims of this thesis - to give voice to marginalised groups - I start by
extrapolating from my analysis some policy implications for SCR and cloning, as well as for
wider relations between scientists and public groups. In the second part of this chapter, I will
offer some thoughts on the significance of this thesis for social science theories and concepts.
This thesis has been written with the express aim of explicating some of the ways SCR and
cloning is being constructed by both scientists and other relevant social groups. To do this, I
have mapped a number of recurrent themes that have emerged in the parliamentary debates, and
identified relevant social groups whose voices, whilst rhetorically invoked in the SCR and
cloning debates, have been systematically marginalised. I have conducted in-depth interviews
with scientists working in the field of SCR and/or cloning, focus groups with patient and
infertility support groups, and interviews with two carers for people with Alzheimer's. In these
interviews and focus groups, I allowed participants to discuss issues surrounding SCR and
cloning, generating their own sets of questions, problems, hopes and fears. An overarching aim
was to move beyond the polarised debates - as presented in Parliament and related policy
documents - and to problematise dominant accounts of SCR and cloning.
9.1 Practical and Policy Considerations
In keeping with the cPUS approaches of Wynne and others, the thesis challenges traditional
PUS models that characterise 'public' anxieties towards novel areas of science, technology and
medicine as ^understanding. I have thereby contributed to existing research that emphasises
the need to capture the range of local contexts and embodied experiences that shape the views
of scientists and non-scientists alike. If matters of 'public' (mis)trust are to be addressed, the
epistemological assumptions underpinning what counts as 'knowledge' and 'expertise' in models
of science-public relations used for policymaking and communication activities must be
reconsidered. This is an important endeavour precisely because democratic, transparent and
inclusive public debates call for scientists to be reflexive about the social and cultural
dimensions of their own activities and knowledge, as well as those of the public. As I have noted
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in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, both scientists and publics are aware of the changing cultural context
within which science now operates. That is, focus group participants no longer regard science as
a homogenous enterprise but, made up, instead, of multiple voices from within and outwith the
'walls of the palace'. Thus, scientists are increasingly viewed with scepticism by publics within a
society that defines 'risk' in a more reflexive, provisional and open-ended fashion.
From this standpoint, Chapter 5 shows that scientists appear to be moving towards reflexive
models of PUS - for instance, including the views of some patient groups, and ascribing a
degree of 'expertise' to embodied experiences of health and illness. Science, in this sense,
appears to be moving away from the deficit model of PUS that positions scientific rationality as
the only valid knowledge, or what Irwin and Wynne call, 'the arrogance of a supposed "higher
rationality" (1996c: 221). Such moves towards a reflexive science, however, need to be further
interrogated and treated with caution because, I suggest, reflexive processes do not necessarily
translate into reflexive outcomes. This can be further substantiated by three points. Firstly, only
some patient groups are included (those that have publicly supported eSCR, in particular).
Secondly, the inclusion of such groups simplifies what are rich, complex and ambivalent
accounts of SCR and cloning. Thirdly, as I have shown in my analysis of the parliamentary
debates, patient groups have been rhetorically invoked by pro-eSCR-advocates and yet have had
no direct input into the debates. I will return to this point again later. What I have revealed is
how, in the name of reflexivity, scientists accounts have tended to contribute to polarising the
debates, positioning individuals and groups as either for or against SCR and undermining the
potential of reflexivity. In this process, the nuances of people's views are lost and their identities
delimited. People with diseases and conditions that may be treated with stem cell therapies are
claimed to be wholly in favour of eSCR, unless, of course, they are politically aligned with anti-
abortion groups.
The exclusion of public ambivalence and other meanings that fall outside ready-made schemas,
is, I believe, central to the current impasse in science-public relations. Ambiguous or
contradictory understandings do not fit into the current policy and decision-making processes,
and are of little use in public debates that tend to resort to the language of certainty and risk
management. As far as science policymaking is concerned, what is needed is for scientists and
others involved in policy to develop new and sophisticated ways for both including and hearing
public views. Such practices might involve institutional and cultural changes to the ways in
which policies are formed and implemented to broaden debates. Indeed, as I have argued in
Chapter 4, institutions such as the Wellcome Trust, Royal Society and advisory bodies such as the
Human Genetics Commission, are already developing innovative public engagement practices.
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Gtizens juries, focus groups and 'public' meetings are becoming commonplace as laudable
practices, 'the public' have become 'the publics', and interest groups now occupy a central place
in policymaking contexts. And yet, as noted in Chapters 6 and 7, whilst this certainly constitutes
a step in the right direction for facilitating wider discussion between scientists and other public
groups, some of the most difficult questions raised by publics continue to be omitted. The
implications of this omission are far-reaching and can be gauged by a brief revisit to the views of
participants in patient and infertility support groups.
In Chapter 7 I revealed that people undergoing fertility treatments are unwilling to donate
'viable' embryos for SCR. When still trying to conceive a child, 'viable' embryos are not 'spare'
embryos, but are associated with hope - as potential children. To claim, as many eSCR-advocates
have, that people undergoing fertility treatment are willing to donate embryos for SCR, fails to
attend to people's embodied understandings of embryos, and a pervasive sense of scepticism
towards science and scientists. Across all patient and infertility support groups, participants
raised a number of questions around trust and risk that were largely omitted within
parliamentary debates and in core-eSCR-scientists' accounts. Such issues included trust in
regulatory mechanisms, anxieties regarding the potential exploitation of this area by
'unscrupulous' scientists (e.g., the slippery slope from 'therapeutic' to 'reproductive' cloning) and
concerns about the future direction of this area of science. These fears were underpinned by an
awareness of the nature of scientific research in today's context, understood as multi-vocal and
institutionally linked to other social spheres, such as commerce and politics. However, I have
tried not to fuel claims that there is an 'anti-science' climate in the UK. Instead, I have
attempted to relay the tension between hope and fear that persists in people's accounts of SCR
and cloning. Therapies derived from SCR and cloning-related developments were certainly
received with expectation, but this should not be translated as an unquestioned 'demand' by
pro-eSCR advocates.
Whilst a 'magic bullet' solution to the problems surrounding public ambivalence, policy and
decision-making processes does not exist, a number of changes to facilitate wider inclusion can
be suggested, following existing cPUS studies. Firstly, public consultation exercises have to be
reconsidered, for participants need to be able to generate their own questions and issues, posing
policy problems and solutions. Such exercises should not be conducted once policies are in
place or after scientific research is already underway, but should allow public views to shape,
what Wynne calls, 'front-end innovation commitments' (2002: 463). Indeed, my analysis of the
SCR and cloning debates shows that publics were excluded from 'front-end' decision-making
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processes, and marginalised during debates corresponding to 'back-end' decision-making
processes.
The meaningful inclusion of plurality, complexity and uncertainty into policymaking processes
cannot be achieved overnight - the wealth of studies that have already attempted to provide
solutions to this problem is evidence of the weight of such a task. This is made all the more
difficult because of the current tension between 'tradition' and reflexivity outlined in Chapter 4.
Here, scientists operate between reflexive accounts of expertise, incorporating plurality and
including alternative forms of knowledge, whilst also appealing to traditional boundaries
between binary categories such as expert/lay and science/publics. However, scientists' apparent
willingness to engage in public engagement activities and the flexibility of boundaries between
such binary categories, points to an opening for social scientists and public groups to intervene
and open up the SCR and cloning debates.
Finally, given the centrality of trust in science-public relations, the management of the SCR and
cloning debates by eSCR-advocates has been an obstacle to meaningful dialogue. It was not only
alternative voices within non-science groups that were marginalised, but also those within
science, such as those of scientists working on adult SCR (see Chapter 3). For example, within
the parliamentary debates and in scientists' accounts, eSCR advocates mobilised scientistic
discourses to argue that adult SCR are less likely to develop therapies questioning the validity of
the claims of scientists working with adult stem cells. In dominating and effectively managing
the SCR and cloning debates, the voices of scientists working with adult stem cells were largely
omitted or presented with scepticism by eSCR advocates. Similarly, different forms of
knowledge need to be allowed to flourish alongside scientific knowledge, and recognised as
legitimate ways of understanding. Indeed, discussions with patient groups that took place for
this PhD indicated that the exclusion of 'non-scientific' knowledge further generates a sense of
powerlessness and mistrust. When publics no longer regard science as isolated from other social
spheres and when risks generated by science and technology are understood to be intimately tied
to the wider social context (see Chapter 8), then to continue to exclude these dimensions from
public debates continues to propagate elements of the deficit model of PUS.
9.2 Relevance to the Social Sciences
The crosscutting themes identified in this thesis were informed by the theoretical, conceptual
and methodological approaches of sociology, cultural studies and STS. These disciplinary
approaches enabled me to identify key and recurrent themes in people's accounts of SCR and
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cloning, and in turn, to develop a sophisticated understanding of the social and cultural
dimensions of such developments. At the same time, the data generated in my analysis of
parliamentary debates, scientists' discourses and within focus groups and interviews with non-
scientists, feeds back into our understanding of themes and concepts such as risk, trust and
binary categories. Many of the themes have been difficult to separate out from one another, and,
subsequently, excerpts from interviews and focus groups contain a number of themes that could
have been analysed differently by shifting my emphasis. Rather than trying to further separate
the key themes that were central to my analysis, in this final section I will attempt a 'meta¬
analysis', highlighting the significance of bringing together risk, trust, reflexive modernisation,
and boundary work, for investigating the discursive construction of SCR and cloning.
'Risk' has been a central theme in the SCR and cloning debates - implicitly present in my
analysis and sometimes emerging as an explicit theme. As argued in Chapter 4, 'risk' is endemic
in modern Western societies, increasingly pervading social, cultural and political practices. Here,
I discussed the approaches of Beck and cPUS that have illuminated the role of risks in
generating transformations in contemporary society. Similarly, the concept of risk itself is
undergoing transformations, including our understanding of what risks are, how they are
generated, who generates them, what their implications might be and how we experience them.
Analysis of these transformations has led people such as Irwin (1995), Irwin and Wynne (1996
b, 1996c), Wynne (1988, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2002) and Van Loon (2002), to argue that we need to
attend to the various elements that constitute modem understandings of risks. Here, it is
imperative to investigate how risks are constituted, the discursive repertoires mobilised, which
voices and discourses gain legitimacy and which become marginalised.
My analysis of the SCR and cloning debates has contributed to such approaches, confirming the
need to explore the cultural dimensions of risk definitions in public discourses. To continue to
define risks according to methods of calculation, measurement and avoidance, misses the point
of how many public groups understand and experience risks. Analytically, it has been important
to mobilise a nuanced understanding of 'risk' to capture the ambiguity, indeterminacy and
unquantifiable nature of risks in people's accounts of SCR and cloning. In contradistinction to
traditional risk evaluation methods, my research captures how people articulate risks and
negotiate their implications vis-a-vis their everyday lives. For example, in patient and infertility
support groups, participants mobilised cultural resources such as film and literature, or historical
case-studies of the introduction of novel practices in science, technology and medicine (see
Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Here, the use of focus groups and in-depth interviews were effective data
collection methods for illustrating that cultural idioms and knowledge must be recognised as
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valid knowledge of risk. In doing so, this methodological approach helps to sharpen 'risk' as a
concept within the social sciences, showing its implicit ambiguity and multivalency.
Closely related to risk, are the themes of trust and uncertaintywhich have also received attention
from those working within the sub-field of cPUS (see for example, Brown and Michael, 2002;
Irwin, 1995; Szerszynski, 1999). My analysis of publics' accounts of SCR and cloning debates,
reveals the centrality of trust and also its elusiveness. Scientists were never fully trusted, but trust
was never entirely absent; instead, people's views were characterised by ambivalence. Such
understandings of science and scientists indicate that trust is never fixed or won but that actors
are engaged in 'trust' relations that need to be continually maintained. A further contingency in
people's understanding of the trustworthiness of scientists working on SCR and cloning is the
broader social, economic and cultural context within which science operates. As noted in the
previous section (see 9.1), perceived connections between science and other social spheres
generates public scepticism towards science and scientists. Such scepticism is equally applied to
those other social spheres and their related expert systems such as commerce, the media and
politics (see Chapter 6). The complexities of (mis)trust in people's accounts of SCR and cloning
highlights the need for a model of trust in social science research that sensitises the researcher to
public ambivalence and contradictions and the embodied and lived experiences that shape such
understandings.
Underlying the current concern with risk and trust within social science and, indeed,
government related decision-making bodies, is the broader context of reflexive modernisation
processes. In Chapter 4 I introduced Beck's theory of reflexive modernity as an important
conceptual tool for capturing the paradoxes inherent in contemporary society - the tension
between 'reflexive' and 'non-reflexive' (also referred to as 'traditional' or the 'deficit') models of
PUS. This approach marks the convergence between Beck's Risk Society thesis (1992) and the
work of Wynne and others conducting cPUS research. As discussed in Section 9.1, the
paradoxes of reflexive modernity are a central feature of my analytical framework for exploring
constructions of SCR and cloning precisely because it problematises rather than reifies binary
categories such as expert/lay, science/society, scientists/publics. In contributing to theories of
reflexive modernity I have confirmed how tensions between 'reflexivity' and 'tradition' are
visible in people's meanings and understandings of SCR and cloning-related developments. My
analysis illustrates how reflexivity has seeped into the discourses mobilised by core-eSCR-
scientists, members of patient and infertility support groups, and speakers within parliamentary
debates. The social and cultural dimensions of the scientific enterprise are visible, and the social
constructedness of categories such as 'science', 'expertise' and 'knowledge' are openly discussed.
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This brings me to the penultimate crosscutting theme - boundarywork (Gieryn, 1983, 1995). In
Chapter 5 I explored how core-eSCR-scientists engage in boundary work in order to construct
their work as credible and legitimate, thus asserting themselves as 'experts'. The importance of
rhetorically separating eSCR from reproductive cloning or distinguishing stem cells from
embryos, for instance, exemplifies how boundary work serves to shore up traditional
constructions of expertise, constructing core-eSCR-scientists as particular sorts of actors (i.e.
acting ethically). Processes of boundary work also reveal the flexibility of boundaries and that
demarcations between categories are socially constituted. In other words, scientists do not
negotiate between fixed, monolithic categories of science/society, expert/lay, scientists/publics,
but actively construct, negotiate and reconstruct these binary categories. My analysis of
scientists' discourses extends the 'boundary work' approach of Gieryn (1983, 1995), revealing
that while scientists continue to appeal to such boundaries, they simultaneously blur them,
making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between scientists/publics, expert/lay,
inside/outside. Here, the boundaries between categories are shown to be both malleable and
durable, and sometimes fuzzy. This again illustrates the underlying tension inherent in processes
of reflexive modernisation between traditional and reflexive models of PUS.
The paradox identified above - the malleability and durability of boundaries between binary
categories - is extended, in my analysis, to understand the (re)negotiation of categories around
'nature'. Like core-eSCR-scientists, participants within patient and infertility support groups
engaged in boundary work when constructing understandings and meanings around SCR and
cloning. A key distinction here is that when scientists engaged in boundary work they tended to
limit the SCR and cloning debates, whereas people in focus groups and interviews did so to
open up these debates. Ordered around four key themes - kinship, human uniqueness,
reproduction and the human life course - I illustrate how developments in this area of science
and technology unsettle cultural categories. In other words, SCR and cloning are shown to
generate anxieties because they are risks to the stability of conventional cultural categories.
People's negotiation of these risks, however, are reflexive to the extent that participants do not
simply appeal to such categories, but actively put them to work in complex and contradictory
ways, revealing the contingencies of 'nature'. What is interesting here, is the sense of uncertainty
embedded in people's understanding of 'nature', seen as transitory - shifting across time and
space - and yet remaining a powerful discourse for ordering and understanding SCR and
cloning-related developments.
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SCR and cloning, then, raise a number of issues that are interesting to the social sciences. The
potential of this area of science and technology to redefine meanings and understandings of
cultural categories poses difficult questions for social scientists to which there seems no simple
response. Social scientists must actively engage with dominant actors (e.g., core-eSCR-scientists
and people involved in policymaking) to identify relevant areas for making critical interventions,
such as policymaking processes and the future direction of this field. Informed by appropriate
theoretical and conceptual tools, it is also essential to conduct empirical research that explores
the range of meanings and understandings formed by different social groups - both scientists
and publics. In the face of fast-paced, innovative scientific developments, social scientists are
required to develop equally innovative conceptual and methodological research strategies. But
with so much at stake, we must strive towards a democratically grounded reflexive (social)
science.
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APPENDIX I
The Politics of Cloning: Mapping the rhetorical
convergence of embryos and stem cells in
Parliamentary debates'
Abstract
In April 2001 the 1990 Hurmn Fertilisation and Embryology A a (HFE A a) tuts amended to allow stem
cell research (SCR) to use human errbrycs. By identifying tihat Midkay calls 'discmite regularities' (1993:
723), this paper examines the rhetorical strategies cfand manoeuvring over the meaning ofstem cells, cloning
and embryos within the Parliamentary context I focus upon the 'return to the embryo question and the
significance cfthis for the stem cell debates in terms cfformand ccrntent This feeds into an analysis cfthe wtys in
vthich two specific groups are discursively invoked and constructed ■ those vith diseases and disabilities zeho have
been identified as likely to benrfit from stem cdl therapies, and couples undergoing fertility treatment uho are
needed to donate spare embryos. In doing so, I draw upon similar analyses cfthe earlier embryo debates ■ those cf
Mulkay, Franklin, Kirejczyk and Spallone - leading up to the establishment cf the 1990 HFE Act In
conjunction uith these analyses, I am able to identify parallels between the rhetorical deiiees mobilised and the
legislative outcomes.
Introduction
Whilst human embryonic SCR has been carried out since the mid-nineteen nineties, it was not
until after the birth of Dolly the sheep that the Government formerly addressed policy issues
surrounding related developments. Between 1997, the year Dolly was announced, and early
2001, the Government commissioned a consultation paper by the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (FEFEA) and the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAQ, and
established an expert advisory committee headed by the Chief Medical Officer, Professor Liam
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Donaldson. The outcome of these papers was a proposal to amend the existing 1990 HFE Act,
that culminated in a series of parliamentary debates to decide upon the future of SCR. The
proposed amendment would add a further three categories for embryo research to the existing
five." The amendment was passed in a non-party vote in the House of Commons with 366 ayes
and 174 noes, then passed to the House of Lords who divided with 212 ayes, and 92 noes.
As in the debates that led to the establishment of the 1990 HFE Act, the stem cell debates
demonstrated that there is still no consensus as to the moral status of the embryo. Indeed, it
appears that recent developments in cloning and genetic technologies have further
problematised questions of life as they relate to embryo research. The significance of Dolly was
not the ability of scientists to clone per se, but the demonstration that cells taken from an adult
mammal could be 're-programmed' - a process called de-differentiation - to produce a
genetically identical copy of the original.'" If adult cells can be de-differentiated, then this offers
new avenues for scientific research to understand not only how cells become specialised, but
also how to control that process. Consequently, we have seen speculation regarding a number of
applications, including reproductive cloning, stem cell therapies and xenotransplantation.
This paper examines some of the rhetorical resources and strategies used during the stem cell
debates vis-a-vis analyses of the pre-1990 embryo debates. I will draw upon my analyses of three
Hansard transcripts of stem cell debates: two from the House of Commons (17 November and
19 December 2000) and one from the House of Lords (22 January 2001). By focussing upon
what Mulkay calls 'discursive regularities' (1993: 723), I map the contours of the debates that
dominated discussions of stem cell cloning in Parliament. I have not focussed upon the specific
accounts of individual speakers, nor provided a comprehensive comparison of the broadly pro
and anti-research arguments.'" Instead, this paper identifies discursive regularities of the stem cell
debates comprising typical assertions that reflected the recurrent themes, ideas, assumptions and
discourses that were mobilised during Parliamentary discussions.
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Discussion of the embryo debates during the 1980s is enabled through a selective comparison to
analyses conducted by Michael Mulkay (1997), Sarah Franklin (1997, 1999), Marta Kirejczyk
(1993, 1995, 1999) and Patricia Spallone (1986, 1989). In comparing the 'recurrent interpretative
practices employed' (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 14) by parliamentarians during the 1990 HFE
Act debates with those of the stem cell debates, I will identify the discursive points of
convergence. The form and content of SCR and cloning related developments are shown to be
constructed according to pre-existing sociocultural discourses that reveal the 'interrelated set of
background assumptions' of the speakers (Mulkay, 1993: 723).
Managing the debate: Scene setting and lobbying prior to the Parliamentary
debates
The announcement of Dolly the sheep in February 1997 opened the floodgates for debates on
the implications of the growing biotechnology industry for humans and society. Religious
leaders, politicians, patient groups, scientists and non-affiliated individuals, have voiced their
particular perspectives on the subject. In response to the escalating public debates, in 1997 the
Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAQ and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA) held a joint consultation exercise resulting in a published report, Cloning Issues
in Reproduction, Science andMedicine (January 1998). From this very early stage in the public debates
there emerged signs of the rhetorical severing of therapeutic cloning from reproductive cloning.
Whilst it was recommended that reproductive cloning should remain illegal, and required
primary legislation to explicitly ban it, therapeutic cloning was deemed to hold the promise of
medical benefits. This distinction lay in the intention and purpose of the research rather than the
cloning technique per se. It was considered that the uses of reproductive cloning would be
unethical, unsafe and inefficient as a means for human reproduction. Therapeutic cloning,
however, was not considered to produce the same ethical problems as cloning whole human
beings. That therapeutic cloning is the use of cloning techniques for potentially curing a
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multitude of diseases was an important aspect of the argument for separating the ethical issues
of reproductive cloning from this 'benevolent technique'. Furthermore, in an attempt to avoid
the stigma of the word 'cloning', the HFEA/HGAC report changed the terminology from
'therapeutic doling to 'therapeutic uses of odl nuclear replacement' (my emphasis).
The HGAC/HFEA report advised government to extend the HFEA regulations to include two
further purposes for research: 'developing methods of therapy for mitochondrial diseases and
developing methods of therapy for diseased or damaged tissue or organs' (1998: 9.3). The
government responded to this report in June 1999 by establishing an expert advisory group, the
Donaldson committee, to consider the proposed changes to the HFE Act that would allow SCR
with a view to developing therapeutic uses of cloning techniques.
Between 1999 and the Parliamentary debates in late 2000, numerous science-based organisations
published reports and press releases in the UK explicitly outlining their position on the matter of
cloning and its applications and implications for humans. These include the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, Royal Society, Medical Research Council (MRQ, British Medical Association (BMA)
and the Association of Medical Research Charities (AMRQ. The report of Donaldson
Committee, Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress nith Responsibility (Department of Health, June
2000), opened by focussing upon the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning.
Stem cell research using cloning techniques was supported for therapeutic purposes,
organisations such as the BMA stated that they remained 'resolutely opposed to the cloning of
whole humans' (BMA press release, 24 June 1999). Whilst identifying various ethical problems
caused by the prospect of cloning humans, such as the devaluation and commodification of life,
therapeutic cloning was constructed as presenting no new ethical dilemmas. These arguments
were based upon the grounds that the aims and objectives of the research and its potential
applications differ: one aims to provide treatment for a variety of diseases and conditions whilst
the other aims to produce a cloned human. This position, as advocated by science-related
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organisations, was endorsed by the Donaldson Committee's report which clearly separated
reproductive and therapeutic cloning mobilising arguments outlined by the pro-SCR lobby.
Initial public responses to the development of cell nuclear replacement, the technique used to
clone Dolly, were captured in the Wellcome Trust's study Public Perspectives on Human daring in
1998. Issues covered by the focus group participants addressed a broad range of social, moral
and ethical problems that cloning poses for individuals and society. These included, for instance,
the potential stigma attached to being a cloned human being, kinship issues and the effect of
cloning on sexual relations and procreation. In discussing cloning, participants also expressed
concerns relating to eugenics, genetic engineering, uses of embryos for scientific
experimentation and the regulation of scientists and scientific research. The initial post-Dolly
report from The Wellcome Trust, thus, indicated a more widespread feeling towards cloning and
biotechnologywhich was, at worst, antipathy and, at best, ambivalence (1998).
Within the Parliamentary debates, public anxieties around cloning developments were translated
into an emerging 'anti-science climate' in the UK, by speakers from both sides such as Yvette
Cooperv, Baroness Warnockvi and Lord Alton™. After the high profile media coverage of recent
controversies, such as BSE/CJD and GM foods, science-public relations were perceived to be
increasingly under strain. For those in favour of SCR, the emerging anti-science climate was
identified in order to suggest that anxieties surrounding SCR could be attributed to the broader
'mood' (see, for example, Yvette Cooper, HC 17 Nov 2000: Col 1228-1229). Indeed, Baroness
Wamock believed that fear and suspicion towards scientists and politicians has reached
'dangerous proportions', and subsequentlywent on to argue that:
We are becoming a nation of cynics who cannot believe anything that they are told and
who suspect the evidence and the motivation of the people who produce it. This is a
situation that we ought to fear.
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(HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 43)
In pondering the relationship between opposition to the proposed amendment of the HFE Act
and the perceived anti-science climate, Yvette Cooper argued that 'It would be a dreadful
tragedy if the BSE crisis ... affected Members' judgement of the regulations' (HQ 17 Nov 2000:
Col 1228-1229). Suggestions that arguments against SCR maybe merely a reflection of a broader
societal 'mood' served to discredit anti-research claims as ill-informed and fuelled by moral panic
(Baroness Warnock, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 45).
That cloning techniques were being introduced at a time when science-society relations were
under strain, led to the need for 'some serious PR damage limitation' (Sexton, 1999). Carl
Feldbaum, head of the Biotechnology Industry Organisation in the US, warned that to
mishandle the serious ethical issue of human cloning would threaten the survival of emerging
biotech companies. He went on to say that 'no current issue has more potential to undermine
public confidence in the whole field of genetic and biological research than human cloning'
(Anon. Fimndal Tin^s, 1998: Jan 11). Such sentiments echoed throughout the biotechnology
industry in the UK due to the increasing mobilisation of anti-research lobbyists as reported in
the media. This was evidenced by the lobbying of anti-research advocate, David Alton, who, in
Parliament, voiced his opposition to the Government's role in facilitating cloning research
through funding biotechnological organisations (HL, 3 Sept, 1998: Col WA65).
A comparison of the anti-research tactics of the current debates with those of the 1990 embryo
research debates reveals that similar strategies were employed in both contexts. Anti-cloning and
SCR campaigners such as David Alton and Ann Winterton mirrored their 1990 strategies in
seizing upon the ethical problems raised by embryo research. In the context of the 1990 debates,
anti-research lobbyists 'decided that assisted reproduction and abortion generated the same basic
moral questions about the sanctity of life, about our obligations to the unborn and about the
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nature of responsible parenthood' (Mulkay, 1997: 17). By the same logic, stem research was
located in a lineage of issues which, according to speakers such as David Alton and Ann
Wlnterton, firmly tied together concerns relating to abortion, assisted conception, embryo
research and SCR. Similarly, during the HFE Act debates pro-research lobbyists such as the
MRC were furious at what they regarded as attempts to sabotage much of its work in the area of
embryo research by the pro-life alliances (Mulkay, 1997: 26).™ The considerable amount of time
and research funds that had been put into developing the field of embryology, cellular
development and genetic research were deemed to be under threat. Thus, in both the 1990
debates and the SCR debates, it was not only the future of the actual research that was deemed
to be under threat by the growing anti-research lobby, but the integrity and future of the field of
biotechnology. Whilst the pro-research lobby had been slow in mobilising itself during the 1990
debates, in the cloning debates scientists and related institutions were more actively engaged in a
pro-research campaign from the outset.
Utilising tactics similar to those of the 1990 debates, both the MRC and Royal Society produced
a fact sheet 'educating' the public and politicians outlining their position on SCR and cloning.
Additionally, as Ann Winterton indicated in the House of Commons (17 Nov, 2000: Col 1200,
1205), representatives of science-based organisations, such as the MRC and Biolndustry
Association, visited Westminster to speak to parliamentarians in an attempt to sway members
who were yet to make up their minds on the issues. They also attempted to convert those who
intended to vote against the amendment.
Winterton highlighted that following the publication of The Donaldson Report, there was a
'carefully co-ordinated propaganda campaign, with one group after another ... announcing their
support for human cloning' (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1200). In particular Winterton objected to
the substitution of the term "cloning" with "cell nuclear replacement" by the 'fine-sounding
bodies', such as those mentioned above, who supported the Donaldson reports
229
recommendations (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1200). Winterton also pointed out that
parliamentarians involved in the 1990 debates 'were subjected to an almost identical campaign
[and that] the present campaign is little different' (HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1205). The similarities
between the 1990 embryo debates and the stem cell debates in terms of strategies and rhetorical
manoeuvrings, is indeed corroborated byMulkay's analysis which illustrates the utilisation of fact
sheets (1997: 39) and visits to MPs outlining the medical benefits of the proposed research
(1997: 40-41) during the embryo debates of the 1980s.
The 1990 HFE Act debates were a rich source of rhetoric and tactics for the stem cell debates.
Put simply, those against SCR seized upon the opportunity for redressing the embryo question
and those in favour drew upon the successes of the 1990 debates by arguing that the pro-
research lobby had already'won'. Integral to the success of the pro-research campaign in gaining
the legislative amendment, was the claim that SCR does not differ from IVF related research.
Much of this argument was upheld by framing the stem cell discussions within the enclosure of
debates about embryo research. That the use of the embryo for SCR would not breach the 14-
day limit imposed in the 1990 Act, was an integral component of the pro-research position. In
debating SCR according to the framework of the 1990 HEA Act, the pro-research lobby framed
opposition to the proposed amendment as futile at best (afterall, the embryo debates had met
their legal conclusion over a decade earlier), or insensitive at worst (for opposing therapies that
could potentially cure as yet incurable illnesses and diseases). In doing so, public debates
remained within well-trodden ground for the pro-research lobbyists, thus foreclosing debates
surrounding wider social, legal and moral concerns regarding the development of cloning
techniques.
Negotiating life: embryogenesis in the stem cell debate
In comparing analyses of the 1990 related debates with an analysis of the stem cell debates, one
can determine similarities in terms of the dominance of the 'embryo question' (Franklin, 1999)
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and the strategic politicking of the pro and anti-research lobbies. That questions regarding the
status of the embryo remained central throughout the stem cell debates clearly illustrates the
sociopolitical lineage and connections between IVF and cloning related issues. The legal and
moral status of the embryo, as outlined during the 1990 debates and consequently enshrined in
law, are repeatedly invoked in the context of these later debates about SCR. Thus, in the
following section, the relevance of the 'embryo question' to stem cell cloning debates will be
explored vis-a-vis its significance in the 1990 HFE Act.
Parliamentary SCR debates were couched in terms of a proposed amendment to the HFE Act
and, therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that there was a return to many of the issues discussed
prior to 1990. What is surprising is the absence of discussions about the sociocultural
implications of cloning technologies for kinship relations and health inequalities. Instead, the
stem cell debates are nearly always couched within the terms of ethical considerations of embryo
research, such as the point at which an embryo constitutes a human being, the ethico-legal status
of embryos and the medical benefits versus the exploitation of embryos for research purposes.
For those arguing against embryonic SCR, the debates provided an opportunity to restate their
opposition to embryo research and related practices and to build further support. For those in
favour of embryonic SCR, the focus on scientific issues relating to embryo experimentation,
arguably, drew attention away from the more controversial issues relating to cloning through
rhetorically separating scientific 'facts' from wider social and moral questions.
From the outset pro-research speakers asserted that SCR does not differ from embryo research
already permitted under the 1990 HFE Act. The opening speech in the Commons by Yvette
Cooper, the Parliamentary under-secretary of Sate for Health, indicated several rhetorical
strategies that were to be employed by the pro-research lobby. She began by claiming that:
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Those who opposed the 1990 Act will doubtless oppose the regulations, too ... For
those who support the 1990 Act and IYF treatments, there is a strong case for
supporting the regulations, too.
(HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1177).
The alignment of SCR with IVF related embryo research early on in the Parliamentary debate set
the tone for further discussions. Along with many other speakers, Cooper began by outlining the
existing HFEA regulations, adding that the proposed regulations would introduce a sixth
category of embryo research: 'increasing understanding about human disease and disorders and
their treatment' (Yvette Cooper, HQ 17 Nov 2000: 1178). The new category of research, it was
argued, remained within the existing constraints of the HFEA, thus preventing the use of
embryos over 14 days old:
The proposals do not alter the special status of the embiyo. Embryos of up to 14 days,
the current cut-off point for research, are much smaller than the head of a pin, and the
14-day point is cmcial because that is the earliest point at which the first parts of what
will become the central nervous system can appear. We must recognise the importance
and value of the embryo. The rules governing research on the human embryo must be
tightly drawn, as, thanks to the 1990 Act, they already are.
(Gareth R. Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1197-1198)
That SCR would be subject to the HFEA's 14 day limit provided pro-research speakers with a
powerful rhetorical tool for claiming that the proposed amendment would not challenge the
'special status of the embryo' (Warnock, 1985) as established in the FIFE Act. The arbitrary and
political underpinnings of the scientific explanation and justification for the establishment of a
14 day limit in the 1990 Act received no attention in the stem cell context, instead it was
accepted as a 'biological fact'A
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The point at which an embryo is ascribed the status of 'human being' in the HFE Act debates,
was a notable point of contention. Many of those against embryo research, such as Lord Alton,
argued that human life begins at the point of fertilisation. Indeed, to use embryos in scientific
experiments was deemed to be 'cannibalistic' (Alton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 28). All embryos, in
this view, are ascribed the status of a human being and must be treated accordingly. Indeed, Ann
Winterton, a vocal anti-research protagonist, stated that she found it 'frightening' that 'we have
scientists who think of these [embryos] ... simply as a source to be exploited in obtaining cells
and tissue' (HL, 17 Nov 2000: Col 1204)x.
Anti-research arguments in the stem cell debates were significantly similar to those played out
within the HFE Act debates. In charting the debates and processes leading up to the 1990 Act,
Mulkay (1997) describes the strategies and rhetoric mobilised by the anti-research lobby. For
Mulkay, the 'recommendations of the Warnock Committee in favour of embryo research gave
the anti-abortion lobby the opportunity to revitalise its activities and, perhaps, to attract
additional members by focussing attention on the new topic of the destruction of 'unborn
children' in scientific laboratories' (Mulkay, 1997: 18). Previous debates surrounding the 1967
Abortion Act had already provided an established set of discourses that could be transposed to
future debates relating to scientific and medical uses of embryos, including the harvesting of
embryonic stem cells. Thus, in mobilising the rhetoric of human rights in the context of 'science
out of control', the anti-research lobby were attempting to attract supporters as well as to
revitalise more general issues relating to embryo research and the beginnings of life.
The response of those in favour of embryonic SCR was to agree that whilst an embryo should
have some rights, these should not be the same as those of a baby or adult human being. Human
rights should develop as the embryo develops. Such arguments often drew upon the rhetoric of
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religion and moral philosophy. In combining scientific knowledge of embryo development and
religious doctrine, speakers such as Robert Key and Dr Brand, respectively, argued that:
I share the view of the former Archbishop of York, John Habgood, who has argued
that the value that we attach to the lives of human beings--a value that is the root of all
morality-increases as human life develops, and that we are therefore entitled, morally,
to hold the life of a recently fertilised egg as less to be protected than that of a foetus at
a later stage or a baby when it is bom.
(Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1215)
I do not believe that foetal cells have the same status as a unique human being. If we are
going to be theological about this, I do not think that the divine soul enters when an egg
is fertilised ... there is a great difference between foetal material before 14 days-or
indeed, a foetus of up to 22 weeks-and a bom child.
(Dr. Brand, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1195)
One might expect the religious arguments to be mobilised by those opposing SCR, however, it
was often pro-research speakers that referred to such sources. Rather than simply denunciating
religious arguments against embryo research, as with the 1990 debates, pro-research speakers
drew attention to the points of convergence of the two sides (see Mulkay, 1997: 102). They
pointed to the special status of embryos beyond the 14-day period, and the protection that
should be applied to foetuses and children.
Pro-research lobbyists, in anticipating theological arguments, posited the anti-research lobby as
irrational, through parodying of the principle of ensoulment occurring at the point of
fertilisation:
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Nature is profligate. We do not mourn for wasted sperm and eggs, alive though they
are; nor for the three quarters of fertilised eggs that are lost before implant, half of
which are genetically impaired. As the Bishop of Oxford has said, 'If every fertilised egg
was indeed a soul... then, according to these figures, three quarters of heaven would be
populated by souls that lived for less than a week'.
(Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1215)
This science-based argument serves to normalise experimentation on embryos by claiming that
scientific practice merely mirrors 'natural' processes and is therefore within the confines of
acceptability. The 'natural' occurrence of miscarriage in ziw, is used to justify scientific uses of
embryos. Baroness O'Neill argued that:
In the normal course of events the cells of which this early stage of embryos is
composed have an open future. They may become part of a human foetus and thence
possibly, if all goes well, as a later stage of a human individual; or again, if much goes
well, they become part of a human placenta; or they may— this is often the case— be
shed. So I believe that we are not talking about a human individual or a human foetus.
(HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 67)
Such arguments, in mobilising science-based discourses of human development are instrumental
in constructing the use of early embryos in research as 'natural' and unproblematic. The success
of the pro-research lobby in the HFE Act debates was largely due to the 'transformation of
participants' understanding of the experimental subject of embryo research' (Mulkay, 1997: 132).
In using the term 'pre-embryo' to describe the pre-14 day old embryos, the meaning of the IVF-
related research was shifted from one involving experimentation on defenceless human being, to
research on unformed biological material. Similarly, in the SCR debates, the success of the pro-
research lobby can be attributed to the effective negation of the 'embryos are human beings'
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argument. The anti-research lobby, thus, reiterated their basic moral (opposition to embryo
research (which itself was taken from the anti-abortion movement (Mulkay, 1997: 132)), while
the pro-research lobby maintained their established science-based rhetoric that embryos under
14-days old are merely biological material; a 'small collection of cells' (Joan Ruddock, HQ 17
Nov 2000: Col 1201). Again we see the framing of the debate according to scientific and medical
knowledge, re-asserting the superiority of the scientific worldview (see Irwin and Wynne, 1996).
Both sides of the SCR debates have engaged with and utilised more recent scientific research
which indicate that embryonic cells have the capacity to generate life. That is, embryonic stem
cells contain the information for developing into any cell type, thus procuring the conceptual
shift from the whole embryo to embryonic odls, as 'life itself' (Keller, 1995). This shift if evident
in the following quotes from anti-research and pro-research speakers respectively:
It is a most wonderful being, which has the capacity to initiate, sustain, control and
direct its own development. Its cells provide every different kind of cell and tissue
which make up the human body— skin, nerve, muscle, bone and other organs
(Ann Winterton, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1203)
[embryonic stem cells] are pluripotent and capable of being precursors to a variety of
human cell types and immortal.
(Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 57)
Changes in the discourses of embryos must be located in the context of changes within science,
or more specifically, genetics. Recent developments in genetic research have transformed
biological discourse, as Keller has argued, 'The body of modem biology... has become just
another part of an informational network, now machine, now message, always ready for
exchange, each for the other' (Keller, 1995: 118; also see Franklin et al., 2000). This is pertinent
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to the SCR debates, and in particular, the success of the pro-research lobby, in that this shift
provides the basis for establishing embryonic SCR as benevolent. Today, the embryonic cell is
increasingly replacing the whole embryo as a metonymy of life. Whereas in the HFE Act
debates, the embryo was deemed to be the basic unit of life, the recent debates, whilst at once
maintaining this notion, also challenged it in applying the same rhetoric to the cell.
In utilising a science-based discourse of embryonic cells rather than focussing upon social or
ethical issues, the pro-research speakers went on to argue that the costs of not doing this research
are the lives of people suffering from particular diseases. Anti-research speakers, on the other
hand, used this to further consolidate their claims that embryos require protection:
When the Minster tells the House of Commons that the pre-14-day-old embryo has the
"power" to facilitate cures to mankind's misery, to me it simply underlines that, even at
this early stage of development, we are not dealing with something that is
inconsequential.
(Lord Alton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 29)
This constant return to the 'embryo question' throughout the debate was, in many ways, the
safety net for the pro-research lobby. Comparisons to IVF-related experimentation enabled the
side-stepping of broader issues - such as equal access to future health care provisions utilising
stem cell techniques - and secured their success through the fall back position of the existing
legislation within which the debates were contextualised:
Some people object because we are creating embryos. That is already done and
accepted.
(Lord Taveme, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 64)
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We are not debating today the question of whether embryo research should be allowed.
Parliament decided in 1990 under the Act that such research ... could be carried out.
(Lord Walton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 104-105)
Constructing a demand: Curing disease and disability
As part of the strategy for separating reproductive and therapeutic cloning, pro-research
speakers repeatedly enlisted the support of groups with diseases and disabilities who are likely to
be implicated in stem cell therapies. Groups such as people with Alzheimer's, Huntingdon's and
Diabetes were constructed through emotive stories of illness and loss. Whilst there was not any
consensus as to the means by which such groups could be helped, or even cured, both sides
agreed upon their state of 'desperation'. The pro-research lobby focussed upon the potential of
SCR to cure while the anti-research lobby argued that such claims were based upon false hopes
and were, therefore, manipulative. In drawing upon an article in Nature, Mulkay (1997) shows
how similar tactics were used during the 1990 debates. The article suggested that 'if a sufficiently
strong link could be established between research on human embryos and increased control over
genetic disability' then people's views about embryo research might be changed (Mulkay, 1997:
29). Hence, both cases focussed upon the benevolent applications for humans in aiming to
transform SCR from a controversial practice into an accepted one.
The construction of a demand, or user-pull, is the focal concern of the next section where I will
highlight the ways in which potential use-groups were recruited and caricatured during the
Parliamentary debates. In comparing the SCR debates with the 1990 IVF and embryo research
debates, I will reveal aspects of what Kirejczyk calls 'processes of entrenchment' (1995). Such
processes involve struggles over definitions of the new practices according to existing linkages
between 'technologies, problems, social interests, [and] arguments, socio-cultural values'
(Kirejczyk, 1995: 3). Tracing the lineage of pro-research discourses about SCR to those
associated with the 1990 debates reveals that processes of entrenchment of new technologies
238
follow similar patterns. That is, the creation of a demand for a new technology is an essential
component for gaining acceptance and consent more broadly.
The recruitment of potential user-groups was pivotal to the pro-research lobby strategy and its
eventual success. Parliamentarians articulated a demand for SCR by patient groups, in part,
through references to letters received from individuals and organisations as well as emotive
accounts of people with diseases such as Parkinson's. Speakers argued that they had a moral
responsibility to these groups to allow SCR to go ahead:
We have a duty to society and to the sufferers of degenerative diseases.
(Joan Ruddock, HQ 17 Nov: Col 1211)
Those who are ill and in pain cannot wait. We should not be dilatory.
(Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov: Col 1213)
Those who are suffering can only stand by and watch us decide.
(Baroness Ashton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 87)
In an attack on anti-research lobbyists, one speaker argued that 'some of the letters that I have
had opposing the proposal are somewhat lacking in compassion for their friends and
neighbours' (Robert Key, HQ 17 Nov: Col 1213). Thus, pro-research speakers drew upon the
rhetoric of humanitarianism, arguing that to elevate the status of the embryo above that of
people living with disease and disability, as the anti-research lobby was deemed to do, is to
devalue existing life and therefore, unethical (Gareth R Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1198;
Evan Harris, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1217).
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The construction of potential users according to narratives of hope and fear posits them as
desperate. Gareth Thomas argued that without the development of SCR, many individuals along
with their families and friends will continue to live in 'hell' (Gareth Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000:
Col 1199); many others argued that these developments are the only chance for a cure for many
people. In a similar way, during the 1990 HFE Act debates, men and women experiencing
fertility problems or carrying genetic disorders were also discursively constructed as desperate
and according to narratives of hope and fear. In both debates the pro-research lobby effectively
articulated an account of scientific progress as alleviating pain and suffering. As Franklin has
argued, 'it is significant that the depiction of scientific achievements in the form of new
techniques are inserted within the narrative sequence framed by the hopes and desires of
infertile couples' (1997: 94). That is, science and technology are positioned as a bridge at the
point when 'life's 'natural' progression' is broken off by infertility or illness. Here, as with
infertility treatment, the translation of the hopes and desires of groups with diseases and
disabilities into 'desperateness' helps to naturalise stem cell cloning through embedding it within
life's narrative sequence. This provides grounds for pro-research speakers to position themselves
as responding in both an ethical and 'scientifically sound' manner:
If research into human in vitro fertilisation and subsequent implantation of the embryo
was not permitted, hundreds of thousands of couples today would not be parents.
... Today we have the same opportunity. It is hoped that we can allow but also regulate
research that has the potential to help many others— those suffering from degenerative
disease, diabetes, cardiac disease and those with injuries.
(Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 57)
This debate relates to the quality of life of sufferers from any dreadful diseases. It is not
just a matter of quality of life; for some, we are talking about a question of life or death.
(Lord Dubs, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 40)
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Millions of people— human beings— depend on us today not to take away something
which is most important to them— that is, their hope for a more dignified happier and
healthier future. That hope is becoming more realistic now... Theywant to be free from
the pain and suffering brought about by the diseases which have attacked them.
(Baroness Greengross, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 86)
As with other new technologies undergoing processes of 'entrenchment' (Kirejczyk, 1995),
proponents of SCR must enable (or engender) the articulation of a demand for the new
technology as part of attaining cultural and political acceptability. Similar patterns of
entrenchment are being following in the case of the SCR debates to those followed byHFE Act
and embryo research. There is a notable similarity between the creation of a demand during the
IVF and the SCR debates. Mulkay (1997) notes how during the 1990 HFE Act debates the press
reported how embryo research 'would lead to more control over pain, further relief from
suffering, more frequent personal fulfilment and, hence, to greater joy and happiness' (1997: 70).
He then goes on to say that, 'this message of hope was regularly conveyed and reinforced by
means of highly personal narratives' (Mulkay, 1997: 70). Whilst Mulkay was referring to press
reportage, there was also evidence of such tactics within Parliament. Using science-based
arguments, pro-research speakers clearly adopted the rhetoric of hope to justify claims that IVF
and related embryo research would engender 'a future in which countless people would have a
realistic hope of achieving a better life with the help of the practitioners of embryo research'
(Mulkay, 1997: 134).
The focus on potential cures for people was pivotal to the pro-research lobby for gaining
support within parliament and also for gaining support from pressure groups and organisations
out-with Westminster. Potential users were constructed as not only demanding but also needing
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stem cell therapies; without them they would continue to suffer. The characterisation of people
with diseases and disabilities as desperate was a powerful rhetorical tool for the pro-research
lobby. The following quote demonstrates how emotive descriptions establish the notion of
'desperateness' of both those with diseases, along with their friends and families:
[Parkinson's disease] means the end of an ability to work for someone who cannot rely
on his or her body to carry out the most basic of functions-standing up straight and
still, without jerking, or articulation of thoughts clearly to those he or she manages.
Forced medical retirement comes next, and a gradual restriction of the social circle.
Next is a declining ability to participate in conversations. There is a slow drop in the
number of times the person can leave the house. There is an ever-increasing reliance
and dependence on others— help with food, with getting into or out of bed, with going
to the toilet, with going on holiday and for simply spreading ones wings.
(Gareth R. Thomas, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1199)
As Franklin argued in the context of infertility, 'the cause of 'desperateness', in other words, is
represented as a failure to conform to social norms' (1997: 91). In the case of infertility, it is a
failure to conform to conventional ideas of adult roles through the inability to 'found a family
(Franklin, 1997: 91). The 'desperateness' of individuals with disease and disabilities is a failure to
conform to conventional adult roles in terms of bodily functions, notions of dependency and
ability to engage in a range of 'normal' human activities.
Understanding the ideological processes involved in constructing a demand requires us to
consider the meanings of ageing, disease and disability within contemporary society. We cannot
detach the negotiation of entrenchment and processes of naturalisation of stem cell techniques
from meanings of health and illness. Recent research in the sociology of disability has sought to
deconstruct social and cultural meanings of disability, including the conflation of disability and
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sickness, where the disabled body is conceived according to 'somatic and intellectual
abnormality' (Paterson and Hughes, 2000; also see Turner 1995). In conflating disability and
disease, the 'abnormal' body is constructed as 'an individual health problem and as an individual
existential crisis which requires a charitable response' (Paterson and Hughes, 2000: 39). Disease
and disability, like infertility, are stigmatised conditions, where once identified as such, 'all other
identifying marks are washed away' (Pfeffer, 1987: 82). In sum, the understanding of potential
user-groups according to dominant meanings of the elderly, disabled and sick reinforces and
naturalises those ideas whilst simultaneously embedding stem cell techniques within established
conventions of the treatment of illness.
Existing therapies and alternative research for developing treatments and cures were either
ignored or mobilised in a strategic manner during the parliamentary debate. Crucial to the
construction of potential user-groups as desperate was the construction of SCR as the only hope
of producing therapies that would cure people. Examples of relatives who are ill or have already
died were offered, providing emotive, personalised arguments intended to persuade both
potential users and other parliamentarians that the 'solution provided by the new technology is a
better one than the already existing options' (Kirejczyk, 1995: 2):
I have a daughter for whom the ageing process came depressingly early, including the
loss of her sight... Research may be too late ... but for millions of mankind [sic] yet to
come ... delay is simply no option.
(Lord Rex, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 78-79)
When my mother died, I felt helpless. Tonight, I am at least not helpless. I could not
save mymum but tonight I can try to help to save someone else's.
(Baroness Ashton, EIL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 87)
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Alternative research projects were only referred to in order to demonstrate that they were
ineffectual as a cure or therapy. Therapies such as the injection of foetal brain cells to alleviate
the symptoms of Huntingdon's and Parkinson's disease were discussed so as only to argue that
such research is ethically problematic (see Lord Winston, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 100) and in
practical terms, unfeasible (Lord Walton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 105). Finally, the potential of
SCR to provide cures rather than 'expensive or incomplete' pharmacological therapies or
replacement surgery (Lord Rea, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 61), was a further argument mobilised by
the pro-research lobby.
Claims made by pro-research speakers that stem cell therapies would empty nursing homes, thus
relieving the 'burden on the health care system', framed their argument according to the
responsibilities of a parliamentarian: to consider both economic and individual factors. Such
arguments can also only intensify the 'somatisation of the self', where within a 'somatic society'
matters of the body such as ageing, health and illness 'dominate the centre stage of political
debate and political process' (Turner, 1995; 1996). Here, disease and disability are defined as
individual and privatised, with matters of health and illness becoming an individual responsibility
rather than a collective, social responsibility. Conversely, where we do see health and illness
constructed as a public issue, as in the SCR debates, these are framed according to the terms of
reference of the state and the 'medical science establishment' (Spallone, 1986: 549). That is,
particular groups were defined according to processes of governance where people with various
diseases where constructed as desperate and requiring intervention at the level of politics on
behalf of science and medicine.
In the debates, as framed within the Parliamentary context, it has become increasingly difficult
to raise broader questions about the appropriateness of cloning techniques. As Sexton has
argued, 'If enough real-life stories of individual tragedies which could supposedly be averted
through scientific progress can be played out one after the other ... it will seem churlish to ask
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questions about public health systems, inequity, distribution, exploitation, racism, eugenics and
corporate control, all of which will recede safely into the background' (1999). The parliamentary
debates on medical applications of cloning techniques, under the official rubric of SCR,
simultaneously constructed and elicited the support of potential user-groups and sympathetic
groups. In representing the proposed research according to its medical potential and
foregrounding stories of suffering to demonstrate the existence of a demand, more poignant
questions were successfully nullified, and indeed, rendered irrelevant within the dominant
discourse.
Repositioning infertility: From desperate to donors
The continuation of SCR for developing human therapies requires the co-operation of 'couples
undergoing fertility treatment to donate their spare embryos for research purposes. The views of
people undergoing fertility treatment, however, have been conspicuously underrepresented
either in or outside of Parliament. Whilst there has been plenty of debate over the embryos in
question, little attention has been paid to the sources of embryos for SCR women undergoing
IVF. Where we do see references to those people expected to donate their embryos, the
discourses mobilised are revealing of social and cultural processes involving ideas of health and
illness in the context of reproduction.
Explicit references to the sources of embryos were always made by pro-research speakers in the
Parliamentary debates. Couples undergoing fertility treatment were rhetorically recruited as allies
during the debate as 'public spirited people' (Lord Walton, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 107) wanting to
donate their spare embryos for benevolent purposes rather than have them 'destroyed'.
Donating embryos for SCR, it was argued, resulted in embryos playing 'a useful role instead of
vanishing into thin air' (Lord Rea, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 59). By this connection, those who
donate their embryos would be 'contributing to the well-being of current and future
generations' (Lord Rea, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 59).
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This emotive rhetoric, as described above, is in keeping with dominant discourses of
reproduction in science and medicine that couples undergoing IVF come to be familiar with. A
central feature of reproductive discourses is one that entails ideas, or indeed, judgements about
what constitutes a normal or an abnormal body. For those undergoing fertility treatment, issues
around normality and abnormality are particularly pertinent due to their embodied negotiation of
'deficient', infertile bodies, and IVF procedures such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis.™
Ettorre refers to this as a 'disablist discourse' (2000). The management of bodies during fertility
treatment by experts is, in part, organised according to broader social models of disability, which
characterises bodies according to 'rigid definitions of health and illness' (Ettorre, 2000: 404).
Given that those required to donate embryos will already be confronted with issues concerning
disability through reproductive practices such as embryo selection, amniocentesis, and pre-natal
screening, they are likely to have already developed an 'antipathy to what is considered to be
undesirable physical, sensory or mentally-related difference or 'abnormality' in their bodies'
(Ettorre, 2000: 412-413). The call to arms by pro-research speakers for 'couples' to donate spare
embryos to 'advance the common good' (Joan Ruddock, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1210) is
dependent upon already established complex social and cultural constructions of health and
illness. Therefore, there is less rhetorical work to be done by the pro-research lobby to
encourage couples to donate their spare embryos.
In the context of embryo donation for medical research, couples are subject to discourses of
responsibility. These discourses of responsibility extend beyond responsibilities to a potential
child, but also include responsibilities to the science and medical profession with which they are
engaged. Joan Ruddock, in her speech, recruited the support of donors in arguing that:
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More than most, they have an acute sense of what life is. They also have lengthy and
close contact with medical science and an appreciation of the efforts of those who work
in the service of human health and well-being.
(HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1210)
Here the discourse of gift exchange is mobilised, where in return for medical science helping
couples to conceive a child, they have a responsibility to donate their spare embryos for SCR.
There is a presumption that in participating in fertility treatment, 'couples' are in agreement with
the dominant scientific model of embryos and life. This greatly simplifies the relationship
between individuals undergoing fertility treatment, their embryos and the clinicians, which are
complex and often contradictory. Whilst on the one hand fertility clinics trade on the
construction of embryos as potential sources of life, and actively encourage the engagement of
'couples' in embryo selection and transfer processes (Goslinga-Roy, 2000). On the other hand,
clinicians also 'destroy' embryos as part of the IVF process, requiring the discursive separation
of 'good' embryos from 'bad' ones. This is achieved through employing developmental criteria
as recorded in the lab 'exempting certain embryos from the moral and legal standards that apply
to embryos as potential sources of life in the lab' (Cussins, 1996: 587).
Adult versus embryonic stem cells
Debates regarding the use of embryonic versus adult stem cells™ became a key controversy
within the Parliamentary context. Concerns were articulated according to the scientific, ethical
and political issues surrounding their respective advantages and disadvantages. Permeating the
SCR debates were discourses of progress where SCR was intimately associated with the
development of science, the economy and the human race. Whilst the pro and anti-research
lobbies envisaged different methods for developing stem cell therapies, in terms of the sources
of cells, both sides talked uncritically of the role of SCR in furthering progress. As already
indicated above, neither side considered alternative therapies, but instead focussed upon the
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relative costs and benefits of using embryos or adult tissue for SCR purposes. That SCR is
characterised by scientific uncertainty and controversy, often meant that this particular issue was,
ultimately, fought on the grounds of the 'embryo question'. In the following section I will focus
upon some of the underlying assumptions that permeated questions over sources of stem cells
and how the pro and anti-research lobbies responded to this controversy.
Speakers advocating the use of embryos as a source of stem cells framed their arguments
according to seven main, albeit overlapping, elements. Firstly, as already discussed earlier, the
use of embryos for SCR was not seen to challenge the 1990 HFE Act. That embryos would not
be used beyond the established 14-day limit and the research aims are essentially therapeutic,
gave credence to claims that there are no 'great new ethical issue[s] here' (Gareth R Thomas,
HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1197). Secondly, delaying the legislative amendment to allow embryonic
SCR, it was argued, would slow down the research process and the expediency for developing
stem cell therapies. Arguments for the swift development of stem cell therapies were made in
conjunction with four other points: the co-development of adult and embryonic SCR, long-term
research would not involve using embryos, the need for cures, and the role of SCR and
biotechnology in the UK economy. Each of these points will be addressed in the following
discussion.
Debates over the sources of stem cells were largely framed according to scientific and technical
issues. The anti-research lobby argued that adult stem cells are 'easier to manage' in liuo and have
already been demonstrated to have health care benefits for many conditions (Ann Winterton,
HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1204, 1205). As in the 1990 embryo research debates (see Kirejczyk
1999: 93), the parliamentary opponents of embryonic SCR switched from a rhetoric of fear to
one of hope when discussing alternatives to embryonic stem cells. Speakers such as Ann
Winterton, again using scientific rhetoric and evidence, argued that there is insufficient scientific
evidence to support claims that embryonic SCR will 'kick start' therapeutic breakthroughs (HQ
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19 Dec 2000: Col 243). Conversely, in drawing upon published scientific papers, adult stem cell
sources such as umbilical cords and bone marrow were cited as having already provided some
therapeutic benefits (Bill Tynan, HQ 19 Dec 2000: Col 251). Furthermore, it was argued, the
'deep divisions within the medical scientific community constitutes a strong reason for deferring
making a definitive, irreversible decision today (Baroness Cox, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 55).
In agreeing with the potential of adult stem cell sources, pro-research speakers, however, argued
that in order to ensure the development of therapies scientists should pursue both embryonic
and adult SCR;
There is not an either/or choice between adult stem cells and embryonic stem cells ...
The proposals do not suggest that research into adult stem cells should be stopped. ...
However, we cannot stop research in one area in the hope that another area may yield
results.
(Dr Evan Harris, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1220)
It is thought that [embryonic stem cells] will increase the speed at which we obtain
knowledge, [and] increase the range of diseases that we can treat and trigger the first
breakthrough
(Yvette Cooper, HQ 17 Nov 2000: Col 1228)
Again, arguments for the co-development of both embryonic and adult SCR were framed
according to scientific and technical issues, the 'desperation' of potential user-groups and
'speed'. Scientific controversies concerning the two sources of stem cells were mobilised to
justify the need to develop both techniques: if scientists are unsure as to which stem cell source
will provide the breakthrough, then both avenues should be pursued. Discussions between
scientists and MPs were recalled as scientific evidence within the debates. In acknowledging the
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importance of adult SCR, pro-embryonic SCR speakers argued that many scientists believe that
adult stem cells do not have the 'plasticity' of embryonic stem cells and, therefore, 'their use and
applications are much more limited' (Lord Dubs, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 40).
Pro-research speakers lauded the significance of embryo research in developing therapies.
Claims that embryonic stem cells would speed up the research process (Gareth R Thomas, HQ
17 Nov 2000: Col 1198) and 'trigger the first breakthrough' (Yvette Cooper, HQ 17 Nov 2000:
1228) in understanding processes of cell differentiation, were tempered with the inevitable
redundancy of embryonic SCR At the point of application adult stem cells rather than embryos,
it was argued, would be used for human therapies:
The beauty of the procedures we are discussing today is that they have the potential to
make themselves redundant in the not to distant future. When the scientists have leamt
enough from the cells from an embryo source, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility
that theymay in future be able to use cells from the adult to be treated, which will have
no likelihood of rejection.
(Baroness Walmsley, HL, 22 Jan 2001: 102)
The likelihood, in future, of being able to use adult stem cells or even adult cells for
therapeutic purposes requires, initially, research on embryonic stem cells, cells that are
pluripotent and capable of being precursors to a variety of human cell types and
immortal.
(Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 57)
Thus positing that a decision to permit embryonic SCR is a short to mid-term practice and
legislative change to permit this will simply bring forth therapeutic advances. In treating stem
cell therapies as a homogeneous area, where a breakthrough in one disease such as Parkinson's
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signals a breakthrough writ large, is misleading. The fragmented nature of scientific research
according to specialist areas, which themselves have developed according to differing historical
trajectories, suggests that a unified breakthrough for all the diseases and disorders listed by
scientists is a false supposition. Whilst serving as a placatory mechanism, arguments that there
will be one particular point at which embryonic research is no longer needed is, therefore, overly
simplistic and monolithic in its model of science.
As indicated in the introduction, the outcome of the SCR debates was deemed to be indicative
of the state of science, or more specifically biotechnology, within the UK in terms of public
support and science-public relations. Speakers in favour of embryonic SCR often contextualised
SCR according to the role of biotechnology in the UK economy. In amending the HFE Act to
incorporate SCR the UK economy would, in turn, be bolstered. This was further supported by
the British Prime Minister at the European Biosciences Conference in November 2000, aiming
to bring together the views of the biotechnology industry and parliament, crucially, during the
week when SCR debates took place in the House of Commons. Blair warned against a growing
'anti-science' culture within Britain, announcing his support of SCR and the 'revolutionary
potential of biotechnology' (cited in Clark, 2000; BBC, Friday 17 Nov 2000). In debating the
economic value of SCR developments and the potential to develop cures for a wide range of
diseases, demonstrates the successful bringing together of the interests of the biotechnology
industry and government.
Claims focussing upon the economic benefits of SCR were not only made with reference to
alleviating the 'burden' on the health care system through cures, but also through elevating UK
scientists working in biotechnology to world leaders in their field. Indecision, it was argued,
would lead to the UK losing its lead in the field of genetics (Baroness Kennedy, HL, 22 Jan
2001: Col 47; Baroness Cox, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 55; Lord Patel, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 58),
with the additional problem of leading scientists leaving the UK to continue their research
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abroad (Lord Hunt, HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 94). It is perhaps not insignificant that two days
before the first parliamentary debate The Tirrvs ran a story with the headline 'Britain's biotech
talent may flee 'hostile' climate', claiming that UK public attitudes to science were the worst in
the world, and that research was suffering (Henderson, 15 Nov 2000). Additionally, within
parliament, it was stressed by Baroness Kennedy, that the UK would 'be faced with pressure to
import expensive stem cell therapies, possibly those developed in an ethically dubious and less
well-regulated manner' (HL, 22 Jan 2001: Col 47). Thus, the framing of pro-amendment
arguments according to the role of SCR, and biotechnology more generally, within the UK
economy, also contextualised the proposed amendment within a the broader context of a
biotechnology 'race' akin to the space race.3™
Conclusions
Within this paper I have attempted to show how dominant discourses in the SCR debates, as
(reproduced in Parliament, provide interesting analytical nodes from which we can observe the
jostling over meanings and rhetoric by those actors and agencies involved. It is not insignificant
that debates regarding the future of SCR and, by default, the development of cloning techniques
have hinged upon an amendment to the 1990 HFE Act. The introduction of stem cell
technologies occurred through the amendment to legislation that regulates a relatively
normalised practice. This suggests that Mulkay was indeed correct in his supposition that:
there will ... be no mad rush down the slippery slope. Rather, in Britain, there will be a
cautious, gradual, almost imperceptible movement into a future in which nothing will be
certain except that, in the long run, the practices, expectations, values and morality
associated with human reproduction will have been transformed.
(1997: 154).
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This paper illustrates how the rhetorical construction of SCR in the Parliamentary debates slips
seamlessly into existing ideas, values and practices, particularly those relating to health, illness
and scientific progress. Invocations of the 1990 HFE Act have served to frame stem cell
developments on safe ground by focussing upon embryo research. Broader implications of SCR
and cloning related developments were largely muted, such as the financial cost of health care
access to any therapies developed and implications upon sociocultural notions of life, death and
nature. Also, whilst lip-service was paid to controversies surrounding SCR, ultimately, the
grounds on which the debate took place were achieved through what Gieryn calls 'boundary-
work' (1995).
Whilst this paper has focussed upon the rhetorical manoeuvrings relating to the SCR debates
within Parliament, the next important step in exploring the public debates surrounding cloning
related developments should address the omissions, the gaps and the silences. Such an
endeavour could begin by analysing the issues as defined according to the various public groups,
for whom SCR and related cloning developments may have an impact upon their lives. In
moving away from debates framed according to 'operational categories of government' (Irwin,
2001: 9) we can begin to explore the multiple constructions of cloning as they relate to peoples'
everyday experiences and social location. As a technology in the early stages of scientific
development and social entrenchment, jostling over meanings continue to be mooted.
Therefore, as far as cloning is concerned, all hands are yet to be played.
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Existing regulations permitted embryo research that related directly to reproductive
medicine: contraception, miscarriage, infertility and the detection of abnormalities prior to
implantation. The three added categories were as follows: i) to increase knowledge about
the development of embryos ii) to increase knowledge about serious disease iii) to enable
any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments for serious disease (HFEA Code
of Practice, Fifth edition, April 2001: 53)
De-differentiation was the initial term used by Ian Wilmut to describe the technique used for
cloning Dolly the sheep. This is where cells that have become specialised, such as skin or
nerve cells, are re-programmed in order to become any cell type. However, Wilmut has since
questioned the accuracy of this term, in suggesting that cells never fully differentiate to begin
with, hence retaining their capacity to be re-programmed (see Franklin, 2001: 7).
IVI have used the 'pro' and 'anti' research labels as shorthand for the purposes of this paper.
Whilst the debates were not entirely polarised around two positions - with individual
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speakers inhabiting complex and often contradictory positions - the debates were often
structured around Parliamentary conventions: a vote of either for or against.
v
Yvette Cooper was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and an advocate
for stem cell research and the proposed amendment to the 1990 HFE Act.
Vl Baroness Warnock, a pro-research advocate and moral philosopher who chaired a
committee of inquiry in 1982 to 'examine the social, ethical and legal implications of recent,
and potential developments in the field of assisted [human] reproduction' (Warnock, cited in
Mulkay, 1997: 3). This recommendations from this committee formed the basis of the 1990
HFE Act.
v"
As an active pro-life campaigner, David Alton was and continues to be a vocal critic of
embryo research, stem cell research and cloning related developments. During the stem cell
debates Lord Alton had proposed alternative legislation which would put embryonic stem
cell research on hold until after a select committee had considered the implications of the
research.
Vl"
In particular, the MRC were reacting to the success of Enoch Powell's Unborn Children
(Protection) Bill in 1985. The scientific community had been shocked by the size of the vote
against embryo research which saw 238 votes in favour and only 66 against. This was
further compounded by an article in Nature that attempted to show how the 'enactment of
Powell's Bill would prevent specific advances' (Mulkay, 1997: 27). The positive response to
the Powell Bill by politicians gave the pro-research lobby the impetus to form an organised
network during the 1990 embryo research debates. Up until this point the pro-research lobby
had been uncoordinated compared to the energetic lobbying by anti-abortion and anti-
embryo research lobbyists. The Powell Bill was eventually defeated.
IX See Mulkay (1994) for an excellent discussion of the coining of the term 'pre-embryo'
during the 1990 debates. Also, see Pat Spallone (1989) for a brief discussion of the
establishment of the 14 day limit (pp. 50- 55).
x Within this part of the debate Winterton explicitly outlined her belief that embryos are not
simply human cells, but are 'definitely human'.
Xl In using the term 'couple' I acknowledge that fertility treatment, whilst rhetorically treating
the 'couple', actually involves medical interventions on the female body to a much greater
extent than the male body. 'Except for the selection and laboratory preparation of the sperm
for fertilisation, the whole procedure is performed on women' (Kirejczyk, 1993: 518; also see
Crowe, 1990) regardless of whether infertility is due to female or male fertility problems.
Having said this, I am assuming the decision-making processes for embryo donation
involves a complex negotiation between the man and woman trying to conceive, and health
care professionals attached to the clinic.
x"
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a technique used for screening embryos for
genetic diseases/disorders before they are implanted into the woman's uterus. At present
this technique is in its early stages of development and is only used for those at high risk (1
in 4) of passing on terminal disease to their offspring (Franklin et al., 2001). The potential for
widespread use of PGD for preventing the transmission of hereditary disorders raises
pertinent questions about constructions of health and illness, normal and abnormal bodies.
Xl"
Embryonic stem cells are derived from embryos under fourteen days old. Stem cells are
extracted from the embryo and then cultivated in the lab to produce stem cell lines. An adult
stem cell is derived from tissue such as bone marrow or blood from a range of sources
including umbilical cords and people of all ages. Stem cell research, regardless of the
source, aims to understand the process of cell development and differentiation: the process
by which cells develop into particular cell types such as brain tissue, and to develop methods
to direct cells to develop into particular cell types.
XIV The narrative of the global biotechnology 'race' has been further solidified by the recent
race to map the Human Genome. 'Competition' is pitted in terms of publicly versus privately
funded research - Britain versus the US respectively.
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APPENDIX II
Stem Cell Research and Cloning: An Account of 'The
Science'
What Are Stem Cells?
Stem cells are cells in the body that do not have any specialised physiological properties: for
instance, they are not red blood cells that carry oxygen around the body. They are described by
scientists as 'unspecialised'.
Stem cells are believed to be able to do two things:
1) They have the capacity for what is called 'self-renewal'. This is where they divide and replicate
themselves.
2) Secondly, under the correct culturing conditions, they can give rise to specialised cell types,
such as nerve or blood cells.
Adult Versus Embryonic Stem Cells
It is thought that there are a number of sources of stem cells within the human body, but
scientists are not in agreement as to a) where they are and b) which stem cells are the most
useful for research purposes. Research on human stem cells is usually described as either 'adult'
or 'embryonic' stem cell research, which refers to the sources of material from which stem cells
are derived:
i) Adult Stem Cells
There are a number of sources of adult stem cells within the human body, including the
bone marrow, liver and spleen. Other sources that are also described as 'adult' stem
cells are umbilical cord blood, placenta blood and material taken from aborted foetuses.
ii) ErrbryonicStem Cells
The second and most controversial source of stem cells is human embryos. This
involves isolating stem cells from embryos during early stages of development - at
around 5-6 days old - and growing them in cultures.
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In both adult and embryonic stem cell research, scientists are trying to understand how stem
cells 'decide' between simply replicating themselves or becoming specialised cell types. This
involves identifying the genes and proteins involved in cell development and regeneration with
the aim of learning how to control and manipulate cells and tissues. This is the process known
as 'differentiation whereby a cell (either embryonic or adult) becomes a specialised cell type such
as nerve, muscle or neurons.
One of the main scientific disputes within the field of SCR relates to the 'plasticity' of stem cell
sources. 'Plasticity' refers to the number and range of cell types that can be 'made' from
different stem cell sources. For instance, scientists working on embryonic SCR (eSCR) are
sceptical as to how 'plastic' adult stem cells are, arguing that they can only give rise to a limit
range of cell types. Adult stem cells are, therefore, referred to as mdtipotent stem cells - having
the potential to give rise to a limited range of cells and tissues. Conversely, embryonic stem cells
are referred to as pluripotent stem cells - able to give rise to any specialised cell type in the adult
human body. Flowever, this dispute remains unsettled as scientists working with adult stem cells
continue to show that such cells have a greater degree of plasticity than is currently credited.
Stem Cell Therapies: The Uses of Controlling Cell Differentiation
One of the main aims of SCR is to direct stem cells in the laboratory to produce specialised cell
types wanted for transplantation. For instance, to produce pancreatic cells for people with
Diabetes, brain cells for people with Huntington's, Parkinson's or Alzheimer's disease and nerve
cells for people with spinal cord injuries. Other uses of SCR are to help understand how a
complex organism develops from a fertilised egg, what controls normal cell development, and,
therefore, what contributes to abnormal cell development in cases such as cancer. A further
potential use of SCR is to understand how and why cells 'age' or degenerate, and how to control
or reverse the ageing process.
Stem Cell Research —» Therapeutic Cloning
For the purposes of cell transplants, just to produce relevant cells types does not solve the
problem of histocompatibility - that is, the transplanted cells would not match the immune
system of the recipient. If stem cells are developed from adult or embryonic stem cells taken
from somebody other than the patient requiring the transplant, the patient would need
immunosuppressant drugs, which bring their own complications. There are two potential
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solutions to this problem. The first is to use adult cells taken from the patient requiring the
transplant, derive the relevant cell type from this, then transplant them back into the patient.
Because the tissue was taken from the patient, the stem cells would match their immune system
and would not require immunosuppressant drugs regimes. A second option is to combine SCR
with the technique used to clone Dolly the sheep called cell nuclear transfer replacement (CNR).
Because of the use of the cloning technique, this has earned the name 'therapeutic cloning'.
The process involved in 'therapeutic cloning' is depicted in the diagram below:
Starting from the top of the diagram, a cell would be taken from the patient requiring the cell
transplant. At this stage, scientists would also require a donated egg from a woman.1 Then the
nucleus of the cell from the egg is removed and the nucleus of the cell from the patient is
1
The processes of 'harvesting' oocytes (to use the technical name) requires women to take
large doses of hormones to stimulate their ovaries. Here, rather than only one or two eggs
maturing (as would happen during the normal menstrual cycle), the hope is that a number of
eggs mature at once - this is called hyperovulation. Then the eggs are retrieved through
inserting a long needle through the woman's abdomen, into the ovaries and then extracting
the eggs. There are a number of health risks involved in such procedures including infection
and resultant infertility.
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inserted (as represented by this icon of an egg with a needle in it). An electric current is then
applied to the egg containing the genetic information of the patient. This electric current
simulates the sperm entering the egg, causing it to start dividing as though it had been fertilised.
What I have described so far is the nuclear transfer technique used to create Dolly. If at this
point the embryo was successfully implanted into a woman's womb, then this would be the
process of reproductive cloning. In the case of 'therapeutic cloning', the embryo is allowed to
develop in vitro (in a cell culture) for around 5-6 days, after which scientists could then extract
stem cells, grow them in a culture and direct them into the cell type needed by the patient. The
biological material produced would match the recipients immune system and they would not
require immunosuppressant drugs.
The above diagram also depicts stem cell therapies using adult tissue, as indicated in the arrow in
the middle with the corresponding question "can we achieve direct de-differentiation?" This
process would not require human embryos and would still produce cell types that are
compatible with the recipients' immune system.
It is important to note that the above account of stem cells, SCR, 'therapeutic' and
'reproductive' cloning are, like all areas of scientific research, provisional and partial. This
description is heavily influenced by the version of SCR and cloning that has gained legitimacy
within the policymaking context of the Parliamentary debates and ensuing policy documents in
the UK which, in turn, has been shaped by eSCR advocates and excluded advocates for adult
SCR. Also, as is argued throughout this thesis, such accounts of SCR excludes the views of a
range of non-scientists for whom SCR and cloning developments may have an impact.
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APPENDIX III
Coding Tree
1 = Experts/Expertise
Views of politicians
Views of Scientists
Views of Publics
2 = Public debate
Lineage of issues
Entrenchment of reproductive cloning
Role of media
Clarity/effective communication
Entrenchment of therapeutic cloning
3 = Risk
Slippery slope
Wrong hands/mad scientists
Health care access/genetic underclass
Trust/behind closed doors
Risk to health
Eugenics
4 = Driving research?
Cloning as lifestyle choice
Motivation for reproductive cloning
Demand/motivation for therapeutic cloning
'Therapeutic' cloning as alternative to existing medical therapies
Prestige/fame/fortune for scientists
Scientific/human progress
Demand for reproductive cloning
Reproductive cloning as alternative to existing fertility treatment
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5 = Science today
Role in UK economy
SCR and cloning as "space race"/international competition
Patenting
Science-out-of-control/ fear
Uncertainty
Practical/technical/scientific constraints
6 = Imagining cloning: Use of cultural resources
Meaning of word "cloning"
References to specific films/fiction
7 = Distinctions between 'reproductive' and 'therapeutic' cloning
8 = Meaning of embryos
Embryonic versus adult stem cells
9 = Human Uniqueness: Genes vs. Environment
Being a Clone
10 = Regulation and control
Consent
11 = Embodied biography/lived experience
12 = Sex/Gender assumptions
13 = Natural/Unnatural
14 = Ambivalence
15 = Kinship
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